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Abstract 
 
 
Problems with storm water runoff are becoming more frequent, and the main cause is the 
increase of impervious cover (IC). The imperviousness increases stream peak flows, 
changes peak times, and so changes the flood distribution. Several policies are used to 
manage flows and flooding; however most have been reported to be inefficient because 
land owners do not have correct exposure to price incentives and risk. 
The main contributions of this thesis are an investigation into market mechanisms to 
price and allocate impervious cover allowances, while managing flood distribution. The 
market mechanisms are based on the electricity and gas markets which use linear 
programming formulations. This thesis develops three net pool market mechanisms: 
Det_MarketIC is a capped and deterministic market for IC, and Sto_MarketIC and 
Sto_MarketIC_Risk are stochastic market models with flood component penalties and risk 
positions representing the desired risk from the community respectively. Additionally, a 
gross pool market was extended under rainfall uncertainty, Gross_MarketIC. 
The market design is an auction system with operational constraints and bids for IC 
allowances from participants. The system relates physical routed flows at nodal or control 
points to these bids. 
The models clear the market by creating a demand (supply) curve for increments 
(reductions) in flows at specific places, and accounts for marginal changes in the expected 
flood damage and flood damage components. The market formulations estimate efficient 
allocations and prices. Decomposed prices from the market models are shown based on 
duality, as applied in electricity markets. The dual prices show spatial and temporal effects 
of flows, which impact at flooding areas. With Sto_MarketIC and Gross_MarketIC, prices 
account for changes in flood distribution. 
With Sto_MarketIC_Risk, prices also account for the risk as CVaR in flooding areas. 
Thus, prices increase as binding risk conditions are tightened. 
  
 
iii 
Finally, the net pool models are illustrated using hydrological and hydraulic simulators 
based on a small catchment located in Canterbury, New Zealand. Allocations and prices 
varied with the different models. Participants would face increasing prices in their IC 
allowances due to increments in flood damage. 
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Chapter 1 
 
1 MECHANISMS FOR MANAGING IMPERVIOUS 
COVER AND RUNOFF 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In the last decades, severe damage caused from storm water runoff is more frequent and 
occurs in places that were commonly free of such serious problems (E.P.A. 1993; 
Strappazzon et al. 2003; Walls and McConnell 2004; Eigenraam et al. 2005; Jason and Jim 
2005; Tang et al. 2005; Westra et al. 2005; Bradshaw et al. 2007; Hill et al. 2007; Pappas 
et al. 2008; Schielen 2009). The increased frequency of disaster has been mainly a 
consequence of human activities, changes in land management and development in hazard 
areas. One contributing factor is the increase of impervious cover (IC) due to economic 
development. The increase in IC has increased stream peak flows and the risk of flooding. 
Authorities have looked at different mechanisms for controlling and minimising flood 
damage. Some of these mechanisms have been command and control by planning policies, 
taxes, insurance, and market-based instruments. This thesis extends the market approaches 
with a view to finding an alternative solution to the runoff problem and related downstream 
floods. This thesis deals with designing and modelling a smart market for IC allowances 
for managing runoffs and flood damage. The framework of this market approach has been 
used in other areas such as electricity and gas. 
The market is designed under a storm scenario selection (Det_MarketIC) and under a 
stochastic approach (Sto_MarketIC and Gross_MarketIC) with the goal to internalise the 
price. Additionally, the market design will incorporate a risk profile (Sto_MarketIC_Risk) 
to hedge against changes in damage to encourage participants to internalise the costs 
generated by their runoffs. 
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The smart market models calculate prices and allocations based on auction bids and 
desirable environmental standards and risks. Price signals would create incentives to 
improve individual site-specific management to manage flood damage. In addition, when 
using the market design, lower transaction costs and more efficient allocation outcomes for 
society are expected. 
1.2 The runoff-flood problem 
Rogers and Defee II (2005) reported that impacts on catchment outflow arose with 
increasing development, imperviousness and edge density of roads. Those changes result 
in more frequent flooding and threatened natural habitat, in rural and urbanized areas. 
Jason et al. (2005) pointed out that in England and the European Continent, water levels 
had risen to the highest recorded levels. Similar issues have been reported by Kron (2005; 
2007), Kazama et al. (2009), Middelmann-Fernandes (2010) and Yamada et al. (2010). 
In New Zealand, the 2004 North Island floods were estimated to cost about NZ$300 
million (Environment 2008). In the U.S.A. the Western flood in 1993 caused US$16 
billion damage in the Mississippi and Missouri rivers. In Australia, annual flood damage in 
urban and rural areas reach AU$350 million on average; about 40,000 properties are under 
flooding risk with 1% annual exceedance probability (AEP) from storm events, and 
160,000 urban properties with 1% AEP from storm flood events, i.e., in places such as 
banks of creeks or rivers (CSIRO 2000). In the UK, since 1990, weather-related insurance 
claims have cost ₤825 million per year, and the areas at risk cover assets estimated to be 
worth ₤200 billion with over 5 million people, 1.3 million homes and 130,000 business 
(Harman et al. 2002; Treby et al. 2006). Around the world, between 1990 and 2000, nearly 
100,000 people were killed and 320 million people were displaced due to flooding; 
moreover, the damage to properties and infrastructure by floods cost over US$1,150 billion 
(Bradshaw et al. 2007). 
Impervious surfaces alter the natural hydrology, reduce water infiltration in the ground 
and concentrate runoff over the landscape. As the imperviousness is directly related to 
runoff, increasing imperviousness will increase storm water runoff in the catchment. 
Consequently, the possibility of flooding increases as well as pollutant and contamination 
of drinking water, streams and aquifers. This effect is also stressed by Schielen (2009), 
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who mentions that changes in land use affect water levels and flooding, and also points out 
that the effects of changes in land use are larger than the effects of climate change. 
1.3 Mechanisms to deal with flooding 
Damaging runoff flows have motivated governments to create mechanisms and policies to 
achieve economic development with minimum environmental impact. Non-market and 
market-based mechanisms have been proposed and applied to manage runoff and so 
flooding. Most policies relate to the traditional government role for protecting areas rather 
than preventing and managing flooding damage. 
1.3.1 Summarising physical measures 
Protection policies are widely used to manage flooding. Loucks et al. (2005) pointed out 
that flood storage capacity in reservoirs and channel enhancement are used to control peak 
flood and reduce damage. These controls are also linked to plans to decrease settlement in 
flooding areas which can feed into an integrated program between government, mitigation 
policy, insurance, and floodplain management (Burton et al. 1968; White 1994; Loucks et 
al. 2005; White 2011). 
 In the Netherlands, flooding is managed via protection systems such as levees, dikes, 
retention ponds and sewer systems, with protected areas (zones) as well as regulated plans 
and suitable land use to control the development of new projects (Loucks et al. 2005; 
Schielen 2009). 
In England, the Planning Policy Guidance and the Planning Policy Statements establish 
the bases for local policies of land use (Richards 2007). The plans discourage development 
in floodplain areas as a non-structural method such as command and control policy and 
define flood risk zones in terms of frequency and return periods. Any application from 
developers has to present control and mitigation plans to manage runoff flows. 
Public projects in Europe aim to establish storage and transport space for rivers, which 
have been shown to be effective but inefficient. Thus, people in flood areas could feel safe, 
but may not have reduced exposure to flooding, and those who increase flooding are not 
internalising the incremental damage of their decision. However, with a proper market 
system, incentives are clear and landholders can internalise the incremental damage. Thus, 
price signals may help to make decisions about protecting areas. 
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Australia uses structural and non-structural floodplain management and infrastructure 
policy to manage flooding problems. Previously, the plans were focused on command and 
control policies via protecting policies via infrastructure, typically levees, zoning, 
voluntary incentives to move out from flood areas, and flood emergency. Now plans 
address economics for future growth, current and future infrastructures, resources 
management, risk management, flood emergencies, and land use (CSIRO 2000). The idea 
of land use management proposed in the plan is an interesting point, in particular if 
allocations are via a market which accounts for flood limits and risk as proposed in this 
thesis. 
In the USA, structural and non-structural as well as market-based systems are used to 
manage flooding. The National Flood Insurance, The Flood Control Act, and the National 
Environmental Policy Act were created to deal with flooding. Additionally, local plan 
requirements include zoning and land use changes in flooding areas. Non-structural options 
limiting development in upstream areas were used as a way to reduce future damage and 
flooding cost at Chester Creek (Olsen et al. 2000). Jason et al. (2005) pointed out that 
American flood policies rely mainly on infrastructure for flood control. Credits for 
reducing runoff have not obtained good results (Doll et al. 1998). This result has been for 
the voluntary participation of some programs, and people located in upstream areas that do 
not internalise the flooding cost nor the risk. Thus, a market based mechanism should 
induce conditions for encouraging participation, transferring the cost-risk of flood damage 
to each property-owner, simplifying bargaining between the authority and each participant 
(reduce transaction cost), and avoiding extreme payment of the authority for any private 
change in flood damage. These points will be discussed in next paragraphs and in Section 
2.2 in Chapter 2 and Section 4.9 in Chapter 4. 
Researchers have proposed flood management decision models based on optimisation. 
Olsen et al. (2000) proposed a dynamic model for floodplain management to choose 
between levee options (structural flood protection) and economic development. Lund 
(2002) used stochastic programming to evaluate hypothetical structural options to manage 
floodplain plans. Ford (1985) used a branch and bound algorithm to plan flood damage 
mitigation when the plan accounts for a combination of flood changes, flood damage and 
loss burden. Karamouz et al. (2009) evaluated structural options of flood protection and 
land use by a genetic algorithm. They chose a combination of flood damage, plan for 
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managing flooding and land use at different points of the catchment. Piantadosi et al. 
(2008) proposed stochastic dynamic programming to manage storm water, and explicitly 
included a downside risk measure (Conditional Value at Risk) for environmental damage. 
1.3.2 Policies to manage flooding 
Proposed market-based systems consider the taxes, fees and rebates for voluntary programs 
to use best management practices (BMPs) (Thurston et al. 2008), tradable allowances of 
ICs (Thurston et al. 2003), zoning with IC thresholds and Transferable Development 
Rights (TDR) (Kauffman and Brant 2000; McConnell et al. 2006; Walls and McConnell 
2007), insurance and risk analysis (Arnell et al. 1984; Harman et al. 2002; Purnell 2002; 
Sayers et al. 2002; Ermolieva 2005; Treby et al. 2006; Roche et al. 2010), or merely 
command and control (Parker 1995). Despite the theoretical plausibility of these methods, 
empirical evidence has shown problems with efficiencies, prices, allocations and, 
especially, transaction costs. 
 Insurance is widely used to recover cost for flooding damage (Arnell et al. 1984; 
Harman et al. 2002; Purnell 2002; Sayers et al. 2002; Ermolieva and Ermoliev 2005; Treby 
et al. 2006). Treby et al. (2006) pointed out that in the insurance system in UK, the 
government deals with insurance companies to provide flood insurance to household 
contents. In the USA, the National Flood Insurance Program charges premiums to 
encourage the reduction of private exposure to flooding. The system provides 
comprehensive buffer against flood risk, but has not reduced the vulnerability to flood. 
Indeed, those who contribute to flooding are not internalising the damage nor the 
incremented risk. Arnell et al. (1984) noted that the insurance system seems inconsistent, 
as it encourages people to stay in hazardous places. Roche et al. (2010) pointed out that 
where government becomes insurer without guidance on land use insurance, taxes and 
residual market mechanisms, usually fail to provide long term solutions. White (2011) 
noted that incorrectly applied insurance could exacerbate flood losses and discourage 
adoption of long term mitigation measures. 
The use of Transferable Development Rights (TDRs) is another market-based 
instrument which has the potential to preserve undeveloped land, transferring development 
to other places where land can be made dense (Chomitz 2004; Chomitz et al. 2004; Walls 
and McConnell 2004; Kopits et al. 2005; McConnell et al. 2005; McConnell et al. 2006; 
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Walls and McConnell 2007). TDRs are intended to promote suitable land uses, BMPs and 
control of environmental damage caused by demographic density, runoff and 
sedimentation. However, TDR programs are more complex than other market-based 
instruments because they combine a market system with local legislation. TDRs works by 
defining rights and rights equivalences between multiple zone and objectives, which are 
hard to establish; users may not internalize the flooding cost, and TDR programs face high 
transaction costs (Walls and McConnell 2004; 2007). 
Thurston et al. (2003) stated that tradable allowances for impervious surfaces should 
create incentives to incorporate BMPs to reduce storm-water runoff. Parikh et al. (2005) 
compared storm water control policies from a hydrologic and economics perspective. They 
noted that a tradable allowance policy should be a better solution than runoff fees and 
voluntary programs. Allowances should be recognised as property rights, avoiding the 
open access to impervious cover. Additionally, individual entitlements should be defined, 
allocated and recorded to allow monitoring. Enforcement can then borrow from civil 
processes. 
An allowance market should allow reaching a least cost solution and managing 
flooding in the catchment. Additionally, an allowances market should use a suitable 
framework to clear exchanges between participants, pollutant modelling to improve 
accuracy, and a market model which takes into account exchanges. This thesis will propose 
such a market design. 
Some storm water utilities offer credits for reducing peak flows based on a specific 
storm design (Doll et al. 1998). Landowners who reduce runoff will receive compensation 
by receiving an equivalent reduction in taxes. The credit system can encourage the 
adoption of best-practice, storm water practices, lessening the cost of mitigation and 
potential damage. However, this instrument has serious problems with lack of participation 
given its voluntary nature. 
Ribaudo et al. (1999) pointed out that a market based on runoff may work under 
average runoff levels, but trade between point and non-point sources could be possible 
only by defining ratios. The authors noticed that a market based on runoff allowances 
could face issues related to monitoring, information availability, modellers, and legal 
problems based on differences between the average and actual runoff. 
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Despite the theoretical plausibility of these market-based methods, the empirical 
evidence has shown some problems such as inefficient outcomes, poor environmental 
efficacy, and especially high transaction costs. These points will be further discussed in the 
following sections and in next paragraphs. 
Cost efficiency is lost in the presence of transaction costs, market power, externalities, 
and incomplete information (Jaffe et al. 2005; McCann et al. 2005; Stavins 2008; Peace 
and Stavins 2010; Jarrow and Larsson 2012). For instance, Jaffe et al. (2005) pointed out 
that incomplete information and uncertainty discourage investments in new technologies, 
which makes environmental policy more expensive for society. Environmental inefficiency 
could be noticed if participants do not internalise the damage cost. Any market based 
mechanism should address arbitrage opportunities for environmental efficiency (Jarrow 
and Larsson 2012). Moreover, a market based mechanism should enforce property rights 
and their identification with low transaction costs and externalities (Coase 1960). 
Non-supporting prices result for several reasons. One is when the allocation mechanism 
fails to achieve an optimum allocation for society (Dinar et al. 1997). Dinar et al.  (1997) 
point out that market power can cause such inefficient allocation and non-supporting 
prices.  Or, another reason is when the allocation is optimum but the settlement prices are 
miscalculated.  A third instance is when the optimization problem is non-convex, in which 
case supporting prices might not exist (O'Neill et al. 2005). Non-supporting prices may 
also result when transaction costs are significant. In contrast, Fama (1970) noticed that 
efficient prices could be obtained if the price "fully reflect" all information, which is 
available to all participants. 
Transaction costs are high in most environmental market-based instruments (McCann 
and Easter 1999; McCann et al. 2005). McCann et al. (2005) identified possible reasons 
that can cause market-based policies fail due to transaction costs. The authors classify 
transaction costs into categories such as research and information, litigation, design and 
implementation, administration, contracting, monitoring, and enforcement and prosecution. 
Netusil and Braden (2001) evaluated the transaction costs in a bilateral market and noticed 
that the total cost rose to attain an overall load target of sediment control. The authors also 
noticed that in environmental market such as for CO2 and water pollution, transaction costs 
could be high, raising costs for society. 
  
 
8 
As we shall see later in Section 1.4 and 2.2, the market design proposed here is likely to 
handle these issues and to have a range of other good features. 
1.4 Smart market 
A smart market could be an efficient solution to efficiently manage the storm water runoff 
and flooding. A smart market (SM) is an auction system assisted by mathematical tools 
which manage complexities and externalities. Such effects are impossible to handle with 
ordinary auctions. The SM would enable efficient allocations and prices for society by 
trading via the auction in a centralised pool, and through a system operator (SO) (McCabe 
et al. 1989; 1991; Ring 1995; Hogan et al. 1996; Alvey et al. 1998; Read and 
Chattopadhyay 1999; Murphy et al. 2000; Plagmann and Raffensperger 2007; Prabodanie 
and Raffensperger 2007; Raffensperger 2007; Pinto et al. 2008b; Murphy et al. 2009; 
Prabodanie and Raffensperger 2009; Raffensperger et al. 2009; Prabodanie 2010; 
Prabodanie et al. 2010; Raffensperger and Cochrane 2010; Pepper et al. 2012; Pinto et al. 
2012). 
McAfee and McMillan (1987) defined an auction as a “market institution with an 
explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from the 
market participants”. Efficient rules ensure market discipline and allow obtaining policy 
goals. An auction could raise revenues for the authority, but also reveal the bidder’s 
valuation of the resource. Hence, when using a smart market, the regulator may be able to 
make efficient decisions about allocations and prices. Additionally, auctions increase 
transparency, fairness, competition, and efficiency, and reduce transaction costs (Vickrey 
1961; Wilson 1979; McAfee and McMillan 1987; Latacz-Lohmann and Hamsvoort 1997; 
Strappazzon et al. 2003; Eigenraam et al. 2005; Chu and Shen 2007; McAdams 2007; 
Plagmann and Raffensperger 2007; Montero 2008). 
Ordinary auctions systems are used in a diversity of public issues and areas. 
Governments have successfully completed auctions to privatise state-owned firms, and to 
franchise infrastructure and public natural resources (Afualo and McMillan 1996). For 
instance, a simple reverse auction was applied by the USA Environmental Protection 
Agency in The Shepherd Creek, Cincinnati, Ohio, to encourage landowners to reduce 
imperviousness by BMPs in their properties (Thurston et al. 2008). The auction mechanism 
chooses according to a merit order that relates bid prices, investment costs and an 
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environmental index. This system could be difficult to clear in a multidimensional system 
with many control points and landowners impacting in different places and levels. Other 
auctions have been used for licences to extract oil in USA, minerals in England, social 
food provision in Chile, and electromagnetic spectrum in Australia. However, ordinary 
auctions have shown some disadvantages because they may be vulnerable to collusion and 
strategic bidding. Thus, these may lead to higher social costs and inefficiencies in the 
allocation (Wilson 1979; Riley and Samuelson 1981; McAfee and McMillan 1987; 
Rothkopf et al. 1990; McCabe et al. 1991; Guasch and Glaessner 1993; Latacz-Lohmann 
and Hamsvoort 1997; Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi 2005; Rothkopf 2007; Montero 
2008). Rothkopf et al. (1990) and Rothkopf (2007) noted that a Vickrey auction has 
difficulties in practice, because the dominant strategy equilibrium is a weak equilibrium, 
the auction could be vulnerable to collusion, participants could manipulate their bids and 
do not reveal their real cost, and because of low revenues for participants and the SO. 
Milgrom (2000), Schummer and Vohra (2003), and Montero (2008) also noted that when 
using ordinary auctions to allocate public resources, participants try to manipulate their 
bids and do not always reveal their real costs. Thus, participants may inflate or deflate their 
real costs with the purpose of paying a price below the social price or obtaining more 
rights, respectively. Nevertheless, auctions with pertinent corrections and rules are 
effective to implement (Vickrey 1961; Kwerel 1977; Riley and Samuelson 1981; 
McAdams 2007; Montero 2008). 
Compared to ordinary auctions, a smart market is able to manage hydrological and an 
appropriately defined smart market could manage hydraulic effects from trading among 
point and non-point sources (Pinto et al. 2008a; Pinto et al. 2008b; Prabodanie and 
Raffensperger 2009; Raffensperger et al. 2009; Prabodanie 2010; Prabodanie et al. 2010; 
Raffensperger and Cochrane 2010; Pinto et al. 2012). In addition, a SM can use and be 
updated with all available relevant information, which is difficult to handle with simple 
auctions or pair-wise trading, but flexible with a SM. 
In contrast to pair-wise trading in a traditional market, the smart market reduces 
transaction costs because users do not need to search for trading partners, bargaining is 
simpler, price information can be made available, and the manager ensures market 
discipline. However, both designs require expenses for setting up the market, monitoring 
and enforcement. 
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Some real market designs apply optimization techniques to allow allocating and pricing 
under market efficiency criteria (Bohn et al. 1984; Ring 1995; Hogan et al. 1996; Miller 
1996; Alvey et al. 1998; Read et al. 1998; Read and Chattopadhyay 1999; Hogan 2002). 
Bohn et al. (1984) showed that prices in the electricity market represent the 
fundamental physical and engineering properties of electricity. The authors maximised the 
consumers’ and generators’ surplus in a constrained system with demand and supply 
spatially located in a fixed network with flow capacities and transmission losses. Hogan et 
al. (1996) presented a linear programming model (LP) to obtain spot prices in an electricity 
market. The market operator calculates the optimum dispatch, based on bids from 
participants. Prices vary spatially as regard to the network and specific constraints in the 
power system. They noticed that a computer-based market using linear models encouraged 
users to obtain “beneficial trades” while reducing coordination problems and transaction 
costs. Similarly, Murphy et al. (2000; 2009) presented a design of a water market to 
achieve efficient allocation and pricing. McCabe et al. (1989; 1991) designed a computer-
assisted market for natural gas as a sealed bid auction. In that case, the wholesale market 
coordinated the trading from sources in a pipelines network to delivery points. Thus, 
participants would submit locational offers and demands and the model would clear the 
market, maximizing the total surplus of trade, with transport capacities as constraints. The 
model was able to calculate efficient allocations and prices for all participants. Gallien and 
Wein (2005) reported a smart market for electronic trade in real time for industrial 
procurement with capacity constraints. The market framework would enable complex 
transactions in real-time. 
Raffensperger et al. (2009) and Plagmann and Raffensperger (2007) demonstrated that 
a market could be an efficient mechanism to allocate rights for managing ground water, 
and that transaction costs would be reduced. In addition, the market design allows handling 
regulator criteria as well as quickly incorporating new information in the system. 
Prabodanie and Raffensperger (2007) and Prabodanie et al. (2010) proposed a 
deterministic market for licences to discharge nitrates, while maximum quantities of 
nitrates are limited by location. Those papers developed centralized system in a common 
pool, controlled by a market manager, who would use a linear model to achieve maximum 
trade surplus. The linear program would allow trading within environmental thresholds 
over time, while nitrate is leaching from each property. 
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A market based on trading runoff could have serious issues as was observed by 
Ribaudo et al. (1999). Ideally, a market would allocate the actual discharges and impacts. 
However, these discharges are uncertain, and the auction manager’s selected runoff model 
may be incorrect. Hence, the market could be fundamentally about participants’ land use 
and management practices; the market must enforce the agreed behaviours in terms of IC 
of the contract holders. This point enforces the idea of a market which allocates IC while 
reaching optimum land use in the long-term with flooding according to desired standards 
and conditions. 
A smart market for IC would consider the users’ willingness to pay for impacting flows 
at flooding places and the environmental thresholds established by the authority via a 
centralised system for processing the information. Sayers et al. (2002) claimed that any 
integrated flood management system needs to be supported by a computer based system. 
This statement reinforces the idea of having a smart market to incorporate the 
consequences of changes in the catchment. 
If the market were established to choose which technology each participant should use, 
by submitting 0 or 1 type bids, the market model would have integer decision variables. 
This market design would be non-convex, which probably results in non-supporting prices 
(O'Neill et al. 2005). Pinto et al. (2012) pointed out that participants’ decisions about 
technologies are usually private; if participants offering to control obtain only a fraction of 
the equivalent technology, they may need to bid a high price in the next round to obtain the 
next part. 
Pinto et al. (2008a; 2008b) and Pinto et al. (2012) developed a deterministic smart 
market for controlling externalities related to sediment discharge. Raffensperger and 
Cochrane (2010) proposed a deterministic smart market for IC to control problems from 
excess runoff. In this market, the participant trades the consent to change IC as measured 
by the infiltration capacity of the land while the authority specifies maximum capacity of 
storm water runoff at channel control points. Although this study introduced the idea of 
smart market for IC, it did not consider the stochastic nature of rainfall and the risk if an 
extreme event occurs. The current proposal extends the research of Raffensperger and 
Cochrane (2010) to a market that incorporates the rainfall uncertainty. 
Hydrological phenomena such as rainfall events are complex and impossible to predict 
with certainty. Calculations about rainfall are often based on simple averages which create 
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problems when designing infrastructure and developing policy instruments which depend 
on rainfall events. Ignoring the stochastic nature of the rainfall may lead to poor decisions 
and inefficient outcomes. Malcolm and Zenios (1994) suggested incorporating uncertainty 
into planning and infrastructure design, and Shortle and Horan (2008) pointed out that 
uncertainty about sources in water quality trading could lead to market failure. 
Under uncertainty of rainfall events, the regulator should make decisions about design, 
planning and environmental thresholds to keep society safe from flooding harm at 
reasonable cost (James and Lee 1971; Loucks et al. 2005; Cowdin 2008; EFTEC 2010). 
James and Lee (1971), and Loucks et al. (2005) presented theoretical benefit-cost analyses, 
which could be applied to analyse flood control. The decision is influenced by many 
factors such as the rainfall distribution, risk, and the cost of extreme events. The regulator 
must deal with these concerns in the design of a market to encourage hedging against a 
range of events in the market, i.e., to lower flood damage for a range of storms, or if 
extreme storms affect the catchment. 
A flood hazard is the occurrence of a flow event with a predetermined flow exceedance 
probability. Flood vulnerability is the susceptibility to damage from extreme storm events. 
Risk is the result of the combination between an event’s probability and vulnerability, 
resulting in the potential damage. Disaster is the realisation of the risk, i.e., this is the 
flooding damage. Kron (2007) pointed out that probability of occurrence and vulnerability 
should be estimated in levels of damage for a whole range of events. Thus, a functional 
relationship can be identified between flood components; this relationship will be included 
in the market clearing formulation. 
This thesis develops a market to trade IC allowances for managing runoff and so 
flooding. This market will be approached first as a deterministic storm design based on 
extreme storm events and then as a market with risk positions for disaster and uncertain 
rainfall. 
1.5 Scope 
The manuscript is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a framework runoff 
hydrographs, flood damage estimates and the smart market. Chapter 3 presents a 
deterministic net pool market for IC allowances under an extreme event. Chapter 4 
describes a net pool market with rainfall stochasticity. Chapter 5 extends the previous 
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market and proposes flood penalties. Chapter 6 describes a net pool market which accounts 
for an acceptable risk position that the community desires to face in the catchment. Chapter 
7 presents a study case. Chapter 8 extends the market to a gross pool formulation, and 
Chapter 9 gives conclusions and proposes future research. 
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Chapter 2 
 
2 MODELLING FLOWS, FLOOD, AND FLOOD 
DAMAGE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This Chapter presents the conceptual framework for a market system based on impervious 
cover (IC1) allowances, which accounts for storm water runoffs. An IC allowance is a 
tradable permit to use a specific level of perviousness in a specific area (hectare). The 
chapter explains the smart market, IC, storm estimation, storm distribution, runoff 
hydrographs and runoff estimates, governing routed flows, flow estimates, flood damage 
function, flood components, and the expected flood damage. These concepts are part of the 
framework that will be used in the market formulations. 
 The market model assumes a linear system, which accounts for linear changes in flows 
for supper positions, or marginal changes from a status quo of flows across the catchment. 
The purpose is to combine the effects of IC allowances at control points across storm 
scenarios. Thus, imperviousness levels are transformed into linear effects on flows and 
flooding flows (as impact flow coefficients) at different places in the catchment. 
Hydrological and hydraulic models such as HEC-HMS (HEC 2008a) and HEC-RAS (HEC 
2008b) are used to estimate these coefficients. Using linear assumptions is adequate for 
modest changes, but dramatic changes will require extra non-linear modelling efforts to 
update coefficients. 
                                                 
1
 An empirical parameter directly connected with imperviousness is the curve number (CN) which was 
developed by the USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service (SCS 1985). CN measures the direct runoff 
from a rainfall event based on infiltrations and the area's hydrologic soil group, land use, soil moisture 
management and hydrologic condition. 
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 Loucks et al. (2005) present a framework to estimate the expected flood damage and its 
changes. The framework accounts for peak flows, stage flood, flood and peak flow 
probability distributions and flood damage, and calculates the changes in the expected 
flood damage. The authors show, by graphical means, the calculations of the expected 
flood damage, Figure 2-1 illustrates those calculations. An equivalent framework will be 
used in this thesis; thus, the IC market estimates changes in the expected flood damage, 
which depends on the changes in the imperviousness levels in each property and 
consequently in the catchment. 
Exceedance probability
DamagePeak flow
Stage flood
Changes in the 
expected flood 
damage
High
High
High
Low
A
DC
B
 
Figure 2-1 Changes in the expected flood damage. (A) corresponds to the relationship 
between peak flow and stage flood, (B) is the stage flood and flood damage relationship, 
(C) is the cumulative probability distribution of peak flow, and (D) is the cumulative flood 
damage distribution. Figure is based on Loucks et al. (2005) 
 
Then, the smart market clears the participants' demand and supply, based on their 
preferences for impervious levels. The market model calculates how these changes impact 
flows and flood damage at control points. The different market formulations in this thesis 
account for changes in flood damage and the flood damage components such as peak flow 
and stage flood, rapid inundation and duration. Additionally, the flood damage functions 
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and their components are used to create demand curves of IC allowances for participants 
with the Sto_MarketIC. 
Therefore, the IC market design will deal, for instance, with hydrograph curves, with 
their flows at specific places in the catchment, routing flows and the governing hydraulic 
equations, storm probability distribution, and flood damage that are conceptualised as 
follows. 
2.2 Smart market for IC allowances 
In many parts of the world, deregulated markets are used to solve complex problems such 
as the buying and selling electricity and gas (Bohn et al. 1984; McCabe et al. 1989; 1991; 
Read and Chattopadhyay 1999; Pepper et al. 2012). Most of these established markets are 
centrally controlled and enable multilateral trading in a common pool; many permit 
bilateral trading on the outside as well. Commonly, an optimisation model calculates 
dispatch schedules and prices based on the economic maximisation of trading, for 
submitted linearised demand and supply bids from participants. 
These markets allow for management of complicated interactions and externalities by 
trading. A mathematical programming model clears the market. Read and Chattopadhyay 
(1999) present an overview of an electricity clearing market based on a LP model which 
maximises the economic surplus from generators (sellers) and loads (buyers) at specific 
places (nodes), with a specific set of: constraints about operation, transmission capacities, 
consumption, and system security and reliability. Thus, a specific network with nodes 
(regions), demands, and supplies are balanced to estimate a set of nodal prices and the best 
set of the dispatch schedules. Additionally, the government oversees the trading system 
through an authorised institution called the Electricity Commission. McCabe et al. (1989; 
1991) called this type of market a “smart market” (SM) and an equivalent conceptual 
framework is proposed for the market for IC allowances. 
As stated in the previous Chapter, the proposed market for IC allowances corresponds 
to an auction system where equilibrium prices and optimum allocations are found by using 
mathematical optimisation. This market is operated by an auction manager or system 
operator (SO) who can be a governmental agency. Trades are not bilateral between market 
users; rather they trade through the SO, buying and selling these allowances. 
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IC allowances can be decomposed into a set of rights to impact flows at control points. 
These impacting flow rights represent physical flow properties related to capped points and 
flood components (such as the stage flood or duration of a flood). IC allowances in the 
property determine specific flooding conditions across control points and scenario(s) with 
the stochastic formulations. This point will be discussed further in the thesis. Thus, when 
participants trade IC allowances, they are actually bidding to change the set of flow 
impacts across control points which, in turn, change the flood physical distribution in these 
areas. This will be discussed in Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6. Chapter 8 extends the IC market to 
a gross pool formulation. 
Trading IC allowances 
The SM allows bidding (offering) in steps, or tranches of packages of IC allowances. 
Participants could bid (offer) more than one quantity (package). Bids and offers could be 
submitted to the market online. The market is cleared for buyers and sellers 
simultaneously. This market has a uniform price “pool” market arrangement per control 
point (node), and individual prices are adjusted according to specific impacts in the 
catchment. Thus, users with similar IC allowances and at the same place would face the 
same price. 
Alternatively, participants could express their bids as wedges or proportions of changes 
for IC allowances in the property. This idea has been used in electricity markets for 
ancillary services, where a set of incremental reserve proportions of generation are 
established (Read et al. 1998). Thus, a participant may express their desired conditions as 
an incremental proportion of changes for IC allowances in their property, related to an 
established reference usage for IC allowances. From this reference, participants could bid 
for the incremental wedges of changes in IC allowances in their property. We will not 
pursue this idea further. 
In the market, participants (landholders) trade IC allowances in their areas (property) 
which would change runoff patterns and so the flows at control points. It is important to 
differentiate between “land use” from “IC allowance”. Land use is what physically 
happens on a piece of land, the “IC allowance” the runoff flow rights owned or 
“anticipated impacting flows” at control points the measure of flows that are traded. The 
supply is characterised by participants who are willing to reduce or avoid runoff and can 
thus sell the option to reduce IC allowances. To reduce imperviousness, participants can 
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change impervious allowances and use various Best Management Practices2 (BMPs) or 
install control technologies. Participants who desire to increase the IC allowances of their 
land represent the demand. Thus, they have the willingness to buy the IC allowances for 
the area; buyers alternatively could install control technologies and BMPs. 
If a participant does not desire to change IC allowances, he/she has the option of either 
selling at a high price or buying alternatives in a net pool at a low price. If a participant 
changes their land use in a way that does not affect their anticipated runoff and flows at 
control points, they do not need to participate in the market. This will assist the market 
operation when complex combinations of IC allowances prevail on the property. The SO 
could estimate the anticipated runoff and flows for the property if the participant wanted to 
change IC allowances. This would particularly assist with projects such as real estate 
development. Reducing anticipated runoff should also not require participation (but it 
could be beneficial). 
The model will calculate market prices that signal resource shortage. The system would 
incentivise improved management of runoff control and use of BMPs, especially near 
sensitive areas. Thus, the system may incentivise IC changes to reduce stage-flood and to 
move flows from the peak time at control points. This means that a participant could be 
paid to reduce IC allowance, if the change in flows avoids peak flow time. Furthermore, 
the geography and runoff patterns could mean that a participant might increase their IC 
allowance and be paid if the new flows were to reduce the peak of the flood or the length 
of time the flood was at its peak. Most cases of increasing IC allowance would increase 
peak flows. 
An IC market covers a physical area (geography and catchment size) with its connected 
network of channels and rivers. Thus, relevant inflows should come from the physical area 
and be accounted for the market. Similarly, a power transmission network connects 
adjacent electricity markets, and enables interactions between markets for transmission 
capacities. Participants in an IC market would interact only if common rivers or channels 
exist. Prices associated with control points common to adjacent catchments would signal 
                                                 
2
 For example, in urban and rural places, technologies may include detention ponds, wetlands, infiltration 
tranches, porous pavement, swales, vegetative detainments, mulches, agricultural conservation practices, etc 
(Loucks et al 2005).  
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capacity constraints and capacity violations, and each participant whose flows go through 
these points would face these prices in their IC allowances. 
Trade should lead to the lowest social cost, if participants bid truthfully and rationally, 
as would be expected under perfect competition. Strategic decisions are outside the scope 
of this thesis. (For more details on setting prices, innovation and strategic decisions, see 
Laffont and Tirole (1996a; b), Kwerel (1977) and Montero (2008). The goal of such a 
market would be to enable society to satisfy a range of desired environmental outcomes at 
minimum cost). 
Role of the market manager 
The functions described here are all required for the market and while there are many 
regulatory options that would suit the purposes of the market, for ease of discussion most 
of the roles will be attributed to the SO. 
The SO manages the imperviousness in the catchment. In this way the SO manages the risk 
of flooding, and the flood damage, to hedge against a range of extreme storm events. If the 
SO does not control the imperviousness, the impervious level may increase in the 
catchment and the areas threatened by flood will enlarge, which will produce greater flood 
damage. Figure 2-2 illustrates the effects of different levels of IC in the catchment and 
their equivalent flood levels with a similar storm. The level of imperviousness increases 
from IC allowance i to v. In this illustration, the SO could desire to maintain a safe flow 
level by establishing and limiting an equivalent total flow ICL iii. Therefore, the SO may 
allow IC allowances to trade as long as these flow levels in hazard areas are not violated 
(capped design). The IC allowances i and ii do not produce flood problems, while the 
flows from IC allowances iv and v result in flooding. 
 The SO could be concerned about the risk of flooding and would desire to limit the 
frequency of flooding and hedge against a range of flooding events. Given data on these 
events and the affected areas, the SO could estimate flood damage and use this information 
to design the market. The SO should not encourage development in hazard areas. The SO 
should define zoning where floods need to be managed. Additionally, building codes and 
infrastructure requirements should be defined for the flood areas. Roche et al. (2010) 
stressed that regulatory power should focus on zoning and building codes in flood areas. 
The SO or some other regulatory body (e.g., Regional Councils) already place considerable 
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resources and funding to mitigate and manage the risk of flooding. Such risk management 
is outside the scope of this thesis, but the implementation of the various Regional Council 
flood mitigation works, e.g., installing “stop banks”, will (positively) impact on the 
modelled flood damage and associated costs. 
 
Figure 2-2 Flood levels reached with different IC allowances (ICL) in the catchment with a 
similar storm. Level of imperviousness increases from i to v. The ground profile represents 
the cross section in the flood area. Note that impervious level ICL iii is the maximum flow 
level reached before flooding occurs. 
 
The authority could define flow thresholds in the catchment, especially in hazard areas 
where flooding is or could become a problem. Thus, it is possible to use thresholds that 
will account for limiting flows at specific places along channels, streams, rivers, and lakes 
in a deterministic market formulation, or limits that will be violated in a stochastic market 
formulation. Different criteria could be used to establish thresholds in the catchment (for 
more details see Brabec et al., 2002), but the research presented in this thesis will focus on 
runoff flows and capacities in streams, channels, and floodplains only. 
The flow thresholds should be defined according to a "storm design" and infrastructure 
design, for instance a design for a 100 year flood event. This capacity in terms of year 
events is measured in terms of stage flood and peak flows, such a maximum flow of 200 
m
3
/sec. The thresholds also relate to the risk cost analysis used for designing the 
infrastructure capacity, which relies on the expected flood cost that the authority desires to 
face in the area. 
To estimate the individual impact in the catchment at hazard points and places, the SO 
could use hydrological and hydraulic models (Ormsbee et al. 1984; Dutta et al. 2000; 
Flood levels 
ICL i ICL iii ICL ii ICL iv ICL v 
Flow level with ICL iv 
Flow level with ICL iii 
Cross section 
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Mascarenhas and Miguez 2005; HEC 2008a; b; USDA-SWAT 2008; USDA-WEPP 2008). 
These models enable the calculation of runoffs in a routed channel and floodplains for 
specific rainfall events. In predicting impacting flow from property owners, the SO would 
choose one rainfall event "design storm" to incorporate in the market design, for instance, a 
single 200 mm storm for a deterministic market, or several events for a stochastic market. 
Consequently, impacts of participants can be measured as impact coefficients by time and 
storm scenario. 
The storm design affects the demand and supply from participants and their related 
impacting flows. As stated in previous paragraphs, the IC allowance is a set of impacting 
flow rights at different points in the catchment, which are estimated based on storm 
designs. Thus, the IC allowances will produce different impacting flows according to the 
storm design; for instance, total flows from a storm design 200 mm in 24 hours are greater 
than flows from a storm design 50 mm in 24 hours. These flows are constrained by 
threshold capacities in a deterministic formulation, or will violate the capacity under 
extreme storm events with a stochastic formulation. Because of the relationship between 
storm design, flows, and threshold capacities, the model solution could be feasible or 
infeasible in the market, and consequently the SO could face different revenues. This issue 
there will be further discussed in Subsection 3.4.6 in Chapter 3, Section 4.9.1 in Chapter 4, 
and Section 8.8 in Chapter 8. 
The SO should use monitoring to obtain an accurate measure of individual flow impact 
along channels and rivers, which translates IC at a particular site into flows and the flood 
stage at a location downstream under a designed storm, especially environmentally 
sensitive places (common flooding areas). These coefficients should be evaluated and 
periodically controlled to update the market model. Note that the SO independently 
monitors market development. For example, in Michigan the monitoring is done by the 
State of Michigan Department of Environmental Quality for non-point source trading 
(Woodward and Kaiser 2002). 
The SO guarantees the operation of the system by defining rules and enforcing them. 
These trading rules guarantee transparency, fairness, efficiency, and competitiveness in the 
market. In addition, these rules promote confidence among market participants. These rules 
establish: (i) the definition of rights, (ii) which rights are going to be traded, (iii) how the 
participants will obtain these rights, (iv) how long rights will last, (v) registration 
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(enrolment requirements), (vi) how the market will operate, (vii) penalties for participants 
who break rules, (viii) flood damage costs and conditions which are related to violated 
boundaries established in the market, and (ix) procedures for verification of rights and 
trades. These rules must be known to all participants. 
Auction rules require that all participants abide by land uses and management practices 
(IC allowances) for which their bids were accepted. Following market clearing, the SO 
must enforce the agreed behaviours of the contract holders. Ideally, the SO would enforce 
the actual discharges and impacts. However, these discharges are uncertain, and the 
auction manager’s selected discharge model may be incorrect. Hence, the auction is 
fundamentally about participants’ land use and management practices, and flood 
modelling. 
2.3 Rainfall events (Storms) 
Many hydrologic studies discuss rainfall and flood frequency and their probability 
distributions (Pearson 1991b; a; Haan et al. 1994; Ramachandra Rao and Hamed 2000; 
Mays 2001; Koutsoyiannis 2007; Kron 2007; Pasche 2007). Probabilistic modelling is key 
to estimating damage and flood risk due to extreme storm and flooding events. Because the 
storm probability distribution and subsequent flooding are often unknown, simple storm 
distributions are used to describe the hydrological phenomenon (Ramachandra Rao and 
Hamed 2000; Koutsoyiannis 2007). However, rainfall events are difficult to estimate, due 
to their spatial distribution. Thus, the proposed markets could consider a storm distribution, 
at a specific place, to design storms, under the assumption that similar storms would affect 
the whole catchment. 
Singh and Strupczewski (2002) summarised the methods used to estimate the statistical 
parameters of the storm probability distribution into four groups: (a) empirical, (b) 
phenomenological, (c) dynamic and (d) stochastic with Monte Carlo simulation. The 
authors suggested that the empirical methods would be most suitable and accurate to 
estimate exceedance probabilities (EP) at extreme events, particularly the at-site frequency 
analysis method. 
The at-site frequency method requires data collection about storms, plotting and 
estimating probabilities as well as modelling the probability distribution and testing 
goodness of fit. Accordingly, literature suggests different extreme probability distribution 
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types for both storms and floods. These are extreme values type I (EV1) such as 
exponential, lognormal and Weibull which belong to the Gumbel distribution, and type II 
(EV2) such as Pareto and log-Pearson type 3 (three parameter distribution) and Wakeby 
(four-parameter distribution) (see Ramachandra Rao and Hamed 2000; Koutsoyiannis 
2007). From a theoretical and practical point of view, Koutsoyiannis (2007) reviewed the 
applicability of rainfall distributions and pointed out that the popular Gumbel distribution 
and EV1 underestimate events at the tail distribution. The author also presented theoretical 
and empirical arguments to support the use of EV2 type distribution. For an accurate 
rainfall distribution estimate in the catchment, annual exceedance probabilities (AEP) can 
be calculated for different storm intensity (depth) events. 
The exceedance probability (P) corresponds to the probability that a storm will meet or 
exceed a particular event in a period,  TP S s =1–  TP S s  =1  TF s , where S  sT, 
is an event or rainfall in volume with a specific magnitude across time, for instance 100 
mm in 24 hours, and  F   is the cumulative distribution function (CDF). For instance, 
F(S<100) = 0.975, then P(S100) = 0.025, which represents a storm of 100 mm in 24 
hours. Figure 2-3 illustrates an AEP and storm intensity curve reached in a hypothetical 
catchment. 
The storm probability distribution is continuous and multidimensional with dimensions 
corresponding to ‘storm parameters’ such as: intensity, duration, total precipitation and 
geographic distribution. For this thesis, it is determined by a number of representative 
storm events. Each representative storm represents a subset of the storm distribution and 
this storm will be called “storm event” or “event”. The single event could occur with a 
probability 0.025; however, this storm event could occur during a given period or not at all. 
Alternatively, a discrete probability can be obtained using the “basic stage method” 
which categorizes storms with similar parameters of magnitude and intensity. Hence, it is 
possible to obtain a storm magnitude probability,  ( m )
m
P S s
N
  , where m is the ranking 
in a descending order, 
( m )s  is the mth largest storm in volume, and the series N is the total 
scale storm associated with the magnitude and ranking. This probability is an estimator of 
the cumulative probability distribution    
0
S
F S f s ds   of the sample into a rank-
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ordered probability. Hence, it is possible to use statistical methods to estimate probabilities 
of different events in a range    
b
a
P a S b f s ds    . For more details, see Tung et al. 
(2006), Haan et al. (1994) and Mays (2001). 
 
Figure 2-3 Hypothetical annual exceedance probability (AEP) and rainfall 
 
In Chapter 3, the proposed determinist IC market formulations will be based on a single 
"design storm". This worst case will define the possible runoff from the properties, the 
status quo of flows (based on the current IC allowances) and impact flows at control 
points. In Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 8 a range of events will be accounted for based on stochastic 
market formulations. These events will represent the storm distribution within the 
catchment. 
 Different probability representations can be used to evaluate the relationship between 
rainfall and floods. However, Koutsoyiannis (2007) noticed that rainfall and floods have 
similar probability distributions and Loucks et al. (2005) pointed out that the probability to 
reach a peak flow that causes damage is the same as the probability of flood damage. Thus, 
different combinations of rainfall depths, flow peaks, and flood levels would present 
similar distributions in the catchment. This could also be represented in terms of recurrence 
intervals using High Intensity Rainfall Design System for New Zealand HIRDS (NIWA 
2002; 2008). However, as to be discussed further in this thesis, flooding components could 
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be managed by changing impervious cover (Olsen et al. 2000); consequently, a particular 
flooding condition could change in probability of occurrence as well as the floods physical 
distributions. Figure 2-4 illustrates the stochastic nature of rainfall on impervious cover, 
and its effects on flows and flood distributions in flood areas. s is the probability of a 
storm scenario s, CP1 and CP2 are control points 1 and 2 respectively, and ICL is the 
imperviousness level in the area. 
 The rainfall scenarios’ probability (A) will relate the resulting runoff hydrographs due 
to the different land uses, BMPs or control technologies from properties (B). These flows 
from point and non-point sources go through channels and streams, impacting different 
places with different magnitudes and intensities, according to IC allowance levels, 
catchment conditions and storm scenarios (C). Changes to IC allowances (ICL) will 
change the flows and resulting flood damage distributions (at control points) (D). Thus, 
under the same storm distributions, changes in the IC allowance modify the flooding 
distribution and damage. 
 Schielen (2009) pointed out that changes in IC allowances can significantly affect 
flooding, but climate changes would have minimal on flows. Although other stochastic 
sources affect runoff from properties and transport of runoff flows, this research will focus 
on the stochasticity related to storms that affect the catchment (Ribaudo et al. 1999; Shortle 
and Horan 2001; Shortle and Horan 2008). The proposed Det_MarketIC market model will 
use a design storm as the basis for trading, and the issue of defining the storm will not be 
discussed further in this research. 
2.4 Storm water runoff 
Storm water runoff is the excess water from a rainfall event that does not infiltrate into the 
soil and is discharged from a land surface. This flow is part of the total flow, which 
corresponds to the runoff and groundwater (base flow). This research will focus on the 
runoff and the base flow, estimated as part of the status quo of imperviousness level in the 
catchment and storms. We assume a base flow from which changes in imperviousness will 
change only the runoff from the properties. 
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Figure 2-4 Relationship between (A) rainfall events, (B) IC allowances, (C) flows at 
control points, and (D) flood damage distributions in the catchment. CP1 and CP2 are 
control points, 
s storms probabilities, and i, ii and iii are final IC allowances (ICL). 
 
The runoff flow may be connected to channel systems, storm sewers, pipes, and streams; 
thus, these flows convey and reach different points in the catchment such as a reservoir, 
lakes, rivers, estuaries, and the sea. These flows may exceed threshold capacities in 
channels and streams, producing flooding problems. 
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The overland runoff flows can be quantified through monitoring or modelling; 
however, monitoring is expensive due to the logistics needed in the field to estimate flows. 
Alternatively, modelling is widely used to estimate runoff flows, and the rational method is 
probably the simplest runoff model available to determine peak flow discharges from a 
drainage area based on runoff coefficients, rainfall intensity and surface area. This method, 
however, does not allow estimating the flow movement in routed channels and streams, 
nor allows estimating runoff according to different impervious levels (assumes 100% of 
imperviousness). Actually, the method3 does include a level of imperviousness through the 
loss coefficient and the calculation is only for estimating peak flows. Complex models 
estimate runoff by using components of a hydrological cycle. This is called flood routing. 
These models are also able to approximate flows in channels and streams. In addition, 
hydrological models can be linked to geographic information systems (GIS) such as HEC-
HMS (HEC 2008a) and SWAT (USDA-SWAT 2008) in order to improve the spatial data 
management and visualisation (Pasche 2007). A certain method may be more appropriate 
than another under specific scenarios of location, vegetation, topography, catchment size, 
weather, and land uses; and without such information it is difficult to determine the best 
method (Haan et al. 1994; Pasche 2007). 
A runoff hydrograph is a record of runoff flows by time. Flows depend on upstream 
land characteristics such as land cover (IC), soil moisture, soil type, management practices, 
and the rainfall distribution, which affect the infiltration patterns and groundwater (Pasche 
2007). Figure 2-5 illustrates runoff hydrographs from two types of hypothetical rainfall 
distributions categorized as type I and II (whose peaks occur at 1/3 and ½ duration of the 
storm, respectively) as well as storm events with different probabilities. Changes in rainfall 
distribution and probability affect the concentration time, peak time, and total flows 
discharged. 
Figure 2-5 illustrates runoff hydrographs resulting from different IC allowances A, B 
and C. Increasing IC decreases infiltration, increasing the total volume of flows (area under 
curve) and possibly reduces the time of concentration
4
. For instance, increasing IC, by 
                                                 
3
 The rational method calculates peak flows (Q) as follows: Q = C x i x A, where C is loss coefficient, i is 
rainfall intensity, and A is area.  
4
 The time of concentration (tc) is closely related to discharge and infiltration. This time corresponds to the 
time from exceeding runoff from the most remote point to the outlet of a property or catchment. The tc 
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changing the land use from forestry to horticulture land would reduce infiltration and 
accelerate concentration time. Consequently, peak flows at channels and flooding control 
points could occur earlier. 
 
 
Figure 2-5 Runoff hydrograph curve of two rainfall distributions. RA is a type I storm and 
RB is a type II. RA1 rainfall event 1 and RA2 rainfall event 2, RA1 > RA2. A, B and C are 
runoff hydrographs with different land uses or IC allowances (A<B<C) under similar 
rainfall events. qp is the peak flow, tp is the time peak, and tb is the total time duration of 
runoff. 
 
BMPs and technologies will modify the runoff hydrographs. For instance, retention ponds 
slow the release of water. In this case, A, B and C represent different runoff control 
practices (for a specific land use). Changes in land use, implementation of runoff control 
technology, and other BMPs may be approximated to an equivalent IC allowance in the 
catchment (Haan et al. 1994). Such practices may change the peak time as well as the total 
runoff flows (Figure 2-5) from the property, and consequently the routed flows and peak 
                                                                                                                                                    
quantifies the time from the overland flow and the conveyance time in the channels, streams, junctions, 
rivers, street gutters and storm sewers, etc. Similar to runoff estimations and routing, different methods can 
be used to quantify. The tc is mainly affected by overland and channel factors such as surface roughness, 
slopes, sectional shape, length, and storms (NRCS 1975; SCS 1985).  
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flows at flooding areas. These changes in IC have a spatial and temporal flow effect at 
channel and flooding areas. 
Hydrological models such as HEC-HMS (HEC 2008a) and WIN-TR55 (NRCS 1975) 
simulate runoff processes and flow hydrographs. Hydraulic models such as HEC-RAS 
(HEC 2008b), SHE model, MIKE SHE and MIKE11 (Pasche 2007) are used to simulate 
changes in water levels in rivers and streams. Flows obtained from hydrological models 
can be used in hydraulic models to simulate flooding. This thesis will use HEC-HMS and 
HEC-RAS to illustrate a market application in Chapter 7. 
2.5 Hydraulic modelling: governing equations 
This section presents 1-dimensional governing equations used for flooding in channels. 
The main equations account for overland and routing flows which constitute the black box 
in the formulation of the clearing model. These equations are used by HEC-HMS and 
HEC-RAS to estimate runoff and flows in channels. 
Governing equations for hydraulic flows may be included in the market by discretising 
and linearising simulated transport coefficients from each participant, or implicitly by 
using available hydraulic models in the clearing formulation. For instance, the Victorian 
gas market in Australia uses implicit governing equations to simulate gas flows and 
pressures in pipes (Pepper et al. 2012). Other proposed markets have used simulators to 
obtain impacts and transport coefficients, which are included in the market clearing 
formulation. Examples of these are the proposed groundwater and nitrate markets by 
Raffensperger et al. (2009) and Prabodanie et al. (2010). 
The governing equations for simulating flooding are the mass and momentum 
conservation equations, known as Saint Venant equations in one-dimensional flow (Pasche 
2007). These equations predict unsteady flow routing in channels, streams, and floodplain 
areas. Figure 2-6 illustrates sectional shapes of channels and presents the main flow 
components included in these equations. Views (A), (B) and (C) respectively correspond to 
longitudinal, plane and transversal views of a control volume (CV) for the momentum 
balance.  
Mass conservation represents the moving volume between adjacent locations, 
accounting for the changes in water storage, inflows and outflows, evaporation, etc. A 
control volume, CV, of the flow with density  and lateral inflows q corresponds to the 
  
 
30 
sum of the mass variation by unit of time. The mass variation accounts for the spatial flow 
change in the direction x in the time t as shown in Equation [2.1]. 
 
Q
dx Adx q dx
x t
  
 
 
 
             [2.1] 
where Q is the flow discharge and A the wetted area. Since water is incompressible, flows 
are uniform and constant in direction x (dx), the mass equation is as follows: 
Q A
q
x t
 
 
 
                  [2.2] 
The LHS in equation [2.2] corresponds to changes in flow along x and changes in wetted 
area A and by time t, which equals the lateral inflows (RHS). Equations [2.1] and [2.2] 
represent one dimensional flow continuity. Using a similar control volume, the linear 
variation in time momentum conservation
5
 (Ml), 
 Ml
t


, accounts for the forces acting in 
the fluid, and is measured in terms of mass and velocity, v, as follows: 
 
 2cv x
Ml Q
v A dx F
t x t
 
  
  
  
           [2.3] 
In Equation [2.3], F  corresponds to the force in the x direction. Pressure forces change in 
depth and space between 
1pl x
F  and 
2pl x
F . Compression forces 
PF and 
'
PF  for lateral slope 
at channels as depicted in Figure 2-6 (B). Mascarenhas et al. (2005) presented and 
illustrated the changes in forces as follows: 
   
( )
1 2
0
( ) ,
h x
pl plx x
h
F F g A dx g h x B x d dx
x x
    
 
    
     [2.4] 
Where  ,B x   is the channel or stream width,   is the height from the bottom of the 
channel,  ( )h x   is the distance of the centroid to the free surface, and 
 
( )
0
,
h x
A B x d    is the wetted area; accordingly dA = B d. 
 
                                                 
5
 Ml = mass  velocity =  Adx  
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Figure 2-6 Sectional shape with channel factors and physical components. A, B and C are 
longitudinal, plane and transversal views respectively of a control volume (CV) for the 
momentum balance. Individual factors are presented in equations 2.1 to 2.5. 
 
The LHS (Equation [2.4]) is the change in pressure between points x1 and x2. The RHS 
accounts for the changes in force in the x direction. But this formulation does not account 
for changes in force induced by the lateral channel or river slope. Changes in the sectional 
width s xF  implies changes in forces, according to the wetted area dBd , given depth h 
and the distance  ( )h x   of the centroid to the free surface (see Figure 2-6 C). The 
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changes in forces also account for the bottom slope force 
s x
F and the friction force f x
F ; 
hence, the resulting momentum condition becomes: 
01 2x pl pl p s f fxx x x x
h
F F F F F F g Adx g Adx S g Adx S
x
  

        

  [2.5] 
where 
fS  is the energy line slope related to friction head loss of the flow, and 0S  is the 
bottom slope. Finally, substituting xF  from Equation [2.5] into the momentum balance of 
equation [2.3] and rearranging, the momentum balance equation becomes: 
2
0 0f
Q Q h
gA g AS g AS
t x A x
   
     
   
         [2.6] 
From left to right, the terms in Equation [2.6] are the local acceleration 
Q
t


, the 
conservative acceleration 
2Q
x A
 
 
  
, the pressure force 
h
A
x


, the gravity force or inertia 
0g A S , and the friction force term fg AS . 
From the governing equations, it is possible to obtain relationships in terms of velocity 
and depth under different conditions and assumptions (Haan et al. 1994; Mascarenhas and 
Miguez 2005). Such relationships include i) discharge and mean depth; ii) discharge and 
water surface elevation; iii) mean velocity and depth; iv) mean velocity and water surface. 
These relationships are obtained from Equations [2.2] and [2.6], given assumptions about 
forces and sectional topography. The relationship used to model flow and flood 
components will depend on particular conditions in the catchment (Mascarenhas and 
Miguez 2005). Alternatively, the governing equations can be represented in terms of depth 
and velocity without lateral inflows. This relationship would depend on the sectional shape 
across the channel and flooding area. The mathematical complexity to obtain a feasible 
solution increases with more irregular sectional shapes. For instance, assuming a 
rectangular sectional shape, the depth, h, and velocity, v, conditions from balance and 
momentum will be as follows: 
0
h v h
h v
t x x
  
  
  
                [2.7] 
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0
1
f
v v v h
S S
g t g x x
  
   
  
              [2.8] 
2 2
4 3f /
n v
S
h
                   [2.9] 
 h h x,t , and  v v x,t               [2.10] 
Equation [2.7] is the dynamic equation in terms of depth and velocity. Equation [2.8] is the 
continuity equation. Equation [2.9] corresponds to the resistance based on the Manning-
Chezy formula. Equation [2.10] represents the depth and velocity which depend on the 
position in the channel and time. Thus, a flow Q* could produce a specific h* and v*, and 
any change from this baseline of flow Q* will produce changes in h and v. Mascarenhas et 
al. (2005) pointed out that the main equations can be discretised; therefore, velocity and 
depth can be discretised for a section x at time t. Although it is possible to obtain many 
relationships, the mathematical complexity increases as well as problems with stability, 
consistency and convergence. 
2.6 Linear impacting flows 
At this stage, the governing routing flows were included to clarify the hydraulic black-box. 
This box represents the main physical flow variables which can be used explicitly in a 
market clearing formulation. Mascarenhas and Miguez (2005) pointed out that the 
governing equations can be discretised and linearised for which flows could be calculated 
based on sectional shapes. The authors noticed that problems with stability, consistency 
and convergence could be observed when simulating flows. Pepper et al. (2012) pointed 
out that the operational gas market model relies on non-linear governing relationships 
which are linearised. The authors showed how governing relationships are discretised, such 
as the relationship between flow rate and the pressure change across a pipe segment. The 
authors presented employed linearisations for both piece-wise and successive linear 
representations. However, rather than explicitly simulating flows and variables, simulators 
are used for the purpose of obtaining impact coefficients for the IC market. Flow variables 
related to flooding components will be used to model flood damage as further explained in 
the following section. 
The market for IC allowances account for the changes in impacting flows at control 
points from a status quo of flows related to the initial imperviousness levels in the 
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catchment. The flows and their changes due to trading are linearised to be included in the 
market formulations. This linear system translates imperviousness levels into linear effects 
in flows, and the linear effects can be estimated, for instance, by superposition of 
individual hydrographs or by a Taylor expansion from the status quo of flows and their 
translated initial imperviousness levels. 
Because, flows are capped in the deterministic market, the market model includes 
constraints. This constraint representation is illustrated in Figure 2-7. The illustration 
shows two flow levels related to initial IC allowances; ,i jg and ,i jg correspond to the initial 
IC allowances j of a participant i, and 0
,k tQ  and 
0
,k tQ  are the two flow levels related to initial 
IC levels G0 and G1 at time t and control point k in the catchment respectively; and 0,
t
kh  
and 0,
t
kh are the calculated flows of the linearisations. Lk is the threshold capacity at control 
point k. This is just one dimension of a multi-dimensional surface of flows and IC level 
patterns at a control point. Thus, any change in IC allowances would change flows from 
the initial flow conditions by 1
, , ,
t u
i j k i jH g
  . 
 
Lk
Baseflow0,
t
kh
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t
kh
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0G 1G
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Figure 2-7 Impact flow linear approximations
 
 
The proposed market model aims to avoid flooding by limiting this flow as described in 
the Chapter 3. However, extreme storm events may generate flows over channel capacity, 
which violate the limits and produce flood problems at control points. For these “exceeding 
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flows” it is necessary to model flooding for the purpose of predicting flood damage costs. 
The expected flood damage cost can then be determined as a function of channels flows 
(over capacity) at the various control points over time. 
2.7 Flood modelling 
Modelling of flooding requires quantification of the maximum flood stage that may take 
place in the catchment, given an extreme storm event. In many places, flooding is also 
affected by snowmelt (Kattelmann 1997). Snow pack would simply be modelled as a 
different physical system (Walter et al. 2005; Kerkez et al. 2010). Walter et al. (2005) 
pointed out that snowmelt modelling is well-established and based on energy budget 
models. Extra modelling would be required for the market formulation. Although this issue 
is outside the scope of this thesis, it would be make an interesting topic for future research. 
Maximum flooding can be estimated from models by using historical data supported by 
GIS (Guganesharajah et al. 1985; Tineke De Jonge and Hogeweg 1996; Dutta et al. 2000; 
2003). Mathematical formulations to approximate flooding  patterns, based on sectional 
shapes in channels and floodplains with routed flows, can be devised using Manning’s 
equation, the Muskingum-Cunge method, and the Saint Venant equations (Ghosh 1997; 
Mays 2001; Mascarenhas and Miguez 2005; Kron 2007). These equations represent the 
movement of fluid (water) in routed rivers, channels, and reservoirs using parameters such 
as inflow, outflow, sectional shape, depth, and velocity, using hydraulic principles. But, 
obtaining precise estimates is complex. Thus, it is necessary to simplify the analysis by 
making assumptions about sectional shapes, roughness, slope, etc. (further detail see e.g., 
Ormsbee et al. 1984; Ghosh 1997; Mujumdar 2001; Knight and Shamseldin 2005; 
Mascarenhas and Miguez 2005; Kron 2007). For instance, in the Neckar river, Germany, 
one dimensional flood modelling is used for linking flood parameters with risk analysis 
and mapping inundation areas (Kron 2007). 
Accurate spatial and temporal information is required to model flooding and also 
flooding components, which will be used in the market clearing formulation. Flooding 
depth,  G x , depends on the total flows x at control points, which are conditioned to the 
channel capacity or flow capacity *capx , the IC and soil moisture, the storm event s, and 
topography p in the catchment. Thus, these flows above capacity (exceeding flows) would 
generate a flooding condition,  g  , which is represented as follows: 
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   *, ,..., , capG x g x IC s p x              [2.11] 
Routing flows at control points are unsteady, changing over time; thereby, parameters such 
as depth, velocity, duration, and sediment load, will also change over time (Ghosh 1997; 
Dutta et al. 2000). In this research, HEC-HMS is used to model steady state inflows and 
HEC-RAS is used to model unsteady flows at control points among the channel. However, 
changes in some factors such as peak and velocity are quite slow, particularly under 
extreme storms (Haestad et al. 2003). 
Using Manning’s Equation, Equation [2.12], it is possible to approximate flooding 
depth and velocity under assumed steady flows. Equation [2.12] estimates the channel flow 
Q in m
3
/sec, where A is the channel cross sectional area below the water level in m
2
, R is 
the hydraulic radio which can be represented as 
A
P
 where P is the wetted perimeter in m, S 
is the slope, and n is Manning’s roughness coefficient. 
2 1
3 2
1
oQ AR S
n
                   [2.12] 
Additionally, from Manning’ equation velocity 
Q
v
A
 , with cross sectional shape and flow 
information, it is possible to estimate changes in flooding depths for a particular area 
(Figure 2-8). Figure 2-9 illustrates changes in depths for trapezoid sectional shape 
channels. 
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Figure 2-8 Sectional channel shapes and relationship between flow and depth based on 
Manning’s equation (Mays 2001), where z corresponds to channel bank slope in meters, y 
is depth in meters, n is manning’s coefficient, S is the channel slope, and Bw is channel 
base in meters. 
 
 
Figure 2-9 Functional depth vs. flow and velocity vs. flow in a trapezoidal shaped channel. 
Sectional parameters are Bw = 10, z = 500, S = 0.004, and n = 0.023. 
 
Channel and stream cross-sections are, however, not uniform trapezoid or triangular 
shapes; in fact, most of them are irregular, as illustrated in Figure 2-10. This non-
uniformity produces non-linear and non-convex depth. 
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Figure 2-10 (A) Plan view of channel (stream) in flooding area; where Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, and 
Q5 are flows at different levels in the area. (B) Sectional shape A-A; Bl3, Bl2, Bl1, Bc, Br1, 
Br2, and Br3 are base widths; hl2, hl1, hc1, hc2, hr1, and hr2 are the maximum depth levels for 
each section; yi and yj are maximum depths related to flows Qi and Qj. 
 
Depth levels, at different sectional places and flows can be observed in an example 
application in Figure 2-11. The example uses the Manning equation with Manning’s 
coefficient 0.002, channel slope = 0.0004, Bl3 = 400 m, Bl2 = 250 m, Bl1 = 200 m, Bc = 15 
m, Br1 = 300 m, Br2 = 200 m, Br3 = 400 m, hc1 = 1.2 m, hc2 = 0.9 m, hl1 = 0.35 m, hr1 = 0.55 
m, hl2 = 0.55 m, and hr2 = 0.4 m. The changes in depth level at different section levels can 
be estimated by varying flows between 0 and 5,000 m
3
/sec. 
The total simulated depth corresponds to the maximum depth level reached at the 
middle of the channel or stream as well as the flow depth reached at different areas across 
the channel sectional shape. For instance, flooding starts at Bl1 level when flows are greater 
than 80 m
3
/sec, reaching a 1.5 m depth with 3,310 m
3
/sec. At Br3 level with flows above 
680 m
3
/sec, the depth reaches 1 m with approx 4,010 m
3
/sec. 
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Figure 2-11 Changes in depth with different flows across the sectional shape A-A; Q1, Q2, 
Q3, Q4, and Q5 are flows that reach different levels in the section; and hl1, hl2, hl3, hr1, hr2, 
hr3, and hc are the maximum depth levels for each section. 
 
In floodplain areas, flow depth and flows are modelled using water mass balance and 
continuity equations (e.g., Ormsbee et al. 1984; Ghosh 1997; Philbrick Jr and Kitanidis 
1999; Knight and Shamseldin 2005; Mascarenhas and Miguez 2005). Figure 2-12 
illustrates routing relationships between inflow and flood parameters such as depth, 
outflow, and storage in the routing process at specific locations. In addition, it is possible 
to estimate other relationships from the flooding area such as depth vs. flood area, and 
maximum flow vs. flood area. These relationships depend on topography, soil, land use 
(vegetation), and infrastructure in the flood area; accordingly, they should be estimated at 
each channel, river and floodplain area segment. 
Flood routing processes are non-linear, which may imply a need for piecewise 
approximations in the market formulation. Ormsbee et al. (1984) utilised piecewise 
approximations for routing models in channels and basins when modelling the design of a 
detention catchment for storm water management in Glen Ellyn, Illinois. A comparable 
approach could be used for the IC market formulation; however, the market clearing model 
could include the flow-flooding relationships explicitly in the damage function. 
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Figure 2-12 Graphical depiction of flood routing. Panel A is a relationship between inflow 
and outflow by time, B is a relationship between storage and depth, C is a relationship 
between depth and outflow, and D is the relationship between outflow and storage. 
 
Flood damage could be represented by the violations to boundaries at channels, streams, 
pipes, and floodplain areas, related to cost penalties for each flooding component. Thus, it 
is possible to assume maximum thresholds in the channel’s capacity in order to estimate 
the cost damage. This issue will be presented in Chapter 3 when dealing with a 
deterministic formulation that incorporates maximum channel capacities in the market 
clearing model. However, given the stochastic nature of rainfall and the violations of 
channel capacity, it will be necessary to estimate flooding parameters in channels and 
floodplains. 
2.8 Flood damage estimation 
With the aim of considering flood damage, the proposed Sto_MarketIC and 
Sto_MarketIC_Risk clearing models in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 8 link flooding components to 
penalties in each control point. Flood damage is used for participants to create a demand 
function for IC (see Section 2.2 in this Chapter, Section 3.2 in Chapter 3, and Section 4.6 
in Chapter 4), which depends on the selected storm scenarios used to establish the markets 
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(see Section 3.4.9 in Chapter 3 and Section 4.3 in Chapter 4). The market models account 
for the storm scenarios at each control point, and the models calculate the expected flood 
damage based on the changes in imperviousness and a flood damage function. 
 Damage depends on the spatial area where flooding may occur. Therefore, cost 
penalties in the market formulation account for mitigation and damage based on maximum 
flooding depth, hastened flood which increases damage due to abrupt increases in flow 
velocity and shear stress in the river’s topographic cross-sections, and slow reductions in 
flow rates which lengthen flood durations. Thus, the accurate estimation of damage 
function is important to the market design. 
The damage estimate considers direct and indirect effects (Smith 1994; Parker 1995; 
Penning-Rowsell and Green 2000; Veerbeek 2007). The former accounts for the direct 
contact damage of flood on populations and properties, while the second accounts for flood 
damage induced on services, traffic problems and economic losses in surrounding areas. 
Penning-Rowsell and Green (2000) presented an update of the flood damage estimation 
theory, pointing out that damages are too complex to estimate due to the indirect and 
secondary damage. The importance of such damage depends on the specific area. For 
instance, in the lower Thames area, the authors pointed out that the indirect damage would 
represent only 4% of the total damage. Additionally, they suggested periodically 
calibrating the total damage due to more expensive contents derived from economic 
growth. The authors also noticed that damage estimation had shifted recently toward 
replacement cost rather than depreciated values. 
To assess the cost of flooding, the SO (authority) could use simple approximations with 
category-unit loss function, which accounts for the stage-flood damage function 
(Krzysztofowicz and Davis 1983a; Ormsbee et al. 1984; Hannan and Goulter 1985; Kron 
2007; de Moel and Aerts 2011) or complex methods by using GIS (Smith 1994; Tineke De 
Jonge and Hogeweg 1996; Dutta et al. 2000; 2003; Herath 2003; Kazama et al. 2009). The 
unit loss estimates the potential damage per property or per economic sector (“the loss 
unit”), related to maximum flood depth in an ex-ante flood situation or under pre-
established flood damage relationships. 
Penning-Rowsell and Chatterton (1977) estimated stage-damage curves for urban areas 
in the UK. They modelled a depth damage function for different residential and building 
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properties based on property conditions. They used these curves to assess flood damage 
and evaluate flood mitigation options. Tineke De Jonge and Hogeweg (1996) noted that the 
flood cost depends on the land uses, flooding depth and spatial distribution. Embrechts and 
Schmidli (1994), and Ermolieva and Ermolie (2005) pointed out that costs depend on the 
timing of flows (flooding). Dutta et al. (2003) and Herath (2003) recommended estimating 
damage with detailed GIS information. Additionally, based on a spatial distribution, those 
authors modelled inundation depth with a stage-damage function. When doing a 
conventional valuation, Tung et al. (2006) noted that a flood damage function can be 
linked with the physical characteristics of the installed infrastructure; thus, cost damage 
could be estimated according to violations in constraints associated with infrastructure 
capacity. De Moel and Aerts (2011) focused on flood damage estimates under uncertainty 
based on depth-damage functions at different flood areas with different land use. They 
accounted for possible damage based on assessments and land uses. 
Smith (1994) reviewed some urban flood damage methods, noting that finding a stage-
damage curve (flooding depth) is a key step in assessing the flooding cost; however, this is 
only a first approximation to the flooding cost, and the assessment requires field surveys 
and spatial risk analysis. The author suggested relating hydrological information such as 
probability of storm occurrence, peak flow, flow duration, and flow velocity with detailed 
flooding cost to predict cost damage of flooding. 
The market models Sto_MarketIC and Sto_MarketIC_Risk will thus relate the flooding 
cost to hydrological information and flooding components, and so creating a demand curve 
for IC. The main factors linked to flood damage are the peak flow f (closely related to the 
maximum depth flood), the time to reach a flood level h (related to flash flooding and 
changes in velocity), inundation period d (duration), and sediment load e (Smith 1994; 
Parker 1995; Ghosh 1997; Dutta et al. 2000; 2003; Middelmann-Fernandes 2010; de Moel 
and Aerts 2011). Factors such as availability of information, and external response to 
flooding (Kron 2007) is not accounted for in our analysis, nor sediment load (sediment 
load is covered in Pinto et al. (2012)). Figure 2-13 illustrates damage cost  C f  in terms 
of inundation depth and inundation period (duration) at a given level of depth. A deeper 
inundation and a longer duration produce greater cost. In addition, the cost of damage 
changes with the place; however, most of the damage follows similar nonlinear trends. 
Herath (2003) noted that the Japanese Ministry of Construction obtained an exponential 
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function of damage to crops for flood duration, and for damage to urban places, a fourth 
polynomial function with depth. Kron (2007) pointed out that square root stage damage, 
power, and polygon functions are used according to the contents, inventory, and property 
condition. Penning-Rowsell and Green (2000) noted that a single flood-depth-damage 
could be over and under estimated due to the property levels, which would require to work 
with an expected damage function. 
 
Figure 2-13 (A) Expected relationship between damage and inundation depth. (B) 
Relationship between inundation period and damage rate under different inundation 
depths, ID-1 < ID-2 < ID-3. 
 
Figure 2-14 illustrates the effect of hastening peak flood or increase the rising limb (slope) 
of the hydrograph curve, which represents the fast increase of flow and flood. The stage-
flood is reached previously for increasing IC allowances in the catchment and 
consequently the damage is increased from C(t*) to C(t**). Thus, a participant would pay 
the equivalent cost for increasing flows as ** 'tF  or would receive for reducing flows as 
** "tF . 
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Figure 2-14 Changes in peak time and flood damage in a storm scenario. 
 
Most flooding relationships, such as flow versus velocity and flow versus maximum depth, 
are non-linear and non-convex. However, electricity and gas market-clearing models use 
piecewise linear approximations to handle these issues (Hogan et al. 1996; Hogan 2002). 
In the Sto_MarketIC and Sto_MarketIC_Risk models, the damage cost function could be 
convexified for each control point using piecewise approximations. Alternatives for 
linearising and convexifying the flood damage function will be further discussed for those 
models. Convex curves guarantee an efficient solution (allocations and pricings) since a 
global maximum can be reached (Kall and Wallace 1994; Birge and Louveaux 1997; van 
der Vlerk 2002). 
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can be linked to flood patterns, which generate different levels of damage. For instance, a 
high peak flow in a short time may produce flood damage greater than the damage 
generated from the same peak, but later as illustrated in Figure 2-14. Similarly, lengthened 
duration could produce more damage than a shorter duration. 
 
 
Figure 2-15 Flow hydrographs A, B, C and D at control point and distributional differences 
in floods; hA, hB, hC, and hD are peak flows at control point; FA, FB, FC, and FD are 
inundation areas; tA, tB, tC, and tD are the time peaks or peak flows; and dA, dB, dC, and dD 
are the lengths of the flow which contribute to the flooding. 
 
Figure 2-15 shows four different flow hydrographs linked to hypothetical floods in the 
floodplain area. For instance, flows A and B could receive similar total inflows (runoff), 
reaching a similar peak flow (related to maximum flooding depth) hA   hB, duration dA   
dB, and flooded areas FA   FB; however, the damage could be greater for A because the 
peak flow was reached sooner, tA < tB. A shorter time increases the damage due to the extra 
cost in terms of evacuation and warning (Krzysztofowicz and Davis 1983b). 
 Comparable analysis can be done with patterns B and C where even though they have 
similar total inflows, the flooding duration in C is longer (dC > dB) and the peak flows in B 
is greater than in C (hB > hC). In this case, a trade-off is expected between depth peak and 
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duration. However, if the main damage component is related to flooding peak (maximum 
depth), the flooding pattern in B will generate more damage than C. Finally, pattern C may 
produce more damage than D, although peak flows and peak depth are similar hC   hD, 
because the flood duration in C is longer than in D (dC > dD). In brief, different flood 
patterns produce different flood damage. 
 As was previously pointed out, in modelling flood damage different functional cost 
relationships can be obtained. For example, in the flooding area there is a quadratic depth 
peak function ( f ), Equation [2.13], and an exponential damage function  C f , equation 
[2.14], where x  is the flows above boundary (channel capacity). 
1
0f x
                [2.13] 
  10
fC f e  , and so    
1
1 0
0
x
C x e
 


       [2.14] 
To ensure convexity in the cost damage function, if required, sufficient conditions are to 
have the parameters 0 , 1 , 0  and 1  > 0. Thus, 
 
0
C f
f



 and 
 2
2
0
C f
f



, and also 
  
 
 
0
C f x f x
dx
f x x
 

 
 and 
  
 
 2 2
2 2
0
C f x f x
dx
xf x
 


. For instance, if cost and depth-
flow parameters were 0  = 0.5, 1  = 0.8, 0 = 0.32 and 0 = 0.44, and those represent the 
maximum flood level that could be reached in the flooding area (or its equivalent peak 
flow), the cost damage function with flooding depth and total flooding flows would have 
trends such as those presented in Figure 2-16. 
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Figure 2-16 Cost related to maximum depth at control point. Panel A is the cost 
relationship with maximum depth and B is the cost relationship with peak flow. 
 
For non-uniform channel shape, Figure 2-10 illustrates the relationship between damage 
and flow and Figure 2-17 illustrates flood damage estimates related to maximum stage-
flood with an exponential damage function when reaching a flood depth at each level in the 
area (levels could correspond to levees). Despite the convex damage function at sections, 
the final flood damage function could be non-convex with respect to the peak flow over 
capacity. This is because of the non-uniform channel shape. In Chapter 4, the 
Sto_MarketIC clearing model will deal with a non-convex damage cost function, choosing 
scenarios and convexification of the flood damage function. 
 
Figure 2-17 Flood damage with exponential damage at each section. A1 and A2 are flood 
damage relationships with depth levels and total flows respectively. 
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2.9 Flood damage function 
In a specific place, rural or urban areas from source and non-source points, the flood 
damage could be represented as  *cC x x  or  *, , , , cC f h t d e x , x is the flows, f peak flow, 
depth h, hastening peak flood t, duration d and sediments e, and *
cx  is the flow boundary or 
capacities. 
As previously stated, flows  x IC,s  depend on the impervious cover (IC) and storm 
event s  S, for a given infrastructure and topography; thus, a general representation of 
flood damage, in terms of the maximum peak flow f, is as follows: 
   *cC f x IC,s x          [2.15] 
A flood damage model similar to Equation [2.15] will be included in Sto_MarketIC in 
Chapter 4. This market model will also take into account the flood damage related to 
maximum flooding depth (maximum flow) along scenarios, which will be affected by IC 
trade. 
 Changes in IC allowances change runoff hydrographs, which may change peak flows 
and volumes at control points, resulting in changes to the flood distribution in the flooding 
areas (Figure 2-4 (D)). Figure 2-18 illustrates hypothetical changes of IC allowances, and 
the corresponding changes in flood damage from storm scenarios. The solid arrow 
represents the damage effects resulting from changes in IC (A). This damage function is 
non-linear; however, a piecewise linear approximation could be applied in the market 
clearing formulation. 
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Figure 2-18 Final damage and changes in IC and storms at a hypothetical control point. 
 
A discretised change in damage under different IC allowances by scenario can be 
represented as follows: 
      * *i c j cC f x IC ,s x C f x IC ,s x    ,  s  storm scenario   [2.16] 
Because the change in damage depends on the change in IC allowance from i to j, the 
marginal value varies in accordance with this level. Thus, Equation [2.16] will be greater 
or equal than zero when i j  and lower or equal than zero when i j . The last would 
imply that changes in damage, when increasing IC, would be greater than zero. This will 
be extended with a theoretical example to show that changes in IC allowances are convex 
in expectation. 
The flood damage can be represented in each scenario s and control point k as 
 *, , ,k cC f h d e x . The damage function can be expressed in terms of flows (or exceeding 
flows) x as         *, , ,k cC f x h x d x e x x , given the hydraulic conditions of the 
catchment. Then, the marginal changes in damage, at control point k and scenario s, for 
increasing maximum depth as 
 *, , ,k cC f h d e x
f

  
can be calculated. Given that depth 
depends on exceeding flow, the resulting marginal change in damage is 
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 
 
*, , ,k cC f h d e x
f x


       f x h x d x e x
x x x x
   
   
. The change in flood damage can also be 
estimated as a function of with the flooding duration and hastening peak flood components. 
Finally, the total expected damage is         *, , ,
S
k k k k k c
s
C f x h x d x e x x   g x s ds , 
where   g x s  is the probability distribution of the rainfall event s. 
2.10 Expected flood damage 
The proposed market models Sto_MarketIC, Sto_MarketIC_Risk and Gross_MarketIC 
will be formulated as two-stage stochastic programming (TSSP) models. The recourse 
flood cost in the models includes a flood damage cost function, and changes in IC 
allowances result in changes in the expected flood damage. Kall and Wallace (1994), Birge 
and Louveaux (1997) pointed out that the theoretical foundation of stochastic 
programming is around properties of the expectation, and averaging has a convexifying 
effect, so the expectation is “usually” convex (Wets 1998). For the approximation, the 
recourse cost may have a convex hull. Our market design could use the same argument to 
model the expected flood damage as a convex function. 
Despite a flood damage function obtained from the expectation, the flood damage could 
be non-convex, but monotonically increasing,  ,C x  . Figure 2-19 illustrates a flood 
damage condition that may be faced in the flood area. Figure 2-19A shows hypothetical 
flood damage conditions under different storm scenarios, and Figure 2-19B shows an 
approximation of the flood damage function, which assumes that the flow impact is 
normally distributed. An approximation to the flood damage function may be required if 
the changes in expectation are not convex. However, changes in IC allowances will usually 
increase flows at peak times and produce changes in expected flood damage. Because the 
flood damage function is monotonically increasing, the changes in the expected flood 
damage could be convex when flows are increased. 
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Figure 2-19 (A) Illustration of flood damage condition under different damage-storm 
events and (B) an approximation of the floods damage function, which assumes that the 
flow impact is normally distributed 
 
The expected flood damage for maximum depth (peak flow), E C x 
 
, can be represented 
in a continuous or in a discrete formulation. Thus, if flood damage  ,C f IC     for 
changes in flows is monotonically increasing, 
   , ,C f IC f IC
dIC
f IC
     
 
 0, the changes 
in the expected flood damage with increasing IC allowances could be convex 
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   , ,
0
S
s
s
C f IC f IC
dIC
f IC
E ds
IC

        
   
 . Thus, it would be reasonable to assume that 
changes in the expected flood damage for changes in flow would be convex. 
The proposed market models use discrete storm scenarios and focus on such storms as 
the main source of uncertainty. The flood damage is represented by the flood cost function 
in the TSSP market model, which may be non-convex. A piecewise approximation is 
calculated for the damage function. Furthermore, the market can deal with a non-convex 
damage function (monotonic increment condition) as will be presented in Chapter 4 and 
Appendix B 
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Chapter 3 
 
3 DETERMINISTIC MARKET FOR IC ALLOWANCES 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This Chapter presents a smart market design (Det_MarketIC) for IC allowances which is 
based on one extreme storm event. This market is cleared by a LP model which 
incorporates capped points at stream and channel locations as desired thresholds in rural 
and urban places, and impact coefficients from each participant. 
The market is a net pool formulation. In the net pool formulation, participants specify 
demands and offers based on their initial positions which correspond to a status quo of 
current IC allowances in their property. Thus, participants are bidding from an initial IC 
allowance to a desired IC allowance. 
Participants trade in IC allowances by land use, such as 1 ha of mixed forests and 
crops. An IC allowance is a tradable permit to use a specific IC allowance in a specific area 
for the allowance term ($/ha for a specific impervious cover). The area is the continuous 
decision variable. The IC allowance terms may be long or short. We assume IC allowances 
last for a short time such as 1 or 2 year, however, the optimum IC allowance period should 
be evaluated for the SO. Much of the analysis in this thesis can also apply for longer 
periods. Participants can bid for changes in advance, which allows them to plan their IC 
allowances throughout a year or longer. Those actions can be linked to contracts, which 
stipulate future physical actions on the land regarding IC allowance, or equivalent 
imperviousness at a specific time. Participants whose IC allowance may not match the 
current land use (based on a reference usage discussed in Chapter 8) as well as those who 
desire to develop new projects can also participate in the market. Thus, participants will 
trade IC allowances which correspond to specific land use (imperviousness) or BMPs and 
area (for instance, 1 hectare) which is part of a specific region (e.g., their farm) across time 
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periods. The catchment moisture condition affects runoff; thus, the antecedent moisture 
condition (AMC) has to be assumed. The IC would be estimated based on a uniform 
moisture condition AMC II (SCS 1985; Haan et al. 1994). 
The number of periods in a given auction, the length of each period, and the timing of 
the auction will be called the ‘auction schedule’. The storm period corresponds to elapsed 
time during a storm. The auction period corresponds to elapsed time between opportunities 
to trade land use. The IC allowance period corresponds to the length of time of the 
associated right. The thesis will focus on one auction period, which would depend on the 
hydrological seasons and the main economic activities in the catchment. For instance, in a 
catchment comprised mainly of farms, the market would run with regard to the agricultural 
seasons, i.e., two to four times per year; while in an urban area, the market may run 
monthly. Determining the best action time period is likely to be based on regular review by 
the authority. A full discussion of this appears later in this chapter. 
Equivalent IC allowances can be estimated for runoff controlling technologies and/or 
BMPs. If the market were to choose which technology each participant should use, the 
model would have integer decision variables and would be non-convex, probably resulting 
in non-supporting prices (O'Neill et al. 2005). However, decisions about technologies and 
IC allowances are private, so we allow any bid to be fractionally met. Therefore, if a 
participant offering to control runoff using BMPs obtained only three quarters of the 
equivalent IC allowance, that would mean they had not offered a low enough price; 
however, this participant could sell the next quarter or sell back the unused allowance in 
the following auction period. 
Outside the market, participants may apply different options to control their runoff, 
while satisfying the System Operator (SO) rules; thus, they would not worsen their runoff 
hydrograph. Where a participant did not meet their obligations, penalties would apply. 
These options could be expensive, which could encourage participating in the market. 
Thus, participants could trade in the market and buy (sell) impervious areas; however, 
participants could not buy (sell) more rights than their initial area, nor could they finish 
with an IC allowance different that their initial area. 
A change of imperviousness and technology might increase or reduce the runoff from 
the property, raising or reducing penalties if a participant does not comply with 
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obligations. To simplify calculations, the SO could develop a web site where participants 
could estimate their IC allowance for different land uses and options. 
The SO will need to validate the impervious surface for each property and for each 
participant in the catchment. Different methods could be used for this purpose. For 
instance, the manager could use a satellite map to estimate the imperviousness of the area 
as was used by Dougherty et al. (2004). In any event, the manager needs to be aware of the 
specific land use to estimate the impact flow coefficients for each property. However, how 
the SO might go about this is outside the scope of this thesis. 
The SO needs to specify the storm event upon which the market will be based. 
Different storms indicate the risks that the SO would address. For instance, 100 mm and 
200 mm in 24 hours may be established in the dry and wet seasons respectively. Short IC 
allowance periods, i.e., the length of time of the associated right, would encourage 
participation. However, participants who desire to change their impacts permanently would 
need to acquire long allowance periods with impacts estimated across the whole allowance 
periods. 
Section 3.2 discusses stepwise demand and supply. Section 3.3 discusses clearing the 
market. Section 3.4 presents a primal formulation of the market model, and analyses the 
market pricing and the trade conditions. Section 3.4.1 describes bid formation.  Section 
3.4.2 presents settlements for participants. Section 3.4.3 is price a analysis. Section 3.4.4 
presents implications of trading. Section 3.4.5 describes locational prices. Section 3.4.6 
discusses operator revenue. Section 3.4.7 discusses the frequency in the auction schedule. 
Section 3.4.8 analyses the planning horizon. Section 3.4.9 discusses selection of storms to 
establish the market. Section 3.5 presents an alternative market formulation, and includes 
price analysis and trade conditions. Section 3.6 presents settlements for participants. 
Section 3.7 compares two clearing model formulations. Section 3.8 presents a short 
discussion of competitiveness in the market for IC allowance. Final remarks and 
conclusions are presented in Section 3.9. 
3.2 Demand and supply 
Demand and supply describe the maximum willingness to buy or sell IC allowances. 
Demand and supply will be represented by tranches or steps, corresponding to prices 
associated with area of different impervious levels. Therefore, market bids are required to 
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be defined in this form. By aggregating individual demands and supplies, total demand and 
supply can be characterised. Models with nonlinear demand and supply curves could be 
solved using nonlinear programming, avoiding the need for multistep supply and demand 
curves. If supply curves are not monotonically non-decreasing or demand curves re not 
monotonically non-increasing, however, nonlinear models may suffer from non-convexity 
and non-supporting prices. This would also be true with linear approximations that deal 
with the non-convexities issues using binary variables. 
 
Figure 3-1 Piecewise linear approximation of demand and supply curve. ,
D
i bQ  and ,
D
i bP  
represents the demanded area (ha) from participant i and price in tranche b; ,
S
j bQ  and ,
S
j bP  
represents the supplied area (ha) from participant j and price in tranche b. 
 
Figure 3-1 illustrates the stair-wise linear approximation of the demand and supply. 
Because properties located at different places in the catchment have different effects on the 
stage flow and stage flood (based on the linear coefficient that summarise the runoff and 
flow routing relationship), the demand and supply curves represent normalised areas (ha), 
which account for the flows at flooding areas and translate the prices and area into prices 
for an effective area. For instance, participant i desires to increase the impervious level to 
“crop” with CN 70 in the first 0.5 ha ( ,1
D
iQ ) and bids at $2/ha ( ,1
D
iP ). This represents the first 
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step or tranche b in the demand. Additionally, he/she demands the next 0.25 hectares (
,2
D
iQ ) 
to “crop” with CN 70 of area allowance at $1.5/ha (
,2
D
iP ) in the second tranche, and so on. 
 
3.3 Clearing the Det_MarketIC 
Matching buy and sell bids requires a comparison between demand and supply, bid 
prices (buy and sell), and impacts (flows). The market objective accounts for the difference 
in the integrals of the demand D(A) and supply S(A) curves       
Q
D A IC S A IC , 
where A is area (ha) with imperviousness levels related to IC allowances. These allowances 
and changes for trading are translated into aggregated flows by time t at different places k 
in the catchment,   ,t kQ A IC . Thus, changes in imperviousness will change the status 
quo,   0,i kQ A IC , of flows that could be noticed in the catchment. (These marginal 
changes can be represented by "H" (see Section 2.6 in Chapter 2 and Section 3.4)). The 
aggregated flows correspond to individual impacting flows (hydrographs) from 
participants located at different places in the catchment; these participants could notice 
different impacting flows related to their imperviousness level in their properties. 
 Nonlinear demand and supply curves could be solved using nonlinear programming, 
but possible problems with non-convexity and non-supporting prices could be faced. 
Participants could try to trade the same level of imperviousness with similar prices, but 
their bids may not match due to different impacting flows at control points. Figure 3-2 
illustrates flows patterns with two levels of IC allowances (1 and 2) for different locations 
(A and B) and hence different flows from them. In the illustration, participant A wishes to 
reduce from level 1 to 2 and participant B wishes to increase from 2 to 1. Bid prices for 
reducing and increasing IC allowances would be the same; however, because the two 
participants have different flows by time, the trade could not be cleared between them. 
Participant A may reduce IC allowance, and participant B could probably not change IC 
allowances if flow capacities are bounded at their peak flow time 2. 
Additionally, participants whose demand prices are too high or offer prices too low will 
not have their bids accepted. To clear the market, the SO must adjust the supply and 
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demand according to the impacts, especially at points with flooding problems. Thus, prices 
will be associated with impacts at different places in the catchment. 
 
Figure 3-2 Flow patterns with locations (A and B) at control point. In the graph, 1 ,p Aq , 
2
,p Aq ,
1
,p Bq and
2
,p Bq  are the individual peak flows with 
1
,p Aq = 
1
,p Bq , and 
2
,p Aq = 
2
,p Bq ; tb and 
tb’ are the time peaks for location A and B respectively; and tb and tb’ are the total time 
duration of flows for 1 and 2, tb= tb’. 
 
To deal with the complexity, the SO uses a linear program that incorporates the hydraulic 
and hydrologic process in routed channels and streams. The linear program clears the 
market and estimates allocations and prices for each participant. The clearing prices 
depend on individual impacts at control points, and the nodal prices at control points, 
which are determined according to the supply and demand for changing IC allowances in 
the catchment. 
In Det_MarketIC1, each participant sells their initial IC allowance and buys their 
desired final IC allowance condition. Thus, for a participant to buy 10 ha of concrete, they 
would simultaneously sell their initial 10 ha of grass. The total area of IC allowance 
purchased must equal the total area of IC allowance sold, even though the flows at control 
points are different. 
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As will be discussed in Section 3.4.2 and across this thesis, the settlement from each 
participant depends on the initial allocation or a specific reference usage [land use] j = m. 
Thus, participants will not face only the price for the final allocation,, 
, , ,
N J K T t
i j k t ki j k t
H     , the SO may not be revenue adequate in each trading auction. 
Actually, the settlement and the applied price for participant would account for their final 
and initial allowance  , , , , ,
N J K T t t
i j k i j m k t ki j k t
H H      and the SO is guaranteed to be 
revenue adequate or neutral only if the catchment is fully allocated. The SO´s rental will be 
analysed in Section 3.4.6, and the following section describes the market model. 
3.4 A LP impacting/pricing model Det_MarketIC1 
This section presents a mathematical model for a market associated with a single extreme 
storm event. The specified storm event establishes the impact coefficients at control points, 
with local linearisation of the channel flow capacities. The market is assumed to be 
perfectly competitive, i.e., participants do not exercise any market power. Additionally, the 
base flows6 in channels and streams are kept relatively constant over time. This assumes 
that the SO defines thresholds at control points. Control points have no individual 
constraints other than capped threshold capacities. The thresholds are maximum flow 
levels in the channel or established maximum flood conditions related to the extreme 
storm. The model will be as follows: 
Indices 
i   = Participant, 1,…,N. 
j,m,n,p = Land use type (CN or imperviousness), j= 1,…,J. 
b  = Bid step, b=1,...,B. 
k,l  = Control point (node), k=1,...,K. 
t,u,r  = Storm time period, t=1,…,T. 
Parameters 
,i jA  =  Total area of IC allowance type j owned by participant i (ha). 
                                                 
6
 The flow of water entering stream channels from groundwater sources in the drainage (hydrology). 
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max
, ,i j bD = Maximum area in IC allowance type j (ha) that participant i in bid step b is willing 
to buy at price 
, ,
D
i j bP . 
max
, ,i j bS  = Maximum area in IC allowance type j (ha) that participant i in bid step b is willing 
to sell at price 
, ,
S
i j bP . 
, ,
D
i j bP  = Demand price ($/ha) for IC allowance type j from participant i and bid step b. This 
is the maximum that participant i is willing to pay for a specific IC allowance type j 
and bid step b. 
, ,
S
i j bP  = Bid price ($/ha) for IC allowance type j from participant i and bid step b. This is the 
minimum that participant i is willing to pay for a specific IC allowance type j and 
bid step b. 
kL =  Maximum allowable flow (volume/time) at channel control point k. 
,i jR = Total area with IC allowance type j from participant i that is not traded (ha).  
0
,k tQ = Initial total flows at control point k and time t. These flows are related to the initial 
IC allowance and the chosen storm scenario.  
1
, ,
t u
i j kH
  = Marginal flow impact at control point k of IC allowance type j across time t from 
participant i at the end of time t –u+1. This corresponds to the hydrograph. u is the 
lag time between commencement of the storm and when the flow reaches the 
control point (volume/time ha). This coefficient relates conditions of the 
participant’s property to the marginal flow impact at control points given the storm 
scenario long the time. This linear coefficient is likely to depend on the initial IC 
allowance conditions in the catchment, so it should be updated as IC allowances 
changes to improve accuracy. If participant i does not impact control point k, then 
, ,
t
i j kH = 0. 
Decision variables 
, ,i j bqsell  = Area in hectares of IC allowance type j and bid steps b sold by participant i. 
, ,i j bqbuy = Area in hectares of IC allowance type j and bid steps b bought by participant i. 
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,i jg  =  Total area of IC allowance type j for participant i (ha). 
Dual variables 
,i j =  Price for participant i and land of IC allowance type j ($/ha). 
,t k  =  Clearing price or nodal price. Price to impact at control point k, time t ($/ 
volume/time). 
Model: Det_MarketIC1 
Maximize , , , , , , , ,
1 1 1 1 1 1
N J B N J B
D S
i j b i j b i j b i j b
i j b i j b
P qbuy P qsell
     
        [3.1] 
Subject to 
0 ≤ , ,i j bqbuy ≤ 
max
, ,i j bD ,   i,j,b         : , ,i j b
 ,
, ,i j b
     [3.2] 
0 ≤ , ,i j bqsell ≤ 
max
, ,i j bS ,  i,j,b         : , ,i j b
 , , ,i j b
     [3.3] 
, , , , ,
1 1
B B
i j b i j b i j
b b
qbuy qsell A
 
   = ,i jg ,  i,j   : ,i j  (free)   [3.4] 
, , , ,
1 1 1 1
0
J B J B
i j b i j b
j b j b
qbuy qsell
   
     ,  i  : i  (free).   [3.5] 
0
,k tQ  + 
1
, , ,
1 1
N J
t u
i j k i j
i j
H g 
   +
1
, , ,
1 1
N J
t u
i j k i j
i j
H R 
    ≤ kL , t, k : ,t k   [3.6] 
,i jg  free.                    [3.7] 
Explanation: 
[3.1] The objective function maximizes the gains for trading IC allowance. Changes in 
the objective are the appropriate measure of changes in welfare (assuming the 
market is competitive enough that offer/bids reflect marginal costs). It is recognised 
that participants may attempt to bid strategically; but such an issue is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
[3.2]  Total IC allowance bought in each tranche is bounded by demand quantities. 
[3.3]  Total IC allowance sold in each tranche is bounded by bid quantities. 
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[3.4]  The final area of IC allowance type j of participant i equals the total cleared (dual 
price
,i j ). Thus, if participant i desires to change to j and their initial condition is m 
this constraint will be qbuyi,j = gi,j and qselli,m + Ai,m = gi,m. 
[3.5]  The total IC allowance sold for each participant must equal the total IC allowance 
bought. This constraint ensures that all participants keep IC allowance for their 
whole land area. That is, the number of hectares owned by participant i is constant. 
For instance, if a participant sold 0.25 hectares with 40% IC allowance, she/he 
should buy 0.25 hectares with other IC allowance. 
[3.6]  The total flow at control point k in time t must be less than the target flow in the 
channel. This is only one of the many representations that could be employed in 
this constraint. The left side of the constraint assumes a reference point related to 
the actual existing IC allowances (land uses). Thus, if participants are not changing 
IC allowances, the initial flows at control point k and time t is: 
1
, , ,
1 1
N J
t u
i j k i j
i j
H A 
   +
1
, , ,
1 1
N J
t u
i j k i j
i j
H R 
    
This constraint also accounts for net changes in impacting flows from participant i. 
The net change in flow is a consequence of the changes between the impact from 
the participant’s final IC allowance of type j, 1, , ,
1
J
t u
i j k i j
j
H g 
 , and the impact from 
their initial IC allowance type m, 
1
, , ,
1
J
t u
i m k i m
j
H g 
 . For instance, if participant i is 
not changing IC allowance, then their impacting flow is 
1
, , ,
1
J
t u
i j m k i j m
j
H A  
 . If 
participant i is changing part of the IC allowance, then their impact will be 
1
, , ,1
J t u
i j k i jj
H g 
  for the new IC allowance type j, plus  
1
, , , ,
1
J
t u
i m k i m i j
j
H A g 

  for 
the IC allowance that remains with type m. Thus, the net change in total flows from 
participant i is 
1
, , ,
1
J
t u
i j m k i j m
j
H A  
 −
1
, , ,
1
J
t u
i j k i j
j
H g 

 
  
1
, , , ,
1
J
t u
i m k i m i j
j
H A g 

 
 . 
Equivalent notation about this condition was proposed by Raffensperger et al. 
(2009), Raffensperger and Cochrane (2010), Prabodanie et al. (2010) and Pinto et 
al. (2012). The positive or negative net changes will be discussed next in the dual 
price analysis and trade implications. 
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[3.7]  Buying and selling quantities of IC allowances are non-negative, and these non-
negativity constraints will limit the final allocation of IC allowance, 
,i jg . So 
imposing additional limits on gi,j will over-constrain the problem, creating a 
degeneracy which could compromise prices. 
The lower bounds from equations [3.2] and [3.3] have negative dual variables, but such 
duals are represented in a canonical way, with duals with positive signs, i.e., 
, ,i j bqbuy   0 
and 
, ,i j bqsell   0, and so 
( )
, , 0i j b
   and ( ), , 0i j b
   respectively. Positive , ,i j b
  and 
, ,i j b
  will be conveyed. 
3.4.1 Bid formation 
The model formulation is based on bids from participants wanting to make changes to their 
IC allowances. Thus, participants trade from their initial IC allowances to the final, and for 
doing that they need to bid simultaneously for both buying and selling conditions. This 
condition of buying and selling forces the participant to face a price difference from their 
initial IC allowance. The change in IC allowance considers pairs of these clearing prices 
µi,j – µi,m, representing a change of 1 unit from type m to type j. 
Participants located at similar places that are changing similar IC allowances could 
present different bids, such as from $1,000/ha to $1,050/ha, and another participant from 
$0/ha to $50/ha. The market model accounts only for the differences, and not the absolute 
bids. 
To simplify bids, the SO could require that bid prices for the initial condition be zero, 
so participants would bid only for their increment or reduction of IC allowance from the 
initial allowance. Participants that want to increase allowances should bid a high positive 
price and those who desire to reduce negative prices. This price implication will be 
discussed in following sections and in Chapter 8. 
3.4.2 Settlement with market model Det_MarketIC1 
The model will allocate efficiently with prices 
,i j  for each participant. The settlement, ri, 
for participant i for the changes in IC allowances is ri = 
, , , , ,
1 1 1
J B B
i j i j b i j b
j b b
qbuy qsell
  
  
    . The settlement considers that participants 
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have rights for the initial IC allowances. Participant i is a net payer if ri > 0, and a net 
receiver if ri < 0. 
Because, the participant i has an initial IC allowance allocation j=m, which can be 
decomposed in terms of impacting flows 
1
, ,
t e
i m kH
 
, by time t and control points k, and after 
clearing the market, could obtain the IC allowance j=p with their impacting flows 1, ,
t u
i p kH
  , 
the settlement becomes as follows: 
 1 1, , , , , , ,
, 1 ,
J K T
t u t e
i p k i p i m k i m t k
m p j k t u e
H g H g    
  
           [3.8] 
3.4.3 Price analysis 
The dual variable 
,i j  in constraint [3.4] is the marginal value to the market for another 
unit of IC allowance type j for participant i. This value corresponds to the cost to the rest of 
the system, when the SO allows an additional unit of IC allowance type j to participant i. 
As would be expected, the LP dual shows that prices are determined by the flow impacts at 
control points, where limits are binding. 
The IC allowances for participant i are valued at price ,i j  and consequently the price 
can be re-expressed as an equivalent set of “constraint rights”, each one with a particular 
shadow price, 
,t k , where individual flows are impacting at time t in control point k. 
However, the price used to charge each participant depends on the price differences 
, ,i j i m  as will be analysed in the following section. 
The dual price ,t k  in constraint [3.6] represents the improvement in economic surplus 
if the SO allowed another unit of capacity in the channel at control point k. This shadow 
price also represents the congestion or capacity price, as in the electricity and the gas 
markets (Hogan 2002; Nesbitt and Scotcher 2009). 
Because there are no other constraints, the dual can be represented as 
1
, , , ,
1
T K
t u
i j i j k t k
t u k
H  
 
  . Although this price considers only a simple catchment 
market, the price could be decomposed across sub-catchments. In this case, the price for 
each participant will be ,i j 
, 1
, , ,
1
K T
t u
i j k t k
k t u
H  
   +
1
, , ,
Z T
t u
i j k z t k
k z t u
H  
   , which 
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represents the value for impacting the catchment plus the value for impacting the common 
control points by time7 (see the full dual formulation Det_MarketIC1.2 in Appendix A). 
In general, this price 
,i j  
will not match the demand and supply price offered by 
participant i, on any step of their discharge demand and supply curve. (Bids are supra or 
infra “marginal” bid steps, discussed later in the chapter.) 
The dual variable 
, ,i j b
  in constraint [3.2] represents the marginal consumer surplus to 
participant i who is demanding a new IC allowance type j. This dual can be decomposed as 
follows (see Appendix A for the full dual formulation in a canonical representation): 
,i j = , ,
D
i j bP  , ,i j b
 + , ,i j b
  i              [3.9] 
If , ,i j bqbuy > 0, then by complementary slackness, , ,i j b
  = 0, so the dual price 
,i j  
becomes 
,i j = , ,
D
i j bP  , ,i j b
  i . This is the marginal value to participant i from another unit of land 
with IC allowance type j, given the opportunity cost of the land area i . The dual price i  
corresponds to the value of the area balance of IC allowance for participant i, or the 
opportunity cost for their marginal land use. The value , ,
D
i j bP  ,i j  i  is the marginal 
surplus that participant i would have from an additional unit, minus the opportunity cost 
for a land area balance. Following trading, the participant’s land must retain IC allowances. 
The dual variable , ,i j b
  in constraint [3.3] represents the competitive rent from 
participant i who offers a specific IC allowance. The dual can be decomposed as follows: 
,i j  = , ,
S
i j bP + , ,i j b

, ,i j b
  
i              [3.10] 
If , ,i j bqsell > 0, then by complementary slackness, , ,i j b
 = 0, and 
,i j = , ,
S
i j bP  
+ , ,i j b

 
 i . 
The equation corresponds to the marginal offer surplus or the marginal competitive rent for 
those who are reducing IC using technologies to control runoff. This equation matches the 
value of another unit of IC allowance (or an equivalent IC for using BMPs or 
                                                 
7 
1
, , ,
1 1
N J
t u
i j k z i j k
i j
H g L 
 
   : ,t z , where 1, ,t ui j k zH    is the impact coefficient at the common control 
point z (which may be the outlet of the catchment), and kL  is the maximum allowable flow at the common 
control point z in time t. 
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technologies), in terms of extra marginal competitive rent 
,i j  , ,
S
i j bP  for participant i, plus 
the price i that participant i will face for trading their IC, given he/she must keep the same 
area. Figure 3-3 illustrates demand and supply curves for two IC allowances, when a 
participant trades both areas, while retaining the same land balance. 
 
Figure 3-3 Clearing and dual variable values in a trade condition for two impervious levels 
j and j’. D and S represent demand and supply. QD and Q
S
 correspond to the demand and 
the supply area respectively. 
 
The sign of 
i dependents on whether the SO allows a unit unbalance in the area of IC 
allowances, although the final balance from constraint [3.5] would be violated. With the 
[3.5] condition, the SO would ensure that all participants retained the same area, and 
landholders without IC allowances would not inject runoff into the system (as free riders). 
Det_MarketIC1.3 in Appendix A develops alternative primal and dual formulations to 
analyse prices. The model Det_MarketIC1.3 decomposes 
i  into i
 and 
i
  prices, which 
represent the extra values if the SO allowed participant i imbalance in one unit of IC 
allowance due to extra sale and purchase respectively. Interestingly, the decomposed 
values depend on the level of allocation in the catchment. This area condition affects the 
marginal competitive rent and consumer surplus from participants: 
,i j  = , ,
D
i j bP  , ,i j b
 + (
i
 
i
 ) + , ,i j b
            [3.11] 
,i j  = , ,
S
i j bP + , ,i j b
  + (
i
 
i
 )  , ,i j b
            [3.12] 
1
D
i , j ,Q
 
2
D
i , j ,Q
 
1
S
i , j',P
 
1
S
i , j',Q
 
2
S
i , j',Q  
Price $ 
i , j
 
i , j'
 
i
 
i , j ,b

 
i , j ,b
  
1
D
i , j ,P
 
2
D
i, j ,P
 
2
S
i , j',P
 
Quantity (Q) 
D 
S 
Price $ 
  
 
67 
If the catchment were fully allocated, i.e., constraint [3.6] were binding before trading, 
expected prices would be 
i
 = 0 and 
i
  0. These dual prices correspond to the cost of 
keeping participant i with the same land area, even though the additional IC allowance may 
increase the total economic surplus. 
On the other hand, in an over-allocated catchment (constraint [3.6] was violated before 
trading,), market feasibility and effects on individual participants is not at all clear. There 
would be participants with 
i
   0 and 
i
  = 0, and others with 
i
  = 0 and 
i
   0. 
However, a dominant 
i
   0 and 
i
  = 0 would be expected for which the total trading 
surplus would increase. 
3.4.4 Trading implication 
The model selects the differences in consumer and supply trading surplus by a merit order, 
because participants are trading their initial and desired final IC allowances. However, 
those bidding higher do not necessarily buy and those bidding lower do not necessarily 
sell. The model takes into account the differences in demand and supply bids, adjusted by 
their impacts at control points, and the land balance. Equations [3.11] and [3.12] show the 
trade condition, which can be arranged as follows. 
+ ,i j  ,i m + , ,i j b

, ,i j b
 + , ,i m b

, ,i m b
 = , ,
D
i j bP , ,
S
i m bP         [3.13] 
Then, rearranging Equation [3.13]: 
, ,i j b

 
+ , ,i m b
 = , ,
D
i j bP  , ,
S
i m bP   1 1, , , , ,
1
K T
t u t e
i j k i m k t k
k t u
H H    
 
   , ,i j b  , ,i m b   [3.14] 
If 0 < , ,i j bqbuy < 
max
, ,i j bD , so 0 < , ,i j bqsell < 
max
, ,i j bS , this makes its variable "basic" so it sets the 
price, then the optimal change in IC allowances for participant i lies in the middle of step 
b, and this makes i “marginal”. This means that neither the upper nor lower bound of that 
demand and supply curve step will be binding. So, by complementary slackness, 
, ,i j b
 = , ,i j b
 = , ,i m b
 = , ,i m b
 = 0. Consequently, equation [3.13] implies ,i j ,i m = 
, ,
D
i j bP , ,
S
i m bP , for that demand and supply curve step. 
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, ,i j b

 
+ 
, ,i m b

 
represents the total surplus to participant i for changing the impervious level 
from m to j; the price differential 
, ,
D
i j bP  , ,
S
i m bP  is the opportunity cost to pay (receive) due 
to changing the impervious level or using technology; and 
 1 1, , , , ,
1
K T
t u t e
i j k i m k t k
k t u
H H    
 
    are the clearing prices at channel points adjusted by 
individual impact coefficients, which are all positive in the Det_MarketIC1 formulation. A 
participant may change the IC allowance if the opportunity cost is at least covered by the 
net clearing value of trade, given the land impervious balance. For instance, if a participant 
wants to change IC allowances, the model accounts for the net differences in bids, 
irrespective of the absolute value of either bid. Clearing prices do not change if relative 
differences do not change. This may look peculiar, if we tried to compare bids between 
participants, and would make it difficult to monitor abuse of market power. But it could 
still be mathematically and conceptually correct. 
Participants that desire to reduce the level of imperviousness, n p , would have a 
surplus for trading as in Equation [3.14]. For participants that reduce IC allowance, the 
model takes into account only the net bid price  , , , ,D Si p b i n bP P ; thus, the total marginal 
surplus, 
,( , ),i n p b , for changes in IC allowances from n to p becomes: 
,( , ),i n p b = , ,i p b
 + , ,i n b
 = , ,
D
i p bP  , ,
S
i n bP  1 1, , , , ,
1
K T
t u t e
i p k i n k t k
k t u
H H    
 
   + , ,i p b  + , ,i n b   [3.15] 
For participants that desire to increase impervious level, m p , the total surplus will be 
,( , ),i m p b = , ,i p b
 + , ,i n b
 = , ,
D
i p bP  , ,
S
i m bP  1 1, , , , ,
1
K T
t u t e
i p k i m k t k
k t u
H H    
 
   + , ,i p b  + , ,i m b    [3.16] 
Another implication of the bids is related to the changes in IC allowance and the changes 
in impacting flows. Thus, lands close to the control point should pay almost nothing if 
runoffs are quick, and so impacting flow avoids the peak. In this case, bids should be 
carefully established, because increasing IC allowance would not necessarily imply that 
they should pay more. In fact, they should actually be paid for covering their land to get 
quick runoff. Land far from the control point should pay nothing, because its runoff is so 
slow that it avoids the peak flow at the control point, and they should probably be paid 
for delaying flows further. However, in most cases, increments in IC allowances increase 
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the runoff-volume and also flows at control points. Appendix B shows an example of 
changes in IC and flows. 
3.4.5 Locational-nodal prices 
After clearing the market, participants i and l with similar impacts in the subcatchment, 
will most face similar prices when they change IC allowances from m to j, 
 , ,i j i m    , ,l j l m   or 
 1 1, , , , ,
1
K T
t u t e
i j k i m k t k
k t u
H H    
 
    1 1, , , , ,1
K T
t u t e
l j k l m k t k
k t u
H H    
 
  . The locational and 
spatial effects correspond to the accumulated impact at different control points (clearing 
prices 
,t k  at control point k and time t). Figure 3-4 illustrates subcatchments with similar 
clearing prices. For instance, participants located in A with similar impacts 
1
, ,
T
t u
i j k
t u
H  
 
1
, ,
T
t u
l j k
t u
H  
  would face the price for IC allowance type j
 
1 1
1
, , ,
T
t u
i j A t A
t u
H  
 1 1
1
, , ,
T
t u
i j B t B
t u
H  

 2 21, , ,
T
t u
i j C t C
t u
H  

 1, , ,
T
t u
i j F t F
t u
H  

 . 
Alternatively, participants with small properties in the same subcatchment D1, but with 
different impervious levels, will probably face similar prices, because 
1
, ,
T
t u
i j k
t u
H  
 
1
, ,
T
t u
l j k
t u
H  
 . This is expected because small differences in imperviousness 
do not significantly change the impacting flows 
1
, ,
T
t u
i j k
t u
H  
  at control point k. 
The locational prices mean that participants with similar imperviousness in different 
subcatchments would face different prices. For instance, participant i in subcatchment D 
with IC allowance type j would face a price 
1 1
1
, , ,
T
t u
i j D t D
t u
H  

  1, , ,
T
t u
i j F t F
t u
H  
 , which 
could be different than the price for the same level of imperviousness j in subcatchment A, 
1 1
1
, , ,
T
t u
i j A t A
t u
H  
 1 1
1
, , ,
T
t u
i j B t B
t u
H  

 2 21, , ,
T
t u
i j C t C
t u
H  

  1, , ,
T
t u
i j F t F
t u
H  
 . This 
observation has also been studied and reported in the electricity and gas literature on 
locational and spatial spot prices (Bohn et al. 1984; Hogan et al. 1996; Chattopadhyay 
2004; Midthun et al. 2009; Nesbitt and Scotcher 2009; Pepper et al. 2012). 
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A1
B1
C1
D1
C2
F
 
Figure 3-4 Example catchment with sub-catchments A, B, C, and D. A1, B1, C1, C2, D1, 
and F are control points where flooding causes problems. B1, C2 and F are common control 
points between subcatchments. 
 
3.4.6 Operator revenue: Initial rights 
Initial IC allowances affect revenue distribution for the SO. After clearing the market, the 
SO will receive a net payment NP = , , , , ,
1 1 1 1
N J B B
i j i j b i j b
i j b b
qsell qbuy
   
  
     , 
which corresponds to a rental of individual valued impacts from participants over time and 
control points,  1 1, , , , , , ,
1 , 1 ,
n J K T
t u t e
i p k i p i m k i m t k
i m p j k t u e
H g H g    
   
    . 
The auction may not be revenue neutral. In a deterministic formulation, Prabodanie 
(2010) discusses the initial distribution of loading permits for a nitrate market, noticing that 
a SO may achieve feasibility with non-negative revenue and infeasible initial conditions 
with negative revenue. The infeasibility condition is related to the revenue, but an 
infeasibility solution could also be achieved if total reducing impacts are above the defined 
thresholds. Additionally, the author above pointed out that the surplus is related to 
payments among participants derived from receptor capacity. A similar issue will be faced 
  
 
71 
in a market for IC, where initial allowances could produce similar consequences, in 
revenue and feasibility, according to whether the catchment is under or over-allocated. 
With an over-allocated catchment, the SO may be a net payer, NP < 0, reaching a solution; 
however, the solution may be infeasible with an over-allocated catchment. Even though all 
participants reduce allowances, still impacting flows are above the capped control point 
limits. A scaling factor will be proposed and discussed in Chapter 8. 
If the initial set of IC allowances and so the flow rights in the catchment is feasible, i.e., 
1
, , ,
1 1
N J
t u
i j k i j
i j
H A 
    ≤ kL  t,k, then NP could be non-negative. Therefore, if the SO 
owns the receptor capacities and participants need to change or to increase IC, and hence 
shift flows without capacity rights, then the SO is a net receiver when selling capacity 
constraints,  1, , ,1 1 1 0
K T N J t u
k i j k t kk t u i j
L H  
   
  
       and so the SO reaches revenue 
adequacy if at least in one control point k, the SO is a net seller 
 1, , ,1 1 0
T N J t u
k i j k t kt u i j
L H  
  
     for k. 
If IC allowances from participants and their corresponding initial rights bind all the 
capacity constraints, 
1
, , ,
1 1
N J
t u
i j k i j
i j
H A 
   = kL , t,k, or the impacting flows do not 
change the period of binding capacity, 1
, , ,1 1
0
N J t u
k i j k i ji j
L H A 
 
     t,k, the SO reaches 
revenue neutrality  1, , ,1 1 1 0
K T N J t u
k i j k t kk t u i j
L H  
   
  
      , and then NP0. That 
means, the SO could not sell any changes in flows at control point k. On the other hand, the 
SO could also reach revenue neutrality if in a control point is a net payer and in another a 
net seller, but both payments are balanced, so NP0. 
Initial allocations of long-term IC allowances may exceed channel capacities. To solve 
this problem, the manager could try to buy rights in the market; hence, the expected level 
of floods and risk could be managed. Alternatively, the SO may try to scale the long-term 
IC allowances, however, if he/she defined rights for the impervious levels, scaling may be 
judged in court. Both solutions could be expensive. Scaling will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
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3.4.7 Auction period 
An appropriate auction schedule needs to be determined that suits participants and 
authorities. For instance, the electricity markets in Australia, New York, and California 
clear every 5 minutes with partial optimization every 30 seconds in Australia and New 
York; in contrast, New Zealand has a half hour clearing market. The Victoria gas market is 
cleared every day with intervals to estimate prices and the schedule (Pepper et al. 2012). 
To obtain an adequate auction frequency, many factors need to considered, including 
liquidity, expected demand, risk of flooding, and environmental requirements. These 
factors may also depend on location, i.e., rural and urban places may require different 
auction frequencies. 
The market may operate with short and long term allowances, and these allowances 
should be issued with clear expiry times. The time-based allowance would improve 
liquidity in the market. Raffensperger and Cochrane (2010) noted that a time-based 
allowance gives incentive to participate and to internalize the cost of the imperviousness in 
the catchment. 
Based on catchment requirements, the SO could choose a schedule which enables the 
desirable allocations while managing the risk and expected demand. A seasonal right with 
an annual auction may be more active and self-hedging against flooding. The manager 
should also consider whether IC allowance periods are short or long. 
In the market, a short-term IC allowance may work for those who require temporary 
land use actions or changes, e.g., land development for construction of real estate, and land 
cultivation for establishing crops. Thus, participants could link their temporary changes 
with their required IC allowances. Those participants who could not obtain allowances in 
previous auctions could alternatively buy short term allowances. 
A short auction period (more frequent auctions) is likely to have higher transaction 
costs. If participants cannot bid in advance for future periods, a longer auction period may 
delay projects, so the opportunity cost to develop would increase. Participants who desire 
to change the imperviousness level would have to wait a long time before they could 
participate in the market, and such delay could change any decision to invest. The IC 
allowance period should reasonably match the participants' land use project. 
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In the long-term, sellers and buyers could trade land cover allowances for long-term 
changes in IC allowances, especially in urban areas. These IC allowances could tie project 
lifetimes with the time of the rights. Thus, long-term projects could be developed and a 
constant level of imperviousness could be ensured. However, long-term allowances may 
counter the desired long-term flood levels for the catchment planned by the SO, whereas 
short-term allowances allow management of such problems. 
While such developers above may provide high bids, there is no certainty of project 
success; accordingly, higher clearing prices could be an issue associated with such 
develop. Hence, buyers that need to change the level of imperviousness will try to move 
their actions to those periods with lower prices. The prices in the risky season would 
encourage other participants to develop short-term actions. Thus, a market with short-term 
IC allowances is likely to be more liquid than a market for long-term IC allowances. A 
long term market could be more liquid only if more are options available to participate. 
Thus, participants could often trade long term rights in each auctions, which could help 
investments. The market would be more contestable if there were no entry or exit barriers, 
no sunk costs, and participants could participate freely in the market (Evenden and 
Williams 2000). However, if trade is possible only for long term allowances with a long 
term auction period, the market may be illiquid discouraging investment. 
Participants could also trade their requirements for imperviousness in advance, e.g., one 
year, five years, or by season, which would generate more liquidity in the long-term 
market. Since participants could bid in advance throughout the planning horizon, BMPs 
could also be planned in advance. Such planning would ensure participants maintained the 
minimum level of imperviousness for the required long term. 
Having both long-term and short-term allowances traded together is likely to raise 
many operational issues. We do not address these further in this thesis. 
3.4.8 Planning horizon 
The model considers the set of extreme storms that could occur in the modelled allowance 
period. In the ‘deterministic model’ the planning horizon accounts for an established 
extreme event. 
The storm event determines the time component for the lagged effect of impacting 
flows at control points. Storm flows commonly impact for only short periods after a 
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rainfall event. Usually the storm period lasts hours or days, depending on the hydrological 
condition of the catchment. The model period should be longer than the lag periods of 
impacts at control points. 
If the market would account for a cumulative effect, as with sediments, the planning 
horizon must be defined carefully. For instance, Raffensperger et al. (2009) noted that a 
ground water market has an inter-temporal effect. The authors also noted that a ground 
water market might be held every week with bids for 52 weeks, being a one-year 
hydrological cycle. However, the constraints should consider periods beyond the 
hydrological cycle. The same time components were noted by Prabodanie et al. (2010), 
who analysed trading nutrients with different planning horizons in a market for nitrate. The 
authors observed that the market should account for the long-term effects at control points. 
Both authors agreed that market models should consider long-term constraints to avoid 
violating omitted constraints after the end of the market planning horizon. However, a 
market for IC allowances could not face this problem if the SO modelled storm for only 
one season, for an auction that traded IC allowances rights that had periods of longer than a 
season. 
The second point to be considered is the participants’ budget constraints, which depend 
on the IC allowance period. Participants make decisions about quantities and prices 
according to their budget constraints, IC allowance, service life of technologies and BMPs, 
risk aversion, income, etc. With a long IC allowance period, participants must estimate 
their bid over a long timeframe; however, they may not be able to pay up front for the 
whole period. Therefore, some participants may wish to bid for a short-allowance period, 
while others may bid for a long allowance period. 
As a consequence of budget constraints, when the allowances and capacity constraints 
belong to the SO, participants might present strategic bids with lower prices. On the other 
hand, if IC allowances belong to participants and few participants bid in the long term, 
there would probably be few transactions. 
Liquidity can be improved if participants have access to financial contracts such as 
contracts for differences, options, etc., as in the electricity market with financial 
transmission rights (FTR) (Hogan 2002). Long-term contracts could allow them to manage 
budget constraints, and to reduce the risk related to future prices. 
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Long term allowance periods may serve to ensure the long-term resource adequacy to 
control runoff. Thus, participants should tie their investments to the maximum capacities 
imposed by the SO. A long allowance period would help to deal with lead time for 
construction. Contracts could be established in the market for future actions or IC 
allowances. Thus, risks related to prices and quantities could be hedged for participants. 
These types of issues are important for a functioning market. However, we do not 
address them further in this thesis. 
3.4.9 Storms to establish short and long term markets 
Participants and the SO face different types of risk. Participants face uncertain prices, 
quantities, investment, and technology. The SO faces risk with security of the system, 
adjustability under any failures, failure to be revenue neutral, establishment of the storms, 
and flood damage for extreme rainfall events. 
A SO has the sensitive decision of choosing the storms used to design the markets. The 
decision would depend on the underlying storm probability distribution, the flooding cost, 
the level of risk that the SO desires, and the actual imperviousness of the catchment. Figure 
3-5 shows several examples of storm distributions. This figure illustrates the changes in the 
storm probability distribution by storm types over seasons (e.g., Plessis 2001). In the 
figure, Ed is the critical event that corresponds to a storm able to generate floods. Thus, if 
the SO chooses this storm, the market will cover any storm up to this event with a known 
probability. Ribaudo et al. (1999) noticed that any goals in terms of runoff had to be 
established in terms of probabilities of occurrences. 
Where auctions cover a single season, choosing the same storm for each season will 
lead to different probabilities that damage occurs by season. An alternative could be to 
choose a probability of damage and use a different storm for each season to deliver this 
level of risk. 
The storm decision will affect the impact coefficients at different control points. A 
market established on a modest storm event of, say, 60 mm rainfall in 24 hours, will have a 
modest runoff from each property, and the SO would allow relatively more IC in the 
catchment. However, with a greater storm, flooding would be increased, with larger 
impacts, so the SO would allow less IC for a given flood stage limitation. This could 
require reducing the imperviousness in the catchment, in case the catchment were over-
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allocated; however, this condition may not allow a clearing market solution. The SO might 
choose an extreme case storm Ed to establish the market. The SO should periodically re-
evaluate the cost of extreme flooding, with a view to defining which storm and which risk 
will define the markets. 
 
Figure 3-5 Seasonal probabilities at a specific place or catchment. Ed is a specific storm 
type, e.g., a storm of 100 mm in 24 hours, and  is the probability of a storm greater than 
the established storm event. 
 
Even though the SO could cover a range of storms, greater events would still affect the 
catchment. Accordingly, the SO should identify those, and evaluate the risk for flood 
damage, when establishing the market with a specific storm design. 
 Establishing a storm design is similar to the risk cost balancing problem in 
infrastructure design and flood protection (CSIRO 2000; Loucks et al. 2005; Jha et al. 
2012). The decision about the infrastructure capacity and so for the "storm design" is 
conditioned to the expected flood damage that could be faced in the area and the possible 
protecting benefit for the changes in infrastructure. Additionally, the benefit for 
improvement in infrastructure capacity could be noticed with the dual price in the market. 
Thus, an optimum storm design could be defined for the area. 
Storm (intensity) 
Probability 
Storm design, winter 
Ed 
1 
1   
Spring 
 
Summer 
 Autumn 
season 
Winter 
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3.5 An alternative LP pricing/impacting model Det_MarketIC2 
An alternative market model could be formulated considering trade for changes in IC 
allowance in the area rather than trading initial and final IC allowances such as 
Det_MarketIC1. The market formulation “Det_MarketIC2” will account for differences in 
IC allowances within the area, while adjusted changes in flows are calculated by the LP 
market model. If participants bid for the differences, it could avoid that the market 
accounts for the net differences in bids that was observed with the previous market model 
Det_MarketIC1. The impacting flow coefficients H in Det_MarketIC are positive, and the 
applied price for participant i accounts for the changes in impacting flows between the 
initial IC allowance and the final IC allowances, Equation [3.8]. With Det_MarketIC2, the 
market model considers marginal impacting flows at control points, and the coefficient H 
accounts for the marginal changes in impacting flows. That means, the H coefficient 
accounts for the marginal changes in flows between the initial IC allowances and the final 
IC allowances, and those could be positive or negative at each control point. 
Det_MarketIC1 and Det_MarketIC2 reach similar clearing prices if the market is 
competitive. 
Participants will trade IC allowance from an initial condition m to a final desired 
condition j; instead of selling m and buying j. In Det_MarketIC2, participants would sell if 
the IC allowance type j that they desire to reduce in the properties is lower than the initial 
IC allowance type n, n > j (or the equivalent IC for implementing the BMPs). This 
accounts for the changes in impacting flows at control points; in this case, the impacting 
flows are being increased. Participants would buy if the IC allowance type j that they 
desire to increase is greater than the initial IC allowance condition m, m < j. This assumes 
that participants have initial IC allowances and the increase in IC allowances increase 
impacting flows at control points. Participants buy (sell) via bidding in tranches; thus, a 
participant could demand (offer) more than one IC allowance change for their property. To 
simplify bidding, participants could demand and offer for the final desired IC allowance in 
the area. Changing IC allowances is a continuous variable and hence participants will 
account for their initial IC allowance in their bid decisions. For instance, they could 
demand as a first tranche 1 ha for changing to B (from A) and as second tranche 0.25 ha 
for changing to B (from A) in the block area (1.5 ha). Thus, the market could allocate 1.1 
ha for changing to B. 
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The model uses some of the nomenclature of Det_MarketIC1, Det_MarketIC1.1 and 
Det_MarketIC1.3; for instance, the base flows are kept relatively constant over the period 
in the channels and streams. However, new parameters and decision variables are 
incorporated. Additionally the market assumes uniform soil moisture AMC II in the 
catchment. 
Parameters 
0
,i mA  =  Total initial IC allowance type m owned by participant i who desires to buy IC (ha). 
0
,i nA  =  Total initial IC allowance type n owned by participant i, who desires to sell IC (ha). 
max
, ,i j bD = Maximum area in IC allowance to change to allowance type j (ha) that participant i 
in bid step b is willing to buy at price , ,
D
i j bP . 
max
, ,i j bS =  Maximum area in IC allowance to change to allowance type j (ha) that participant i 
in bid step b is willing to sell at price
, ,
S
i j bP . 
, ,
D
i j bP  = Demand price ($/ha) for changing to IC allowance type j from participant i and bid 
step b. This is the maximum that participant i is willing to pay for a change from IC 
allowance type m to allowance type j and bid step b. 
, ,
S
i j bP  = Bid price ($/ha) for changing to area allowance type j from participant i and bid 
step b. This is the minimum that participant i is willing to accept for a change from 
IC allowance type n to allowance type j and bid step b. 
kL =  Maximum allowable flow (volume/time) at channel control point k. These 
capacities depend on the chosen storm scenario at control point k. 
Tot
iA =  Total area of participant i (ha). 
Tot
iA = 
0
,
1
J
i j
j
A
  for all i,j that could be checked 
previously to clear the market model. This area constraint will also be checked in 
the participants’ bidding interface. 
0
,k tQ = Initial total flows at control point k and time t. These flows are related to the initial 
IC allowance and the chosen storm scenario.  
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1
, ,
t u
i j kH
  = Marginal flow impact at control point k of IC allowance type j from participant i, 
at the end period of t –u+ 1. u is the lag time between commencement of the storm 
event and when the flow reaches the control point (volume/time ha). This 
coefficient relates initial conditions on the participant’s property to the marginal 
impact at control points. The impacts are estimated for a specific storm type. This 
linear coefficient is likely to depend on the initial IC allowance conditions within 
the catchment, so it should be updated as IC allowances change to improve the 
accuracy of the impact coefficients. This marginal impact can be positive or 
negative. If participant i does not impact on control point k, then 
, ,
t
i j kH = 0. 
Decision variables 
, ,i j bqbuy = Area in changing hectare to IC allowance type j  and bid steps b bought by 
participant i. 
, ,i j bqsell = Area in changing hectare to IC allowance type j  and bid steps b sold by 
participant i. 
,
D
i jg =  Total hectares bought for changing IC allowance type j  for participant i (ha). 
,
S
i jg =  Total hectares sold for changing IC allowance to type j  for participant i (ha). 
,
D
i j =  Price for buying participant i and changing land allowance type j ($/ha). 
,
S
i j  =  Price for selling participant i and changing land allowance type j ($/ha). 
,t k  =  Clearing nodal price. Price to discharge at the control point k, time t ($/ 
volume/time). 
Model: Det_MarketIC2 
Maximize , , , , , , , ,
1 1 1 1 1 1
N J B N J B
D S
i j b i j b i j b i j b
i j b i j b
P qbuy P qsell
     
       [3.17] 
Subject to 
0 ≤ , ,i j bqbuy  ≤ 
max
, ,i j bD ,  i,j,b        : , ,i j b
 , , ,i j b
    [3.18] 
0 ≤ , ,i j bqsell  ≤ 
max
, ,i j bS ,  i,j,b         : , ,i j b
 , , ,i j b
    [3.19] 
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, , ,
1
B
D
i j b i j
b
qbuy g

 ,  i,j        : ,Di j  (free)   [3.20] 
, , ,
1
B
S
i j b i j
b
qsell g

 ,  i,j        : ,Si j  (free)   [3.21] 
0 1 1
, , , , , , ,
1 1
n J n J
t u D t u S
k t i j k i j i j k i j
i j i j
Q H g H g   
 
      ≤ kL ,  t,k : ,t k   [3.22] 
,
D
i jg , ,
S
i jg , (free)                 [3.23] 
Explanation: 
[3.17] The objective function maximizes the gains for trading IC allowances across time, 
for a given rainfall event. The objective function does not measure the absolute 
welfare, but is indicative of any such changes. It is recognised that participants 
could try to bid strategically; but that issue is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
[3.18]  Total changing area bought in each tranche is bounded by demand quantities. 
[3.19]  Total changing area sold in each tranche is bounded by bid quantities. 
[3.20]  The final area bought for changing to IC allowance type j of participant i. 
[3.21]  The final area sold for changing to IC allowance type j of participant i. 
[3.22]  The total flow at control point k in time t must be less than the maximum flow 
capacity in the channel. This capacity corresponds to the differences between 
channel capacity and status quo base flows. The dual price ,t k represents the 
improvement in economic surplus if the SO permitted another unit of capacity in 
the channel at control point k. 
[3.23] Buy and sell quantities ( , ,i j bqbuy  and , ,i j bqsell ) must be non-negative, and will 
naturally limit the final allocation of IC allowances, ,
D
i jg  and ,
S
i jg . 
The final IC allowance should be limited to the initial IC allowances (ha). In this case, the 
formulation should use an additional constraint, so participants cannot finish with a 
negative initial IC allowance or with more area allowance than their property area: 
, ,
1
J B
i j b
j m b
qbuy
 
  0,i mA  i,m and , ,1
J B
i j b
j n b
qsell
   
0
,i nA ,  i,n : ,
D
i m , ,
S
i n    [3.24] 
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The duals in these constraints, 
,
D
i j  and ,
S
i j , correspond to the marginal value of using a 
particular piece of land. Thus, it is expected that participants with several high value 
alternative land uses will have a high 
,
D
i j  and ,
S
i j . 
The next dual analysis considers the first model without the condition [3.24]. 
Participants are bidding for their net changes in IC allowances, and not for a set of possible 
changes from their initial IC allowance. 
This market formulation accounts for the desired and initial conditions. The dual 
variables 
,
D
i j  and ,
S
i j  account for these changes in impacting flows while the IC allowance 
balance is maintained. The variables ,
D
i j  and ,
S
i j  are presented in a canonical way and dual 
variables are conveyed to be positive for the analyses in this section and in the following 
chapters. 
The dual variable 
,
D
i j  in constraint [3.20] is the marginal value for another unit of 
changing impervious area level to j bought for participant i. The price accounts for the 
changes in IC condition, for the corresponding changes in impacting flows across time and 
control points ,
D
i j =
1
, , ,
1
K T
t u
i j k t k
k t u
H  
   , where 
1
, , ,
1
0
K T
t u
i j k t j
k t u
H  
 
  . This price 
is equivalent to the final clearing price used to charge participants from Det_MarketIC1. 
The dual variable ,
S
i j  in constraint [3.21] is the marginal economic surplus for another 
unit of changing impervious levels j sold by participant i. This also represents the 
increasing cost to the system if another unit of changing impervious levels were permitted 
to user i. This is the applied price used to pay participant i for the changes in impacting 
flows. ,
S
i j = 
1
, , ,
1
K T
t u
i j k t k
k t u
H  
   , where 
1
, , ,
1
0
K T
t u
i j k t j
k t u
H  
 
  . 
These final prices are also similar8 to the applied prices for participants from 
Det_MarketIC1 if the market is competitive, with the following trading conditions: 
                                                 
8
 The dual price from Equation [3.14] can be arranged to show the relationship with [3.25]. Thus, if a 
participant is increasing imperviousness, with Det_MarketIC1 could sell their initial IC allowance at , ,
S
i m bP  
and could buy at , ,
D
i p bP , and the applied price for changing imperviousness is ,i p ,i m . This price 
accounts for the marginal changes in impacting flows at control points,
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,
D
i j
 
= 
, ,
D
i j bP  , ,i j b
  +
, ,i j b
 , i,j             [3.25] 
,
S
i j
9
 = 
, ,
S
i j bP   , ,i j b
  + 
, ,i j b
 ,
 
i,j            [3.26] 
Participants will trade IC changes if their bids, which represent the opportunity costs of 
such changes in IC allowances, are greater than the clearing price when they desire to 
increase impervious, and lower when they are reducing impervious level. The trading 
conditions [3.25] and [3.26] are similar to those shown in equations [3.15] and [3.16], 
which account for the differences for buying and selling in Det_MarketIC1 while 
maintaining a land area balance. 
As in Det_MarketIC1, participants would need to establish their bids carefully, because 
their IC allowances change the flows at control points. Increasing IC allowances does not 
necessarily mean participants need to pay, as they could get rapid runoff from their 
property to reduce flows at peak times. Participants should then receive a payment. 
Participants with land close to the control point should pay almost nothing for increased 
imperviousness, because the runoff is so rapid that it avoids the peak flow at control point. 
In this case, a participant’s bidding interface could help to see if their decision may reduce, 
increase or shift peak flows at control points. 
3.6 Settlement with market model Det_MarketIC2 
The market model allocates with prices ,
D
i j  and ,
S
i j  for each participant. The settlement, 
ri, for those participants who demand increased IC allowances is ri = , ,
1
J
D D
i j i j
j
g
 , and 
                                                                                                                                                    
 1 1, , , , ,, 1 ,
J K T t u t e
i p k i m k t km p j k t u e
H H    
  
   . From Equation [3.25], the price to increase imperviousness 
is , ,
D
i j bP , which accounts for their initial IC allowance implicitly and the applied price ,
D
i j  accounts for the 
marginal changes 
1
, , ,, 1
J K T t u
i j k t km p j k t u
H  
     . With Det_MarketIC2, the coefficient H accounts for 
the marginal changes in impacting flows from the initial to the final IC allowances, which is the same 
 1 1, , , ,t u t ei p k i m kH H    from Det_MarketIC1. Thus, the applied price from Det_MarketIC1 and Det_MarketIC2 
are the same, as well as the settlements for participants. 
9
 For the purpose of discussion, dual price is represented in a canonical and positive formulation and contains 
prices with negative values ,
S
i j    0 
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for those who offer to reduce IC allowance is ri = , ,
1
J
S S
i j i j
j
g
 . The settlement considers 
that participants have rights for the initial IC allowances. 
3.7 Comparing trade condition from models 
It is possible to choose parameters for the LP market models Det_MarketIC1 and 
Det_MarketIC2 so that similar primal and dual solutions results. The two models result in 
the same trading surplus (same total social costs), and further parameters can be chosen 
such that they result in the same net costs/profits for each market participant. However, 
participants would trade in conceptually different ways. In model Det_MarketIC1, 
participants trade their conditions, while in model Det_MarketIC2 participants bid for the 
final condition, which represents the changes in IC allowance. In Det_MarketIC1, 
independently of their bids, the model takes into account the marginal effects between 
price bids. This may confuse participants who may misestimate their bids. This issue could 
be solved by informing participants of such an inconvenience, or by simply implementing 
the Det_MarketIC2 model. 
3.8 Market competitiveness 
Competition concerns government and market designers because there could be significant 
losses for society when participants exercise market power and alter prices for their benefit 
away from competitive prices (Ferguson and Gould 1980; Stoft 2002). Market power could 
be generated due to few participants or concentration in the market. However, a thin 
market does not necessarily mean a non-competitive market (Varian 1994). 
Physical competitiveness in a market for IC allowances can be measured using physical 
trade conditions which correspond to the impacting flow coefficients, 1, ,
t u
i j kH
  , and how 
participants’ flows overlap at control points. Unfortunately, different properties with the 
same IC allowance have flows which reach control points at different times and intensities. 
These differences may produce market concentration problems and tradability which 
should be identified by the SO. 
Chakrabarti and Goodwin (2008) presented different measurements to analyse 
competitiveness in a market. Prabodanie and Raffensperger (2009) analysed the problem of 
tradability in a market for nutrients and used the hydro-geological conditions from 
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participants as a way to test the level of potential physical trade and so the competitiveness 
in the market. These authors used the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure 
market concentration. Day et al. (2002) have noted that markets with competitive HHI 
indices could present prices above competitive levels due, for instance, to transmission 
constraints. In the same way, non-competitive HHI indices could correspond to 
competitive prices. Hence, the HHI could be used only as a first view for market 
competitiveness. 
If HHI is used to measure physical competitiveness in a market for IC allowances, the 
physical measurement of market share ,
t
i k  can be calculated in terms of physical trade 
conditions. Thus, the index can be estimated by time t and location k, in particular in places 
with flooding risk. The index is as follows: 
 
2
,
1
N
t t
i k
i
HHI 

                [3.27] 
1
, , ,
1
,
1
, , ,
1 1
J
t u
i j k i j
jt
i k N J
t u
i j k i j
i j
H g
H g

 

 
 


 
,
 i,k,t           [3.28] 
HHI ranges between 0 and 1; with HHI < 0.01, the market is not considered concentrated; 
with 0.01 < HHI < 0.18, the market is moderately concentrated; with HHI > 0.18 the 
market is concentrated (Chakrabarti and Goodwin 2008). Thus, the SO could monitor 
market concentration for storm water flows at different points in the catchment. This index 
could also be estimated in terms of storm scenarios, and their relationships with flows and 
flooding components. 
Additionally, the SO could estimate when participants are able to raise the market 
prices. This requires private cost data from each participant, which the SO does not have. 
Alternatively, the SO could measure the probable pivotal ability to raise prices using 
indices such as the Pivotal Supplier Index (PSI), the Residue Supply Index (RSI), and the 
Residual Demand Analysis (RDA). The Residual Supply Index (RSI) measures the capacity 
to reduce supply in accordance with the total demand. In an IC market, this index could be 
estimated as the capacity to reduce flows by time at the control point. Note that 
transmission market operators in the USA often calculate competitiveness of transmission 
constraints in a similar fashion, especially with RSI (Sheffrin 2002; Sheffrin et al. 2004; 
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Chang 2007; Lee et al. 2011). Thus, this index could be estimated for the period where 
flooding reached the peak or throughout the flooding period. 
,k i kt
k
k
TC InC
RSI
TD

  , k,t              [3.29] 
TC is the total capacity of a participant to reduce impacting flows, InC is the individual 
capacity to reduce, and TD is total demand of impacting flows required by time. RSI > 1 
indicates the supplier i may have little influence on price. With RSI < 1, the supplier i may 
exercise market power. Because each participant impacts on specific control points, their 
market power is specific to those control points but not others. While the participant is not 
exercising power in these points; however, the index may show she/he is doing so. 
Therefore, this is only an approach. The indices will not be further discussed nor 
calculated, and this would be part of future research. 
3.9 Final remarks and conclusion 
This chapter developed clearing formulations for an IC market under an extreme storm 
scenario. The models maximise surplus for trading IC allowances, with limits of channel 
capacity, or maximum flooding levels established under a storm scenario. 
In both formulations, duals represent valued changes in impacting flows from an initial 
and final condition. Additionally, the dual prices account for the requirement that each 
participant has to keep the same area at the end of the auction as at the start. 
The revenue from the SO depends on the catchment conditions. An over-allocated and 
under allocated catchment, i.e., over and under allocated capacity limits, will result in the 
SO being a net payer or receiver. Capacity limits are traded and valued to reach the 
standards that society expects. The limits are established according to a storm scenario. 
The market formulation accounts for related changes in physical storm water flows in the 
channel, streams and flooding conditions in the catchment. 
The market models Det_MarketIC1 and Det_MarketIC2 were established with capped 
control points, where flow capacities cannot be violated. Thus, participants implicitly trade 
as if a specific storm scenario occurred. This market condition could generate inefficient 
allocations, because the marginal value of increasing impervious levels may be higher or 
lower than the marginal cost to the system if the SO allowed an extra unit of flood capacity 
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at a specific place. Therefore, the nodal clearing price could be higher or lower than the 
true marginal incremental damage
   
,
f f
k k k k
k k
k k
C f C f
or
f f
 
  
  
  
 
. Consequently, the 
price signals may promote inefficient IC in the catchment. The models in this chapter 
assumed a strict non-violation of the control points. That means participants are trading, 
but may not incorporate the cost of flooding in their decisions. To establish which flooding 
level could be obtained in the catchment within the market, the market design should 
consider which storm and flooding level should be chosen in the catchment; the damage 
cost and the convexity in the flooding cost; the damage cost approximations, how the 
economic implications affect the market decision; and the revenue adequacy that would be 
observed related with the damage approximation. 
The market should account for the rainfall uncertainty as well as any possible change in 
flood distribution derived from changes in IC allowances. Marginal changes in flood 
distribution would then be priced. Thus, participants would face a price when their actions 
shift the flood damage distribution. 
Charter 4 will present a market formulation that accounts for the storm distribution and 
changes in flooding distribution. Chapter 5 will present a formulation that constrains for 
hastening peak flood (hastening peaks) and flood durations associated with particular 
scenarios and hazard areas. 
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Chapter 4 
 
4 A MARKET FOR IC ALLOWANCES UNDER 
RAINFALL UNCERTAINTY 
 
4.1 Motivation for stochastic programming 
The previous chapter presented a deterministic market proposal with the models 
Det_MarketIC1 and Det_MarketIC2, where the SO had to define a single maximum 
rainfall event to hedge against flood in the catchment. A stochastic version of 
Det_MarketIC1 and Det_MarketIC2 models, which had hard constraints [3.6] and [3.21] 
respectively, are not required, because it is likely that just one scenario would have the 
tightest constraint in both models, and none of the others would be binding in the optimal 
solution. These markets do not fully consider the stochastic nature of rainfall and flood; 
thus, participants do not incorporate the cost of flooding from storms greater than that 
established under the storm design criteria. The market should ideally be affected by the 
rainfall distribution and the resulting private and social costs of flooding during extreme 
events. 
Thus, the stochastic model Sto_MarketIC is instead an attempt to clear the market by 
creating a demand curve for flood reductions (indirectly, imperviousness reductions) that 
will be cleared against the implicit supply (based on the bids of participants). The demand 
(supply) curve is based on the marginal expected changes resulting from increases 
(decreases) in imperviousness levels (accounting for the transfer functions, flows and 
stage-damage relationships ((Krzysztofowicz and Davis 1983c; Loucks et al. 2005)). 
The resulting IC allowances take advantage of specific relationships in the single 
‘worst case’ storm, relying, for example, on the timing of rainfall to mitigate the impact. 
There will always be bigger storms than those modelled. 
  
 
88 
The catchment’s IC allowances and storm events would affect storm water, surface 
runoff, and hence flows and flooding (Chapter 3) at control points. Thus, any change in IC 
allowances, BMPs and control runoff technologies can affect the patterns of runoff from 
the property, and also the impacting flows at control points. These changes are not 
instantaneous due to inflexibilities of demand and supply; furthermore, under any extreme 
event, demand and supply do not respond quickly enough to modify IC allowances. Thus, 
a proposed market should incorporate ex-ante participant preferences for IC allowances, 
and the model should account for a range of rainfall events and possible changes in flood 
distribution. The proposed market takes into account a flood cost only for maximum peak 
flow at the control point. 
 In the market model, the stochastic nature of rainfall is incorporated by assigning 
probabilities of rainfall events. The effect of a rainfall event depends upon the impact 
coefficients derived from the IC allowances, BMPs and technologies. Those coefficients 
correspond to the flows per unit of time at different points across the channel under 
different rainfall scenarios. Figure 4-1 illustrates the stochastic nature of rainfall events and 
storm water flows observed from different storms and impervious levels. 
 
Figure 4-1 Rainfall events on land with different impervious levels (i < ii < iii). 
1s   and 
2s   are probabilities of rainfall events. A is a property in the catchment, and B is the 
outlet control point. 
Rainfall event 
1s   2s   
1s   
2s   
Impervious level i 
A with Forest (30%) 
 
Impervious level ii 
A with Crops (70%) 
 
Impervious level iii 
A with Concrete 
(90%) 
A 
B 
Flows at outlet 
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Different models have been proposed and applied to deal with uncertainty, in particular 
with inflow uncertainty. Loucks et al. (2005) presented different methods to manage 
stochastic water resources for river basin, urban water, reservoirs, lakes, and flooding 
problems. The authors pointed out that for any water planning, which involves uncertainty 
(rainfall, stream flows and flood flows), a probability distribution function is required to 
manage the resource. 
 Pereira and Pinto (1985) used stochastic programming for managing reservoirs in a 
hydro dominated electric system; 37 reservoirs in Brazil were used to illustrate the 
proposal which included an extension of Benders decomposition. Yang and Read (1999) 
used constructive dynamic programming (CDP) to optimise reservoir releases for power 
under uncertain inflows, and Carrion et al. (2007) proposed stochastic programming with 
recourse, for solving the electricity supply problem of a large consumer. Pritchard et al. 
(2010) proposed a stochastic programming model for scheduling electric power generation 
under uncertainty, inflexibilities, and uncertain demand. They assumed that scenarios were 
finite; thus, they solved the problem by using standard techniques. 
Tilmant et al. (2008) presented a stochastic programming model to obtain the marginal 
water value in an integrated economic hydrologic model for a multipurpose multi-reservoir 
system, where agriculture and hydroelectric power compete for water. 
 Hollinshead and Lund (2006) reported a stochastic model, in three stages with recourse, 
to minimize the expected cost of long-term spot and option water purchases as a way to 
meet environmental demands. As a result, they optimized seasonal water purchases for a 
manager, taking into consideration uncertainties derived from the hydrological, 
operational, and biological issues. 
Calatrava and Garrido (2005) analysed water market systems under uncertainty of 
water supply in Spain. Barquin et al. (2004) presented a market model under uncertainty 
for medium-term inflow uncertainty, where the equilibrium took into account uncertain 
fuel prices, demand, hydro inflows and generator failures, based on a scenario tree 
representation. 
Tilmant et al. (2008) pointed out that stochastic programming such as a two stage 
stochastic programming (TSSP) is suitable for addressing hydrologic uncertainty with a 
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hedging strategy against extreme events, such as floods and droughts. Moreover, stochastic 
formulations are able to take into account the uncertainty, violation of constraints (flood 
cost), and the complex spatial and temporal trade-offs, which would allow determining 
marginal water values in multipurpose multi-reservoir systems. 
Concerning flooding, Piantadosi et al. (2008) presented a stochastic model to choose a 
policy to manage urban runoff, and Liu et al. (2009) proposed a two stage programming to 
manage flood diversion under uncertainty. In the latter, the authors noticed that many 
impacting flood components were uncertain due to flow variability, and that two-stage (or 
multi-stage) stochastic programming (TSSP) is particularly useful for working with 
infeasibilities. Accordingly, the TSSP is a plausible approach to model the randomness 
from different rainfall events and flooding; thus, this approach will be used for the IC 
market clearing formulation. 
A hypothetical illustration of flood control options using a TSSP model is presented by 
Lund (2002), whose goal was to minimise the expected cost of flood damage from 
different options to manage flooding. The author reported that an additive non-convex 
flood damage function could increase the intractability of a solution; accordingly, the 
author proposed a piecewise linear approximation to deal with this limitation. 
With this market framework, the proposed stochastic IC model uses linear piecewise 
approximations to avoid convexity difficulties of the flood damage function. 
Piecewise linear function and penalties were also proposed by Dupacová et al. (1991) 
who approximated a convex function and used penalty functions for floods, irrigation and 
recreation. Van der Vlerk (2002) considered a lower and an upper bound for the total 
supply with piecewise linear penalties for violating those bound. The author optimised the 
electricity distribution system in the Netherlands, with uncertainty of the future energy 
supply. The proposed IC market formulation follows this penalty condition and piecewise 
approximation by convexifying the flood damage cost. 
Finally, the SO would have revenue adequacy in expectation, although in some 
scenarios the SO may be a net payer or net receiver. Pritchard et al. (2010) noticed that 
prices and allocations could vary from the deterministic solution. Prabodanie (2010) 
discussed revenue for the SO from the view of a deterministic condition, Raffensperger 
(2011) presented alternatives to match available water with a revenue sufficiency for the 
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SO. Pinto et al. (2012) dealt with revenue neutrality when the catchment is over and under 
allocated. The revenue issue will be faced in the proposed Sto_MarketIC of this chapter 
with initial allocations, and extra rent with the convexification. 
The proposed TSSP market model will maximise the expected economic surplus for 
trading impervious land cover, while accounting for flood cost due to flow violations in 
channels, streams and floodplain areas. Thus, flood cost, associated with the flows and 
constraint violations, will account for the flood damage in extreme storm events. The 
model assumes that damage functions would not change during the planning horizon. The 
recourse in the TSSP does not represent recourse decisions of participants, who cannot 
adjust imperviousness or BMPs under different scenarios; rather, this allows calculation of 
the flood damage function  C f , where f is a vector of stage flood from changes in 
demand Di,,j and supply Si,j from participant i and IC allowance j. 
The SO will be in charge of protecting areas against flooding and maintaining an 
acceptable level of risk for the community. The SO does not participate in the market 
directly, but the SO defines the flood damage cost in the market model. Price signals will 
incentivise reduction of storm water flows and damage due to flooding. Consequently, the 
market could be hedged against a range of storms, and flooding in the catchment. Figure 
4.2 illustrates a hypothetical rainfall distribution and flood damage that could be observed 
with different IC allowances in the catchment. The dashed line indicates the shifted flood 
damage under different IC allowances and storms; these changes correspond to changes in 
flood distribution and consequently changes in the hedged range of storms. 
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Figure 4-2 Probability distribution of rainfall events and flood damage for extreme events. 
The axis on the left represents storm probability and the axis on the right flood damage ($). 
Ed, Ed’, and Ed’’ represent storms that the market would hedge against. 
 
4.2 The general two-stage stochastic model 
This section describes the general formulation for the two stage stochastic program with 
recourse, also known as a stochastic model with penalties (Dupacová et al. 1991; Kall and 
Wallace 1994; Birge and Louveaux 1997). A first stage considers decision variables x 
under uncertainty. A second stage, begins with a known value of x, and the variables y 
work to evaluate consequent recourse flood cost penalties. 
The formulation for an equivalent deterministic model is as follows (Kall and Wallace 
1994; Birge and Louveaux 1997): 
max
x
E[  ,f x  ]:    min
TTc x E q y     
    [4.1] 
s.t.  Ax = b 
       T x W y h     ,    
    x, y Rn 
Storm probability 
Storm probability 
distribution function 
Ed 
Rainfall intensity 
Ed’ 
Flood damage ($) 
Flood damage relate to IC levels 
Ed’’ 
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In the market model for IC, Tc x  represents the expected objective function for trading IC, 
where the objective is to maximise trading value.    
T
q y   is the recourse flood cost 
function which accounts for flood damage, where   is a random (unknown) variable for 
rainfall events,      N. The decision variable x needs to be selected before the 
random variables are known; 
s  is the rainfall probability for  = s , defined for a discrete 
set of possible storms s=1,…,S, 0s   and 1
S s
s
  ;    W y   corresponds to the 
violation of the constrained capacities constraints;  h  =h and  T   are the participants’ 
impact coefficients. Thus, the formulation takes into account the chance of future flood 
damage which will depend on IC trading x, the final impervious levels in the catchment, 
and the probability of rainfall events. The stochastic model [4.1] is linear and the objective 
accounts for a linearised damage cost function of flooding. 
4.3 Choosing scenarios 
Dye (1994) pointed out that suitable scenarios must be chosen to obtain efficient outcomes. 
In this case, suitable storm scenarios are selected to represent the storm distribution and 
hence the flood damage distribution. From this discretised distribution, storm probability 
scenarios could be calculated (Loucks et al. 2005). These representative scenarios should 
be used to clear the market; however, they should give insight into all the storms and in 
particular for the extreme storm scenarios and their probabilities Scenarios should include 
details about the flooding and the expected flood damage. For instance, the chosen storms 
could simply be as 100 and 200 mm rainfall in 24 hours, or as a series of storms such as 
100, 30 and 110 mm rainfall in 76 hours. Accordingly, the SO should select from storms 
scenarios that represent flood damage conditions, while maintaining a robust solution. 
 Different methods could be used to select scenarios. The method could be simply an 
arbitrary selection of storms and their related probabilities by the SO, which should 
account for the distribution focusing on extreme events and keeping the condition that the 
scenario probability selections must sum one 
1
1
S s
s


 ; for further detail see Loucks et 
al. (2005). More complex methods include scenario reduction to define the scenarios that 
match with the distribution. Dupačová et al. (2003) proposed a scenario reduction 
technique based on a different probability metric for scenario reduction in stochastic 
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programming. Growe-Kuska et al. (2003) proposed an algorithm to reduce scenarios to 
determine scenario subsets and adjust probabilities. The scenarios and probabilities are 
modified and bundled into similar scenarios to reach a smaller number of scenarios. In this 
research, scenario selection and their probabilities are obtained based on a discretised 
distribution based on HIRDS (NIWA 2002; 2008). 
As was noted in section 2.8, in Chapter 2, any possible flood scenario may have non-
linear and non-convex flood damage functions. Figure 4-3 shows a situation where, 
according to the changes in IC allowances and storm severity, different stage-floods and 
costs are reached; the width of the bar represents the minimum and maximum stage-flood 
and damage derived from the storm. A, B and C represent sections of the damage cost 
function which are non-linear and convex, non-linear-non-convex, and non-convex 
respectively. In the market design, possible non-convexity will be addressed by 
convexification of the damage function. If this is not fixed, the non-convexity issue may 
raise externalities. Therefore, some participant will not correctly internalise the marginal 
changes in flooding for the changes in IC allowances, even though they contribute to the 
stage-flood; consequently, there will be differences between the final payment and the 
marginal flood damage contribution from the participant as well as between the expected 
flood damage and the total payments from participants. These differences could be 
internalised for the SO or society. This point is discussed throughout this chapter. 
Additionally, marginal flood damage could be almost zero during extreme storm 
scenarios. Because the clearing price represents the marginal change in flood damage, it 
may change little with the extreme storms, even though IC allowances change (see C in 
Figure 4-3). Thus, a low event probability, such as for a 400 mm or 500 mm storm in 24 
hours, could reduce the clearing price nearly to zero in these scenarios. For this reason, 
these scenarios may be omitted in the chosen storm scenarios for the market formulation. 
This effect is emphasised when the damage function is linearised but the non-convex 
condition remains unchanging. This effect is illustrated in Appendix B. 
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Figure 4-3 Flood damage curve and chosen storm scenarios i, ii and iii with their 
equivalent stage-flood levels. A, B and C are the different costs related to impervious level 
combinations in scenarios: linear (dots), piecewise linear approximation (dashed). D is the 
total piecewise convex approximation. 
 
4.4 Overview of the Sto_MarketIC market 
The proposed market for IC works as an auction system, accepting selling offers and 
purchasing bids, to trade IC allowances (continuous variable). Participants would not trade 
pair-wise, but buy from and sell to a central auction manager, through common pools 
which would have control points and areas where flooding occurs. 
The SO should evaluate which policy he/she desires to implement through the market, 
given the SO must include the flooding mitigation in the market model. The SO may limit 
the value of contents and properties to discourage new investments in the floodplain area. 
Accordingly, any change in the flood damage cost should be internalised for people in the 
flooding area, i.e., they should face changes in the expected flood damage under changes in 
imperviousness in their properties; otherwise, the SO could periodically update the damage 
valuation. Thus, any change in flood distribution would be progressively more expensive, 
and participants that change IC would face higher prices. Although participants in the high 
areas have rights to ICs, increasing flood costs may discourage imperviousness in these 
properties. This also implies that they have the rights only for a specific expected flood 
A 
B 
C 
i ii iii 
i ii iii iv v vi 
Linear 
Piecewise linear 
convex 
Peak stage-flood 
Piecewise in a non-
convex region 
Linear 
Linear 
Piecewise convex 
Total piecewise convex approx. 
D 
Damage cost ($) 
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damage and flood distribution. The SO should evaluate this strategy as a way to discourage 
imperviousness. As will be seen in next sections, prices depend on changes in flood 
distribution and the SO could finish as a net payer if participants have sufficient initial 
capacity rights. 
The demand and supply curves are expressed in steps of price and quantity pairs for the 
right to trade IC allowances; thus, each participant provides a piecewise linear 
approximation of a value function for changing IC allowances. Basically, the price and 
quantity pairs represent the characterization of participants in terms of location, IC 
allowances, control technologies, BMPs, and development projects on their properties. 
As with the proposed market described in Chapter 3, the Sto_MarketIC model is not 
formulated to select which technology each participant should use, and so the clearing 
formulation does not have integer decision variables. Consequently, it avoids 
corresponding non-convexity issues and the related problems with prices. 
The Sto_MarketIC allows participants to bid in advance according to an auction 
schedule which would depend on the hydrological season, flooding period, and the main 
economic activities. For instance, a catchment comprised of farms would run with regard 
to the agricultural season, e.g., two or three times per year, but in an urban catchment, the 
market may run monthly or annually. As the optimal timeframe depends on the catchment 
land uses, this should be evaluated regularly by the authority. Outside the market, 
participants may evaluate the opportunity costs of different options to control their own 
runoff, whilst satisfying the SO, and considering that they are not going to change their 
initial runoffs. To simplify the IC calculation, the land cover could be estimated online by 
implementing a web site administrated by the SO. 
Boundaries in each control point would be set in terms of capacity at channels, pipes 
and streams, as well as flooding components such as depth and duration. Based on those 
boundaries, the authority will approximate mitigation costs and flood damage for extreme 
events. The resulting damage depends on the storm scenario, described in the next section. 
Additionally, if the market is cleared every year and allowances account for a year, the 
flood damage corresponds to the expected flood damage in the year. However, in a market 
with longer timeframes and allowances, the flood damage cost may account for the present 
value of the damage for these events. The scenarios will account for the combination of 
  
 
97 
these events. The following section will focus on a year timeframe and leave for future 
research the market that accounts for longer IC allowance periods. 
4.5 A piecewise convex approximation to flooding cost 
In modelling a system with hydraulic flow movements, flooding and flood damage can be 
non-linear and non-convex with respect to decision variables which would require 
convexifying the function. In approximating a non-linear function, the piecewise linear 
approximation approach can be used. 
Beale et al (1970) introduced an ordered set of variables and constraints that force a 
consecutive set to be positive; accordingly, a global optimal solution over a non-convex 
piecewise linear function could be found. That approximation requires integer variables. 
An NLP with linear constraints and convex piecewise approximation in the objective 
function can be solved efficiently as a LP. Similarly, Hogan (2002) pointed out that an 
economic market solution relies on local linearisation in an electricity dispatch. Midthun et 
al. (2009) and De Wolf and Smeers (2000) noticed that linearisation allows feasible 
solutions in large scale networks, such as a gas market with linearised gas flows. Recently, 
Pepper et al (2012) showed a clearing market engine in the Victoria gas market which uses 
successive multi-dimensional piecewise linearisation in the constraints. Dupacová et al 
(1991) reported that piecewise linear costs, based on simple algorithms, can be used to 
solve water management problems. 
Van der Vlerk (2002; 2004) proposed a convex approximation of the expected recourse 
cost function. The author divided the penalty cost function into a one-sided or two-sided 
function to obtain a function for shortage and surplus costs. This approach would be 
equivalent to estimating the flood damage using a one-sided cost penalty approach. 
In using a piecewise linear approximation, the expected trading combination of IC 
allowances will raise or lower the total peak flows, and the flood damage will move along 
the damage curve. The piecewise convex approximation may model this movement as 
illustrated in Figure 4-3. 
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The piecewise approximation10 could handle the nonlinearity and could be 
approximated in a convex way when having non-convexity in the range. A similar 
implication was noted by van der Vlerk (2002) and by Pepper et al. (2012), who used 
successive linearisation to deal with non-convexities. However, even though a convex hull 
could be obtained, the real problem is still non-convex. In the IC market, a piecewise 
approximation implies forcing a convex feasible region into a particular scenario, such as 
B shown in Figure 4-3. 
For a particular rainfall scenario, the final flooding is defined by the market. Cost 
would be between a minimum and maximum flood damage that could be reached with the 
lowest and highest IC allowances respectively, for the trading combination and their flows. 
Thus, the market would be cleared between the peak flows ,1kf  and ,5kf , and linearised 
flood damage  ,1kC f and  ,5kC f  (see Figure 4-4). Thus, ,sk rf  is the flow in the break 
point in the range r, and  ,sk rC f  is the damage evaluated at these break points. The 
approximation accounts for a number of ranges R, and 
   , , 1
, , 1
s s
k r k r
s s
k r k r
C f C f
f f




 is the slope that 
represents the marginal damage in this range. The illustration also shows a rough linear 
approximation (dashed line) which may be generated by the Taylor expansion, and by 
splines choosing knot points (e.g., Fox 2008). 
                                                 
10
 A piecewise linear approximation of non-linear continuous function g in  is linear in each interval 
 1r rc ,c  . Thus, for real numbers c1 < c2 <…< cR, and r = 1,…,R, there is a linear slope in the interval for 
which cr is a break point, and from this variable the slope changes in the next range interval r + 1. For a 
convex function g, the piecewise approximation is also convex. 
  
 
99 
 ,1kC f
1k ,f 2k ,f 3k ,f 4k ,f 5k ,f
 ,2kC f
 ,3kC f
 ,4kC f
 ,5kC f
  ,3 ,3,k kC f f
  ,5 ,5,k kC f f
Cost damage ($)
Flow (m3/time)
 
Figure 4-4 Piecewise linear cost approximation of a convex function for flow vs. damage 
cost. 
 
4.6 Market model for IC, Sto_MarketIC 
The Sto_MarketIC model approximates the flood damage by using a flood cost which 
relates flood parameters to damage. This market assumes that i) no flow losses and no non-
source flows are injected in the system during a storm event; however participants have 
initial allocations; ii) storms in the chosen scenarios are the most representative in the 
catchment and they affect the area as a whole; iii) the flood damage cost function does not 
change during the planning horizon, which implies that changes such as new investments 
in infrastructure and real estate projects in the flooding area are ignored in the flood cost 
function estimation; iv) the market is perfectly competitive; v) the base flows remain 
unchanged in channels and streams, and the soil moisture is constant over the period. 
4.6.1 Damage and flood cost 
The market-clearing model will take into account violations at the control points due to 
flows at channel, stream, and floodplain areas above threshold capacities. In that case, the 
catchment could have flood damage as shown in Figure 2-13 A and Figure 2-16 B 
(Chapter 2), and the flood damage will be estimated by the maximum peak flow. The peak 
flow is related to the maximum flood depth (stage flood) in the flooded location; this 
implies the maximum damage. This assumption could be debatable since hydraulic 
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processes at the channel control point may not necessarily be related to the flood in the 
surrounding area; however, this is an acceptable approximation due to the relationship 
between peak flow and stage flood (Loucks et al. 2005). Damage is also a function of 
duration of inundation. However, this could be considered as a referential flood cost 
related to peak flow. 
In places such as streams and rivers, the maximum peak is closely related to the 
maximum depth, so it is possible to assume a direct relationship between peak flow and 
maximum flood depth. Several studies have a similar approach relating maximum depth 
and damage estimates (Hannan and Goulter 1985; Smith 1994; Dutta et al. 2000; 2003; 
Herath 2003). Figure 4-5 shows the peak flow at a control point. The maximum peak flow 
at a control point can also be linked to the spatial distribution of flooding in the area, which 
would include damage of the whole affected area (see Figure 4-4). 
The market-clearing formulation considers penalties based on peak flows from 
established thresholds at each control point. In an electricity market, ancillary services 
(electricity reserves) are used in response to contingency events (Chattopadhyay et al. 
2003; Chen et al. 2005; Read 2010). Chen et al. (2005) minimises the expected cost of 
energy and reserve cost for such contingency events; thus, the market operator estimates an 
optimum spinning reserve schedule to cover contingencies. The authors defined 
probabilities for each contingency event, which may affect prices as was also pointed out 
by Read (2010). The Sto_MarketIC will penalise such contingency events, rather than 
mobilising reserves to cover unexpected power needs in electricity markets. Thus, the 
Sto_MarketIC1 will penalise using a flood cost for the maximum stage-flood. 
A flood damage cost function  C f  accounts for a peak flow (maximum flood depth) 
at control points across scenarios. This flood cost will be used in the TSSP market-clearing 
model (Sto_MarketIC1). The following section presents additional market assumptions as 
well as the Sto_MarketIC1 model. 
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Figure 4-5 Total flows and flooding. Flood flows are above channel capacity. A and B are 
individual impacting flows from contributing properties to control point k. 
 
4.6.2 Market-clearing model Sto_MarketIC1 
This section presents the primal formulation of the clearing market model with the 
nomenclature previously introduced with the Det_MarketIC2 models in Chapter 3. In 
addition, it is assumed that flood damage is estimated for each storm scenario by the 
violations to capacities, and that any technology used to control runoff is perfectly 
divisible. The main source of stochasticity are the storm scenarios. It is recognised that 
other sources of uncertainty exist, but the focus is on the storm uncertainty. The expected 
flood damage is convex under changes in imperviousness, as outlined previously in 
Chapter 2 and Section 4.5 of this chapter. The base flows are kept relatively constant over 
the period in channels and streams. Participants have perfect knowledge regarding 
outcomes of their decisions and agree to the outcomes from simulations. Participants are 
demanding (offering) changes to their IC allowances on their properties based on their 
initial positions. The initial positions correspond to a status quo of initial IC allowances on 
their property. The market clearing model accounts for these differences. Participants 
cannot bid for changes more than their initial IC allowance within the area. If participants 
bid for a set of possible changes in allowances within their properties, the market 
formulation should include conditions similar to [3.24] in Chapter 3. Nodal prices vary 
Control point k 
Catchment segment 
 
Inundation depth 
Stream 
Channel capacity 
 
Maximum 
peak flow at k 
Flow (m
3
) 
 
Time 
A B 
Flood period 
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over time, across network locations and storm scenarios at places where flooding is an 
issue (channels, streams, and floodplain areas). 
The market-clearing model can be formulated by its equivalent deterministic 
formulation, which accounts for a finite set of realizations of the random vector of storms 
s=1,…,S, and their related probabilities 
s . Thus, the market clearing can be as follows. 
Indices 
i  =  Participant, 1,…,N. 
j,m,n,p= Land type (CN or imperviousness), j= 1,…,J. 
b =  Bid step, b=1,...,B. 
k,l =  Control point (node), k=1,...,K. 
t,u,r =  Storm time period, t=1,…,T. 
s =  Scenarios of rainfall (storms), s= 1,…,S. 
Parameters 
0
,i mA  =  Total initial IC allowance type m owned by participant i who desires to buy IC (ha). 
0
,i nA  =  Total initial IC allowance type n owned by participant i, who desires to sell IC (ha). 
max
, ,i j bD = Maximum area in IC allowance to change to allowance type j (ha) that participant i 
in bid step b is willing to buy at price , ,
D
i j bP . 
max
, ,i j bS  = Maximum area in IC allowance to change to allowance type j (ha) that participant i 
in bid step b is willing to sell at price , ,
S
i j bP . 
, ,
D
i j bP  = Demand price ($/ha) for changing to IC allowance type j from participant i and bid 
step b. This is the maximum that participant i is willing to pay for a change from IC 
allowance type m to allowance type j and bid step b. 
, ,
S
i j bP  = Bid price ($/ha) for changing to area allowance type j from participant i and bid 
step b. This is the minimum that participant i is willing to accept for a change from 
IC allowance type n to allowance type j and bid step b. 
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kM =  Flow capacity (volume/time) at channel control point k. The flow capacities depend 
on the channel sectional shape and the chosen base-flow at control point k. 
 f sk kC f = Flood cost at control point k in scenario s. This cost represents the flood damage 
under peak flow s
kf  
in volume (m
3
) at control point k. This damage will be 
incorporated as a cost ($ volume/time) and could be linearly approximated as was 
outlined in section 4.5. 
s =  Probability of storm in scenario s. This parameter satisfies the following properties: 
0 
s  1, and 
1
S
s
s


 1. 
0,
,
s
k tQ = Initial total flows at control point k across time t and scenario s. These flows are 
related to the initial IC allowance.  
1,
, ,
t u s
i j kH
  = Marginal impact at control point k of IC allowance type j from participant i and 
scenario s, at the end of the time t –u+1. u is the lag time between the storm time 
and the flow which reaches the control point (volume/time ha) and scenario s, as 
well. This coefficient relates conditions of the participant’s property with the 
impact at control points across rainfall scenarios, e.g., volume/time/ha. This linear 
coefficient is likely to depend on initial IC allowance conditions from the property 
within the catchment, so it should be updated as IC allowances change. This 
marginal impact can be positive or negative. If participant i does not impact control 
point k, then ,, ,
t s
i j kH = 0. 
Decision variables 
, ,i j bqbuy = Area in changing hectare to IC allowance type j  and bid steps b bought by 
participant i. 
, ,i j bqsell = Area in changing hectare to IC allowance type j  and bid steps b sold by 
participant i. 
,
D
i jg =  Total hectares bought for changing IC allowance type j for participant i (ha). 
,
S
i jg =  Total hectares sold for changing IC allowance to type j  for participant i (ha). 
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,
D
i j =  Price for buying participant i and changing to IC allowance type j ($/ha). 
,
S
i j  =  Price for selling participant i and changing to IC allowance type j ($/ha). 
,
s s
t k  = Price to discharge at control point k, time t and scenario s ($ volume/time) only if 
flooding occurs. 
s
kf  =  Peak flow above maximum capacity under scenario s at control point k 
(volume/time). The recourse flood cost represents the flood damage for each 
scenario s. 
Primal: Sto_MarketIC1 
Maximize: , , , , , , , ,
1 1 1 1 1 1
N J B N J B
D S
i j b i j b i j b i j b
i j b i j b
P qbuy P qsell
     
        
  
1 1
S K
s f s
k k
s k
C f
 
               [4.2] 
Subject to: 
0 ≤ , ,i j bqbuy  ≤ 
max
, ,i j bD ,  i,j,b        : , ,i j b
 , , ,i j b
    [4.3] 
0 ≤ , ,i j bqsell  ≤ 
max
, ,i j bS ,  i,j,b        : , ,i j b
 , , ,i j b
    [4.4] 
, , ,
1
B
D
i j b i j
b
qbuy g

 ,  i,j        : ,Di j  (free)   [4.5] 
, , ,
1
B
S
i j b i j
b
qsell g

 ,  i,j        : ,Si j  (free)   [4.6] 
0, 1, 1,
, , , , , , ,
1 1
n J n J
s t u s D t u s S
k t i j k i j i j k i j
i j i j
Q H g H g   
 
      ≤ kM + skf ,       
              t,s,k  : ,
s s
t k       [4.7] 
s
kf  ≥ 0,             : 
s
k      [4.8] 
,
D
i jx , ,
S
i jx  (free)                 [4.9] 
Explanation 
[4.2] The objective function maximizes the expected gains for trading IC, less the costs 
for flood damage under different rainfall events. This formulation considers a 
discrete probability distribution of rainfall events, and recourse cost for flood 
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damage at different control points. The objective function does not measure the 
absolute welfare, but changes in the objective are the appropriate measure of 
changes in welfare (assuming the market is sufficiently competitive that offer/bids 
reflect marginal opportunity costs). It is recognised that participants could try to bid 
strategically; but this issue is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
[4.3]  Total changes of IC allowances that are bought in each tranche are bounded by 
demand quantities. 
[4.4]  Total change of IC allowances sold in each tranche is also bounded by bid 
quantities. 
[4.5]  The final area bought of changing to IC allowance type j  of participant i. 
[4.6]  The final area sold of changing to IC allowance type j  of participant i. 
[4.7]  For each scenario s, the total flows at control point k in time t should be lower than 
the flow capacity kM . However, flows may violate the capacity kM  and 
s
kf  which 
estimates the peak flow above capacity in the channel area across scenarios. In 
several scenarios 0,,
s
k tQ  kM , this means there is no chance of avoiding a flood in 
these storms, just an ability to reduce the damage caused for the flows. This 
constraint deals with possible upstream participants that are prepared to pay for the 
flood damage cost. 
This general representation corresponds to the flows from participant i ( 0, ,,
t s
i kQ ) 
related to their initial IC allowances plus a flow gradient  ,, ,t si j k for the changes in 
IC allowances, with the gradient being positive or negative across scenarios. Figure 
4-6 illustrates this condition and two linear approximations across scenarios. This is 
just one dimension of a multi-dimensional surface; Gi,j 
corresponds to the initial IC 
allowances, and , 10,
t s
kQ
  and , 20,
t s
kQ
  are flow levels related to the scenario s =1,2; ,0,
t s
kh  
and ,0,
t s
kh  are the calculated intercept flows of the linearisations. Any change in IC 
allowances would increase or reduce the flows from the initial flow conditions by 
1,
, , ,
t u s
i j k i jH g
  . 
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Mk
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,
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t s
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1 1
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Figure 4-6 Impact of flow linearisation for two storm scenarios
 
 
[4.8] Condition of non-negative flows above capacities. 
[4.9]  Quantities traded in the market as well as the initial allowance (area) with the initial 
IC allowance must be non-negative. This will limit the final allowance allocations, 
,
D
i jg  and ,
S
i jg . 
The recourse flood can have different piecewise linear approximations. Firstly, 
,
1 1 1
S K R
s s s
r k r
s k r
f 
      where 
s
r  is the marginal damage in range r and scenario s, 
with a constraint for exceeding peak flows max,, ,0
s s
k r k rf f    k,s,t. Secondly, with the 
Lambda method (Beale and Tomlin 1970; Lee and Wilson 2001), where the damage 
function becomes , ,
1 1 1
S K R
s s s
k r k r
s k r
D l
     , and the variable 
s
kf  from [4.7] 
is , ,
1
R
s s
k r k r
r
F l
 ; where ,
s
k rD  is the damage at grid point r, ,
s
k rl  is a variable introduced for 
each grid point r, ,
s
k rF  is the flow (flood level). Additionally, a convexity constraint on ,
s
k rl  
should be introduced in the formulation. However, this formulation may have non-
convexity problems (Beale and Tomlin 1970). Fortunately, a smooth flood damage cost 
can be found by convexification and piecewise approximation. 
  
 
107 
,
1
1
R
s
k r
r
l

 ,   k,s          : s sk      [4.10] 
, ,
1
R
s s s
k r k r k
r
F l f

 ,  k,s        : s sk       [4.11] 
, 0
s
k rl  ,  k,s,t           : ,
s
k r      [4.12] 
4.6.3 Price analysis 
A price analysis can be derived from the dual of Sto_MarketIC1 (the dual in Appendix A is 
presented in terms of the flood damage cost and its derivative). 
The objective function [4.2] provides a net benefit measurement, which is fixed given 
the primal solution. The duals specify how this wealth is distributed among participants. 
The dual variables’ definitions and implications are given in the following analysis and 
discussion. 
The clearing prices associated with constraint [4.7] correspond to a set of flows 
received at control points, by time and by storm scenario, and will be non-zero for those 
flows at or above threshold capacities. The prices ,
s s
t k  are the changes in the expected 
flood damage that may occur in the area. 
The shadow price ,
D
i j  for constraint [4.5] is the marginal expected value for another 
unit j due to the changes in IC allowances j to participant i. This shadow price accounts for 
the expected marginal flood damage due to increasing IC allowance, and also for changing 
flow patterns at the control points and scenarios. In other words, the dual variable ,
D
i j  
corresponds to a weighted set of flow impacts across all scenarios and period peaks t. 
Thus, the applied price that will be used to charge participant i will be: 
,
D
i j = 
1,
, , ,
1 1
S K T
s t u s s
i j k t k
s k t u
H  
     ,  i,j    : ,
D
i jg     [4.13] 
The shadow price ,
S
i j  in constraint [4.6] represents the cost to the system, in terms of 
marginal surplus or the marginal change in the expected flood damage, for an extra unit of 
changes in IC allowance from n to j  in the area. The dual variable is ,
S
i j  
is the applied 
price to pay participant j: 
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,
S
i j = 
1,
, , ,
1 1
S K T
s t u s s
i j k t k
s k t u
H  
     ,  i,j    : ,
S
i jg     [4.14] 
The condition [4.14] corresponds to the extra expected return for marginal changes in 
flows across time t at control point k. (In this case, this is expected to be negative, but a 
canonical expression is conveyed to be positive.) This value will be recalled in the next 
section when discussing its relationship with the flood costs. 
Equations [4.13] and [4.14] account for all impacts at the subcatchment (nodal price) 
and common points for potential flooding as well as flooding peaks by period across 
scenarios. These prices are influenced by changes in flow impacts, the probabilities for 
extreme storm events and their relationships with the clearing prices, which in turn are 
linked to the flood damage. The last point will be discussed in the next section. 
As similar to Det_MarketICs, participants need to establish their bids carefully, because 
their IC allowances change the flows and the peak flow times at control points across 
scenarios. In most cases, increased IC allowance means increasing total runoff, flows at 
peak times at control points and so participants pay for the imperviousness. But in 
particular situations participants might be paid to increase imperviousness, e.g., the 
increment in IC allowances avoids peak flows and so reduces flow at peak times; thus, the 
condition is 
1,
, , ,
1 1
S K T
s t u s s
i j k t k
s k t u
H  
     < 0 at the new peak time. This could be 
observed in properties close to the control points whereby participants could pay or receive 
almost nothing. 
The trading condition could also be analysed from the next dual conditions. 
,
D
i j  = , ,
D
i j bP  , ,i j b
 + , ,i j b
 ,  i,j,b            [4.15] 
,
S
i j  = , ,
S
i j bP + , ,i j b
  , ,i j b
 ,  i,j,b            [4.16] 
If 0 < , ,i j bqbuy  < 
max
, ,i j bD  and 0 < , ,i j bqsell  < 
max
, ,i j bS , the optimal IC allowance changes for 
participants in the demand and supply side lie in step b from each, resulting in both being 
marginal. This means that neither the upper or lower bound for the demand and supply 
steps will at their bound; hence, by complementary slackness, , ,i j b
 = , ,i j b
 = , ,i j b
 = , ,i j b
 = 
0. The marginal conditions are ,
D
i j = , ,
D
i j bP  and ,
S
i j = , ,
S
i j bP , and correspond to the marginal 
clearing points between adjusted demand and supply curve steps in terms of impacting 
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flows along control points and storms scenarios. Thus, a set of these marginal changes will 
be clearing, one for each bounded limit at each control point and scenario, and prices will 
value violations as will be seen next. 
All other demand/offer steps will be either infra-marginal or supra-marginal, and these 
shadow prices will balance the equations [4.15] and [4.16], because participants’ marginal 
values (demand and supply bid prices) have exceeded the costs imposed on the rest of the 
system for increased flooding. Thus, when 
, , 0i j bqbuy   and , , 0i j bqsell  , so by 
complementary slackness 
, ,i j b
 = 
, ,i j b
  = 0, the surpluses in the demand and supply for 
participants in step b are ,
D
i j = , ,
D
i j bP  , ,i j b
  and ,
S
i j = , ,
S
i j bP + , ,i j b
 . 
If the market model accounts for an equivalent constraint [3.24], i.e., the participant 
could bid in a set of possible changes in IC allowances, the dual variables related to this 
constraint will affect the final trade. Thus, the dual equations [4.15] and [4.16] are as 
follows: 
,
D
i j  = , ,
D
i j bP  , ,i j b
 + , ,i j b
  ,
D
i j m  ,  i,j,b          [4.17] 
,
S
i j  = , ,
S
i j bP + , ,i j b
  , ,i j b
 + ,
S
i j n  ,  i,j,b           [4.18] 
The new dual conditions could be seen as ,
D
i j  = , ,
D
i j bP  ,
D
i j m   and ,
S
i j  = , ,
S
i j bP  + ,
S
i j n  with 
the opposite implication from ,
D
i j m   and ,
S
i j n  . Thus participants who want to increase 
imperviousness will face an additional cost for their preferred IC allowance conditions, 
with the dual prices as the marginal value of IC allowance. This internal condition may 
increase the opportunity cost of increasing IC allowances, especially in areas with high 
opportunity cost such as city centres. Thus, they could not easily increase their IC 
allowances, and they could be encouraged to adopt BMPs. 
4.6.4 Prices relating to flood costs 
Dual prices can be decomposed into the marginal expected flood damage across control 
points and scenarios. These prices are linked to the flooding costs  f sk kC f  at control point 
k, as well as with the rainfall and its probability of occurrence 
s  in scenario s. In this 
situation, the dual accounts for the marginal expected changes in the flooding distribution. 
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From the dual Equations [4.13] and [4.14], as well as from the next dual Equation [4.19], 
new price conditions are obtained for 
,
D
i j  and ,
S
i j . 
 ,
T
s s
t k
t
    sk  = 
 f sk ks
s
k
C f
f



 ,  k,s    : s
kf     [4.19]  
Notice that if 
,
s
t k  > 0, the new condition will be 
 
,
1
f s
T k ks s s
t k s
t
k
C f
f
  



  due to 
complementary slackness where s
k  = 0. In addition, given that the flood cost takes into 
account the maximum flow, the condition ,
1
T
s s
t k
t
 
  would be bounded in time 
t*=t*(k,s). Assuming that the peak is reached for each scenario and control point, the 
condition becomes 
*,
s s
t k   in the scenario s. The clearing price ,
s
t k  
accounts for the 
marginal flood damage cost for an additional unit of peak flow at a control point. Thus, as 
the value of *,
s s
t k  > 0, the dual condition will be 
 
*,
f s
k ks
t k s
k
C f
f




 and the dual prices 
will be as follows: 
,
D
i j =
 
*,
, ,
1 1
f s
S K k ks t s
i j k s
s k
k
C f
H
f

 

  ,  i,j          [4.20] 
,
S
i j = 
 
*,
, ,
1 1
f s
S K k ks t s
i j k s
s k
k
C f
H
f

 

  ,  i,j         [4.21] 
The prices generated from equations [4.20] and [4.21] correspond to the expected 
marginal flood damage increment (or reduction), at peak time t*, across the rainfall 
scenarios. Since participants are trading IC allowances, these prices represent the marginal 
changes in flows at the peak of flooding, at control points and the resulting marginal flood 
costs for extreme storms. 
In the dual conditions of Det_MarketIC models described in Chapter 3, clearing prices 
were related to established storms and thresholds, and the dual prices were related to the 
cost to the system under an extreme storm condition. However, in this case, the dual 
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variables 
,
D
i j  and ,
S
i j  depend on the expected market clearing values along discrete 
rainfall scenarios. 
4.7 Settlement 
The participant's settlement depends on their initial IC allowance and the applied prices 
,
D
i j  
and 
,
S
i j  
account for the marginal changes in the expected flood damage. This non-
arbitrage- price condition does not depend on what flow occurs in a given year nor for the 
flood realisation. The condition actually accounts for the changes in the expected flood 
damage at control points in the catchment, and the market may be revenue inadequate. This 
condition will be discussed in Section 4.9 in Chapter 4, and an adjusted method to reach 
revenue neutrality will be proposed in Section 8.9 in Chapter 8. 
 The market model allocates with prices ,
D
i j  and ,
S
i j  for each participant. The 
participant’s settlement, ri; for those who are demanding to increase IC allowances, is ri = 
, ,
1
J
D D
i j i j
j
g
 . For those participants who are offering to reduce IC allowances, ri = 
, ,
1
J
S S
i j i j
j
g
 . The settlement considers that participants have rights for the initial IC 
allowances. The settlement is ri > 0 for those who are increasing IC allowances, and ri < 0 
for those who are reducing IC allowances. 
4.8 Hedging against storms 
Participants and the SO will observe that the catchment is hedged against a range of storms 
defined by the rainfall scenarios. In this research, a hedging level corresponds to a range of 
storm scenarios that would not produce any flooding damage. Figure 4-2 shows the effect 
of hedging: in the initial market condition Ed, participants are not internalising flood 
damage, nor controlling runoff. This can be interpreted as the participants having the rights 
to damage in a specific flood distribution. During a market, prices will be the signal to 
change impervious levels, and to allocate impervious levels until the marginal surplus of 
trading matches the marginal expected flood damage. In essence, this is a classic 
competitive market equilibrium in which the marginal benefit of consumption (the demand 
curve) equals the marginal cost of supply. In Figure 4-2, the hedging effect corresponds to 
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Ed  Ed’  Ed’’; accordingly, the damage will start from an extreme storm, producing 
changes in the probability distribution of flooding in the catchment. 
Figure 4-7 illustrates hypothetical changes in flood probability distributions with 
different final impervious levels in the catchment. Commonly, an increase in the final 
impervious levels would increase the probability of damage. For example, an increased IC 
would result in 100 mm of rainfall within a 24 hour storm reaching similar damage level to 
of 150 mm rainfall in a 24 hour storm prior to the increased impervious levels. 
The hedging will produce different effects for participants and the SO, depending on 
trade conditions. Next, cases are presented that summarise different trading situations, 
price conditions, and final hedging. 
 
Figure 4-7 Hypothetical flood damage probability density functions with different IC 
allowances (ICL) in the catchment. i, ii and iii are incremental final IC allowances which 
raise flood distribution in the catchment. 
 
4.8.1 Trading cases 
Case 1: If a participant desires to increase their imperviousness, increased runoff will result 
and peak flows will shift at control points in each storm scenario. The price that a 
participant pays should take into account the expected marginal increment in flood damage 
for both shifting effects. These effects would increase the clearing price at control points. If 
other participants are not trading, the marginal cost for increasing floods at each control 
point should be paid by the developer. As a result, the developer would pay for increasing 
flooding damage within the flood areas. The price will correspond to the changes in area 
0 Damage 0 Damage 
ICL iii 
 
ICL ii 
 
ICL i 
 
ICL ii 
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between ICL iii or ii and ICL i in Figure 4-7. The hedging changes will be paid by the 
participant who is increasing the IC allowance. Additionally, given the SO is overseeing 
the flood damage areas, the new flood condition will be priced and the anticipated 
incremental damage will be paid to the SO. 
Case 2: A developer desires to increase the impervious levels which consequently will 
increase flows and flood damage across scenarios, but other participants desire to trade 
with the objective of reducing stage-flood times. Previous auctions had similar clearing 
prices, but with the new developer, participants may face higher clearing prices. 
Consequently, participants whose bids were previously not accepted are now able to trade. 
Developers may face higher clearing prices, and hence incur greater costs for their 
increasing flows. The price signals may encourage other participants to reduce their 
impervious levels within the catchment at the next auction. 
Case 3: A developer desires to buy more IC allowances, which increases the peak flow, but 
previously, the capacity constraints were loose in some scenarios, and the catchment was 
hedged against a range of storm scenarios and flooding. To date, flooding was not an issue 
and trading participants paid almost zero. However, in changing the impervious condition, 
the participant would face rising clearing prices due to violations of capacity constraints. 
The expected flood damage would rise, and the hedging level would fall. As a result, the 
clearing price would rise, and participants who were used to trading IC allowances almost 
for free, now face higher prices. 
Case 4: The current impervious levels within the catchment are high with serious flooding 
problems, and participants desire to trade IC allowances. In this case, different trading 
situations may occur. The SO may accept bids to reduce the expected cost of flooding for 
the purpose of reducing the peak flows. Thus, accepted bids would correspond to those 
allocations which reduce the expected flood damage more than the bid prices. 
Additionally, accepted bids may raise imperviousness, shifting peak time t* towards time 
t** where flooding is not a problem, as illustrated in Figure 4-7. In some trading scenarios, 
the shifting effect in peak period (from t* to t**) may reduce the final clearing prices 
*
, ,
s s s s
t k t k     due to the reducing effect of flood damage, via hypothetical changes in 
flood patterns between A and B shown in Figure 4-8. In both situations, the market may 
work as a one-sided auction, and the SO would be a net payer for reducing impervious 
levels and hedging against a range of storm events. 
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Participants’ marginal surplus for trading is greater than the marginal damage. 
Participants who increase IC would trade to the extent that their demand prices are greater 
than the expected marginal flood damage. In the same way, participants who reduce 
impervious levels would trade until their bid prices were lower than the expected marginal 
flood damage. Therefore, the final hedging condition will depend on the trading scenarios. 
A scenario that reduces flood damage will be hedged against storms with a corresponding 
movement in the probability function as illustrated in Figure 4-7, from ICL iii or ii to ICL 
i. Other trading scenarios could increase the flood damage and the movement in the 
probability density function would be the opposite (from ICL i to ICL iii), and the hedging 
level would be reduced. Any increments in the expected damage would be internalised for 
those participants who increase the damage, or change the flood damage distribution. 
 
Figure 4-8 Flooding patterns with different exceeding flows and peak flow with a storm 
scenario; ,
s s
t k   and 
*
,
s s
t k   represents clearing prices with impervious levels A and B 
respectively; t is time. 
 
In summary, different trading scenarios could occur in the catchment and consequently 
different hedging levels could be reached as well. Any changes in the flood probability 
distribution and consequently in the hedging level will be internalised for those participants 
who change their IC allowances. Thus, the changes in flooding would be priced and those 
prices would encourage participants to use more efficient BMPs and technologies, or to 
change IC allowances to avoid flood damage. 
For each case presented above, hypothetical situations of trading IC allowances, 
property size, storm scenarios, control points and flood damage will be presented or 
analysed. The market timeframe is a year, so the recourse flood cost of the TSSP model 
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accounts for the expected damage during the year. Piecewise convex functions will 
represent flood damage. The main flooding component will be the maximum flooding 
depth. 
Ten participants are bidding in the market, with different impervious areas. Each 
participant has 20 ha and is able to change their IC allowances in 10 ha. 
Table 4-1 presents initial IC allowances from participants. Figure 4-9 shows the 
catchment where participants inject their runoff to the system, as well as flooding control 
points CP1, CP2 and CP3. Lag periods between control points are assumed. 
 
Table 4-1 Hypothetical IC conditions for ten participant properties 
Participant 
Initial 
area (ha) 
Non trade area Area to trade IC 
IC condition ha IC condition ha 
1 20 Forest 10 Meadow 10 
2 20 Forest 10 Crop 10 
3 20 Crop 10 Crop 10 
4 20 Concrete 10 Meadow 10 
5 20 Concrete 10 Crop 10 
6 20 Crop 10 Meadow 10 
7 20 Concrete 10 Concrete 10 
8 20 Concrete 10 Concrete 10 
9 20 Crop 10 Crop 10 
10 20 Meadow 10 Crop 10 
 
 
Figure 4-9 Hypothetical catchment showing properties (1-10), control points, and flow 
routing. 
 
1 2
CP1 CP2
86 7
3 54
CP3
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The catchment has flooding problems at CP1, CP2 and CP3. Different maximum flows can 
be reached with current IC allowances, across scenarios. Additionally, 14 storms are used 
to establish the market and their probabilities (in order of increasing storm intensity) are 
0.399, 0.2, 0.15, 0.1, 0.07, 0.04, 0.02, 0.01, 0.005, 0.003, 0.0012, 0.0008, 0.0005, and 
0.0005. Figure 4-10 illustrates the maximum flows reached across the 14 storm scenarios 
at control points CP1 and CP3. This assumes that storms affect different control points in 
the same way. 
 The flood damage cost functions relating to maximum peak flows are 2
1 0.22Dm f , 
3
2 0.00011Dm f , and 
3
3 0.000055Dm f  at CP1, CP2 and CP3, respectively. Grid 
points for the piecewise flood damage cost function at CP1 are estimated as 
 
0.5
0
0.22
i
i
T
F I n
f
n
 
  
 
, where I0 is the initial and F final damage values in the damage 
interval  0 ,I F , ni is the number of the grid points between 0,..,nT, and nT is the number of 
ranges in the interval. The flood damage cost functions are piecewise linear approximated 
and the threshold capacities kM at control points are 70, 230 and 250 m
3
/time at CP1, CP2 
and CP3 respectively. These threshold capacities correspond to the difference between 
channel capacity and the base flows. 
Participants have different IC preferences, and we assumed that they have evaluated the 
opportunity costs of their changes in IC allowances. Those preferences are in Table 4-2 
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Figure 4-10 Initial maximum flow levels by time, at control points (CP) 1 and 3, across 14 
storm scenarios. 
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Table 4-2 Participants’ preferences for changing IC allowances 
Particip. Initial IC 
Initial 
area 
(ha) 
Impact 
at 
control 
point 
Option 1  Option 2 Option 3 
ha IC $/ha ha IC $/ha ha IC $/ha 
1 Meadow (F) 10 1,2,3 5 Cr $8 3 Cr $7 2 Cr $6 
2 Crop (Cr) 10 1,2,3 5 Cn $2 3 Cn $1 2 Cn $1 
3 Crop (Cr) 10 2,3 5 Cn $9 3 Cn $7 2 Cn $5 
4 Meadow (M) 10 2,3 5 Cn $10 3 Cn $8 2 Cn $6 
5 Crop (Cr) 10 2,3 5 Cn $11 3 Cn $8 2 Cn $7 
6 Meadow (M) 10 2,3 6 F $2 3 F $8 1 F $9 
7 Concrete (Cn) 10 2,3 6 M $4 3 M $7 1 M $10 
8 Concrete (Cn) 10 3 6 Cr $5 3 Cr $8 1 Cr $9 
9 Crop (Cr)  10 3 6 F $7 3 F $10 1 F $12 
10 Crop (Cr) 10 3 6 F $5 3 F $10 1 F $15 
 
Figure 4-11 illustrates the exceeding maximum flows at control points and the damage 
across storm scenarios, where CP1 has a lower probability of flooding than CP3 as well as 
lower damage. The expected flood damage in the catchment is $1,303.50, divided into 
$94.49, $445.06 and $763.98 at CP1, CP2 and CP3 respectively. In current conditions, 
CP1 and CP2 are hedged up to storm type 4, and CP3 up to storm type 3. 
 
Figure 4-11 Hypothetical initial conditions of peak flows and flood damage at CP1, CP2, 
and CP3. On the left, storm probability vs. peak flows, and on the right, storm probability 
and flood damage costs. 
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Case 1 
In this case, participant 2 desires to change IC allowances from the current IC allowance 
“crops” to “concrete”. The expected flood damage rises to $1,350.40. The participant has a 
maximum willingness to pay $20, $16 and $14/ha for increasing 5, 3 and 2 ha to 
“concrete”. Because the participant bids high enough, he/she could change IC allowance in 
the 10 ha to a final payment of $48.54. The expected flood damage is increased by $46.90, 
which is a little lower than the total payment of participant 2. This difference is due to the 
piecewise approximation of flood damage, and in this case the SO would obtain extra 
revenue. 
On the other hand, if the participant bids low prices such as $6/ha, $3/ha and $2/ha, the 
market would clear with the participant only being able to change 5 ha, paying $23.64. The 
expected damage in the catchment would be $1,326.50 (rising by $23). 
Case 2 
This case considers an established market where small changes in flood damage have been 
noticed and traded through the market. Participant 2 desires to develop a project which 
would change the flooding in the catchment. If participant 2 was not in the market or bid 
low prices, initially participants 1, 3, and 5 increase IC allowances by 10 ha to “crop”, 5 ha 
to “concrete”, and 8 ha to “concrete” respectively. In contrast, participants 6 and 7 reduce 
IC allowances by 6 and 10 ha respectively. The final expected damage costs are $1,344.60. 
Let us see changes in prices, allocations and flooding if participant 2 bids higher by some x 
to increase IC allowances. Assume bid prices $1.50x, $1.20x and $x/ha, for respective 
quantities 5, 3 and 2 ha, and assuming x between 1 and 6, the following will be observed: 
- Participant 1 who already changed 10 hectares to “crop” could increase only 8 ha, since 
the clearing prices were raised by participant 2’s bid. 
- Previously, participant 2 did not change IC; but now with a high demand price, the 
participant could change 10 ha to “concrete”. These changes shift the peak flows and the 
damage across scenarios and at control points CP1, CP2 and CP3. Figure 4-12 illustrates 
these effects in the peak flows and flood damage at CP1. Thus, with incremental IC the 
expected damage increases from $102.60 to $125.90 at CP1, and from $1,344.60 to 
$1,380.76 at the catchment level. 
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Figure 4-12 Changes in peak flow and flood damage at CP1 under changes in demand 
from participant 2. 
 
- Changing demand changes clearing prices across storm scenarios. Figure 4-13 illustrates 
the changes in clearing prices at control points 1 and 3. Participant 2 is at the CP1 area, 
so changes in clearing prices are stressed at CP1, due to the changes in the incremental 
flood damage and that no participants reduce IC allowances at CP1. At control point 
CP3, prices changed smoothly due to the trade-off between the marginal flood 
increments and the incremental surplus for changing impervious levels, as well as the 
piecewise linear approximation to the damage function. The solid circle in Figure 4-13 
shows the change in the clearing price at the CP3. 
- This section describes the scenario selection, the marginal effects for the extreme storm 
events and the minimum marginal contribution to the final price (see Section 4.3). The 
last two storm scenarios (scenarios s13 and s14), which correspond to the dashed circles 
in Figure 4-13, show the reducing effect of the marginal increment of flood damage. In 
these scenarios, the duals correspond to $0.052 and $0.062 at CP1; $0.118 and $0.149 at 
CP2; and, $0.133 and $0.133 at CP3 ($/peak flow) (see Table 4-3). The marginal 
contribution is reduced by the storm probability; however, in this example the effect is 
not emphasised and could easily be observed when the marginal flood damage is almost 
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zero. Additionally, at CP1 the observed final total damage and the expected damage are 
$14,639.90 and $15,137.80, and $7.31 and $7.46. 
 
Figure 4-13 Changes in clearing prices (shadow prices) across storm scenarios and control 
points. 
 
Table 4-3 Total and expected damage, and dual in scenario s13 and s14 
Control 
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CP1 $14,639.90 $15,137.80 $7.31 $7.46 $0.052 $0.062 
CP2 $77,797.30 $81,626.90 $38.89 $40.81 $0.118 $0.149 
CP3 $121,2270 $127,127.00 $30.61 $63.56 $0.133 $0.133 
 
Case 3 
In this case, the capacities are changed to emphasise the effects in flood conditions across 
scenarios. At CP1, CP2 and CP3, the threshold capacities kM  
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However, participants desire to change IC, and consequently the flood distribution may 
change at each control point. Participants have the same preferences as previously 
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high enough to increase IC allowances. Other participants may have strategic decisions, 
but this issue is outside the scope of this thesis. 
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The market is cleared under the F1 condition, and participants 1, 3, 4 and 5 increased 
IC allowances, but participants 6 and 7 reduced IC allowances. In this case, 10, 5, 5, 8, 6 
and 9 ha of IC allowances would be changed. Under F2 the final land allocation would 
remain similar; however, participant 2 could increase IC allowance by 10 ha. Figure 4-14 
illustrates the dual prices under both situations. 
 
Figure 4-14 Dual prices across scenarios at control points CP1, CP2 and CP3. CP_Ini, 
CP_F1 and CP_F2 are initial, F1 and F2 conditions at control points respectively. 
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With options F1 and F2, CP1 and CP2 are hedged up to storm type 4, and CP3 remained 
with the same hedged storm type 3, but flooding increased its intensity across scenarios 
(see Figure 4-14). Prices at CP1 rise because insufficient participants reduce their IC 
allowances at CP1, and participants demand sufficiently high to compensate the 
incremental expected flood damage along control points. At CP2 and CP3, participants 6 
and 7 reduced IC allowances, smoothing the flooding levels as well as the dual prices 
reached at the control points under F1 and F2. 
Case 4 
In this case, control points CP1, CP2 and CP3 have threshold capacities kM of 60, 280 and 
300 m
3
/time with respective damage functions of 2
1 15Dm f , 
3
2 0.001Dm f , and 
3
3 0.0005Dm f . Fourteen storm scenarios with different intensities are used in the 
market. Under the current IC, the expected flood damage at CP1, CP2 and CP3 are 
$7,982.10, $28,003.10 and $5,001.28 respectively, and $40,986.50. Flooding occurs from 
storm scenarios 4, 5 and 6 at CP1, CP2 and CP3. Participants are assumed to have the 
previous demand and supply preferences. 
Flooding occurs often with significant damage. Thus, if the market were cleared, the 
SO would be a net payer. However, the imperviousness would be reduced, so the 
catchment would be hedged against a wide range of storms. In addition, the flood 
distribution would be shifted, reducing expected damage. 
In this case, any participants who desire to reduce IC can do so, e.g., participants 5-10 
would reduce IC by 10 ha each, but participants who desire to increase IC would not do so. 
Consequently, the catchment is now hedged up to storm types 5 and 4, and flows are 
reduced across scenarios at CP2 and CP3, see Figure 4-15.. 
 
  
 
124 
 
 
Figure 4-15 Changes in peak flows at control point CP1, CP2 and CP3 before and after the 
market is cleared. 
 
4.9 System operator revenue 
After clearing the market, the SO’s revenue (RE) is obtained as the difference between the 
payment from participants with increasing demands and reducing supplies, which is 
represented as follows: 
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S s t s D
t k i j k i j
i j s k t
H g        + 
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, , , ,
n J S K T
S s t s S
t k i j k i j
i j s k t
H g            [4.22] 
In the electricity market, revenue adequacy is defined as payouts to financial transmission 
rights being less than congestion revenues from dispatch. With a dispatch clearing model 
under uncertainty, Pritchard et al. (2010) noticed that revenue is reached only in 
expectancy, and that in some scenarios the SO could be a net payer and in others a net 
receiver. However, in the proposed Sto_MarketIC clearing model, the SO can reach 
different revenue in expectancy That means the SO is exposed to a weighted payment or 
receipt related to the changes in flood damage and the probability of the storm scenario, 
s ,. Thus, the SO could be a net receiver or net payer depending on the marginal changes 
in flood distribution. The SO could be a net receiver if the SO would sell expected flood 
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damage in the flood area; contrarily, the SO could be a net payer if the expected flood 
damage is reduced. More detail is discussed in next Section. In addition, the market is not 
necessarily revenue neutral in expectancy, but depends on initial IC allowances and the 
flood cost function approximation. 
4.9.1 Initial IC allowances and revenues 
Section 3.6 of Chapter 3 pointed out the SO may reach different revenue positions 
according to initial IC allowances, and over and under-allocated capacity constraints in a 
market established with one storm scenario. In the Sto_MarketIC, the IC allowance is a set 
of impacting flows 
1,
, ,
t u s
i j kG
 
,i jA  along period and scenarios at control points, where 
1,
, ,
t u s
i j kG
  is the impact flow related to the initial IC allowance and Ai,j is the initial land area. 
The IC allowance’s price represents the value of violating capacity at different places in 
the catchment. 
Initial loose constraints which allow increasing flows in some scenarios, which implies 
that the SO could sell these rights, and receive revenue for the equivalent increment in IC 
allowances, if the channel capacity will become binding due to flooding in the area. 
Additionally, high prices could increase IC allowances and the SO could receive payments 
for those increments. Contrarily, the SO could be a net payer when marginal flood 
expected damage is greater than the offer prices to reduce IC allowances. Marginal prices 
for changing flood and IC allowances could be different than the marginal flood damage, 
and the SO may pay or receive the difference. 
Thus, if Pi,j is the bid price to increase IC allowance, and because a non arbitrage 
condition is faced in the market, the clearing price will be 
 
*
1
f s
S k ks
ss
k
C f
f




 at control 
point k. This prices represents the marginal change in the expected flood damage at the 
new flood distribution. So if the new condition 
 
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1
f s
S k ks
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previous flood distribution, the SO could face revenue adequacy Pi,j 
 
1
f s
S k ks
ss
k
C f
f




    
0. This means, the SO is exposed to an outward shift to the flooding distribution and would 
sell this change. Contrarily, the SO could be a net payer, if the demand curve is shifted and 
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the new bid prices were reduced. In this case, the SO could buy expected flood reduction 
 
1
f s
S k ks
ss
k
C f
f




  Pi,j   0.The revenue for the SO depends on the total initial IC 
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The SO may be a net receiver in expectancy if participants shift flow distributions 
along scenarios, particularly, toward periods and scenarios when the peaks are below the 
threshold capacities, Mk. Thus, the SO may sell violated capacity Mk 
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the SO may be a net receiver if participants increase IC allowances, and pay high enough 
prices for shifting flood damage distribution at some control points, 
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The SO may be a net payer, if the opportunity cost for changing IC allowances is lower 
than the marginal expected damage, , ,
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The SO may reach revenue neutrality by being a net payer at some control points and 
net receiver in others, or when the opportunity cost for IC matches the marginal damage of 
the flood distribution which remains constant at the end. 
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4.9.2 Operator revenue due to flood damage cost approximation 
Different approximations of the flood damage cost can generate different rents for the SO. 
This has been observed when modelling transmission losses, financial transmission rights 
and flow pressure in electricity and gas markets (Hogan et al. 1996; Hogan 2002; Philpott 
and Pritchard 2004; Lesieutre and Hiskens 2005; Pepper et al. 2012). In this case, the extra 
rent corresponds to the possible surplus or deficit for the SO, which is termed supra and 
infra revenue. (Note that if the flood damage cost is linear, this extra revenue is almost 
zero.) A net surplus is reached based on the differences between the changes in the 
expected flood damage and the price paid/received for the SO for allowing trading. This 
effect will be illustrated and discussed in section 4.9.3. 
Figure 4-4 and Figure 4-16 illustrate linear approximations of flood damage costs, and 
a linear approximation for particular scenarios. Convexification of the function may 
produce this additional rent (supra and infra revenue) to the SO. The SO’s extra rent will 
be analysed in one scenario which corresponds to a simple flooding scenario model, and 
under several scenarios in the Sto_MarketIC in expectation. 
 If A or B were chosen, the nodal clearing prices would be
1 2A A AP P    or 
1 2B B BP P   , and 1AP  and 1BP  which correspond to the marginal flood damage at 
specific flooding levels A and B. Accordingly, 
2AP  is the supra revenue that the SO may 
receive (pay) for the linear approximation. The extra rent corresponds to PA2(Qsell – 
Qbuy) in A and this should be minimised by doing a more accurate approximation. 
On the other hand, the SO could be a net extra payer if point C were chosen and IC 
allowances were increased. In this case, the price signal in the market would be 
 c A Bor   . However, the flood damage is more expensive than the linearised 
marginal prices PC1, and the SO would be finally paying PC2 (infra revenue), which is the 
difference between the linearised and the real marginal damage. Under this situation a 
generalised condition such as C could produce an infeasible market condition, and hence 
the SO should evaluate the market design carefully. 
In summary, if rainfall scenarios and flooding levels like A, B, or C were chosen, the 
market will account for the marginal flood damage in those scenarios. In A, participants 
may face high marginal cost at equilibrium, and the SO becomes a net payer, and most of 
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the supply offers would be accepted. Thus, the price signal may incentivise flood 
reduction. In C, the marginal cost would be low at equilibrium, and participants will 
observe the opposite situation to A or B. In this case, the price signal would be almost zero, 
and most of the demand for increasing IC would be accepted, raising flood damage, and 
participants would not pay for contributing to the damage. However, this market design 
could fail, and the SO would need to convexify the damage function. As was previously 
stated, the expected flood damage is convex, and so the market would not likely face this 
situation. 
 
Figure 4-16 Cost approximations and flood scenarios. A, B and C are scenarios; A , B , 
and C  are the corresponding clearing prices (linearised marginal cost). 1iP  and 2iP  
decompose the clearing price; in A and B, 1iP  is the marginal damage and 2iP  is the supra 
revenue for the non-linear function; in C, 1iP  is the clearing price and 2iP  is the infra 
revenue (cost). 
 
In a market established with scenarios A, B and C, the estimated expected marginal 
damage estimated (EEMD) would be 
A A +
B B +
C C  or 
A  1 2A AP P + 
B  1 2B BP P + C 1CP . The real expected marginal damage (REMD) would be 
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B
1BP +
C  1 2C CP P . The difference EEMD–REMD equals A 2AP +
B
2BP 
C
2CP . 
When 
A
2AP +
B
2BP 
C
2CP  the EEMD would be close to the REMD, whereas damage 
could be underestimated in other scenarios. On the other hand, if 
A
2AP +
B
2BP    
C
2CP  
participants do not cover 100% of the expected marginal cost, and price may encourage 
them to increase IC allowances. This will also be observed if convexification is applied to 
the flood damage cost rather than for each scenario, as will be used to illustrate trading 
cases using convexification in Appendix B and then in Chapters 6 and 7. 
4.9.3 Operator revenue surplus 
As stated, the SO is exposed to revenue conditions according to the initial IC allowances, 
the flood damage approximation and the net demand for changing IC allowances. The 
exposure from the SO corresponds to changes in the expected flood damage due to changes 
in the demand curves. Because the market is designed as a net market, the demand can 
correspond to the marginal net income for trading IC allowances. The Sto_MarketIC 
clearing model assumes that the flood cost functions across scenarios do not change, and 
changes in clearing prices are only due to changes in demand, as shown in Figure 4-17. 
Therefore, the SO is exposed only to changes in demand curves. 
 
 
Figure 4-17 Changes in demand curves given a marginal expected damage supply curve. 
k  is the clearing price. A, B, C are net surplus areas. F and F’ are the expected flow 
levels. 
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Figure 4-17 illustrates the changes in market equilibrium for changes in the demand 
curves. Initially, the market is cleared at 1  with expected flows F (demand curve 1); 
however, demand preferences could change to demand curve 2 and reach a new 
equilibrium at 2  and F’. Thus, the SO is exposed to a new expected flood damage 
condition. The SO receives (F’F)* 2 , allowing increments in expected damage C and 
having a surplus B. The participants pay a net (F’F)* 2  and have a net surplus A. 
Figure 4-18 illustrates the clearing condition in the next trading period. Net demand is 
reduced and the final flood condition is F’. The SO is a net payer for reducing flood and 
pays D = ((F+F’)* 3
k ), but has a net surplus area G. However, the initial flood 
condition F could not be achieved because the net demand was not reduced sufficiently to 
reach an equivalent flood level condition. 
Because changes in flood distribution could be achieved via IC allowances, the SO is 
exposed to revenue conditions after clearing the market. This revenue could be used to 
mitigate flood damage, to insure against floods, etc. Also, the extra revenues such as B and 
G in Figure 4-18 (i) and (ii) could be scaled between market participants. The decision 
regarding this revenue as well as scaling will be determined by the SO and the authority. 
 
Figure 4-18 Net demand curve and changes in the expected flood damage. 
k  is the 
clearing price, and D and G are net surplus areas. F, F’ and F+  are flood levels. 
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On the other hand, after several auctions with the expected flow level F and clearing price 
2 , the SO may observed that the damage function in the flood area has significantly 
changed. The new damage function is damage 2 (see Figure 4-19). Thus, under this new 
market clearing condition, the clearing price could be 3  and expected flows F’. The SO 
needs to pay (FF’)* 3  to reach the new condition F’. Participants reach an extra surplus 
A, since the payment is higher than changes in demand B. Interestingly, the SO may reach 
a surplus C due to not compensating all the changes in the new expected damage curve. 
The previous figure showed the SO as a net receiver in the first trading period and net 
payer in the second period, but the SO was actually a net receiver after both trades. Indeed, 
the flood damage in the catchment was changed. The SO could use this revenue to improve 
infrastructure, to mitigate flood or to use as insurance in the flood location. 
 
Figure 4-19 Demand curve and changes in the expected flood damage curve. 
k  is the 
clearing price, and A, B, and C are net surplus areas. F and F’ are flow levels. 
 
Those changes in flood damage could also mean that the SO is required to carefully 
evaluate the established thresholds to avoid over constraining the market, which could 
cause an extreme net payment condition at the end. The payment could be more than the 
SO’s budget; however, it is expected that the SO could accommodate small changes. 
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Alternatively, to avoid extreme changes at the flood distribution tail, the SO could try 
to hedge against extreme changes and could use a risk measure for changing the extreme 
flood distribution. This proposed risk condition in a possible market formulation will be 
analysed in Chapter 6. 
4.10 Dealing with a non-convex flood damage cost in the market formulation 
A piecewise linear approximation may fail when the approximated function is non-convex 
(Beale and Tomlin 1970). However, a non-convex condition can be handled by adding 
binary variables (Keha et al. 2004). The method known as SOS2 forces a weighted 
combination between adjacent grid points (Beale 1963; Lawler and Wood 1966; Beale and 
Tomlin 1970; Lee and Wilson 2001; Keha et al. 2004; Loucks et al. 2005). 
Pepper et al. (2012) pointed out that the Victorian gas market in Australia deals with 
non-convexities in the physical equations. They noticed that SOS2 allows acceptable 
solution and clearing prices, accordingly, the gas market in Victoria has being working 
efficiently for the past 10 years. The Sto_MarketIC could deal with the issue of non-
convexity in some scenarios. Currently, other approximations can deal with non-convexity 
issues, particularly with prices (O'Neill et al. 2005; Bjørndal and Jörnsten 2008), but these 
non-convexity issues are outside the scope of this thesis. Loucks et al. (2005) presented a 
non-convex stage-damage function which will be noticed if peak flows exceed channel 
capacities, banks, levees, dykes, etc. This flood damage function could be addressed in the 
Sto_MarketIC model via discretisation, linearisation and using SOS2 method. 
The SO can estimate flood damage with a local solution from adjacent points with 
SOS2, calculated from a convex combination between grid points of the linearised and 
non-convex flood damage cost for each storm scenario. The SOS2 formulation includes the 
following conditions: 
,
s
k rl  = , 1 ,
s s
k r k r   ,   k,s,t where r  (2,R-1)         [4.23] 
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,
s
k r  forces a solution in the range (r–1, r). The market formulation could include 
conditions [4.23]-[4.26] to deal with non-convexity. However, this could create 
externalities in the market as can be seen with a numerical example in the first section of 
Appendix B. 
Using SOS2 and convexification for the flood damage produces different revenue for 
the SO. The approximations also change prices and allocations along with the final IC 
allowances in the catchment as was previously discussed. These affect the flood 
distribution and the hedging flood condition that could be reached in the catchment. 
Implications of flood damage approximations and also using SOS2 are extended in 
Appendix B along with several numerical examples. 
4.11 Final remarks and conclusion 
The Sto_MarketIC is not a stochastic version of Det_MarketIC, which had a hard 
constraint [3.21], because with Det_MarketIC model just one constraint would be binding 
in the optimal solution. Rather, the Sto_MarketIC includes a flood damage function which 
accounts for the transfer functions, flow-stage, flood-stage and stage-damage relationships 
in the flooding area (Loucks et al. 2005). 
The market model Sto_MarketIC1 considers only the peak flow period, not flows by 
period along the flood periods. The cost is internalised only for participants who contribute 
to the stage-flood over the modelled scenarios. Sto_MarketIC is constructed by first 
creating a demand curve for flood reductions (increase) and so indirectly for 
imperviousness. The curve is based on marginal changes in the expected flood damage, 
and this marginal damage will be faced for those participants by the no-arbitrage condition. 
Duality shows the no-arbitrage condition of prices; the price represents the marginal 
changes in the expected flood damage at the equilibrium. This price is accounted for at 
settlement for each participant. The settlement also depends on the initial IC allowances 
[reference usage (land use)] that each participant owns in their property. Consequently, the 
SO could be exposed to different revenue conditions, being a net payer or a net receiver 
according to the net changes in the expected flood damage at each control point and the 
status quo of the initial land uses in the catchment. This revenue also depends on the flood 
damage approximation. 
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When applying the cost approximation to the flood damage, the SO may not have 
revenue adequacy; however, the SO may reduce the stage-flood in some parts, or move 
stage-floods among areas especially in sensitive zones. Thus, the price signal may 
incentivise participants to move out the peak period as long as they receive a net payment. 
The expenses would be paid by the SO and the catchment would be hedged against a wide 
range of storms events as well as flood scenarios. On the other hand, the price may also be 
a signal to increase flooding. 
In convexifying the flood damage cost, the Sto_MarketIC will allocate IC allowances 
in different ways as was stated in previous paragraphs. Now the question is who should 
internalise those differences when the damage function is convexified? Society may accept 
to be a net payer if the conditions allow a net social benefit, or if those who are increasing 
the damage or changing risk position for society internalise the extra damage. However, 
who should pay for these differences for the approximation as well as possible 
distributional effect for scaling are beyond the scope of this research. 
To deal with non-convexity of the flood damage function and possible failure when the 
approximated function is non-convex, a SOS2 method is proposed. The method allows 
getting prices and allocations, and the price accounts for the expected flood damage. 
Finally, in a small catchment where most flows arrive at control points with similar 
impacting flows by time, each participant’s flow will be impacting at the peak period, 
resulting in such flows being priced correctly. However, in a larger catchment, participants 
whose flows arrive before or after the peaks may not pay. Accordingly, when participants 
inject flows that hasten flood and lengthen flood duration, they are being free riders. In 
both situations, participants are free riders because the market considers only the peak flow 
to charge participants for their flood contribution. Even if the damage was well estimated, 
participants contributing to floods may not be correctly charged. This situation can be seen 
as an externality that could be addressed by market model design. To prevent these free 
riders, the next chapter will propose ways to penalise non-peak flows. 
The SO may observe that in some flood areas, participants could change IC allowances, 
and their flows would arrive before the stage-flood. These flows do not increase damage, 
and so this condition could be a desired pattern for the SO. The same could be noticed with 
those IC allowances that delay flows, but lengthen flood. The SO could also desire this 
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condition if peak flows are reduced. In both cases, participants are not contributing to 
damage and so are not free riders. 
Insurance companies (private and public) could be free riders if the IC market were 
established in the catchment. Changes in flood distribution and hedging for flood condition 
will change the risk premiums. A less impervious catchment for a long term would reduce 
risk premiums resulting in reducing the adverse selection to participants in the flood area. 
However, companies could also face extra losses if the catchment became impervious and 
the flood distribution were shifted with potentially more frequent events. These 
implications are outside the scope of this thesis, but an important point for future research. 
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Chapter 5 
 
5 EXTENDING PENALTIES FOR FLOOD DAMAGE 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The Sto_marketIC1 market model was designed considering that the peak flow was an 
approximation of the total damage. Those peaks flows then resulted in flood costs which 
were estimated based on the recourse flood cost in the TSSP model, and for a range of 
scenarios based on location, and the catchment. The damage depends on peak flow or stage 
flood, but also flood rate (flash flood) and flood duration (Krzysztofowicz and Davis 
1983b; c; d; Georgakakos 1986; Smith 1994; Penning-Rowsell and Green 2000; Loucks et 
al. 2005; Thieken et al. 2005; Kreibich et al. 2009; Merz et al. 2010). Empirical studies 
demonstrating these effects are reviewed in Sections 2.8 and 2.9 in Chapter 2, and Section 
5.2 later. 
Krzysztofowicz and Davis (1983a; b), and de Moel and Aerts (2011) pointed out that 
most studies on flood damage simplify the damage estimation by using the maximum 
depth “stage-flood”. This approach is also suitable to Sto_MarketIC1; however, this 
simplification may carry inefficiencies by having free riders, who are injecting runoffs and 
their flows contribute to the flood damage because those flows are hastening the peak time 
(flash flood) or lengthening flood duration (Krzysztofowicz and Davis 1983a; c; 
Embrechts and Schmidli 1994; Dutta et al. 2003). Additionally, the stage-flood approach 
does not capture interactions from flood components such as flash flood or flood duration. 
A market focused only on penalties based on maximum flow depths may result in biased 
price signals. Accordingly, this chapter will explore alternative penalty costs which will 
account for flood components such as flash flood or hastening peak flood measured as 
increment in the rising limb slope (hastening stage-flood), and flood duration as increment 
in the reducing slope flow, enabling physical changes to floods, and for the cost of flood 
  
 
137 
damages. Penalties will be approximated to the cost of flooding. Therefore, the TSSP 
market model will estimate the flood cost taking into account additional flood components. 
This chapter proposes alternative cost penalties to decompose the flood damage. The 
Sto_MarketIC2 formulation decomposes flood damage into the components of depth, 
duration (lengthening flood), and hastening peak flood (hastening peak period). Thus, any 
changes in flow due to changes on IC allowances, BMPs and technologies could be 
penalised by the flood component and its related costs. Penalties related to flood cost 
would be incurred by those participants who contribute to the flood damage. 
In Sto_MarketIC2, flows reduce capacities, for which a recourse flood cost of flood 
damage is raised for a given scenario. The market model can penalise for ramping up or 
down around established thresholds; however, in this case the penalties cost will be related 
to violate an established rising limb slope and so hastening peak time of flood (flash flood) 
and lengthening flood duration related to violate established flow reducing slope. 
In the Sto_MarketIC1 model, flood damage was linked to peak flows (maximum depth 
flooding), and the market model accounted for peak flows over a finite set of storm 
scenarios. This flood cost could be adjusted according to the storm’s type, i.e., different 
cost estimates for storms that hasten or lengthen flood duration. Such an approach could be 
cumbersome due to the need of having as many cost estimates as storms used to establish 
the market. However, with this approach, any change in flood patterns outside of the stage-
flood may not be penalised. Thus, rather than establishing only a flood cost for each peak 
flood, a more general cost scheme for flood patterns could be established, which is able to 
cost any change that could modify the physical flood distribution and the flood damage 
across storm scenarios. 
As stated in previous chapters, two similar flooding depths could result in different 
damage costs, depending on the period to reach the maximum depth or the duration after 
reaching a given flood peak. The proposed penalties would reflect the changes in flood 
physical distribution and associated cost. Penalties will not account for all real and possible 
combinations of flood damage; but provide a plausible and referential measure of such 
damage. 
Section 5.2 presents the flood damage components and the related penalties for each 
flood component. Section 5.2.1 discusses the depth cost related to stage-flood damage. 
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Section 5.2.2 introduces the slopes dependences related to warning and flood duration. 
Section 5.2.2.1 presents penalties constraints which specifically relate the rising limb of the 
hydrograph curve with a penalty for violating this slope with warning flood (flash flood), 
and the lengthening flood with flood duration. Section 5.2.2.2 presents an alternative way 
to relate these penalties with flood components. Section 5.3 describes the market model. 
Section 5.4 presents the price analysis with the proposed penalties. Section 5.5 is final 
remarks and conclusions. 
5.2 Relating cost to flood damage 
Flood components such as hastening peak flood and lengthening flood should be linked 
to penalties which in turn should account for violations of physical constraints. For 
instance, large increases in flows may increase the damage for changes in the slope of the 
rising limb of the hydrograph curve, which reduces the time to reach a peak level of 
flooding (flash floods). Slow decreases in flows may increase flood duration (discussed in 
section 5.2.2.1). Hastening of floods and their duration could be approximated via 
establishing flow thresholds during the flood warning period (further discussed in section 
5.2.2.2). Implementing penalties enables the market model to price the flood components 
that influence flooding. As a result, floods can be managed with clearer and long term 
price signals. 
Flooding components from governing hydraulic equations at control points and 
scenarios could be added into the flood cost function. Thus, instead of approximating 
piecewise hydraulic components, a piecewise approximation could be determined directly 
from the damage cost function, e.g., the corresponding peak flow could be related to the 
flood damage condition. 
The SO could also use the proposed penalties to obtain the desired flood conditions. In 
such cases, the SO could establish thresholds that actually achieve the desired flood levels. 
For any increase in the established thresholds, penalties will be raised; thus, participants 
prepared to pay such penalties, which correspond to flood costs, can change IC allowances 
and also the physical flood distribution. The SO could penalise for hastening peak flooding 
in a specific period based on a desired depth increase, with the aim of achieving a smooth 
flood. Also the SO could desire a particular depth over a given time period, and penalties 
would be raised for increases in flood depth. 
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5.2.1 Depth cost in floodplain areas 
Depth of flooding contributes to damage. In the Sto_MarketIC2 model, the cost depends 
on the maximum flow that is reached at each control point, which represents the maximum 
depth in the channels and floodplain. Damage  f sk kC f  is related to maximum flow skf  by 
control point k and storm scenario s. 
5.2.2 Rapid flooding and lengthening duration 
Flood damage is raised by sudden and large increases in flows or depth levels, and also by 
slow declinations (Thieken et al. 2005; Kreibich et al. 2009). Flash floods may produce 
considerable damage cost (Georgakakos 1986); in fact, regional authorities monitor 
changes in flows to avoid such extreme damages, and if necessary evacuating people in 
anticipation of such floods. Penalty costs could account for the anticipation of peak flows. 
These penalty costs could be related to warning costs (Krzysztofowicz and Davis 
1983b; d; c; Penning-Rowsell and Green 2000). Smith (1994) noted that in urban areas, 
reductions in the warning period, i.e., notification that the floods would start in a short 
period, may increase the damage by up to 25%. In addition, the author showed that in a 
less prepared area, the relationship of actual/potential damage could increase from 0.6 to 
0.85 when warning time is reduced from 5 hours to 1 hour. Similarly, Penning-Rowsell 
and Green (2000) noted that with advanced warning, potential flood damage can be 
reduced by about 13%. Other empirical studies that estimate flash flood damage were 
addressed by Barrera et al. (2006), and by Kreibich et al. (2009). 
 Longer flood periods can also result in increased damage and such damage cost could 
be calculated by the flow declination penalties for flood duration. 
Dutta et al. (2003) presented stage-damage curves, based on flood depth and duration in 
the agricultural sector in Japan. From those curves, it was possible to see increased damage 
associated with flood duration; e.g., after 4 days of flooding, damage ranged between 10% 
and 15%, and after 7 days of flooding, increased to 45%. Thieken et al. (2005) showed that 
duration increases losses in buildings from 10% with 2 to 7 duration days to 20% of losses 
with 21 days of flooding. Other studies of flood duration damage were pointed out by Scott 
(1989), Smith (1994), and Penning-Rowsell et al. (2005). 
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The SO could establish thresholds (illustrated by the series i in graphs A and B in 
Figure 5-1), for a possible maximum flood level, storm scenario and the status quo of IC 
allowances in the catchment. These figures show an upper inclination and a lower 
declination from established flows or depth levels. The market model could raise penalties 
according to levels illustrated by   and   angles in Figure 5-2, which would account for 
the resulting damage. This threshold inclination (declination) may correspond to a cost of 
flooding in a particular scenario. The electricity market uses similar constraints for 
generator ramp-rates (Alvey et al. 1998); in fact, such constraints ensure electricity 
injections in the systems. In our case, for instance, if the current flow situations were 
illustrated by iii, the manager would try to move flows toward situations such as ii and i. 
 
Figure 5-1 (A) inclination to reach a flood level and (B) declination to reach a desired 
condition; indices i, ii and iii represent flood inclination (declination) to reach level 1 
(being a more preferred flood level), and time ti > tii > tiii in A and ti < tii < tiii in B. 
 
Figure 5-3 shows the hastening peak by time for flooding levels L1 and L2. If the threshold 
angle conditions were continuously violated over a period, a flash flood event would more 
likely be noticed in scenario s, and the period to reach this flood level would be reduced by 
't t  periods ( 't ). Flows above threshold capacity increase flood damage, which is 
represented by changing the angle from   to    as in Figure 5-3 B. 
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Figure 5-2 Upper inclination and lower declination penalties with hypothetical total flow 
patterns A and B at a control point. Angles  and   represent the severity of the upper 
inclination and lower declination violations. 
 
If a participant increases their impervious level, it will probably increase the threshold 
depth inclination, and he/she will most likely pay for increased flood costs. The change in 
the angle as well as its effect on flash flooding is represented in Equation [5.1]. This 
equation approximates the reduction in the period to incremental damage which is 
observed when the changes in flow thresholds are significantly violated- 
, 1
, 1 , 1
'
k t
k t k t
z
t t
z z

 

 

  
 
, 1
, 1 , 1
1
k t
k t k t
z
t
z z

 

 
 
   
       
     [5.1]  
, 1k tz

  is the marginal change in depth (flow) at in control point k and time t, 't  is the 
reduction in period to reach level L1, and , 1 , 1 , 1k t k t k tz z z
   
       . Figure 5-3 shows that at 
time t’, the flood reaches depth L1; thus, if 
, 1
, 1 , 1
0
k t
k t k t
z
z z

 

 


 
, an upper flood bound could 
be reached in a shorter period, given a constant period time . A similar approach could be 
used in case of violating declination flow changes as well as any violation able to lengthen 
the flooding duration. 
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Figure 5-3 (A) Flash flood inclinations and relationships between flood costs and angles 
 and    . The difference between angles corresponds to the increment of flash flood 
damage. (B) Changes in damage for the times that threshold is violated. 
 
5.2.2.1 Changes in flow levels and penalty cost 
The market formulation could include flood physical conditions such as those indicated 
with A and B in Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2. Equation [5.2] links changes in flows over time 
for hastening peak flood (flash flood). Equation [5.3] links changes in flows with 
lengthening flooding duration. 
, 1 ,
s s
k t k tz z    , 1
s
k t

  + , 1
s
k tVz

     s,k and t’   t   t’’     [5.2] 
, 1 ,
s s
k t k tz z     ,
s
k t
   ,
s
k tVz
     s,k and t*   t   t**     [5.3] 
Equations [5.2] and [5.3] represent the changes in flows , 1 ,
s s
k t k tz z   at an inundation area k, 
time t, and scenario s. Flow changes also represent changes in flow velocity, and so the 
period to reach a particular flood condition. Consequently, ,
s
k t
  and ,
s
k t
  are the enlarging 
and reducing thresholds defined by the SO at control point k, storm scenario s and time t. 
Accordingly, , 1
s
k tVh

  and ,
s
k tVh
  are the flow changes that violate thresholds at control point 
k, time t and scenario s. In period t’  t  t’’ and t*   t   t**, changing flows hasten the 
flood period and lengthen flood duration respectively. 
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The violated boundaries in [5.2] and [5.3] can be linked to flood damage or flood cost 
 ,v sk k tC Vz   and  ,v sk k tC Vz  . For any violation , 0sk tVz   , the flood damage would have a 
marginal increment due to a possible flash flood. Thus, participants who increase this 
damage will face the corresponding cost. Figure 5-3-B illustrates the violations from the 
threshold α. Recalling Figure 2-14 in Chapter 2, the stage-flood was shown to be reached 
at an earlier time, increasing the damage from C(t*) to C(t**). The market model in this 
chapter will account for this category of violation. 
When penalties for declinations are established, and thresholds are violated, i.e., a long-
lasting flood, 
,
s
k tVz
  > 0, the marginal increment in flooding could be estimated by 
 ,v sk k tC Vz  , and the resulting damage could be greater, due to the extended flood duration. 
The SO may be more concerned about maximum depth and flash floods than flood 
duration. In this case, the market clearing formulation would have penalties only for stage-
flood and enlarging slope. An alternative flood cost for increasing flows at the first or final 
flood stages is proposed in this chapter. 
5.2.2.2 Alternative penalty cost for large flow increments 
Alternative constraints and thresholds to represent hastening peak flood, and lengthening 
flood duration could be as follows: 
,
s
k tz   ,
s
k t
  + ,
s
k tVz
    for s,k,t and t   t*         [5.4] 
,
s
k tz   ,
s
k t
  + ,
s
k tVz
    for s,k,t and t   t**        [5.5] 
The flood costs that account for the flows above thresholds represent a flood level or a 
condition that the SO determines across scenarios within the catchment. Figure 5-4 
illustrates the thresholds ,
s
k t
  and ,
s
k t
 , and times t* and t** established by the SO. The 
thresholds also represent tolerance flow levels, below which the SO would not apply flood 
cost penalties. Participants who change total flows above these thresholds would be 
penalised by the cost  ,v sk k tC Vz   and  ,v sk k tC Vz  . 
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Figure 5-4 Flows above thresholds (
,
s
k t
  and ,
s
k t
 ) leading to flood penalty cost before and 
after times t* and t**. 
 
This chapter focuses on constraints and thresholds associated with flood cost described in 
section 5.2.2.1). Chapter 7 extends examples for both types of proposed constraints. 
5.3 Sto_MarketIC2 model 
The Sto_MarketIC2 model extends the Sto_MarketIC1 model, by incorporating new 
parameters and variables to represent flooding in channels. Concerning channels and 
streams, model Sto_MarketIC2 will consider the maximum depth as well as maximum and 
minimum flow changes to approximate flood damage for hastened floods and duration 
respectively. Violated boundaries have flood costs which represent the changes in flood 
damage. The market model formulation will be as follows. 
Parameters 
,
s
k t
  = Maximum inclination of changing flows at control point k and scenario s (channels 
or streams) between time t and t1. The SO establishes these differential 
thresholds, which represent manageable levels that do not increase damage 
(volume/time). 
,
s
k t
  =  Minimum declination of changing flows at control point k and scenario s (channels 
or streams) between time t and t+1. The SO establishes these differential flood 
thresholds as manageable flood levels that do not increase damage (volume/time). 
t* t** Time 
Flows (m
3
/time) 
,
s
k t
  ,
s
k t

 
Exceeding flows (scenarios) 
Capacity 
Thresholds 
Penalty period Penalty period 
Penalised exceeding flows 
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s  =  Probability of storm scenario s. This parameter satisfies the following properties: 0 
 
s  1, and 
S
s
s
  1. 
 f sk kC f  = Flood damage for peak flow skf  at control point k and scenario s. This flood 
cost represents the flood damage in channels and streams related to the maximum 
depth ($/ volume/time). 
 ,v sk k tC Vz  = Flood damage for a large change in the flow inclination between time t and 
t+1 at floodplain area k, and scenario s. This flood cost represents the increase flood 
damage for accelerating flooding (flash flood) in scenario s ($/ volume/time). 
 ,v sk k tC Vz  = Flood damage for a small change in the flow declination between time t and 
t+1 at floodplain area k, and scenario s. This flood cost represents the incremental 
flood damage for lengthening flooding duration in scenario s ($/ volume/time). 
Decision variables 
s
kf  =  Maximum peak flow above threshold capacity Mk in scenario s at control point k 
(volume/time). 
,
s
k tz  =  Flow above capacity Mk at control point k, by time t and scenario s (volume/time) 
,
s
k tVz
  = Exceeding changes in flow at control point k, time t and scenario s. These flows 
are those above the established maximum flow inclination, k
  (volume/time). 
,
s
k tVz
  = Small changes in flows which are below the established minimum changes in flow 
declination, k
 , at control point k, time t and scenario s (volume/time). 
,
s s
k t  = Clearing price for hastening peak flood and lengthening flood at control point k, 
time t and scenario s ($/ volume/time). 
,
s s
t k  = Clearing price, at control point k, time t and scenario s ($/ volume/time). 
,
s s
k t 
 = Price for reducing the time to reach a flood level (resulting in flash flood damage 
or lengthening of flooding) at control point k, scenario s and time t ($/ 
volume/time). 
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,
s s
k t 
 = Price for lengthening flooding at control point k, scenario s and time t ($/ 
volume/time). 
Market clearing model: Sto_MarketIC2 
Maximize 
, , , , , , , ,
1 1 1 1 1 1
N J B N J B
D S
i j b i j b i j b i j b
i j b i j b
P qbuy P qsell
     
       1 1
S K
s f s
k k
s k
C f
 

 
 ,
1 1
K T
v s
k k t
k t
C Vz 
 
   ,1 1
k T
v s
k k t
k t
C Vz 
 

         [5.6] 
Subject to: 
0 ≤ 
, ,i j bqbuy  ≤ 
max
, ,i j bD ,  i,j,b        : , ,i j b
 ,
, ,i j b
    [5.7] 
0 ≤ , ,i j bqsell  ≤ 
max
, ,i j bS ,  i,j,b         : , ,i j b
 ,
, ,i j b
    [5.8]  
, , ,
1
B
S
i j b i j
b
qsell g

 ,  i,j        : ,Si j  (free)   [5.9] 
, , ,
1
B
S
i j b i j
b
qsell g

 ,  i,j        : ,Si j  (free)   [5.10] 
At channel 
Peak flow 
0, 1, 1,
, , , , , , ,
1 1
n J n J
s t u s D t u s S
k t i j k i j i j k i j
i j i j
Q H g H g   
 
      ≤ Mk + skf ,       
               k,s,t   : ,
s s
t k    
 [5.11] 
Flow at channel by time 
0, 1, 1,
, , , , , , ,
1 1
n J n J
s t u s D t u s S
k t i j k i j i j k i j
i j i j
Q H g H g   
 
      ≤ Mk + ,sk tz ,       
              k,s,t  : ,
s s
k t      [5.12] 
Inclination and declination threshold violations 
, 1 ,
s s
k t k tz z     , 1
s
k t

  + , 1
s
k tVz

 ,  k,s and t’   t   t’’ : , 1
s s
k t 

     [5.13] 
, , 1
s s
k t k tz z     ,
s
k t
  + ,
s
k tVz
 ,  k,s and t*   t   t**  : ,
s s
k t 
     [5.14]  
s
kf , ,
s
k tz , ,
s
k tVz
 , and ,
s
k tVz
   ≥ 0   : sk , ,
s
k t , ,
s
k t
 , ,
s
k t
       [5.15] 
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,
D
i jg  and ,
S
i jg  (free)                [5.16]  
Explanation 
[5.6] The objective function maximizes the expected total economic surplus for trading 
IC allowances, less the expected flood cost, due to flood damage under a finite set 
of rainfall events at different control points. Changes in the objective are the 
appropriate measure of changes in welfare (assuming the market is sufficiently 
competitive). 
[5.7][5.11] Constraints have the same meaning as conditions [4.3][4.7] in 
Sto_MarketIC1. 
[5.12]  For each scenario s, the total flows at control point k in time t should be lower than 
the flow channel capacity Mk. However, flows may violate the capacity Mk and ,
s
k tz  
estimates these flows
 
by time and scenarios across control points. 
This arbitrary representation accounts for a reference baseline of flows for the 
initial IC allowances (existing land uses) from participants. This constraint also 
accounts for a flow gradient  ,t sk for the changes in IC allowances. These changes 
in flows may violate threshold flows for hastening the peak time of flooding or 
lengthening flooding. Thus, participants willing to pay for these threshold 
violations could change IC allowances. Those who reduce these flows and reduce 
cost violations will receive a payment for their change in IC allowances. 
[5.13]  For each scenario s, increases in flows at control point k per unit time should be 
lower than a threshold. Violations for greater flows are estimated by , 1
s
k tVz

 , which 
is linked to flood costs. Thus, any change to reduce this cost would tend to be 
granted in the market in period t’  t  t’’. 
[5.14]  For each scenario s, reductions in flow at control point k and time t should be 
greater than a threshold. Violations for reductions in flows are calculated by ,
s
k tVz
  
which in turn is linked to the flood duration cost in period t*   t   t**. 
[5.15] and [5.16] correspond to non-negativity conditions; and, IC allowance must be non-
negative. This will naturally limit the final allowance allocations, ,
D
i jg  and ,
S
i jg . 
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Sto_MarketIC2 uses a canonical formulation to estimate dual prices, as in previous 
formulations. This formulation can be extended to allow participants to bid for a set of 
preferences for their IC allowances as in Sto_MarketIC1. In this case, as in 
Sto_MarketIC1, additional constraints should be included. 
5.4 Price analysis 
The clearing prices associated with constraint [5.11] have the same meaning as constraint 
[4.7] of the previous Sto_MarketIC1 model. That is, the dual variable 
,
s s
t k   represents the 
marginal flood damage. 
The dual price ,
s s
k t   in constraint [5.12] represents the marginal value for violating 
threshold capacities of hastening peak flood and lengthening flood duration at control point 
k in scenario s. This price will be non-zero for those flows at or above the thresholds. 
The following sections will focus on flood cost implications when the solution violates 
different threshold capacities. Firstly, the section analyses the dual price related to 
maximum depth in the channel. Finally, the section will analyse the dual price when most 
boundaries for flood components are violated along control points, period and scenarios. 
The dual price is formulated in Appendix B. 
5.4.1 Maximum depth in channels and floodplains 
The first analysis of dual variables considers flood violations in floodplains and channels, 
and assumes no violation in threshold inclinations and declinations across scenarios. This 
would correspond to a catchment where the SO is concerned only about stage-flood levels. 
Therefore, , 1
s
k tVz

  and ,
s
k tVz
= 0, then , 1
s s
k t 

 , and ,
s s
k t 
 = 0; consequently, ,
s s
k t  =0. Thus, 
the relevant dual equations are as follows: 
,
1
T
s s
k t
t
 
 +
s
k  = 
 f sk ks
s
k
C f
f



,  k,s    : skf      [5.17] 
In Equation [5.17], the marginal value equals the marginal increment in flood damage for 
an extra unit of peak flow at control point k and scenario s. 
Participants will face prices for their changes in IC allowances. These prices account 
for the expected changes in flood costs due to participants’ contributions to maximum 
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flood depth. Considering a flood distribution with a single maximum peak across scenarios 
at channel places, the dual variable *
,
s
k t  will be non-zero in time t*, so individual flow 
impacts *,
, ,
t s
i j kH will be priced in the time t*u+1. Therefore, the SO will charge ,
D
i j  and 
will pay 
,
S
i j  to participants for their changes IC allowances based on dual variables as 
follows: 
 
*,
, , ,
1 1
f s
S K k kD t s s
i j i j k s
s k
k
C f
H
f
 
 


  ,  i,j         [5.18] 
 
*,
, , ,
1 1
f s
S K k kS t s s
i j i j k s
s k
k
C f
H
f
 
 


  ,   i,j         [5.19] 
5.4.2 Depth, rapid flooding and flood duration 
The dual conditions account for all violations including: peak depth, lengthening duration 
and hastening peak time of flooding across scenarios and control points. By 
complementary slackness, , 1
s
k tVz

  and ,
s
k tVz
  > 0; hence variables ,
s
k t
  and ,
s
k t
 = 0 
respectively. The last means constraints [5.13] and [5.14] are violated; therefore, the 
corresponding dual conditions will be as follows: 
 ,
,
,
v s
k k ts s s
k t s
k t
C Vz
Vz
  
 





,  k,s, and t’   t   t’’   : ,
s
k tVz
     [5.20] 
 ,
,
,
v s
k k ts s s
k t s
k t
C Vz
Vz
  
 





,  k,s and t*   t   t**   : ,
s
k tVz
     [5.21] 
The dual condition [5.20] represents the marginal flood damage for an additional unit of 
flow, which in turn hastens floods at time t, control point k and scenario s, in the period t’ 
to t’’. 
The dual condition [5.21] represents the cost for an extra unit of flow at time t, control 
point k and scenario s, in the period t* to t**. These flows will lengthen the flood duration, 
and so they will also increase flood damage. Thus, those participants whose changes in IC 
allowances lengthen flood duration face a higher price. 
The duals for slope costs measure the effect of increasing damage between time t1 
and t, and for the reducing flow effect in the next time t and t+1, given the increments in 
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flow (depth) at time t, 
   , , 1
, , 1
v s v s
k k t k k t
s s
k t k t
C Vz C Vz
Vz Vz
   

 

  
 
  
 
. Similarly, the threshold violation 
accounts for the increment in the flooding duration, given the increasing flow in time t+1 
   , , 1
, , 1
v s v s
k k t k k t
s s
k t k t
C Vz C Vz
Vz Vz
   

 

  
 
  
 
. Note that period length t is constant. Thus, changes in 
slope are measured by the changes in flows or depth. 
Figure 5-5 illustrates some hypothetical effects for enlarging flows and cost based on 
changes in slope, and on the reducing effect in the following period. The increment in 
flows over time t would reduce the slope to **, 1
s
k tVz

  between period t and t+1, which in 
turn would reduce the flood cost 
 , 1
, 1
v s
k k t
s
k t
C Vz
Vz
 





. However, this change increases the slope 
to **
,
s
k tVz
  and the flood cost to 
 ,
,
v s
k k t
s
k t
C Vz
Vz
 



, between period t1 and t. 
Consequently, the new dual condition that accounts for the above violations is Equation 
[5.22], which now includes the threshold violations. By arranging and substituting, the dual 
variable ,
s s
k t   will become as follows: 
     , ' , ' 1 , *
,
, ' , ' 1 , *
v s v s v s
k k t k k t k k ts s s s
k t s s s
k t k t k t
C Vz C Vz C Vz
Vz Vz Vz
   
     

  

    
     
    
  
 , * 1
, * 1
v s
k k t
s
k t
C Vz
Vz
 






  
k,s,t  for time t’ and t* in period t’ and t*     [5.22] 
The dual variable ,
s s
k t   represents the marginal value for an additional unit of flow at time 
t, control point k, and scenario s. The dual accounts for the marginal damage due to 
hastening peak flood, and the damage for lengthening flood duration. 
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Figure 5-5 Effect of changes in flows which lengthen flooding between time t1 and t+1. 
 
The dual variables in Equations[5.17], [5.20] and [5.21] are a set of simultaneous 
equations. Any change in IC allowance, and so in flow would modify all the dual variables. 
Any change in flows would affect the main dual condition as well as other related dual 
conditions. 
Those participants whose changes in IC allowances increase these violations will face a 
greater price. Those who reduce these violations will face equivalent reducing prices. For 
instance, participants could reduce the stage-flood level, but would hasten flooding. On the 
other hand, other participants could be incentivised to delay their runoffs and flows, 
because the cost of lengthening duration is less than the cost of hastening the peak time of 
flooding and increasing peak flow. 
The dual variables ,
D
i j  and ,
S
i j , represented by the Equations [5.23] and [5.24], 
account for all previous threshold violations. Thus, the duals correspond to the expected 
total marginal flood costs for changes in flow patterns at channels. Any change in flood 
distribution will be penalised and priced. 
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 k,s,t for time t’ and t*          [5.24] 
 
5.4.3 Theoretical illustration for participants’ price allowances 
This section illustrates flooding patterns that, in theory, could be observed across 
scenarios. The illustration shows how dual prices include the flooding components related 
to flood damage, and how participants who affect flooding have to face those prices. These 
prices depend on the probability of each storm scenario, participants’ coefficients, and 
flood costs across control points (see Equations [5.23] and [5.24]). Assuming that flood 
cost functions represent real social costs, the prices that participants would face may be 
considered socially efficient. 
Let us analyse a developer who desires to change the IC allowance on their property. 
Assume that their current flow impact is just one channel control point across storm 
scenarios, no one exercises any market power, and most storm scenarios present similar 
flooding patterns at the control point. Accordingly, with the new imperviousness, flows 
will increase the maximum flood depth and flows, and the price for changing the 
impervious level from m to j will be estimated as follows: 
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Figure 5-6-A illustrates the change in flood pattern, given the increment in IC allowance in 
the property, and so in the clearing prices 
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 due to the changes on the flood impacts. Notice that flood 
damage has accounted for the stage-flood depth. Consequently, the price will be as 
follows: 
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Patterns B and C illustrated in Figure 5-6 depict changes in flooding due to shifting the 
time of the stage-flood. In the case of B, the maximum flow depth remains constant, but 
flood costs related to the slope’s violation increase. Consequently, allocation could change, 
which will be explained next. Participants who previously traded with similar prices would 
face a lower or greater price; the new prices will depend on their contribution to the new 
stage-flood. Furthermore, those prices could be lower or greater than before, as 
**, *,
, , , ,
t s t s
i n k i n kH H  or 
**, *,
, , , ,
t s t s
i n k i n kH H  at the new stage-flood time respectively. Thus, their bids 
(supply) cannot be accepted nor can they trade. 
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Figure 5-6 Hypothetical changes in flood patterns. Solid lines represent initial flood and 
dashed lines are resulting floods. Circles represent the area where slopes are violating the 
thresholds for lengthening flood peaks and duration. A corresponds to changes in peak, B 
changes the peak time, C changes in maximum peak and peak time, and D changes in peak 
time, maximum peak and flood duration. 
 
A similar situation can be observed when IC allowances change, causing a slope violation 
for hastening peak flooding. A participant who desires to change IC allowances and violate 
thresholds could finish paying the following price ,
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This dual variable 
,
D
i j  for IC allowance accounts for the changes in flow at the new peak 
time, from t* to t**, and for the marginal changes in flows which will shift slopes 
,
s
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related flood cost 
   , ' , ' 1
, ' , ' 1
v s v s
k k t k k t
s s
k t k t
C Vz C Vz
Vz Vz
   

 

 

 
over times, and storm scenarios. In this 
case, a participant may have paid previously for the previous flood conditions. With the 
new flood patterns, their changes in allowances are not increasing the peak, so he/she could 
increase imperviousness and pay less for these changes. Actually, the participant could be 
paying only for hastening the peak time of flooding (flash flood). 
With pattern C (Figure 5-6), the floodplain has similar effects with shifting peak and 
raised flood cost. In this flood pattern, participants face a greater flood cost for increasing 
the maximum peak damage from 
 f sk k
s
k
C f
f


 to 
 *
*
f s
k k
s
k
C f
f


, where 
   *
*
f s f s
k k k k
s s
k k
C f C f
f f
  
 
  
 
. Participants also face higher-slope costs for hastening peak 
flood time, t to t**. Furthermore, allocations would also change under the new flood 
patterns, similar to the previous B illustration. 
Finally, the final IC allowances with pattern D would hasten the stage-flood time, 
increase the maximum depth, and lengthen the flood duration. Thus, if a developer desires 
to change IC allowances to reach this flood pattern, he/she should pay for these changes as 
well as for the expected flood damage. If most storm scenarios remain unchanged, and the 
flooding does not change significantly, the dual variable used to charge those changes in 
IC allowances will correspond to those calculated by Equation [5.23]. 
 Two numerical examples are used to show the penalties for hastening peak flow and 
flood duration. Both examples account also for peak flows. A participant wants to change 
imperviousness in their property, which theoretically keeps the stage flood in the area 
across storm scenarios, but flows could hasten peak time or could lengthen duration. To 
simplify the penalty analysis, we use only one scenario. Figure 5-7 illustrates the 
hydrograph curves at the control point. The initial flow condition has a peak flow of 36 
m
3
/sec at time 5 with incremental flows of 4 m
3
/sec before reaching the peak, and 
decreasing flows of 4 m
3
/sec after reaching the peak. Channel capacity is 20 m
3
/sec. The 
SO defines the penalising period as those before and after time 5, and penalises by 
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$10/(m
3
/sec) any flows above channel capacity (based on changes in the initial 
hydrograph). The SO additionally penalises peak flow by $5/(m
3
/sec). The illustration 
considers a market model that accounts for Equations [5.4] and [5.5]. 
 In the first example, a participant wants to increase IC allowances in 10 ha and bids 
$15/ha for 5 ha, $10/ha for 3 ha, and $5/ha for 2 ha, which hastens peak from time 5 to 
time 4 if whole area increases imperviousness. If the SO does not include penalty for 
hastening the participant could change the 10 ha and pays nothing. However, if the market 
accounts for a hastening peak, the participant could increase imperviousness only in 8 ha, 
paying $56 in total. The peak flow is also reduced by 0.8 m
3
/sec at the control point. 
 In the second example, the participant wants to change the hydrograph curve, to 
lengthen duration from time 9 up to time 13. The participant keeps the same bid 
preferences. In this case, if the SO does not include the penalty for duration, the participant 
could change imperviousness, but pays nothing. However, if the penalty for lengthening is 
included, the participant then faces this cost. In this case, the participant changes 5 ha and 
pays $62.5 in total. Thus, even though both examples include penalties, the participant 
could change imperviousness, but he/she faces the cost for hastening or lengthening. In 
both examples with penalties, the participant could not change imperviousness in their 
whole property. 
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Figure 5-7 Initial and wanted flows at a hypothetical control point. Channel capacity is 20 
m
3
/sec. 
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5.4.4 Initial IC allowances and the SO’s revenue 
This section extends the discussion regarding initial IC allowances from Sto_marketIC1 
described in Chapter 4. With model Sto_MarketIC2, the SO reaches similar revenue 
positions related to initial allowances and preferences from participants in the market. 
The Sto_MarketIC2 formulation establishes that allowances are a set of rights to impact 
on flows. The initial IC allowances, in physical terms of flooding, correspond to the set of 
total flows 
1,
, , ,
1 1
N J
t u s
i j k i j
i j
H A 
   = ,ˆ
s
k tf , s,k,t. These impacting rights can be 
decomposed into a set of valued capacity rights, in terms of maximum peak flows and 
flood depth, and marginal increments of flows and depths by time such as 
,
s
k t
  and ,
s
k t
  at 
control points for hastening the peak time of flooding and lengthening flooding in each 
storm scenario (channels and floodplain areas or receptor constraints). Thus, each 
landholder has some initial allowance corresponding to a set of individual peak flow 
impacts on receptor constraints 
1,
, , ,
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j
H A 
 = , ,
s
i k tf ,  s,k,t. Each landholder also has 
a set of initial rights for changing flow levels, such as  2, 1,, , , , ,
1
J
t u s t u s
i j k i j k i j
j
H H A   

  for 
time t=1,…,T, scenario s=1,...,S, and control point k=1,…,K. These rights link to flood 
components which account for the flood distribution. 
When participants shift the flood distribution, the SO may be a net receiver or payer; 
for instance, the SO may be a net receiver if she/he sells peak flow capacity Mk 
 1,, , ,
1 1
N J
t u s
i j k i j
i j
H A 
    at the peak flow time t*. The SO may also sell hastened flood 
time capacity , 1
s
k t

  , 1 ,s sk t k tz z   and flood duration capacity  , 1 ,s sk t k tz z  ,sk t  at some 
scenarios. So, the SO may be a net receiver if participants shift their flows and increase 
peak flows across storm scenarios. In this case, participants are prepared to pay high prices 
for the violated flow thresholds that account for the expected flood damage from 
increasing peaks at control points. The SO receives the increase in the expected flood 
damage and revenue for selling loose capacities. 
The SO may be a net payer, when participants offer to change IC allowances which 
reduce stage-floods at prices lower than the flood cost for the expected flood damage, and 
when other participants demand with sufficiently low prices. For instance, a participant 
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may offer a price 
, ,
S
i j bP  lower than the flood cost for the changes in the expected flood 
damage. 
Additionally, the SO may face revenue neutrality, in which he/she does not sell or buy 
any net change in violating capacities at control points. In this case, the opportunity cost 
for changing participants’ IC allowance matches the expected marginal flood damage for 
the current flood distribution. As a result, the flood distribution is retained at the end. The 
SO can also reach revenue neutrality when he/she is a net payer at some control points, and 
net receiver in others, while matching the condition RE0 at the end. 
5.5 Final remarks and conclusion 
Chapter 5 described model Sto_MarketIC2, and how its equilibrium prices follow changes 
in flood distribution. The flood distribution cost is approximated in terms of the maximum 
peak flow that could be reached in the flood area, for hastening peak flooding, and flood 
duration. Thus, Sto_MarketIC2 accounts for spatial and temporal flood damage in the 
catchment. Participants who change IC allowances, and hence the flood distribution, will 
internalise the changes in the expected flood damage. 
The market establishes a set of rights for boundaries which account for the final flood 
distribution in the catchment. These rights represent flows that could affect the catchment 
when extreme storms are faced. These rights also represent physical routing of flows that 
link flood components such as velocity and duration with damage. 
The SO could use the proposed constraints and thresholds to manage desired flood 
conditions. The cost could account for hastening flooding in a specific period, based on a 
desired depth increase, as discussed in this chapter. However, the SO could also establish a 
flow threshold, grant IC allowances for flows below a specified level, and penalise any 
change above this threshold. The final IC allowances in the catchment will take into 
account the desired condition. 
Participants will observe that increasing IC allowances could hasten flooding, so they 
would receive a payment to reduce imperviousness of their properties. However, other 
participants could receive a payment or pay less for increasing imperviousness if flows are 
moved to loose threshold conditions. The catchment could reach impervious levels which 
reduce flash flood conditions. 
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In the same way, a flood cost function could account mainly for flood duration. So the 
catchment could reach IC allowances which could reduce the flood duration. The final 
condition depends on the desired condition that the SO wants to reach or keep in the 
catchment. The SO would not consider the cost for lengthening flow duration if the 
concerns were peak depth and hastening flooding. Any IC allowance that delay flows 
would be granted under this condition. 
With participants located upstream and downstream of a control point, participants’ 
impacting flows contribute to flood damage based on the decomposed flood damage 
components. Upstream participants could notice that reducing imperviousness may reduce 
peak and delayed flows, but those flows lengthen flood duration. Downstream participants, 
located close to the flooding areas, could notice that increasing imperviousness could raise 
flows, increasing flow velocity and contributing to hastening peak flow. These flows 
would be penalised. Hastening peak flows contribute to reduce the warning time and flash 
flood could be noticed often in the area. 
Thus, participants trade under the proposed thresholds and costs which account for the 
desired flood in the catchment. Participants prepared to pay for violating thresholds and so 
raise flood costs could change IC allowances. 
If a flood disaster affects the catchment, the cost would probably be greater than the 
expected damage that participants were able to internalise. Even under this market 
formulation, the risk for the new flood physical distribution is not fully internalised. The 
market design may include a hedging mechanism to keep society safe from frequent 
flooding. The next chapter proposes a hedge based on the conditional value at risk. 
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Chapter 6 
 
6 HEDGING VIA CONDITIONAL VALUE AT RISK 
(CVaR) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The market models, Sto_MarketIC, proposed in Chapters 4 and 5 considered the 
stochasticity of rainfall events. However, they do not consider extreme flood risk 
explicitly, which the SO may face when participants’ trade changes the flood distribution. 
Furthermore, Sto_MarketIC was modelled as a risk neutral design, which implies that 
people in the flood area are risk neutral. The final flood level was defined by clearing the 
market. Changes in flood damage were penalised and estimated by the TSSP recourse, 
which determines expected flood costs based on damage within the catchment. The 
damage can be viewed as a socioeconomic cost, such as for flood warning, mitigation and 
damage to infrastructure and contents, and for the purpose of initiating evacuation 
procedures. 
The Sto_MarketIC clearing model was able to estimate the expected damage for the 
changes in the flood distribution across a range of storm events. However, if an extreme 
event occurs, the disaster damage could be far higher than the expected damage cost. For 
example, the expected cost of flooding could be $1 million; however, it could exceed $10 
million in a single disaster. In this chapter, this effect is accounted for, with a view to 
include the community risk of extreme flood events within the catchment. 
The IC allowances implicitly correspond to flood rights for a specific flood distribution. 
Thus, in terms of flooding, people could desire a specific risk position with respect to 
flooding. On the other hand, participants in the upper catchment area could own flood 
rights in the catchment. Accordingly, it is proposed that a risk measure represent the flood 
risk that the community desires within a given catchment. This risk should account for the 
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probable maximum floods that could occur in the area, acknowledging that there is always 
a nonzero probability of a higher flood (Ely and Peters 1984; Stedinger and Griffis 2008). 
Those participants who may attempt to change this profile would internalise the risk. 
Accordingly, the SO would be concerned with flooding in excess of the maximum flood 
levels set by the community. 
Figure 6-1 illustrates the link between the rainfall intensity distribution (A), flood 
damage (B) and flood distribution (C) with different final IC within the catchment, which 
represents the flood disaster related to the final IC, and assuming normal AMC type II. The 
filled area in B represents a disaster relating to a storm event, and the filled area in C 
represents the SO’s risk assessment for possible flood disasters. 
So far, flood rights in terms of risk positions in the market have not been discussed. 
People, particularly those residing on flood plains may desire to have rights per se as a 
means of being safe from any flood event. This situation has motivated authorities to focus 
on providing flood protection via structural policies rather than managing impervious 
cover. A new status quo of IC allowances will be reached in the catchment, which may 
allow achievement of a risk profile based on what the community may desire to ensure 
flooding is avoided within a given catchment. 
This chapter presents how the SO could manage risk in the market clearing 
formulation, to hedge against changes in flood damage associated with extreme storm 
events. It is unlikely that severe flood damage associated with extreme storm events can be 
totally eliminated, but the market could be expected to reduce such losses. Such a limit 
represents the risk position as downside risk. This chapter proposes to use Conditional 
Value at Risk "CVaR" as the risk profile. Section 6.2.4 will analyse CVaR further. Thus, 
the SO can hedge against a range of extreme storms and anticipated damage. The risk 
position for extreme storm events could be used for the design of suitable infrastructure in 
the long term such as roads and bridges, as stressed by Yeou-Koung (2005). 
The implication could be viewed as equivalent to an electricity market which includes 
generators that increase the risk of failure for frequency, voltage and blackouts. Thus, the 
grid may have a higher probability of failure, and consequently increase the cost of system 
collapse. Transpower (2008) noticed such an effect with wind generators as part of the 
grid. Indeed, this risk of failure may be more than the desired risk in the system. 
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Figure 6-1 Rainfall and flood distribution under different final IC allowances. A is the 
storm probability distribution, B is the final damage related to IC allowances and storm 
intensity, and C is the storm probability and resulting flood damage. 
 
Uncertainty related to flooding determines the risk that is perceived by the different agents 
in the market (participants, SO and people in the flood area). In fact, any decision that 
modifies flood distribution in the catchment implies changes in risk positions which in turn 
are transferred to landholders. However, in this research it is assumed that the SO is 
capable of representing the risk of catchment participants who wish to avoid flood damage. 
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Possible hedged positions (and actions) that people in the flood area could have with 
insurance are not considered. In addition, it is assumed the risk of flood damage depend on 
rainfall uncertainty and the IC levels within the catchment. The SO would determine which 
flood distributions would be preferred over others, and whether these preferences would be 
included in the market clearing model. 
Because not all storms cause flood damage, the market design deals a situation with 
non-zero probability of no flood and no damage cost. This may affect the implementation 
and application of the risk concept, which the SO should carefully analyse. The SO may 
wish to maintain a flood distribution in the catchment, and because he/she mis-estimated 
the risk position, the flood damage could be more than the desired condition. On the other 
hand, the model could be over-constrained, and make the solution infeasible. These points 
will be further discussed in this chapter. 
Section 6.2 resumes the decision-making under risk, and introduces concepts of risk 
aversion, stochastic dominance, risk measures and CVaR. Section 6.3 presents a form to 
include CVaR in the market formulation. Section 6.4 describes the market model. Section 
6.5 discuses dual prices with CVaR. Section 6.6 presents examples. Section 6.7 discuses 
misestimating CVaR values. Section 6.8 discuses possible issues with hedging via CVaR. 
Section 6.9 is final remarks and conclusions. 
6.2 Decision-making under risk 
The variability of random variables generates risk (Fishburn 1980; Kall and Wallace 1994; 
Birge and Louveaux 1997). Many approaches have been proposed to manage and measure 
risk, and the most suitable method depends on the particular situation. 
Extensive research on risk has been based on expected utility theory, stochastic 
dominance, downside risk, and other investment decision approaches, such as the mean-
variance (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1947; Markowitz 1952; Pratt 1964; Arrow 
1971; Fishburn 1977; 1980; Rockafellar and Uryasev 2000; Levy 2006). Von Newman and 
Morgenstern (1947) developed the theory of expected utility and risk preferences, where 
the decision maker is characterized according to their utility function U, which is based on 
a distribution of outcomes with preferences over lotteries. Arrow (1971) and Pratt (1964) 
showed that the risk premium changes when the decision maker is risk averse, and this 
premium can be decreasing, increasing, or constant with wealth. Markowitz (1952) 
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proposed a mean-variance measure to trade off risk and return. Fishburn (1977; 1980) 
defined a risk measure based on the downside variance, which is the lower partial moment 
of the distribution from a boundary position t, or a weighted probability function of 
polynomial deviations below a specified target. Thus, if the polynomial’s order is greater 
than 1, the decision maker will be risk-sensitive. Additionally, Fishburn introduced the 
concept of stochastic dominance as a way to analyse risky decisions with partial 
knowledge of U and with the moments of the probability distribution. Eppen et al. (1989) 
noted that the measure of downside risk or “tail risk” is a particular case of the mean-risk 
dominance proposed by Fishburn (1977), which measures the risk faced due to losses. In a 
catchment based market, the risk due to losses is where the SO faces extreme flood related 
or disasters. Rockafellar et al. (2000; 2001) and Pflug (2000) introduced the concept of 
CVaR as a measure of downside risk. 
6.2.1 Risk aversion 
The utility function and preferences of a risk averse decision-maker will be as follows: 
-  The utility function U represents risk preferences with a non-negative first derivative 
condition ' 0U   and a non-positive second derivative '' 0U  . However, the utility 
function with regards to losses has a non-positive first derivative condition ' 0U  . 
-  The utility function is continuous over a convex set of preferences. 
 Jensen’s inequality holds: the expected utility is equal to or smaller than the utility of 
the expected return.  0E U w x     0 1pU w x      0 21 p U w x   and 
 0E U w x       0 1 21U w px p x       0U w E x  
 A risk avoider will not be a fair payer, and will not play a fair game. That means 
avoiders do not pay the expected prize of a game. However, they have the willingness 
to pay for a positive risk premium   to insure their wealth level. By Jensen’s 
inequality     0 0E U w x U w E x     , there would be a premium   where 
    0 0E U w x U w E x       . Thus, risk avoiders may be willing to pay an 
expected value with a view to reducing risk to obtain a similar utility position as close 
as possible to their expected utility with the game. 
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6.2.2 Stochastic dominance 
Stochastic dominance is used in decision making theory to order revealed preferences. This 
term refers to gambling where there is a probability distribution over possible outcomes 
such as IC allowances; thus, floods can be treated as though they were games. However, 
stochastic dominance does not give a complete ordering for higher moments. Let us see the 
way that stochastic dominance conditions and preferences may affect the IC market. 
U1 (utility) dominates U2 if preferences for one flood distribution dominate another 
flood distribution in U2, for all flood scenarios x. Thus, the expected value of U1, i.e., 
E[U1(x)] is greater than the expected value of U2, E[U2(x)], for all x (flood distribution) 
with at least one strict inequality. 
There are several types of stochastic dominance (Levy 2006). These include the 
following: 
First degree stochastic dominance (FSD) rules rely on probability distribution 
functions. For instance, let us assume that G and F are two cumulative distributions of two 
impervious decision levels, which relate to flood distribution, then F dominates G if F(x) 
  G(x) for all flood levels x, and consequently EF[U(x)]   EG[U(x)] for any monotonic 
 U x . 
Measures associated with FSD include measures such as means, geometric means and 
the left tail condition, which is closely related to CVaR (Levy 2006). The necessary 
condition of left tail (losses) of the distribution is MinF(x)MinG(x) where the cumulative 
distribution area G is above the distribution F for each flood level x in the tail. That means, 
for each final flood event, the decision maker would prefer distribution F rather than G. 
However, according to Levy (2006), sometimes the left tail condition does not guarantee 
first stochastic dominance. 
Second degree stochastic dominance (SSD) is closely related with risk preferences. If F 
and G are two flood conditions with density function f(x) and g(x) respectively, then F 
dominates G in the second degree if and only if     0
x
a
SSD G t F t dt     . 
Alternatively the condition can be formulated as     0
x
a
G t F t dt    , and so 
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 FE U x      0GE U x    , for all x with at least one strict inequality for some 0x . 
Therefore given a decreasing risk-averse utility function (  ' 0U x  ), a risk avoider 
prefers  F x  to  G x  in the range  ,a b  if      ' 0
b
a
G t F t U x dx    . The risk 
premium corresponds to the amount of income that the SO is willing to pay for accepting a 
risky flood situation. 
The final ICs (a portfolio) whose flood damage distributions dominate would be those 
with positive changes in utility, especially in extreme flood damage situations. Figure 6-2 
shows distribution probabilities F and G with a SSD of F upon G. Since  ' 0U x   and 
 '' 0U x  , extreme losses in distribution G will generate marginal disutility values which 
will be higher than those produced in F. Thus, the dominance of F would be expected for 
particular impervious levels in the catchment. 
Third degree stochastic dominance (TSD) is related to preferences for positive skew 
and  '''U x . However, TSD degree stochastic dominance are outside the scope of this 
thesis. Hence, this chapter will focus on risk measurement methods which are in 
accordance with FSD and SSD, which assumes risk averse The next section presents how 
risk measures could be modelled in the market formulation. 
 
Figure 6-2 Illustration of two cumulative probabilities G and F where F is SSD to G. The 
grey areas correspond to differences in cumulative probabilities. 
 
The stochastic dominance was introduced to support the idea that CVaR is a risk measure, 
which allows making decision in accordance with the first and second degree. Therefore, 
CVaR could be used in a market model as a flood risk profile that the community desires 
G 
F 
Returns Losses 
Cumulative probability 
0 
1 
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within a given catchment. However, the concept of stochastic dominance is not explicitly 
used in the market formulation. 
6.2.3 Risk measure 
Researchers and practitioners use various approaches to include risk in decisions problems. 
Such approaches include Mean Value-Variance (Markowitz 1952), Sharpe´s single factor 
(Sharpe 1964), Value at risk "VaR" (see, for instance, Duffie and Pan 1997; Linsmeier and 
Pearson 2000), Mean Absolute-Deviation (Konno and Yamazaki 1991), and CVaR (Pflug 
2000; Rockafellar and Uryasev 2000; 2001). Equation [6.1] represents a general 
maximization (minimization) including risk measures. 
max
x
    , , :E f x w D f x w x X           or 
min
x
    , , :E f x w D f x w x X                     [6.1] 
Where  ,f x w  is the function that represents the decision problem with uncertainty, D is a 
measure of risk, perhaps dispersion or variability, and   is a weighted trade-off between 
expected flood damage and risk measure. A second-order Taylor's approximation allows 
obtaining an expected value-variance (E-V) from a utility function where, the variance 
measure, both upwards and downwards deviations, are treated the same. However, in the 
market the focus will be on the extreme downwards side of the distribution, because most 
decision makers would be concerned about the losses. Ahmed (2006) proved that mean-
variance criteria lead to computational intractability with stochastic programming such as 
two-stage stochastic linear programming with non-convex formulations. 
 On the other hand, non convexity could be noticed if a non linear utility function in 
damage is used. This could underestimate risk for the SO, so prices would not reflect 
changes in damage, and non-supporting prices could reached in the market. (This was 
discussed in Chapter 4). More imperviousness could be allowed in the catchment, 
increasing flooding problems. 
  A similar decision problem would occur when the measure of risk corresponds to the 
value at risk (VaR). VaR measures the maximum loss with a specified confidence level  
(Pflug 2000). VaR fails to be consistent with subadditivity, because in a portfolio with two 
instruments the VaR may be greater than the sum of individual VaRs (Rockafellar and 
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Uryasev 2002). When studying alternative risk measures, Uryasev (2000b) noted that VaR 
is difficult to optimise due to non-convexity with multiple local extrema. Rockafellar and 
Uryasev (2002) pointed out that VaR does not handle losses beyond the threshold amount 
indicated as VaR and cannot discriminate worse situations. 
 Ogryczak and Ruszczynski (1999) pointed out that the mean-variance approach 
presents difficulties with stochastic dominance rules and with the task of modelling all risk 
preferences and consistencies which “may lead to inferior decisions.” On the other hand, 
Ogryczak and Ruszczynski (2002) noted that under the worst conditional expectation, a 
mean-risk measure may be consistent with stochastic dominance. The authors also pointed 
out that asymmetric risk approaches such as downside risk measures would be in 
“harmony with the stochastic dominance order”. In particular, the Conditional Value at 
Risk (CVaR) meets this condition, as well as other important properties related with 
coherence (Rockafellar and Uryasev 2000; Uryasev 2000b; Rockafellar and Uryasev 2001; 
Acerbi and Tasche 2002). Coherence of risk measure satisfies four axioms or properties of 
translation invariance, positive homogeneity, subadditivity, and monotonicity (for further 
details, see e.g., Artzner et al. 1999). 
 Comparing CVaR with a non-linear transformation of damage, CVaR preserves 
convexity (Rockafellar and Uryasev 2002). As stated in previous paragraphs, changes in 
the expected flood damage related to imperviousness level is convex, therefore a convex 
condition could also be reached with CVaR. CVaR has better performance and is 
considered a better measure of risk than Mean Value-Variance, VaR and Mean Absolute 
Deviation (Uryasev 2000a; Rockafellar and Uryasev 2002). 
 Comparing CVaR with the nonlinear transformation of damage, CVaR might control 
extreme changes at the tail of the flood damage distribution, but a non-linear 
transformation of flood damage could not avoid this change in flood damage. However, 
both costs will be faced for each participant in the Sto_MarketIC_Risk. This price 
implication will be further discussed in Section 6.5. 
6.2.4 CVaR 
CVaR measures the conditional expectation of losses that exceed the value at risk (VaR) at 
a confidence level   (Pflug 2000; Rockafellar and Uryasev 2000; Uryasev 2000b; 
Rockafellar and Uryasev 2001). Thus, a confidence level  of 0.95 indicates a 0.05 chance 
  
 
169 
that the expected losses exceed a level $X. Recalling the flooding issue, the flood damage 
would be greater than a given boundary of cost. Thus, larger  values would lead to 
conservative impervious levels in the catchment due to the higher weight on the worse 
scenarios. Figure 6-3 shows storm probabilities and flood losses where the CVaR 
measures the expected flood losses above the confidence level   in the storm distribution. 
Note that the sum of probabilities related to flooding is not 1, since not all storm scenarios 
produce flood damage, only extreme storms do so. 
 
Figure 6-3 Hypothetical storm probabilities and flood losses under a final IC allowance in 
the catchment.  is the confidence level, CVaR is the conditional value at risk, and VaR 
is value at risk for confidence level . 
 
CVaR has been used in many areas to hedge against extreme losses, especially in portfolio 
management for trading operation in stock markets (see, e.g., Krokhmal et al. 2005; 
Mansini et al. 2007; Trindade et al. 2007; Sarykalin et al. 2008; Zheng 2009; Uryasev et al. 
2010) and for making insurance decisions (Mulvey and Erkan 2006; Liu et al. 2008). 
Carrion et al. (2007) proposed CVaR for a large consumer participant in the electricity 
market. Here, the participant makes decisions about bilateral contracts, production and 
participation in the spot market via minimising the expected value of the procurement cost 
while limiting CVaR. Noyan (2010) proposed CVaR for selecting facility locations and 
inventory with uncertain demand, and included CVaR for disaster under emergency 
Storm probability 
Flooding losses ($) 
Maximum loss () 
CVaR 
0 
VaR 
CVaR 
CVaR 
Maximum loss () 
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supplies. Piantadosi et al. (2008) proposed to use CVaR to manage storm water, to find 
optimal pumping policies, avoiding losses and reducing the risk of environmental damage. 
 The CVaR measure has been widely used for its consistency as a risk measure and it is 
in harmony with respect to stochastic dominance of order 1 and order 2. CVaR meets 
properties of coherence of functional preferences such as translation invariance, positive 
homogeneity, superadditivity, monotonicity, and consistency (for further details, see e.g., 
Artzner et al. 1999). 
Street (2010) demonstrated consistency and convexity in an equivalent utility-
probability function in CVaR, and the author pointed out that a utility function, measured 
as “probability-dependent utility”, would bring an equivalence in terms of risk averse 
preferences between CVaR and the “certainty equivalent”. Zheng (2009) pointed out that 
CVaR is a measure of skewed and tailed distributions (stochastic dominance of order 3). 
A measure of CVaR at level  can be represented as follows: 
     
 
1
,
1 ,
P x
CVaR Q x w p w dw 


             [6.3] 
Where  ,Q x w  is a random variable that represents losses,  p w  is the probability 
distribution,   is the value at risk  = min {    :  ,P x    } and  ,P x   is the 
cumulative distribution function. Thus, CVaR can be represented as follows: 
  1inf ,
1
CVaR E Q x w

 
 
 
                [6.4] 
Uryasev (2000b) presented an analytical representation for discretised density function 
 p w  which is only available for s scenarios. This function is convex and solvable by LP: 
 ˆ ,F x  =   ,
S
s
Q x w  

             [6.5] 
The function  ˆ ,F x   is linear with respect to the vector  ,Q x w  whereas   is a constant 
equal to   
1
1 S

 , and storm scenario s   w. Additionally, Uryasev (2000b) used 
auxiliary variables s  to substitute the terms   ,Q x w 

  into the expression  ˆ ,F x  , 
and imposed auxiliary constraints represented by  ,s sQ x w    with 0s  The author 
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showed an approach to approximate CVaR by a set of linear constraints C  and 
confidence levels   (scenarios) by using the following constraint: 
1
S
s
s
C  

                  [6.6] 
CVaR could be used as the flood risk position in the market clearing model. This point will 
be proposed and discussed in the next sections. 
6.3 Including risk in the market clearing model 
A stochastic representation of Equation [6.1] that incorporates risk profile preferences 
would quantify the trade-off between the mean cost of risk and the economic surplus from 
trading ICs. The market model includes only CVaR as profile risk in the market 
formulation. This model would be consistent with the SO risk preferences and the potential 
changes in the flood distribution in terms of CVaR. 
Piantadosi et al. (2008) analysed policies to manage urban storm water using CVaR. 
The authors minimised CVaR to find an optimum pumping policy for a connected storage 
dams in Australia, while penalties accounted for environmental damage. 
Ahmed (2006) and Noyan (2010) minimise cost, explicitly including CVaR in the 
objective function. Similarly, Street (2010) proposed an equivalent formulation where the 
risk measure is a convex combination with a weight of *
1





 from   in equation 
[6.1], and so the objective becomes max:    *1 ,Tc x E Q x w       * ,CVaR Q x w . 
Following the approaches of Ahmed (2006), Noyan (2010) and Street (2010), the 
market clearing formulation could include risk by the following options: (i) maximising the 
economic trading value with flood costs as recourse, while constraining the risk position 
(Uryasev 2000b); and (ii) maximising the value of trading ICs while penalising for changes 
in flood distribution and the risk position for extreme events. This risk position is defined 
as the expected maximum flood damage level above a confidence level that the SO would 
expect to face. (For more detail describing CVaR in the objective and constraints, see 
Krokhmal et al. (2005) and Fábián (2008)). The CVaR position is equivalent to having a 
risk position in terms of storms resulting in different flood severities within the catchment. 
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Mulvey et al. (2006), Fábián (2008) and Uryasev et al. (2010) used comparable ideas of 
maximum expected losses in a constraint. 
According to this framework, the two proposals above could be applied to the IC 
market; however, this research will focus on constraints with CVaR, i.e., in option (i). 
 A simplified risk profile condition could be established by constraining the market 
model rather than including a risk profile in the objective. In this case, the SO knows the 
risk as a CVaR profile at each control point and at the catchment level. This constrained 
option will be proposed and extended later in this chapter. 
However, constraining the risk positions may lead to an obvious difficulty that may 
make the market solution infeasible. At this stage the market accepts this issue. Thus, if the 
market solution remains infeasible, the SO could relax the constraints. 
The constraints used to establish and limit risk profile positions for control points and 
catchments are as follows: 
- At control point 
 s s k sk k kC f    ,  k,s         
1
1
S
s s
k
k ks W 
 


 


,  k          
- At catchment level 
 
1
K
s s s
k k
k
C f  

  ,  k         
1
1
S
s s
s W 
 


 


 ,        
The auxiliary variables 
s
k  and 
s  relate losses in the TSSP recourse for violating 
thresholds at different control points and catchments, across time and storm scenarios. If 
the damage cost for maximum depth is  , s kQ x w , the variable 
s
k  will account for the 
damage for changes in depth at control point k and scenario s. This variable accounts for 
the changes in damage above the confidence level . The variable s  will account for the 
damage for changes in depth of the catchment in scenario s. 
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Equation [6.6] can be expressed as  s s s kk k kC f    , where  s sk kC f  is the damage for 
the maximum depth in scenario s and control point k, and 
s
k  is the damage beyond 
k
 . If 
the damage function included another flood component, such as velocity (hastening peak 
time of flooding), the damage would be  ,,s s sk k k tC f Vh   and so the constraint would be 
 ,,s s s s kk k k k tC f Vh     Thus, if the SO is concerned regarding management of flash floods, 
CVaR could model the requirements incorporating the related damage costs. The auxiliary 
variable 
s
k  could account for flood components and associated damage, allowing for the 
required trade-offs. The final point and its implications will be discussed in the section on 
duality and flood cost. 
Using CVaR requires an accurate measure of the probability distributions of storms for 
the close relationship between expectation and risk position. CVaR’s focus is on the 
extreme damage tail which requires analysing the extreme storm events. Additionally, the 
market design assumes a storm distribution which implies that the catchment is affected by 
storms with similar intensities, and durations over a specified time period. The model 
ignores possible climate changes that could modify the parameters and probabilities are not 
accounted for in the market. 
If the market is cleared using option (ii), the objective function would be as follows: 
    max , ,E f x w CVaR f x w             [6.7] 
Then, rearranging and using the property of translation invariance of CVaR, the objective 
becomes: 
Max       1 , ,Tc x E Q x w CVaR Q x w             [6.8] 
Additional auxiliary constraints as stated in the previous paragraph are needed: 
 , ssQ x w    , s               [6.9] 
  
1
1
,
1
S
s s
s
CVaR Q x w   
 
 
            [6.10] 
Equation [6.10] corresponds to the conditions of Equation [6.5] and Equation [6.6]. These 
conditions could represent the risk at the catchment level. Equation [6.9] and [6.10] can be 
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generalised for each control point. The contribution to the risk position from control points 
becomes: 
  
1 1
1
,
1
K S
s s
k
k s
CVaR Q x w   
  
 
           [6.11] 
Equation [6.11] meets the superadditivity property of CVaR and accounts for the risk 
position at the catchment. The variable 
s
k  is estimated at each control point k and scenario 
s. 
6.4 The proposed market clearing model 
This section proposes a model which will clear trading of IC allowances, while accounting 
for the violated boundaries along control points and storm scenarios, considering the SO’s 
risk profile position expressed as CVaR. The market model will catch any violation of 
thresholds by linking flood components with the corresponding damage. Any change in 
flood distribution over a desired profile is considered in the estimation of the SO’s 
downside risk (CVaR). 
 
Figure 6-4 Hypothetical flood probability density functions with IC allowances A, B and C; 
'' , '  and   correspond to the confidence levels related to VaR; ''e , 'e and e  are the 
conditional expected values below the confidence level  . 
 
Figure 6-4 illustrates trade of ICs and the corresponding final flood distribution. It assumes 
that the initial condition of the catchment IC is C or B with equivalent CVaR-C ( ''e ) and 
 '  
e  'e  
0 Losses ($) 
C 
B 
A 
"  
e ''  
Storm probability 
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CVaR-B ( 'e ) which are greater than the preferred CVaR condition ( e ). In this scenario, 
the trade combination would be moved towards IC allowances which may reach level A. 
However, if the last level was the policy of the SO, the trades may not be revenue positive 
and the SO may be a net payer to reach the risk position. Participants who increasing the 
risk would face an increased price for their IC allowances. This issue will be discussed in 
the next sections and in Chapter 7. 
Parameters 
 =  Confidence level coefficient (0,1) which corresponds to the probability level of the 
threshold of losses. 
 =  Risk coefficient in the range  0,  which corresponds to a non-negative trade-off 
between risk preferences and the expected damage. If  = 0, the SO is risk neutral, 
and  > 0 means the SO is risk averse. 
s =  Probability of a storm in scenario s. This parameter satisfies the following 
properties: 0 
s  1, and 
1
S
s
s


 1. 
kW =  Maximum expected damage that the SO accepts at control point k for extreme 
storm events. This value corresponds to the CVaR at control point k. 
W =  Maximum expected damage in the catchment that the SO accepts for extreme storm 
events. This value corresponds to the CVaR at the catchment level. 
Decision variables 
,
D
i j =  Buying price to firm i for changing IC allowance to type j ($/ha). 
,
S
i j  =  Selling price to firm i for changing to IC allowance type j ($/ha). 
s
kf =  Flow above threshold capacity which takes into account the maximum peak flow 
(depth) in scenario s at control point k (volume/time). 
k
 =  The value at risk at confidence level   at control point k. 
 =  The value at risk at confidence level   in the catchment. 
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s
k =  Losses above 
k
  in scenario s. The losses correspond to the flood damage above a 
confidence level   in the storm distribution or the equivalent flood damage 
distribution. The losses are in each scenario s which belongs to the range 1–  of 
the storm distribution. 
s =  Losses above   in scenario s at the catchment. The losses correspond to the flood 
damage above a confidence level   in the storm distribution or the equivalent 
flood damage distribution. The losses in scenario s belong to the range 1–  of the 
storm distribution. 
Dual variables 
,
s s
t k  = The price to impact (receive) at control point k, time t and scenario s 
($/volume/time). 
s s
k  = The marginal cost for increasing the risk of flooding at control point k and scenario 
s. This is the marginal risk-damage for an additional unit of flooding at scenario s, 
or for a marginal change in the flood distribution at the loss tail. 
s s  = The marginal cost for increasing the risk of flooding in the catchment and scenario 
s. This is the marginal risk of damage for an additional unit of flooding at scenario 
s across control points, or for a marginal change in the flood distribution at the loss 
tail, at the catchment level. 
k
 =  Marginal opportunity cost (in terms of economic surplus) for trading and changing 
the flood distribution, when the SO allows an extra unit of loss in the CVaR at 
control point k. This value corresponds to the marginal cost of allowing changes in 
the SO risk position related to the flood at control point k. 
 =  Marginal opportunity cost if the SO allows an additional unit of loss in the loss tail 
(CVaR). This value implicitly corresponds to the adjusted risk for allowing higher 
marginal cost of some flood points within the catchment. 
Market clearing model: Sto_MarketIC_Risk1. This model implicitly accounts for CVaR in 
the constraints. 
Maximize 
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, , , , , , , ,
1 1 1 1 1 1
N J B N J B
D S
i j b i j b i j b i j b
i j b i j b
P qbuy P qsell
     
       
  
1 1
S K
s s s
k k
s k
C f
 
               [6.12] 
Subject to: 
0 ≤ 
, ,i j bqbuy  ≤ 
max
, ,i j bD ,  i,j,b     : , ,i j b
 ,
, ,i j b
       [6.13] 
0 ≤ 
, ,i j bqsell  ≤ 
max
, ,i j bS ,  i,j,b      : , ,i j b
 ,
, ,i j b
       [6.14] 
, , ,
1
B
D
i j i j b
b
g qbuy

 ,  i,j     : ,Di j  (free)      [6.15] 
, , ,
1
B
S
i j i j b
b
g qsell

 ,  i,j     : ,Si j  (free)      [6.16] 
0, 1,
, , , ,
1 1
N J
s t u s D
k t i j k i j
i j
Q H g 
 
  1,, , ,1 1
N J
t u s S
i j k i j
i j
H g 
 
   ≤ Mk + skf ,      
           t,s,k   : ,
s s
t k         
[6.17] 
 s s k sk k kC f    ,  k,s      : s sk         [6.18] 
1
1
S
s s
k
k ks W 
 


 


,  k     : k
         [6.19]  
 
1
K
s s s
k k
k
C f  

  ,  s    : s s          [6.20]  
1
1
S
s s
s W 
 


 


,      :          [6.21] 
s
kf , 
s
k  and 
s  ≥ 0      : sk , 
s
k , 
s        [6.22] 
,
D
i jx , ,
S
i jx , ,
D
i jg , ,
S
i jg ,   and 
k
  free           [6.23] 
Explanation 
[6.12] The objective function of Sto_MarketIC_Risk1 maximises the total economic 
surplus for trading IC allowances, less the expected flood damage across rainfall 
events. The objective function measures changes in welfare by trading rather than 
the absolute measure of welfare (assuming the market is sufficiently competitive). 
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[6.13]-[6.17] Constraints have the same meaning as [4.3][4.7] in Sto_MarketIC1. By 
definition, the lower bounds in [6.13], [6.14] and [6.22] have negative dual 
variables, so they are represented canonically forcing duals to be positive, 0 
 , ,i j bqbuy and 0   , ,i j bqsell , so 
( )
, , 0i j b
   and ( )
, , 0i j b
   respectively; thus, 
positive 
, ,i j b
 , 
, ,i j b
 , s
k and 
s
k will be conveyed. The model should include an 
extra condition to specify the total area and its impervious level, 
0,
,
1 1
Z J
z Tot
i j i
z j
A A
 
  , where z is an index to indicate the location of a particular 
block within the property as well as its total area (Ai
Tot
). 
[6.18]  For each scenario s, this constraint calculates the loss beyond the value at risk. The 
dual s s
k   is the opportunity cost for allowing an extra unit of CVaR at the 
confidence level 1 at control point k. 
[6.19] For each control point k, the total losses beyond the value at risk across scenarios 
should be lower than a maximum expected loss. The dual variable 
k
  is the 
opportunity cost of allowing another unit of CVaR. 
[6.20] For each scenario s, this constraint calculates the loss beyond the value at risk at the 
catchment level. The dual s s   is the opportunity cost for allowing an extra unit of 
CVaR across storm scenarios s, which belongs to confidence level 1 of the storm 
distribution at the catchment level. 
[6.21]  This constraint defines the total maximum expected damage that the SO is willing 
to face at a confidence level  in case of extreme events across all control points. 
The dual variable 
  is the opportunity cost for having an extra unit of boundary, 
in terms of CVaR. 
[6.22] Non-negative conditions of IC allowances, flows above threshold capacities, and 
losses above k
  and  . 
[6.23] Buying and selling quantities of IC allowances and the initial IC allowance are non-
negative. This condition limits the final allocation of 
,
D
i jg  and ,
S
i jg . A similar 
condition occurs with k
 . 
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The next section will present a discussion of dual variables and the related flood costs for 
violating any flood boundary within the catchment. A detailed dual formulation of 
Sto_MarketIC_Risk1 is presented Appendix A. 
6.5 Price analysis 
This section presents an analysis of duals, flood costs and the SO’s risk position in the 
market clearing models, with a view to show the implications of including risk in the 
market as well as its effects on prices faced by participants. Risk should be transferred to 
those who increase flood damage and the SO’s risk. Contrarily, participants should be 
rewarded for reducing risk and flood damage in the catchment. 
As previously stated, the right to IC allowance corresponds to a set of impacting flows 
received at control points across scenarios, given an initial imperviousness in the 
catchment. With a market formulated by Sto_MarketIC_Risk1, the rights also account for 
the SO’s risk positions. This implies that landholders participating with established IC 
allowances have rights to the SO’s risk positions. These rights are represented by 
1,
, , ,
1 1 1
S N J
s t u s I
i j k i j
s i j
H A  
     , which can be decomposed in terms of the peak flows, 
1,
, , ,
1 1 1
S N J
s t u s I
i j k i j
s i j
H A  
     , the flows at the risk position 
 
1,
, , ,
1 1 1
S N J
s t u s I
i j k i j
s i j
H A

  
       at control point k, and the total risk position at the 
catchment levels, 
 
1,
, , ,
1 1 1
ˆ
S N J
s t u s I
i j k i j
s i j
H A

  
      . H  and Hˆ  represent the flows above 
the confidence level  in the storm scenarios (related to flood scenarios). Additionally, the 
IC allowance also can be seen as a set of valued impacts. 
The next sub-section presents duals for the model Sto_MarketIC_Risk1 and for risk 
implications of peak flows. The discussion is then expanded to the price analysis for the 
SO with different risk positions. 
6.5.1 Price analysis and CVaR 
The dual prices 
,
D
i j  and ,
S
i j  represent the reduction in economic surplus when participant i 
is permitted an extra area with IC allowance type j. The marginal reduction in surplus is 
also linked to the SO’s risk position. The dual analyses reveals that these prices are 
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generated by the flow impacts that violate thresholds, such as maximum peak flow 
(maximum depth), and raising the risk positions at control point k and at the catchment 
level. The next dual equation allows decomposing the clearing price into damage and SO 
risk. 
,
1
T
s s
t k
t
 

 s sk ks s
k s
k
C f
f


 

 s sk ks s
s
k
C f
f


 

+ s
k  = 
 s sk ks
s
k
C f
f



, k,s : s
kf  [6.24] 
When flooding occurs at control point k, the result is 0skf  , and a maximum peak is 
reached, the shadow price will be active at that time t; hence, 
,
s s
t k  > 0. Then 0
s
k   by 
complementary slackness, and the clearing price 
,
s s
t k   matches the marginal flood 
damage as well as the marginal risk positions in terms of CVaRs ( s s
k   and 
s s  ). To 
simplify this analysis, it is assumed that flooding has just one peak across storm scenarios; 
thus, shadow prices would be binding just at the stage-flood time for each scenario. In 
addition, the SO’s binding risk positions generate a price which is represented with the 
following conditions: 
1
0
S
s s
k k
s
 

    ,  k         : k     [6.25] 
1
s
s s sk
k k
 


   

 = 0,  k,s        : s
k     [6.26] 
1
0
S
s s
s
 

              :      [6.27] 
1
s
s s s
 


   

 = 0,  s        : s     [6.28] 
Equation [6.25] and [6.27] represents the balance between the incremental flood damage 
above a confidence level , and the risk at control point and catchment respectively. Thus, 
marginal damage across scenarios matches the marginal cost for an additional unit of 
damage in the loss tail for extreme disasters. If widespread flooding was present within the 
catchment, the SO could impose a maximum damage for Wα, which would force a single 
binding condition for the entire catchment, and a single price would be faced across all 
control points in response to the SO’s risk position. 
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Equations [6.26] and [6.28] show the relationships between the shadow price for 
marginally increasing the damage in the tail loss distribution (above the confidence level 
 ), and the marginal cost in terms of the risk positions at control points and at the 
catchment level. This loss will raise the SO’s bounded risk position, signalling prices to 
participants within the system which are adjusted by (1– ). The clearing price at control 
point k and scenario s matches the marginal flood damage as well as the corresponding 
incremental adjusted risk position at the control point and at the catchment level when an 
additional flow unit of peak flow is permitted at the control point k, time t and scenario s. 
Equations [6.25] and [6.26] account for the changes in the final portfolio of IC 
allowances and the corresponding expected changes in the flood distribution, particularly 
in the extreme tail of flood damage (see Figure 6-4). Arranging and substituting Equation 
[6.25] and [6.26] generates a dual relationship for s
k  where there are two significant 
points. First, the shadow prices s s
k   would be binding in the (1– ) right side of the 
losses distribution. (See Figure 6-4, but note the losses are shown on the left side, and the 
analysis and model places the losses on the right side.) Secondly, the dual value s
k  takes 
the same value along binding scenarios, being adjusted by the probability of occurrence 
s  for those scenarios above the confidence level  . The next equation represents this 
condition. 
 
1
1
S
s s s
k k
s
 

    ,  k             [6.29] 
Thus, any flooding changes in binding scenarios would have the same implication in terms 
of the risk. The SO’s position would be affected in those scenarios that were allowed to 
have an additional unit of flood damage which is weighted according to the probability. 
Similar implications can be observed and analysed from Equations [6.27] and [6.28] at 
the catchment level, particularly in the extreme tail of flood damage. Similarly for 
Equation [6.29] the dual value s  takes the same value along binding scenarios at the 
catchment level, which are adjusted for the probability of scenarios above the confidence 
level  . Thus, any change in flooding may affect the risk position at the catchment level 
and this price considers possible relationships between flooding at several control points. 
In this case, the condition is as follows: 
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 
1
1
S
s s s
s
 

                    [6.30] 
Clearing prices depend on the risk positions when CVaRs’ limits are binding at control 
points 0s k
   , and/or catchment level 0s    . Thus, if 0sk   and 0
s  , by 
complementary slackness 0sk   and 0
s  . Substituting [6.26] and [6.28] into [6.24] 
the clearing price will be as follows: 
,
s s
t k  =
 s sk ks
s
k
C f
f



   
1 1
s s s ss s
k k k kk
s s
k k
C f C f
f f
    
 
 
 
   
,  k,s,t    [6.31] 
These clearing prices will account for the marginal flood increments, even at non-
connected control points, due to those participants who raise their risk positions at the 
catchment level. The next section presents the shadow prices, in the equilibrium, that users 
would face for changing impervious levels when risk positions are bounded. 
6.5.2 Participants’ shadow prices 
Within the market, participants face the price 
k
  for the binding constraint associated 
with the risk position at control point k. At the catchment level this price is  . Now let us 
see how the shadow prices 
,
D
i j  and ,
S
i j  can be used to pay and to charge participants. 
 
*,
, , ,
1 1
1
1
s s
S K k kD t s s k
i j i j k s
s k
k
C f
H
f
  
 
 
  
  
  
  ,  i,j       [6.32] 
 
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, , ,
1 1
1
1
s s
S K k kS t s s k
i j i j k s
s k
k
C f
H
f
  
 
 
  
  
  
  ,   i,j         [6.33] 
The prices in [6.32] and [6.33] are the allowance prices, and they correspond to a set of 
valued impacts at control points, which generate marginal changes of flood damage by 
scenario, and affect the SO’s risk position. Any change in IC allowance at any location 
upstream may change flows across scenarios, and consequently to affect the flood 
distribution. In addition, different risk positions can be generated and priced, which are 
analysed as follows. 
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If the catchment level risk constraint is non-binding, i.e., 0s    , but the CVaR 
positions are binding at several control points k=1,..,K-c (with c non-binding CVaR control 
points, so 0s k
   ); then participants face the following prices for the allowances. 
 
*,
, , ,
1 1
1
1
s s
S K k kD t s s k
i j i j k s
s k
k
C f
H
f

 
 
  
  
  
  ,  i,j      [6.34] 
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S K k kS t s s k
i j i j k s
s k
k
C f
H
f

 
 
  
  
  
  ,   i,j      [6.35] 
Participants face prices based on their changes in the impacting flow patterns 1,
, ,
t u s
i j kH
  along 
control points and scenarios. Notice that 1,
, ,
t u s
i j kH
  can be positive or negative depending on 
the initial IC allowance. The prices represent marginal changes of the maximum peak flow 
damage, and the marginal cost of damage at the risk position and at binding control points. 
The SO can include CVaR at all control points, or just those of concern. Therefore, the 
participants whose flows impact at binding control points and raise the CVaR positions 
would be charged for those flows. 
If the risk position is binding at the catchment level, so 0s    , but control points do 
not match the CVaR positions, so 0s k
   , then participants will observe the following 
prices for their allowances. 
 
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i j i j k s
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k
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  
  
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i j i j k s
s k
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C f
H
f

 
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  
  
  
  ,  i,j      [6.37] 
In this case, participants should realise that their changes in IC would shift impacting flow 
1,
, ,
t u s
i j kH
  , thus affecting the flood distribution and the resulting flood damage in extreme 
storm events. Since the SO has a limit for CVaR at the catchment level, participants should 
face the marginal cost for the SO’s risk position. 
If both the catchment and control point risk positions are binding, 0s     and 
0s k
   , then participant allowances would be priced for [6.32] and [6.33]. Thus, they 
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will pay/receive allowances based on their marginal changes of flows for varying flood 
distributions as well as for the expected damage above the confidence level  in the flood 
damage distribution. 
Participants who change IC allowances may increase peak flows and flood damage, and 
so influence the risk position of the community (see equations [6.32][6.37]). 
Additionally, some participants may observe that increasing imperviousness shifts the peak 
time, impacting flows at control points. Thus, participants pay a small price or are 
rewarded for reducing a possible risk position by the SO. However, if the market model 
considers the flood cost for hastening the peak time of flooding (fast flood), a possible 
trade-off between the flood cost and the constrained risk may be observed. Thus, even 
though the new IC allowances may avoid peak flow times, such IC allowances could 
hasten inundation and hence participants cannot change IC allowances. 
Participants face the price for influencing flood damage and binding risk positions of 
the SO. The signalled price may incentivise participants to manage IC allowances and 
avoid risk. 
6.5.3 Hedging with a set of CVaR positions at control points 
The previous analysis accounts for a CVaR value at each control point as a way to hedge 
against different flood scenarios for extreme events and to establish the corresponding risk 
positions. Variables should include a set of =1… '  for 
,
s
k  , which estimates damage 
above VaR  k  at different confidence levels. Thus, the constraints [6.18], [6.19], [6.20] 
and [6.21] could include a set of CVaR positions at control points and catchments. For 
instance at control point the conditions are as follows: 
  ,s s k sk k kC f     ,  k,s,    : ,s sk          [6.38] 
,
1
1
S
s s
k
k ks W

 
 


 


,  k,    : k
         [6.39]  
The new dual conditions represent; the clearing price, the opportunity cost to the system 
and the risk positions, as follows. 
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Equation [6.40] differs from [6.24] in that the new condition accounts, explicitly, for a set 
of risk positions at each control point. A position in the set is priced when CVaR levels 
are bounded. The price represents the cost to the system for changing risk and the flood 
damage distribution; accordingly, the dual price 
,
s
t k  accounts for all such risk positions. 
Thus, when assuming bounded conditions at one control point and catchment at one peak 
time per scenario, the new clearing condition is: 
,
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 
 
     ,  k,s,t [6.41] 
The clearing price accounts for the incremental flood damage, and for the trade-off 
between the cost of the risk positions at each control point, as well as for its contribution at 
the catchment level, adjusted by the incremental flood damage, when an extra unit of peak 
flow at peak time t* is allowed to impact on control point k. Consequently, this would 
signal a price for participants to shift the flood distribution particularly at the tail 
distribution. 
Equation [6.42] defines the prices to charge those participants. 
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  
  
   ,  i,j    [6.42] 
It is expected that at least one binding CVaR limit will price the system for each control 
point. This limit accounts for the tail flood distribution that the SO wants to keep in the 
catchment. Thus, the new impervious level conditions and BMPs in the catchment will be 
distributed such to reach the desired tail flood condition. 
As similar to [6.31], the CVaR’s set could over-constrain the market and make it 
infeasible. This could occur because the SO may desire to adjust an established status quo 
of flood damage via CVaR in the catchment. This will signal the market with high prices, 
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and so participants will be limited in changing IC allowances. Consequently, the SO will 
be a net payer. This will be discussed further in the chapter. 
Next, an example is presented showing how CVaR values are included in the 
formulation for a small hypothetical catchment. The CVaR positions will change final 
prices from participants. 
6.6 Example applications 
This section gives three theoretical examples to show implications of including CVaR as 
risk measure in the market model. The examples assume 10 participants, who are located at 
different places in the catchment (see Table 6-1 and Table 6-6) and a stream network 
carries flows from the participants, producing a spatial and temporal flows condition at 
different control points (see Figure 4-9). Different stage flood damage functions are used in 
the examples, which account for peak flows. Example 1 considers a linearised convex 
stage flood damage function in the recourse. Examples 2 and 3 account for a linearised, but 
non-convex stage flood damage, considering the SOS2 method. Finally, examples 1 and 2 
compare trading (allocations and prices) and initial and final flooding under different storm 
scenarios and CVaR position. Example 3 considers a set of CVaR positions at each control 
point to evaluate the effect of CVaRs in allocations and prices of participants. 
Example 1 
This hypothetical example includes the SO’s risk position in terms of CVaRs. The market 
timeframe is one year, so the recourse cost accounts for the expected damage during the 
period. It is assumed that; 10 participants each have 10 hectares; 5 participants desire to 
increase ICs (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) and the other 5 participants desire to reduce ICs (6, 7, 8, 9, 
and 10). The catchment has three control points CP1, CP2 and CP3 and participants are 
impacting at different locations (see Figure 4-9). Control points CP1, CP2 and CP3 have 
threshold limits Mk of 41, 57 and 70 volume/time. Table 6-1 summarises participants’ 
preferences as well as the information on ICs and impacting areas. For instance, participant 
1 has 10 hectares and desires to change 9 hectares from forest to meadow; participant 9 has 
10 hectares of concrete and desires to reduce 9 hectares to meadow. It is assumed the flow 
impact at control points will rise associated with the increasing impervious levels. 
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Table 6-1 Initial ICs and preferences of participants (Example 1). 
Particip. Initial IC 
Initial 
area 
(ha) 
Impact 
at 
control 
point 
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
ha IC $/ha ha IC $/ha ha IC $/ha 
1 Forest (F) 10 1,2,3 4 M $22 3 M $6 2 M $3 
2 Meadow (M) 10 1,2,3 4 Cr $12 3 Cr $10 2 Cr $8 
3 Meadow (M) 10 2,3 4 Cn $15 3 Cn $13 2 Cn $11 
4 Meadow (M) 10 2,3 4 Cn $14 3 Cn $11 2 Cn $10 
5 Crop (Cr) 10 2,3 4 Cn $13 3 Cn $11 2 Cn $8 
6 Crop (Cr) 10 2,3 5 F $2 3 F $8 1 F $9 
7 Concrete (Cn) 
(Cn) 
10 2,3 5 M $4 3 M $7 1 M $10 
8 Concrete (Cn) 10 3 5 Cr $5 3 Cr $8 1 Cr $9 
9 Concrete (Cn)  10 3 5 M $7 3 M $10 1 M $12 
10 Crop (Cr) 10 3 5 F $5 3 F $10 1 F $15 
 
The market is established with 9 storms with probabilities of 0.8, 0.08, 0.05, 0.03, 0.017, 
0.0125, 0.0075, 0.0025, and 0.0005, which generate different flood scenarios. The SO is 
concerned about extreme flood damage, and includes CVaR constraints for three control 
points (CP) and at the catchment level. The SO is considering CVaRs at confidence level 
(1 )=0.95 of $600, $1,480, and $2,710 for CP1, CP2 and CP3 respectively. 
Additionally, he/she is considering a CVaR, at the catchment level, of $10,000. 
The damage function related to total flows at CP1 is quadratic and at CP2 and CP3 are 
cubic, and the damage functions are $CP1
21.28 f , $CP2
30.0008 f  and 
$CP3
30.0004 f , where f is the peak flow at the control point. The damage functions are 
convexified. 
The resulting trades for this example were 26.65 hectares to buyers and 15.95 hectares 
to sellers. The clearing prices in the market varied according to; control point, scenario and 
time peak. Table 6-2 summarises the clearing prices at control points. The manager would 
receive net revenue of $12.68, because their risk position allows increasing impervious 
level in the zone close to CP1; however, the SO receives less revenue if this is risk neutral 
($103.44). For instance, participant 3 bought 4 hectares (concrete) and paid $58; 
participant 7 sold 9 hectares and received $132 (for the change to meadow). Table 6-3 
summarises these transactions. Positive and negative payments are charged and received 
for participants respectively. 
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Table 6-2 Clearing prices at control points (CP) 
CP Scenario Time 
Clearing price 
CP Scenario Time 
Clearing price 
With Risk 
position 
(CVaR) 
($/m
3
/time) 
Risk neutral 
($/m3/time) 
With Risk 
position 
(CVaR) 
($/m
3
/time) 
Risk neutral 
($/m
3
/time) 
1 5 7 $0.131 $0.089 2 8 9 $0.714 $0.299 
1 6 7 $0.284 $0.131 2 9 8 $0.131 $0.089 
1 7 7 $0.158 $0.284 3 2 9 $0.035 $0.200 
1 8 7 $0.096 $0.158 3 3 10 $0.163 $0.035 
1 9 6 $0.030 $0.096 3 4 10 $0.640 $0.205 
2 3 9 $0.598 $0.116 3 5 10 $1.675 $0.423 
2 4 9 $2.027 $0.332 3 6 10 $1.490 $0.567 
2 5 9 $1.982 $0.479 3 7 10 $1.450 $0.505 
2 6 9 $1.920 $0.470 3 8 10 $0.938 $0.530 
2 7 9 $1.113 $0.490 3 9 9 $0.659 $0.289 
 
Alternatively, if the market design is risk neutral, i.e., equivalent to a risk neutral SO (not 
accounting CVaR risk positions); then, participants’ prices would be reduced, which may 
generate increasing IC. Thus, the SO sells more ICs for 45 hectares and buys 10 hectares 
and the final total revenue is $103.44. This revenue could be used to mitigate damage in 
the flood area. For instance, participant 3 bought 9 hectares (concrete) and paid $41.3; 
participant 7 sold 5 hectares and received $22.93 (for changing to meadow) (see Table 
6-3). 
The final flood distribution across control points changes depending on the SO’s risk 
position (neutral or risky). In the example, the risk positions are bounded at CP2 and CP3 
and they generate shadow prices of $0.2154 and $0.1353 respectively, but the constraints 
for CP1 and catchment risk levels are not binding. The flood distribution changed at CP1 
and CP2 with both risk positions, given the slacks of the CVaRs at those points at the 
beginning of the auction. Flows at CP2 increased, changing the flood distribution and 
binding the CVaR. At CP3 the risk position is binding in the final flood distribution. The 
catchment and control points are hedged against changes in flood at the extreme tail of the 
flood distribution, and the clearing prices for the allowances account for these risk 
positions (see Table 6-3). 
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Table 6-3 Transactions for sellers and buyers 
Particip. 
Initial 
trading 
area (ha) 
SO with risk position as CVaR SO risk neutral 
Area bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold 
(ha) 
Payment 
($) 
Area bought 
(ha) 
Area sold 
(ha) 
Payment 
($) 
1 10 7 0 $26.99 9 0 $12.17 
2 10 9 0 $34.70 9 0 $12.17 
3 10 4 0 $58.67 9 0 $41.27 
4 10 0 0 $0 9 0 $41.27 
5 10 6.25 0 $68.69 9 0 $30.95 
6 10 0 5 -$36.67 0 5 -$11.46 
7 10 0 9 -$132.00 0 5 -$22.93 
8 10 0 1.54 -$7.70 0 0 $0 
9 10 0 0 $0 0 0 $0 
10 10 0 0 $0 0 0 $0 
Total  100.00  26.25  15.54 $ 12.68  45.00  10.00 $ 103.44 
 
Table 6-4 summarises the initial and final peak flows at control points with different risk 
positions. When CVaR positions are binding, the final flood distribution does not change 
significantly (CP2 and CP3); however, flood distribution was shifted with assumed risk 
neutrality. For instance, at CP3 in scenario 9, flooding was anticipated to increase from 
530 to 573.5 m
3
/time, while in reality it had no significant shift, being from 530.0 to 530.1 
m
3
/time with CVaR. 
 
Table 6-4 Initial and final stage-flooding in m
3
 with a SO risk and neutral risk 
Control 
Point 
Scenario 
Initial 
flooding 
(m
3
) 
Final 
flooding 
with CVaR 
(m
3
) 
Final 
flooding 
with risk 
neutral (m
3
) 
Control 
Point 
Scenario 
Initial 
flooding 
(m
3
) 
Final 
flooding 
with CVaR 
(m
3
) 
Final 
flooding 
with risk 
neutral (m
3
) 
1 5 0 0 0.04 2 8 189.0 190.4 215.1 
1 6 1.0 4.2 4.6 2 9 353.0 355.4 396.5 
1 7 9.4 13.2 13.72 3 2 2.0 2.0 7.22 
1 8 22.0 26.8 27.4 3 3 50.0 50.0 58.7 
1 9 64.0 72.0 73 3 4 98.0 98.0 110.18 
2 3 25.0 25.5 33.7 3 5 146.0 146.0 161.66 
2 4 57.8 58.5 69.98 3 6 170.0 170.0 187.4 
2 5 90.6 91.5 106.26 3 7 218.0 218.0 238.88 
2 6 107.0 107.9 124.4 3 8 290.0 290.0 316.1 
2 7 139.8 140.9 160.68 3 9 530.0 530.1 573.5 
 
Example 2 
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In this example, 10 participants are located at different locations in a small catchment as 
shown in Figure 4-9. Participants have 20 ha each with different IC allowances. Table 6-5 
shows the initial allowances for the non-trading and trading areas from each participant. 
Participants desire to change IC allowances amounting to 10 ha each; however, they each 
have different demands and bid prices, see Table 6-6. 
 
Table 6-5 Initial IC allowance from participants 
Particip. 
Non-trading 
IC 
Non-trading 
area (ha) 
Trading Area, 
Initial IC 
Changing 
area (ha) 
1 Forest (F) 10 Meadow (M) 10 
2 Forest (F) 10 Crop (Cr) 10 
3 Crop (Cr) 10 Crop (Cr) 10 
4 Concrete (Cn) 10 Meadow (M) 10 
5 Concrete (Cn) 10 Crop (Cr) 10 
6 Crop (Cr) 10 Meadow (M) 10 
7 Concrete (Cn) 10 Concrete (Cn) 10 
8 Concrete (Cn) 10 Concrete (Cn) 10 
9 Crop (Cr) 10 Crop (Cr) 10 
10 Meadow (M) 10 Crop (Cr) 10 
 
Table 6-6 Participants’ preferences for changing IC allowances 
Particip. Initial IC 
Changing 
area (ha) 
Impact 
at 
control 
point 
Option 1  Option 2 Option 3 
ha IC $/ha ha IC $/ha ha IC $/ha 
1 Meadow (M) 10 1,2,3 5 Cr $15 3 Cr $12 2 Cr $10 
2 Crop (Cr) 10 1,2,3 5 Cn $15 3 Cn $12 2 Cn $10 
3 Crop (Cr) 10 2,3 5 Cn $9 3 Cn $7 2 Cn $5 
4 Meadow (M) 10 2,3 5 Cn $20 3 Cn $18 2 Cn $15 
5 Crop (Cr) 10 2,3 5 Cn $15 3 Cn $12 2 Cn $10 
6 Meadow (M) 10 2,3 6 F $2 3 F $8 1 F $9 
7 Concrete (Cn) 10 2,3 6 M $4 3 M $7 1 M $10 
8 Concrete (Cn) 10 3 6 Cr $5 3 Cr $8 1 Cr $9 
9 Crop (Cr) 10 3 6 F $7 3 F $10 1 F $12 
10 Crop (Cr) 10 3 6 F $5 3 F $10 1 F $15 
 
A channel and stream network carries flows from the participants, producing a spatial and 
temporal condition of the flows. The flows impact at specific areas and (potentially) cause 
flooding problems. Similar impacting flows are assumed at control points which vary 
according to the impervious levels and scenarios. Control points CP1, CP2 and CP3 have 
threshold limits Mk of 70, 230 and 250 volume/time. Fourteen scenarios with different 
intensities are used in the market, which are perfectly correlated over control points. The 
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probabilities are 0.399, 0.2, 0.15, 0.1, 0.07, 0.04, 0.02, 0.01, 0.005, 0.003, 0.0012, 0.0008, 
0.0005, and 0.0005, for storms which have similar intensities across the small catchment. 
Those impact coefficients and probabilities are used in the market clearing formulation. 
 Each flood area has a different topography which causes non-uniform incremental 
flood depth damage. Figure 6-5 illustrates the initial flood distribution, and the flood 
damage cost for peak flows. These conditions at control points will be used in the market 
model, which has linearised and non-convex damage functions. SOS2 conditions will force 
a convex combination between adjacent points (see section 4.10 Chapter 4). Cplex 9.1 
reached the solution in 14 seconds. 
Before clearing, the expected damage at control points 1, 2, and 3 are $441.30, 
$1,093.30, and $1,905.20, respectively. The SO needs to hedge against extreme events 
which is achieved by evaluating various CVaR options. The SO does not desire to face 
losses greater than $11,056, $21,040 and $31,805 at the confidence level =0.97 CVaR for 
control points 1, 2 and 3; and neither at the catchment level above $110,000. This will bind 
the risk positions that the SO desires while being a net payer. 
 
 
Figure 6-5 Initial flood distribution (A) and flood damage cost (B). CP1, CP2 and CP3 are 
control points 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
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If the market is cleared using the risk positions, the final expected damage will change at 
each control point, and catchment. The risk positions tighten the control point constraints, 
reducing the total expected flood damage. The SO may desire this condition; however, the 
SO could be in the final position as a net payer. The expected damage was reduced from 
$1,093.30 to $1,079.90 at CP2, from $1,905.20 to $1,864.96 at CP3, and from $3,439.90 to 
$3,386.26 at the catchment level. The flood distribution at CP1 was maintained and the 
expected damage did not change ($441.36). However, if the SO cleared the market as risk 
neutral, the final expected damage at the catchment level is increased to $3,504.12 and at 
CP1, CP2 and CP3 to $456.49, $1,114.96, and $1,932.68 respectively. Consequently, the 
SO is a net revenue receiver amounting to $64.93. 
The risk positions are bounded at CP1, CP2, and at the catchment level with dual prices 
of $0.087, $0.00018 and $0.00027 respectively. It is interesting to analyse the situation of 
the participants, given they could trade with such binding constraints. Table 6-7 
summarises the final trade when the SO includes CVaR constraints. In this case, 
participants 4 and 5 increase IC allowances of 6.05 and 5 ha, and pay $108.90 ($18/ha) and 
$67.5 ($13.5/ha), and participants 6 and 7 reduce IC allowances of 6 and 10 ha, and receive 
$27 ($4.50/ha) and $180 ($18/ha) (located in zone 2). Participants 1 and 10 can change IC 
allowances in 0.022 and 4.71 ha, and other participants cannot change IC in the catchment. 
Participant 1 could not increase IC, because the risk position is binding at CP1, and no 
participants are offering to reduce an equivalent change in flood damage and risk. 
However, under a risk neutral condition, participant 1 could change 5 ha from meadow to 
crop. 
The catchment is almost hedged in terms of extreme events and the SO pays $53.88. 
When a linearised and non-convex flood damage cost was used in Chapter 4, the SO’s 
revenue depended on the participants’ preferences and the damage function. In this 
example 2, the SO would be a net payer of $53.88, because the catchment became pervious 
at CP2 and CP3, and also because control point risk positions were tightened at CP1, CP2, 
and at the catchment level. 
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Table 6-7 Transactions for sellers and buyers 
Particip. 
Initial 
trading 
area 
(ha) 
SO risk controlling Risk neutral 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold (ha) 
Payment 
($) 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold (ha) 
Payment 
($) 
1 10 0.022 0 $0.33 5 0 $60.45 
2 10 0 0 $0 0 0 $0 
3 10 0 0 $0 0 0 $0 
4 10 6.05 0 $108.89 8 0 $143.23 
5 10 5 0 $67.50 5 0 $67.14 
6 10 0 6 -$27.00 0 6 -$26.86 
7 10 0 10 -$180.00 0 10 -$179.03 
8 10 0 0 $0 0 0 $0 
9 10 0 0 $0 0 0 $0 
10 10 0 4.71 -$23.60 0 0 $0 
  100.00  11.07  20.71 - 53.88  18.00  16.00 $ 64.93 
 
To reach the desired position at CP2 and at the catchment level the SO is a net payer. 
Consequently, the flood distribution was shifted. However, at CP1 the flood distribution 
was almost maintained at the same level. If the SO relaxes CP2 and the catchment risk 
position levels, the SO becomes almost revenue neutral with $2.54. This is the result of the 
SO selling expected flood damage at CP3. 
The expected damage changes from the initial $3,439.90 to the final $3,386.26. The 
reduction is due to the expected damage ($3,439.9 – $3,386.26 = $53.64), and the payment 
of $53.83 corresponds to the surplus for the SO and the supra rent for the linearisation; 
however, this difference is almost zero ($53.64 – $53.83= -$0.19). 
Example 3 
The market clearing is now illustrated with a set of CVaR positions at each control point 
(see Section 6.5.3). The flood damage cost functions are linearised and non-convex, hence 
the SOS2 method is used. The same assumptions from example 2 are used, but the clearing 
model accounts for 3 CVaR positions for each control point and catchment level. These 
risk positions are established at the confidence levels =0.95, =0.97 and =0.99. Table 
6-8 summarises the hypothetical risk positions in the market clearing formulation. 
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Table 6-8 CVaR positions at different confidence levels 
 CVaR=0.95 ($) CVaR=0.97 ($) A-CVaR=0.99 ($) B-CVaR=0.99 ($) 
Control point 1 $8,000 $11,056 $26,300 $23,400 
Control point 2 $19,000 $21,205 $48,000 $36,000 
Control point 3 $30,000 $31,805 $67,224 $50,000 
Catchment $90,000 $110,000 $145,000 $145,000 
 
When clearing the market with the previous assumptions (CVaR=0.95, CVaR=0.97, and A-
CVaR=0.99) and participants’ preferences, the final area traded should be the same as the 
previous example, given that the risk positions are bounded only at CVaR0.97. (The A-
CVaR0.99 is not bounded). Prices and allocations for the other participants would be the 
same. However, small differences can be observed if unscaled infeasibilities were observed 
with Cplex due to ill-conditioned constraints. CVaR constraints could be tightened so that 
a solution can be reached, but there would be a violation of reduced cost (indicating non-
optimality) or of a bound (indicating infeasibility) (Fourer et al. 2003; ILOG 2008). This 
point was presented in previous paragraphs. 
If the model was additionally cleared using BCVaR0.99 rather than with ACVaR0.99 
(see Table 6-8), it would have more restrictive conditions for the extreme events above the 
99% confidence level, which may be interpreted as a more risk-averse market. In this 
condition, the total trade would change as well as the prices at control points. Participants 1 
and 4 would increase IC allowance for 0.02 and 4.19 ha, and they would pay $0.33 
($16.50/ha) and $83.83 ($20/ha); participants 6, 7 and 10 would reduce 6, 10 and 6 ha, and 
they would receive $30 ($5/ha), $200 ($20/ha) and $36.19 ($6/ha) respectively. Therefore, 
for instance, clearing price would increase for participants 6 from $4/ha to $5/ha and 
participant 7 from $18/ha to $20/ha for the binding risk position respectively. 
Risk constraints bind at CP1 and CVaR0.97 with 0.0591 ($/$ at CVaR=0.97), and at 
CP3 and CVaR0.99 with 0.015 ($/$ at B-CVaR=0.99). Clearing prices at control points 
changed due to the changes in the marginal flood damage as well as for the effects of the 
extra cost to the system, when allowing an extra unit of risk position at the confidence 
level . Thus, the final flood distribution is shifted toward less damage. However, this has 
a cost to the system which corresponds to the reduction in damage, and for this reason the 
SO is exposed as a net payer of $182.02. The final expected damage is $3,279.31 from an 
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initial expected damage of $3,439.90, i.e., the difference is $160.59. However, the total 
payment from the SO of $182.02 is more than the reduction in the expected flood damage 
$160.59). This difference is due to the catchment risk position and flood damage 
linearisation. 
6.7 Misestimating confidence level () and CVaR value 
Prices can be affected when the confidence level () and CVaR values are mis-estimated. 
The mis-estimation was discussed indirectly in previous examples when the market had 
slack and tightened CVaR conditions. Misestimating CVaR can allow more IC levels or in 
an alternative situation can result in the SO becoming a net payer or a net receiver. For 
instance, IC allowances can be changed which would shift the flood distribution, but the 
SO desired to maintain the current flood distribution. Such a case was presented in 
example 1 (Section 6.6), when at CP1 the CVaR constraint was slack, which allowed 
incrementing the IC allowances in this area. Otherwise, the SO could be a net payer, as 
shown in example 3 where the binding CVaR condition increased prices and probably 
reduced IC allowances in the zone. In both situations, the goals may be to maintain the 
current flood damage distribution. 
Similar effects could be observed when misestimating the confidence level which may 
result in CVaR constraints being slack or binding. 
6.8 Possible issues in hedging against changes in damage via CVaR 
This section discusses possible issues that could be noticed when a CVaR position is 
included in the market formulation. The section addresses misestimating and over-
tightening CVaR positions, revenue condition for the SO, market infeasibility, and raising 
prices for participants. Numerical examples are used to explain these problems with CVaR. 
 Extreme events, such as 200 mm of rainfall in 24 hours would require extra analysis for 
the probable effects on prices with CVaR. For instance, suppose the disaster cost is 
unchanged despite lower IC allowances. In this case, if CVaR were used, the model may 
be infeasible, or clearing prices would increase and consequently the SO could be a net 
payer if participants previously had the IC allowances. If the extreme disaster does not 
change, even though IC allowances were reduced and the model is accounting for CVaR, 
then desired CVaR is not reachable and the model is infeasible. An equivalent issue was 
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discussed previously in this chapter. Even if all participants could implement practices to 
reduce runoff from their properties and consequently the impacting flows, the cost of the 
disaster does not change. This could be the case of hedging against flows above 1,450 
volume/time at CP3 shown in Figure 6-5. 
Additionally, the SO may be over-allocated according to a new risk position, but 
previously CVaRs were loose at some control points. In this case, the SO would be a net 
payer to reduce impacting flows. Another comparable situation could be faced with 
binding CVaR conditions, if the SO desires to reduce CVaRs even more. Because 
participants have rights for the previous risk conditions, the SO would be a net payer. But 
the condition may not be reachable if any offer combination for reducing ICs (and its 
equivalent in reducing damage) were above the desired CVaR condition and the solution 
would be infeasible. 
Figure 6-3 illustrated a CVaR accounting for the flood damage at the extreme events. 
The catchment is a small area to simplify the analysis, so the storm is affecting the 
catchment with similar intensity and hence probability. Examples 3 to 16 storm scenarios 
are extended with the following probabilities: 0.3987, 0.2, 0.15, 0.1, 0.07, 0.04, 0.02, 0.01, 
0.005, 0.003, 0.0012, 0.0008, 0.0005, 0.0005, 0.0002 and 0.0001. The last two scenarios 
reach the asymptotic flood damage levels (see Figure 6-5). Above 290 volume/time and 
1450 volume/time at CP1 and CP3, the flood damage would reach the maximum of 
$16,000 and $33,750 at these control points respectively. Thus, any storm event and IC 
allowance combination (even with the maximum permeability) will trigger damage at these 
limits. CVaR=0.9998 of $35,201 and $74,251 at CP1 and CP3 correspond to lower bounds 
which limit trade, see Table 6-9. Any lower value would generate an infeasible solution, 
because no IC allowance combination can be lower than the bound. (This could also 
correspond to a fundamental capacity, even if all properties were pervious, disaster would 
reach this level.) 
If the catchment was badly constrained with CVaR, the market could be infeasible and 
the SO would be a net payer until new IC allowances allowed the desired flood 
distribution. Meanwhile, this over-constrained condition produces an extra cost on the 
system which would require careful evaluation. Prices are raised and participants are 
limited for most activities within the catchment. 
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Suppose different CVaR values are estimated for the tail distribution as shown in Table 
6-9. Under the previous catchment condition and participants’ preferences (example 3), 
participants 1, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 10 change IC allowances in 1.11, 5.98, 5, 6, 10, and 6 ha. 
Payments from the SO are -$16.70 ($15.05/ha), -$107.7 ($18.01/ha), -$67.50 ($13.50/ha), 
$27 ($4.50/ha), $180 ($18/ha) and $30.02 ($5/ha) (negative value means the SO receives 
from participants). The flood tail distribution is kept at control points, and the SO is a net 
payer with $45.12. The expected flood damage is $3,439.12. 
 
Table 6-9 CVaR at different confidence levels 
Control 
Point 
CVaR0.95 CVaR0.97 CVaR0.99 CVaR0.999 CVaR0.9995 CVaR0.9998 
CP1 $8,405 $11,389 $23,265 $29,800 $32,165 $35,201 
CP2 $17,020 $21,599 $37,115 $47,819 $48,525 $48,889 
CP3 $23,614 $32,417 $52,325 $70,220 $72,110 $74,251 
Catchment $95,700 $110,000 $140,000 $159,000 $165,000 $170,000 
 
However, a completely different condition is observed if the SO over-tightens the CVaR 
constraint. For instance, CVaR0.99 of $49,325 at CP3 would raise clearing prices due to the 
risk position components, 0.146 ($/$ at CVaR) at CVaR0.99 boundary (reduced by $3,000). 
Most offers from participants are accepted, and the surrounding areas become permeable. 
Participants 6 to 10 reduce IC allowances in 9.75, 10, 6, 10 and 9 ha and receive $87.75 
($9/ha), $360 ($36/ha), $35.50 ($5.93/ha), $141.30 ($14.10/ha) and $127.20 ($14.13/ha) at 
CP2 and CP3 respectively. Prices rise for all participants, in particular participant 6 from 
$4.50 to $9, participant 7 from $18 to $36, and participant 10 from $5 to $14.13. 
Consequently, the flood tail distribution is shifted at CP3 and CP2. At CP2 and CP3, the 
expected damage decreases from $1,108 to $1,009.21, and from $1,927.60 to $1,700.80 
respectively; at CP1 the expected damage does not change. The SO is a net payer of 
$746.20 and the final expected damage is $3,165.11 from $3,487.41. The expected 
reduction in damage is only $322.30, and the difference corresponds to bounded risk 
positions at CP1 and CP3 with CVaR0.99. 
Previous cases accounted for risk positions that tighten the catchment and control 
points, raising prices. This is because the current flood condition needs to be reduced and 
so the SO is exposed to this condition. Notice that if the market was cleared risk neutral, 
the flood distribution would be shifted, and the expected flood damage may increase. 
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Another way to manage extreme flooding could be to impose penalties on participants 
as in CO2 market (Holt et al. 2007). This could be an effective policy while the SO could 
be revenue adequate. However, this additional constraint includes another price at each 
participant. Now, each participant faces this individual price, which may limit their 
decision about imperviousness and BMPs, and their trade. This penalty produces an 
additional cost to the system faced for each participant. The SO should evaluate this option 
to manage flooding; however this idea is not further discussed and could be part of future 
research. 
6.9 Final remarks and conclusion 
This chapter presented a method to hedge against changes in floods via CVaR. Various 
measures of risk were examined resulting in the CVaR method being favoured due to its 
coherence properties. Additionally, the inclusion of the CVaR risk profile into a market 
clearing model was demonstrated. The risk position depends on the community’s desired 
catchment conditions as represented by the SO. The desired catchment conditions have 
price and allocation effects for the IC allowances and final trading outcomes. 
The chapter showed how prices are affected by SO’s risk constraints. The SO may 
choose a CVaR position at each control point and for the entire catchment. The CVaRs’ 
constraints were shown to work as caps for the market design. Prices were shown to be 
higher as the risk CVaRs were tightened at control points and at the catchment level. 
This chapter showed that participants face risk, producing a cost to the system that is 
transferred to those participants who impact on binding risk conditions. Participants who 
do not change their impacts at the tail flood distribution incur cost risk, but these 
participants are not charged. 
Incorporating a risk position could produce an extra cost to the system if the risk is 
over-constrained. Participants may face a high price for most IC allowances, but they could 
be incentivised to adopt BMPs in their properties. A market with this condition may work 
as one-sided with the SO paying for any peak flow reductions to reach the risk position. 
The SO could be a net receiver if loose CVaR risk positions become bounded. 
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This chapter focused discussion on stage-flood, but the CVaR positions could also 
account for different aspects of floods that contribute to damage, such as duration (see 
Chapter 5). 
Until now, this thesis has used only simple and theoretical numerical examples. In the 
next chapter, the proposed market models will be illustrated using more comprehensive 
cases. 
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Chapter 7 
 
7 CASE STUDY 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents applications of the proposed market models as described in Chapters 
3, 4, 5 and 6. The case studies are based on the L2 river catchment located in the Ellesmere 
catchment, Canterbury, New Zealand. 
Data from the study area are used to simulate the impact of storm events on IC 
allowances [land use] and flow consequences. Hydrological and hydraulic parameters from 
the area are used to simulate impacts resulting from changes in IC allowances. Storms are 
designed using HIRDS (NIWA 2002) and are the main source of uncertainty in this 
illustration. However, it is recognised that other sources of uncertainty such as flow and 
flood modelling parameters and possible climate change could produce more intensive 
storms and resulting flood damage (Yang and Read 1999). Hydrological and hydraulic 
simulators HEC-HMS (HEC 2008a) and HEC-RAS (HEC 2008b) are used to simulate 
runoffs from hypothetical properties and hydraulic flows in the L2 river. To simplify the 
analysis and reporting, the properties were agglomerated into 24 areas. 
In the L2 catchment, the SO could use the Det_MarketIC, Sto_MarketIC and 
Sto_MarketIC_Risk formulations, but each has a different price, allocation and possible 
revenue implications that will each be illustrated. The formulations include different flood 
components (depth, hastening inundation and duration), flood cost types (maximum stage-
flood, changes in flows and violating flow thresholds) and flood damage approximations 
(convexified and linearised non-convex damage functions). Prices and allocations are 
analysed under different market formulations and flood damage approximations. The first 
illustration considers a hypothetically established market under an extreme storm for the 
Det_MarketIC. Secondly, rainfall uncertainty is included in Sto_MarketIC, with discussion 
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on the effects of prices, allocation, flood distribution, and hedging of floods in the 
catchment. The Sto_MarketIC includes the proposed flood components and related flood 
costs. Finally, the Sto_MarketIC_Risk is evaluated, where the SO desires to reach a risk 
position against extreme storm disasters, which could correspond to an acceptable risk that 
the community desires for the flood areas. 
In Section 7.2 is introduced the catchment location, the properties, and the hydrological 
and hydraulic assumptions. Subsection 7.2.1 presents participants' properties and their 
preferences for land uses. Subsection 7.2.2 presents the storm design. Subsection 7.2.3 
describes the catchment hydrology. Subsection 7.2.4 presents the hydraulic flows in the 
network. Section 7.3 describes the initial flood conditions at the flooding places. In Section 
7.4 there are examples (cases) using the proposed market formulations. Section 7.5 is final 
remarks and conclusions. 
7.2 Property, hydrological and hydraulic assumptions 
The catchment area is divided into 4 sub-catchments of 1,004.31, 500.00, 3,089.94, and 
3,677.00 ha respectively (see Figure 7-1). Six properties per subcatchment are assumed 
each with similar areas, but with different IC allowances and impervious surfaces (see 
Appendix C). HIRDS provides rainfall depth for different average recurrence intervals 
(ARI) for a specific location, and HIRDS was also used to design realistic storm events for 
modelling. Runoff from properties and routing flows in channels were estimated with 
HEC-HMS and HEC-RAS. HEC-RAS was also used to model flows at different channel 
sections as well as possible exceeding flows. ‘Exceeding flows’ as previously defined are 
flows above channel capacity or flows which will overflow the channel banks. 
7.2.1 Participant properties and preferences 
Figure 7-1 shows the initial IC allowance areas, the related to curve number CN, areas, and 
concentration time (Tc) for each of the six properties. Tc (hr) is estimated based on the SCS 
lag method (NRCS 1975; SCS 1985; NRCS 2010). The SCS lag method developed by 
Mockus (NRCS 2010) considers the hydraulic length of the watershed in meters I, 
catchment lag in hours L, a parameter S based on the curve number (CN), and average 
watershed slope in percentage (Y). Tc is as follows: 
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Figure 7-1 Reach sections. (i) corresponds to the L2 catchment with the individual 
injecting upper places and (ii) represents the channel network. Red points correspond to 
cross-sections within each reach. 
 
Table 7-1 also shows the participant’s preferences. For instance: 
 
None of the XS's are Geo-Referenced ( Geo-R f user entered XS  Geo-Ref int rpolated XS  Non Geo-R f us r enter XS  No  G -R f interpolated XS)
Reach C 
Reach A-up 
Reach A-down 
Reach B 
Reach B-C 
Reach C-D 
Reach D 
Reach outlet 
(i) 
(ii) 
Upper node A 
Catchment outlet 
CP-A 
CP-AB 
CP-ABC 
CP-ABCD 
85-93 CN 
79-84 CN 
71-78 CN 
47-70 CN 
30-46 CN 
Upper node B 
Upper node C 
Upper node D 
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Table 7-1 Initial and desired conditions of participants at different subcatchments. 
Property 
Area 
(ha) 
Initial Condition Desired Condition Base 
flows (1) 
(m
3
/sec)  CN 
Impervious 
area (%) 
Tc 
(min) 
CN 
Impervious 
area (%) 
Tc 
(min) 
A1 167.385 85 65 856 80 60 1,010 0.253 
A2 167.385 85 65 856 80 60 1,010 0.253 
A3 167.385 85 65 856 80 60 1,010 0.253 
A4 167.385 80 65 1,010 74 60 1,207 0.253 
A5 167.385 74 9 1,207 80 9 1,010 0.253 
A6 167.385 74 9 1,207 80 9 1,010 0.253 
B1 83.333 78 10.5 813 74 10.5 913 0.075 
B2 83.333 82 10.5 717 80 10.5 764 0.075 
B3 83.333 75 10.5 887 74 10.5 913 0.075 
B4 83.333 78 10.5 813 70 10.5 1,020 0.075 
B5 83.333 80 10.5 764 85 10.5 648 0.075 
B6 83.333 80 10.5 764 85 10.5 648 0.075 
C1 514.99 53 5 3,273 60 5 2,743 0.088 
C2 514.99 78 9 1,684 60 9 2,743 0.088 
C3 514.99 53 5 3,273 60 5 2,743 0.088 
C4 514.99 53 5 3,273 60 5 2,743 0.088 
C5 514.99 74 9 1,893 60 9 2,743 0.088 
C6 514.99 74 9 1,893 50 9 3,531 0.088 
D1 612.83 78 65 1,806 80 65 1,698 0.235 
D2 612.83 53 5 3,509 53 5 2,940 0.235 
D3 612.83 53 5 3,509 70 5 2,940 0.235 
D4 612.83 47 5 4,088 53 5 3,509 0.235 
D5 612.83 47 5 4,088 60 5 3,509 0.235 
D6 612.83 78 65 1,806 60 65 2,266 0.235 
(1) A proportional base flow was calculated based only on properties' size and the flows measure in the river 
and catchment. 
 
- Participant A1 has 167.3 ha (urban area) with a hypothetical hydraulic length of 1,293m, 
CN 85 and slope 0.01%, and their Tc is 856 approx min. With the purpose to shift IC in the 
areas, this participant desires to reduce IC allowances to CN 80 by improving grass cover 
in the area, and so Tc is approx 1,010 min. 
- Participant B4 (farm area) has a property with bare soil, and desires to crop, and hence to 
reduce IC allowances to CN 70. Consequently, the Tc would increase to approximately 
1,020 min. 
- Participant C5 (farm area), with row crops, wishes to change IC allowances to meadows, 
and hence to reduce CN to 60. In this case the Tc would increase to approximately 2,743 
min. 
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- Participant D3 (farm area) with pasture (CN 53) desires to crop using a BMP (contoured), 
and hence would change IC to CN 70. The Tc would be reduced to approximately 2,940 
min. 
7.2.2 Storms 
Twenty-four hour type I, II and III storms were designed with ARIs of 2, 5, 20, 30, 40, 50, 
70, 80, 100, 125, and 150. The Sto_MarketIC uses 28 scenarios to estimate impacting 
flows from properties and flood components. These scenarios represent the storm 
distribution and the chosen scenarios accounts for the frequency curve as accurately as 
possible. 
 The storm design accounts for intensity-duration-frequency (IDF) curves (Durrans 
2010) and the peak time. Thus, storms account for the maximum intensity and the peak 
time. Table 7-2 shows the duration-intensity and estimate for the Ellesmere area from 
HIRDS. The storm intensity at the first 0.5 hour corresponds to 43.567 mm/hr 
(    
2
3.382942 0.560905 ln 0.5 0.001858 ln 0.5
e
    =43.467, see B in Table 7-3). Column E in Table 7-3 
corresponds to the 24-hours ARI 100 type I design storm used to simulate flows from 
properties and flows at control points in the L2 catchment. 
 
Table 7-2 Estimates for the duration-intensity for an ARI 100 years. 
Duration 
(min) 
Duration 
(hrs) 
Accumulation 
Depth (mm) 
Incremental 
Depth (mm) 
Intensity 
(mm/hr) 
Ln(Intensity) 
(mm/hr) 
Ln(Duration) 
(hrs) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 0.17 6.6 6.6 39.60 3.68 -1.79 
20 0.33 9.2 2.6 27.60 3.32 -1.10 
30 0.50 11.1 1.9 22.20 3.10 -0.69 
60 1.00 15.5 4.4 15.50 2.74 0.00 
120 2.00 21.3 5.8 10.65 2.37 0.69 
360 6.00 35.5 14.2 5.92 1.78 1.79 
720 12.00 49 13.5 4.08 1.41 2.48 
1440 24.00 67.6 18.6 2.82 1.04 3.18 
2880 48.00 84.8 17.2 1.77 0.57 3.87 
4320 72.00 96.9 12.1 1.35 0.30 4.28 
 
Annual exceedance probabilities were estimated from HIRDS, which reports frequencies 
for different duration and storm depths across New Zealand. Storm probabilities can be 
estimated by adjusting historical storms to a distribution such as EV1 and EV2 which was 
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described in section 2.3, Chapter 2, or with a first-order two-state Markov chain for a daily 
time-series (Brown 2007). For this illustration, exceedance probabilities are calculated 
using frequencies from HIRDS, followed by specific storm distribution types, i.e., I, II and 
III are assumed to have probabilities of 0.2, 0.7 and 0.1 respectively. For example a 24-
hour ARI 50 type II storm, may have an exceedance probability of 1.4%. Low intensity 
storms such as ARI 2 would not produce significant flood problems, and the discretised 
storm probabilities will sum to 1. 
 
Table 7-3 Twenty four hour type I (peak at the 1/3 storm time) ARI 100 storm for the L2 
catchment. 
Duration 
(hrs) A 
Intensity 
(mm/hr) 
B 
Cumulate 
depth 
(mm) 
C= A x B 
Incremental 
depth (mm) 
D= Ct-Ct-1 
Redistributed 
rain (mm) 
E 
Duration 
(hrs) 
A 
Intensity 
(mm/hr) 
B 
Cumulate 
depth 
(mm) 
C= A x B 
Incremental 
depth (mm) 
D= Ct-Ct-1 
Redistributed 
rain (mm) 
E 
0.5 43.567 21.784 21.784 1.635 12.5 7.077 88.464 1.558 1.558 
1 29.457 29.457 7.674 1.723 13 6.922 89.987 1.524 1.524 
1.5 23.430 35.145 5.687 1.826 13.5 6.776 91.478 1.491 1.491 
2 19.917 39.834 4.689 1.948 14 6.638 92.938 1.460 1.460 
2.5 17.559 43.898 4.064 2.096 14.5 6.508 94.369 1.431 1.431 
3 15.842 47.525 3.627 2.279 15 6.385 95.772 1.403 1.403 
3.5 14.521 50.824 3.299 2.515 15.5 6.268 97.149 1.377 1.377 
4 13.467 53.866 3.042 2.834 16 6.156 98.501 1.352 1.352 
4.5 12.600 56.701 2.834 3.299 16.5 6.050 99.830 1.329 1.329 
5 11.872 59.362 2.662 4.064 17 5.949 101.136 1.306 1.306 
5.5 11.250 61.877 2.515 5.687 17.5 5.853 102.420 1.284 1.284 
6 10.711 64.266 2.389 21.784 18 5.760 103.684 1.264 1.264 
6.5 10.238 66.545 2.279 7.674 18.5 5.672 104.928 1.244 1.244 
7 9.818 68.728 2.182 4.689 19 5.587 106.154 1.225 1.225 
7.5 9.443 70.823 2.096 3.627 19.5 5.506 107.361 1.207 1.207 
8 9.105 72.842 2.018 3.042 20 5.428 108.551 1.190 1.190 
8.5 8.799 74.790 1.948 2.662 20.5 5.352 109.724 1.173 1.173 
9 8.519 76.674 1.885 2.389 21 5.280 110.882 1.157 1.157 
9.5 8.263 78.501 1.826 2.182 21.5 5.210 112.023 1.142 1.142 
10 8.027 80.273 1.773 2.018 22 5.143 113.150 1.127 1.127 
10.5 7.809 81.997 1.723 1.885 22.5 5.078 114.263 1.113 1.113 
11 7.607 83.675 1.678 1.773 23 5.016 115.361 1.099 1.099 
11.5 7.418 85.310 1.635 1.678 23.5 4.955 116.447 1.085 1.085 
12 7.242 86.905 1.595 1.595 24 4.897 117.519 1.072 1.072 
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7.2.3 Hydrology of properties 
Once storms are defined, they are used to simulate flows from properties under different IC 
allowances. Then the SCS method for losses and unit hydrographs (SCS 1985) is used to 
estimate flows from each property. The flows are routed through the channel network, 
which has uniform base flows (see last column in Table 7-1). Routing flows were 
simulated using the Kinematic wave channel routing equation with HEC-HMS, assuming 
trapezoidal sectional shapes. Table 7-4 presents channel reaches and shapes used in the 
simulations. 
Posterior impacting flows were simulated from each property at injecting locations, 
which were also simulated into the nodal channel system, and at junctions. It was assumed 
that once flows arrived at the junctions (which can also be control points), the flows would 
be proportional to the injected flows. This would correspond to impacts at short distances 
such as in the L2. Thus, a set of discretised individual flows at different places in the 
network can be calculated by time and scenario, under different IC allowances from each 
participant. The channel network and the injection points from each participant are 
illustrated in Figure 7-1. 
 
Table 7-4 Channel reaches, cross-sections and properties. 
 
7.2.4 Hydraulic flows in the network 
Hydraulic simulations were carried out with HEC-RAS to evaluate flood areas, and to 
estimate flood components in the channel network under different flows resulting from the 
simulated storms. The injecting flows correspond to runoff flows, at each upper node, from 
each section (see injecting node from section A in Figure 7-1 ii). The water level at the L2 
catchment outlet was defined by the total channel flows, the outlet cross-section and a 
Channel reaches 
Length 
(m) 
Slope 
(m/m) 
Manning 
coefficient 
Sectional 
shape 
Base width 
(m) 
Side slope 
(xH:1V) 
Channel reach A-up 1,005 0.00024 0.02 Trapezoid 3 1 
Channel reach A-down 2,313 0.00024 0.03 Trapezoid 4 1 
Channel reach B-C 2,647 0.00024 0.03 Trapezoid 5 1 
Channel reach C-D 3,337 0.00024 0.03 Trapezoid 5 1 
Channel reach D-up 3,155 0.00024 0.02 Trapezoid 5 1 
Channel reach D-down 900 0.00024 0.02 Trapezoid 10 1 
Channel reach outlet 700 0.003 0.03 Trapezoid 10 1 
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friction factor of 0.01 (Manning’s n factor). Red dots represent cross-sections along each 
reach (Figure 7-1 ii). Each reach has at least 2 cross-sections. 
HEC-RAS simulates both super-critical and sub-critical flows for each cross-section. 
Given the condition in the L2 river, with sudden change in channel dimensions and slopes, 
all flows will be sub-critical in nature (see e.g., Haan et al. 1994; Mascarenhas et al. 2005; 
Birbil et al. 2009). With critical flows, similar flows may produce different depths and 
velocities, or different flows f1 and f2 produce similar depth h, and looping conditions can 
be observed in the rating curve (see Figure 7-2). However, this evaluation is considered 
difficult (Birbil et al. 2009). Sub-critical flows were used to estimate channel depth. The 
minimum flow that reached the first channel bank (levee) was used to determine channel 
capacity and also used to identify flows that resulted in particular flood levels. 
 
Figure 7-2 Rating curve (depth vs. flows). 
 
7.3 Initial flood condition 
7.3.1 Flows and flow capacities 
Channels are defined by their cross-sectional shape as shown in Figure 7-3. When the 
simulated flow levels exceed either the left or right bank, a flood condition occurs (Figure 
7-3 B). In the Figure 7-3 B, the bank station on the right is 1.11 m from the channel 
bottom, but given the non-uniform sectional shape, this point would be equivalent to a 1 m 
hydraulic depth, and flows above 4.2 m
3
/sec will generate flooding in the area. When one 
of the sides is exceeded, HEC-RAS keeps the flow balance, and thus assumes an artificial 
vertical boundary at the bank station (see Figure 7-3 B). 
Depth (m) 
h 
Exceeding flows (m
3
/sec) 
f1 f2 
Sub-critical 
Super-critical 
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Figure 7-3 Cross section of control point CP-A with two hydraulic depth levels from HEC-
RAS. Blue line in A, B and C represents hydraulic depths. 
 
The case study relates channel flows to flooding at surrounding and sectional places. A 
new channel depth was calculated using Manning’s equation and an extended floodplain 
cross-section as Figure 7-3 C was used to estimate the new flood depth at the cross-section. 
A similar approximation was illustrated in Chapter 2. 
Figure 7-1 illustrates five assumed flood areas, identified as CP-A, CP-AB, CP-ABC, 
CP-D and CP-ABCD. These control points are close to the junction areas. Although flows 
may exceed the banks of other points along channels, only points at these areas were 
studied. These points are assumed to be more likely selected by the SO for managing and 
monitoring floods. 
Table 7-5 presents the flows that reach the bank station before overtopping the control 
points. For instance, flooding becomes an issue at CP-A with minimum flows Mk of 4.2 
m
3
/sec. 
 
 
 
A B 
Hydraulic depth 
Left bank station 
Right bank station 
C 
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Table 7-5 Control points 
Control Points 
Maximum flow 
before overtopping 
bank, Mk (m
3
/sec) 
Maximum 
hydraulic 
depth (m) 
CP-A 4.2 1.03 
CP-AB 4.36 1.24 
CP-ABC  5.7 1.19 
CP-D 3.3 1.46 
CP-ABCD 8.1 1.25 
 
 
Figure 7-4 Initial (Ini) and desired (D) conditions of exceeding flows above banks at 
control points A and ABC under two scenarios (100 and 150 year) and storm distribution 
types I and III. 
 
Table 7-6 presents the initial flood distribution in terms of exceeding flows at control 
points. Figure 7-4 illustrates these flows at two control points and storm scenarios. For 
instance, according to the current IC allowances in the catchment, the initial exceeding 
flows reach peaks of 5.773 m
3
/sec at CP-A for 100 type I, with a flood duration of 34 hrs. 
The desired conditions would shift exceeding peaks from 5.773 to 5.499 m
3
/sec at CP-A. 
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Table 7-6 Initial (Ini) and desired (D) exceeding flows above capacity at control points and storm scenarios (scen) 
Scen 
(Ini) Exceeding peak flows (m
3
/sec) (Ini) Duration (hrs) (D) Exceeding peak flows (m
3
/sec) (D) Duration (hrs) 
CP-A CP-AB CP-ABC CP-D CP-
ABCD 
CP-A CP-AB CP-ABC CP-D CP-
ABCD 
CP-A CP-AB CP-ABC CP-D CP-
ABCD 
CP-A CP-AB CP-ABC CP-D CP-
ABCD 2-II 0.343 1.574 1.520 0.962 2.759 9 19 20 30 31 0.068 1.202 0.579 0.770 1.626 4 18 13 30 25 
10-II 1.932 3.958 4.597 2.336 6.881 20 27 35 43 45 1.623 3.434 2.982 2.168 4.986 20 27 27 50 46 
20-I 2.390 4.606 5.662 3.044 8.743 26 32 44 51 53 2.144 4.181 3.860 2.952 6.592 26 32 35 61 58 
20-II 2.898 5.433 6.541 3.184 9.470 24 30 42 50 51 2.576 4.822 4.505 3.068 7.114 24 30 34 60 56 
20-III 3.022 5.708 6.823 3.170 9.735 23 29 42 50 50 2.680 5.060 4.754 3.067 7.278 23 30 33 60 55 
30-I 2.924 5.408 6.756 3.548 10.248 27 34 47 55 57 2.675 4.942 4.721 3.501 7.838 27 34 41 66 63 
30-II 3.483 6.325 7.732 3.705 11.050 25 32 45 55 55 3.156 5.675 5.447 3.630 8.426 25 32 39 65 62 
30-III 3.619 6.632 8.046 3.688 11.344 25 31 44 55 55 3.268 5.938 5.717 3.627 8.605 24 31 38 65 61 
40-I 3.569 6.384 8.095 4.161 12.092 29 35 51 61 61 3.313 5.873 5.775 4.184 9.379 29 36 47 71 69 
40-II 4.185 7.409 9.190 4.340 12.982 28 33 49 60 60 3.852 6.702 6.591 4.326 10.032 28 35 47 71 67 
40-III 4.338 7.748 9.535 4.322 13.311 27 33 48 61 60 3.977 6.997 6.893 4.321 10.225 27 34 46 69 68 
50-I 4.012 7.058 9.032 4.588 13.364 30 37 53 64 65 3.753 6.515 6.505 4.659 10.442 30 37 53 75 73 
50-II 4.671 8.158 10.203 4.778 14.320 28 35 51 64 63 4.332 7.414 7.389 4.809 11.146 28 35 51 72 71 
50-III 4.832 8.518 10.566 4.760 14.668 28 34 50 64 63 4.467 7.730 7.712 4.806 11.345 28 34 50 69 71 
70-I 4.803 8.263 10.704 5.354 15.647 32 38 58 71 70 4.539 7.665 7.822 5.524 12.363 32 38 61 77 78 
70-II 5.531 9.487 12.011 5.570 16.718 31 36 55 70 68 5.185 8.681 8.812 5.690 13.142 31 36 58 73 76 
70-III 5.710 9.884 12.408 5.546 17.096 30 36 55 70 69 5.333 9.033 9.173 5.687 13.356 30 37 59 70 74 
80-I 5.140 8.778 11.417 5.684 16.631 33 38 59 74 72 4.874 8.158 8.389 5.898 13.186 33 40 63 77 80 
80-II 5.901 10.061 12.786 5.912 17.742 31 36 58 73 70 5.550 9.224 9.428 6.073 14.004 31 38 62 73 77 
80-III 6.083 10.472 13.202 5.884 18.143 30 36 57 71 71 5.700 9.588 9.804 6.068 14.222 31 37 61 70 74 
100-I 5.773 9.742 12.774 6.308 18.486 34 39 62 78 77 5.499 9.085 9.460 6.609 14.757 35 41 68 77 82 
100-II 6.590 11.129 14.248 6.552 19.681 32 37 61 75 75 6.232 10.243 10.588 6.798 15.627 33 39 66 74 78 
100-III 6.785 11.567 14.694 6.520 20.099 32 37 60 72 74 6.394 10.634 10.988 6.789 15.854 32 38 66 71 74 
125-I 6.466 10.810 14.268 6.996 20.528 36 41 65 79 81 6.186 10.097 10.641 7.403 16.479 35 41 72 78 82 
125-II 7.342 12.299 15.860 7.258 21.810 34 39 64 75 79 6.981 11.359 11.858 7.601 17.420 34 40 70 75 78 
125-III 7.550 12.774 16.335 7.223 22.264 33 39 64 72 76 7.150 11.779 12.285 7.594 17.650 33 40 70 71 75 
150-I 7.083 11.756 15.601 7.614 22.352 36 42 69 79 83 6.798 11.003 11.701 8.117 18.032 36 43 75 78 83 
150-II 8.011 13.341 17.295 7.890 23.715 35 40 68 75 79 7.642 12.355 13.000 8.327 19.020 34 40 73 75 78 
150-III 8.230 13.838 17.795 7.852 24.188 34 40 67 72 76 7.823 12.794 13.451 8.317 19.256 34 40 73 72 75 
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Figure 7-5 Stage-flood damage at control points with two flood damage function 
approximations: convexification, and linear and non-convex. CP-A, CP-AB, CP-ABC, CP-
D and CP_ABCD are control points 
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Flood duration would be changed from 34 to 35 hrs at CP-A for 100 type I storm 
respectively. The new desired conditions would reduce peaks and would lengthen flood 
conditions. 
7.3.2 Flood cost 
Peak flows cause flood damage at control points. The relationships between damage and 
flows are non-linear. Note that flood damage was estimated for hypothetical flood 
conditions, assuming exponential flood damage curves at each flood section and at each 
control point (see Appendix C for the approximation values). The market timeframe is a 
year, so the recourse flood cost accounts for the expected damage for the storm throughout 
the year. 
To use the flood damage cost function, the following two approaches are applied: i) 
piecewise linear convexified, and ii) linearised and non-convex. For the first approach, the 
functions are convexified as shown in Figure 7-5. The dashed blue lines correspond to 
convex approximations. For the second approach, the SOS2 method is applied to the flood 
damage cost function at each control point. The red points are estimated nodes for the 
linear and non-convex approximations as stated in Chapter 4. 
7.4 Outcomes for proposed market models 
The proposed market models assume competitive conditions associated with the modelling 
of 28 storm scenarios (Table 7-6). It is assumed that all participants comply with the 
outcomes from the market. The SO monitors flood places, channels and river sections in 
the catchment, which may occur particularly if a market was not established. 
Participants bid in 3 tranches (see Table 7-7), and the bid decisions are private. Bids 
correspond to the opportunity cost for changing IC allowances, which are related to the 
capped points in an extreme scenario (Det_MarketIC) and the opportunity cost of changing 
the flood distribution (Sto_MarketIC). The same bids are used in all cases. 
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Table 7-7 Participant bids for tranche 1, 2 and 3. 
Particip. Area (ha) CN 
Impervious 
area (%) 
Tranche 1 Tranche 2 Tranche 3 
ha $/ha ha $/ha ha $/ha 
A1 167.385 80 60 100 $2 50 $3 17.385 $5 
A2 167.385 80 60 100 $2 50 $3 17.385 $5 
A3 167.385 80 60 100 $2 50 $3 17.385 $5 
A4 167.385 74 60 100 $2 50 $3 17.385 $5 
A5 167.385 80 9 100 $10 50 $6 17.385 $3 
A6 167.385 80 9 100 $11 50 $6 17.385 $3 
B1 83.333 74 10.5 50 $2 20 $4 13.333 $6 
B2 83.333 80 10.5 50 $2 20 $4 13.333 $6 
B3 83.333 74 10.5 50 $2 20 $4 13.333 $6 
B4 83.333 70 10.5 50 $2 20 $4 13.333 $6 
B5 83.333 85 10.5 50 $10 20 $7 13.333 $3 
B6 83.333 85 10.5 50 $12 20 $7 13.333 $3 
C1 514.99 60 5 250 $11 200 $5 64.99 $2 
C2 514.99 60 9 250 $2 200 $5 64.99 $6 
C3 514.99 60 5 250 $11 200 $7 64.99 $2 
C4 514.99 60 5 250 $10 200 $7 64.99 $2 
C5 514.99 60 9 250 $1 200 $3 64.99 $5 
C6 514.99 50 9 250 $1 200 $3 64.99 $5 
D1 612.83 80 65 250 $7 200 $6 162.83 $2 
D2 612.83 53 5 250 $6 200 $4 162.83 $1 
D3 612.83 70 5 250 $8 200 $5 162.83 $1 
D4 612.83 53 5 250 $9 200 $5 162.83 $1 
D5 612.83 60 5 250 $7 200 $4 162.83 $2 
D6 612.83 60 65 250 $1 200 $3 162.83 $5 
 
7.4.1 Det_MarketIC 
The market formulation is cleared under an established storm scenario, similar to using 
credits for reducing peak flows in the USA relating to extreme storm events such as those 
that occur on a 1:50 or 1:100 year basis. This market model will account for a 100 ARI 
type I storm in 24 hours, which is chosen randomly. This storm design is normally used for 
designing policies (Doll et al. 1998). The storm corresponds to 122.5 mm depth based on 
HIRDS estimation. 
 The market will account for capped control points. Although capped points are 
established, floods may still occur in the area. The initial peak flows at control points based 
on the status quo of IC allowances (land uses) are 9.97, 14.10, 18.47, 9.61, and 26.57 
m
3
/sec, with respective flood durations of 34, 39, 62, 78, and 77 hrs at CP-A, CP-AB, CP-
ABC, CP-D, and CP-ABCD. The following three trading cases are analysed. 
Case 1: Initially, the catchment has peak flow conditions for a 100 year type I storm 
with control point caps, Lk, of 9.97, 14.10, 18.47, 9.61 and 26.57m
3
/sec for CP-A, CP-AB, 
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CP-ABC, CP-D and CP-ABCD respectively. That means the market is fully allocated and 
the capped control points reach the same level than the stage flows from the status quo of 
initial IC allowances. 
In this case, most participants trade and change IC allowances. Table 7-8 summarises 
the trade outcomes and final payments. For instance, participants A1, B4 and C5 sell 100, 
15.7 and 14.26 ha to reduce IC allowances, and they receive $200, $31.54 and $14.26 
respectively. Participant D3 buys 450 ha to increase IC allowance to CN 70 and pays 
$2,169.46. The SO receives a net $655.71 due to shifted peak flow times, and so the SO 
sells flows from these new peak times. At CP-A and CP-AB, the capacities are binding at 
time 27 from 26, at CP-ABC at time 31 from 30, at CP-D at time 47 from 43. At ABCD, 
flows are not binding. The clearing prices at CP-A, CP-AB, CP-ABC, and CP-D are 
$720.35, $521.40, $533.12, and $4,300.50/m
3
/sec respectively. 
Case 2: the market is capped at channel capacities, Mk, in an attempt to prevent 
flooding from any extreme storm. Channel capacities at control points CP-A,  CP-AB, CP-
ABC, CP-D, and CP-ABCD are 4.2,  4.36, 5.7,  3.3, and 8.1 m
3
/sec respectively. That 
means, stage flows at control points should be reduced via imperviousness by 5.77, 9.74, 
12.77, 6.31, and 18.47 m
3
/sec at CP-A,  CP-AB, CP-ABC, CP-D, and CP-ABCD 
respectively. This situation, the solution with Det_MarketIC is not feasible. Even though 
most participants would reduce IC allowances, and the SO would try to reduce flows to 
reach channel capacity, flooding would still occur in the catchment. Thus, if the SO tries to 
manage the flooding and to hedge against a range of storms via over-constraining the 
market, the solution may be not feasible. A strategy is required to hedge against a range of 
storms such as investment in levees or banks. Even with scaling initial IC allowances, the 
solution may not be feasible. 
Case 3: the market is capped for the exceeding peak flows, Lk, at CP-A 5.2, CP-AB 9.1, 
CP-ABC 11.5, CP-D 5.5 and CP-ABCD 17 m
3
/sec for a 100 year type I storm. That 
means, the stage flow should be reduced by 0.87 m
3
/sec at CP-A, 0.6 m
3
/sec at CP-AB, 
1.27 m
3
/sec at CP-ABC, 0.81 m
3
/sec at CP-D, and 1.57 m
3
/sec at CP-ABCD. 
In this case, the solution is feasible. The SO desires to reduce flood levels at control 
points. Most reducing IC bids are accepted. The SO will pay a net $18,882.80. This could 
be expensive (maybe far over the SO’s budget). Participants A1 and C5 reduce total 
allowances, selling 150 and 250 ha and receive approximately $600 and $319 respectively. 
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Participants B4 and D3 do not change IC allowances (see Table 7-8), but they were trading 
in case 1. Other participants such as C4 and C6 trade similar IC allowances in similar 
terms (buying 514 and selling 250 ha respectively). Compared to case 1, C4 pays an extra 
$25, and C6 receives an extra $86. The clearing prices at CP-A, CP-AB, CP-ABC, and CP-
D are $4,938.70, $0, $647.79, and $20,564.80/m
3
/sec respectively, much higher than in 
case 1. CP-AB and CP_ABCD were unbounded in this case. 
 
Table 7-8 Trading result from application of Det_MarketIC for trading cases 1 and 3 
Particip. 
Trading case 1 Trading case 3 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold 
(ha) 
Paid 
($) 
Received 
($) 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold 
(ha) 
Paid 
($) 
Received 
($) 
A1 0 100 $0 $200.00 0 150 $0 $600.21 
A2 0 25.034 $0 $50.07 0 150 $0 $600.21 
A3 0 100 $0 $200.00 0 150 $0 $600.21 
A4 0 150 $0 $545.66 0 167.385 $0 $1,633.67 
A5 150 0 $544.81 $0 0 0 $0 $0 
A6 150 0 $544.81 $0 18.552 0 $204.07 $0 
B1 0 0 $0 $0 0 0 $0 $0 
B2 0 0 $0 $0 0 0 $0 $0 
B3 0 0 $0 $0 0 0 $0 $0 
B4 0 15.774 $0 $31.55 0 0 $0 $0 
B5 83.333 0 $37.72 $0 83.333 0 $1.94 $0 
B6 83.333 0 $37.72 $0 83.333 0 $1.94 $0 
C1 514.99 0 $75.17 $0 514.99 0 $100.41 $0 
C2 0 0 $0 $0 0 99.431 $0 $198.86 
C3 514.99 0 $75.17 $0 514.99 0 $100.41 $0 
C4 514.99 0 $75.17 $0 514.99 0 $100.41 $0 
C5 0 14.266 $0 $14.27 0 250 $0 $319.81 
C6 0 250 $0 $299.69 0 250 $0 $385.53 
D1 612.83 0 $193.52 $0 450 0 $1,177.87 $0 
D2 450 0 $454.73 $0 250 0 $1,182.88 $0 
D3 450 0 $2,169.46 $0 0 0 $0 $0 
D4 450 0 $492.63 $0 432.697 0 $2,163.48 $0 
D5 529.498 0 $1059.00 $0 0 0 $0 $0 
D6 0 612.83 $0 $3,762.95 0 612.83 $0 $19,577.70 
Total 4,503.96 1,267.90 $5,760.91 $5,105.19 2,862.89 1,829.65 $5,036.41 $23,919.20 
 
The three cases illustrate market effects when the SO uses different caps for the catchment. 
These caps affect prices, allocations, the final IC allowances in the catchment, and the SO 
faces different revenue conditions. 
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7.4.2 Sto_MarketIC 
This section illustrates the Sto_MarketIC formulation. Twenty nine storm scenarios are 
defined using HIRDS, which uses a generalised extreme value distribution, to estimate 
rainfall frequency and rainfall depth. In case 4, the SO considers only the maximum stage-
flood. Two types of functions are used for modelling this peak damage function: 
convexified flood damage cost (approximation type A) and a linearised non-convex 
damage function (approximation type B). Secondly, the SO extends the penalties due to the 
hastened peak flood time (factor i), and flood duration (factor ii). Case 5 uses flood 
damage approximations type A (x.A) and B (x.B) with flood constraints and thresholds 
type I (see section 5.2.2.1 Chapter 5). Case 6 uses flood damage approximations type A 
(x.A) and B (x.B) with flood constraints and thresholds type II (see section 5.2.2.2 Chapter 
5). Finally, in case 7, the SO is concerned only for hastening peak time of flooding, and 
uses flood damage approximation type B to analyse prices and allocations. 
7.4.2.1 Sto_MarketIC for maximum stage-flood cost 
Case 4: This case penalises only the maximum stage-flood, which is assumed to be the 
main flood component. The initial estimated expected damage in the catchment 
corresponds to $10,839.20 and $18,711.80 for trading cases 4.A and 4.B respectively. 
After clearing the market, the final expected damages are $9,284.41 and $15,471.20 for 
trading cases 4.A and 4.B respectively. The catchment is now hedged against a wider range 
of storms and consequently the expected damage is reduced in both cases by $1,554.79 and 
$3,240.60. However, the total net payment from the SO is only $1,425 and $2,933 in 
trading cases 4.A and 4.B respectively. The SO is a net payer, and due to linearisation 
effects, the SO is paying less than the real estimated damage with an extra rent effect for 
linearisation. Probably a more accurate approximation would be necessary. 
Participants A1, B4 and C5 increase IC allowances with both types of flood damage 
approximations. However, they receive different payments (see Table 7-9). For instance, 
participant D3 increases IC allowances in 250 ha with both damage type approximations, 
but final payments vary by $124.20. 
 In cases 4.A and 4.B, the flood distribution was shifted and reduced, and the system 
cost was between $1,425 and $2,933 respectively, compared to $18,882.80 for 
Det_MarketIC. With Det_MarketIC, the flood damage is not clear, nor internalised by 
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participants. If the equivalent final exceeding flows are used from the Sto_MarketIC 
outcomes in the “100 ARI type I storm” scenario, to cap the control points in the 
Det_MarketIC, and bid participant’s preferences are kept, the system cost is $1,688.70. 
However, the Det_MarketIC final allocation is different from cases 4.A and 5.B (as will be 
seen in the next section). (For further details regarding possible differences in the solution 
between a deterministic and stochastic formulation, see Birge and Louveaux (1997), and 
Kall and Wallace (1994)). On the other hand, if participants reduce bid/offer prices by 
90%, similar allocations could be reached with Det_MarketIC, but the system cost would 
be only $168.87. Therefore, participants may not fully internalise flood damage in the 
Det_MarketIC if prices are set too low. This point was discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
Table 7-9 Trading results from the application of Sto_MarketIC1 for trading case 4 
Particip. 
Trading case 4.A (convexified) Trading case 4.B (non-convex) 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold 
(ha) 
Paid 
($) 
Received 
($) 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold 
(ha) 
Paid 
($) 
Received 
($) 
A1 0 114.51 $0 $343.53 0 150 $0 $599.60 
A2 0 150 $0 $450.00 0 150 $0 $599.60 
A3 0 100 $0 $300.00 0 150 $0 $599.60 
A4 0 150 $0 $709.08 0 167.385 $0 $1,106.18 
A5 150 0 $652.54 $0 100 0 $600.00 $0 
A6 150 0 $652.54 $0 120.377 0 $722.26 $0 
B1 0 0 $0 $0 0 0 $0 $0 
B2 0 0 $0 $0 0 0 $0 $0 
B3 0 0 $0 $0 0 0 $0 $0 
B4 0 50 $0 $161.73 0 50 $0 $198.55 
B5 83.333 0 $61.98 $0 83.333 0 $78.85 $0 
B6 83.333 0 $61.98 $0 83.333 0 $78.85 $0 
C1 514.99 0 $80.52 $0 514.99 0 $121.29 $0 
C2 0 250 $0 $542.79 0 250 $0 $817.44 
C3 514.99 0 $80.52 $0 514.99 0 $121.29 $0 
C4 514.99 0 $80.52 $0 514.99 0 $121.29 $0 
C5 0 250 $0 $326.17 0 250 $0 $493.20 
C6 0 250 $0 $383.78 0 250 $0 $580.57 
D1 612.83 0 $145.69 $0 612.83 0 $263.75 $0 
D2 612.83 0 $26.65 $0 612.83 0 $49.97 $0 
D3 612.83 0 $134.70 $0 612.83 0 $258.91 $0 
D4 612.83 0 $23.17 $0 612.83 0 $42.71 $0 
D5 612.83 0 $41.87 $0 612.83 0 $77.55 $0 
D6 0 250 $0 $251.38 0 250 $0 $474.78 
Total 5,075.79 1,564.51 $2,046.68 $3,472.46 4,996.16 1,667.39 $2,540.72 $5,473.52 
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7.4.2.2 Sto_MarketIC with additional flood components 
In these next cases, the SO desires to manage inundation timing and duration length. Here 
the SO will use the constraints thresholds proposed in Chapter 5 in two model 
formulations. Both formulations include the maximum stage-flood cost from previous 
Sto_MarketIC1. Firstly, the models will account for changes in flows with flood constraint 
type I and for any flow above a threshold with flood constraint type II. Secondly, the 
model will account for having only a rapid inundation (factor i) in both formulations. The 
implication for these market models will be shown in the next analyses. 
Case 5: The first Sto_MarketIC2 model with flood constraint type I will account for the 
changes in exceeding flows across time, which in this case, are calculated in terms of the 
changes of total flows at the control points when flooding starts. Thus, the Sto_MarketIC2 
clearing model penalises any increment in changing flows above 0.2 m
3
/sec between times 
15 and 30 (to hasten stage-flood time), and it penalises for any changes in flows below 0.2 
m
3
/sec between times 35 and 50 for lengthening flooding duration. A similar market 
clearing formulation was used to penalise rapid inundation. 
Case 6: The second Sto_MarketIC2 model formulation, with flood constraints and 
thresholds type II, will account for any exceeding flows above a threshold of 0.2 m
3
/sec, 
before time 25, and any exceeding flows above 0.2 m
3
/sec, after time 40 at control points 
and storms. The type II costs the exceeding flows in those times. Thus, any participant who 
increases flows above these thresholds will face the cost for hastening inundation or 
lengthening duration. Finally, the same model penalises for hastening peak time of flood, 
in only the first 25 times. 
The two model formulations (constraints and thresholds type I and II) penalise 
$450/m
3
/sec, for any flow above the thresholds at the first times (hastening the peak time 
of flooding) and $5/m
3
/sec at later times (lengthening inundation). The SO can shorten or 
lengthen the flood cost period to penalise for flood damage. Initial damage in the area 
varies from the previous illustration; the initial total expected damages for Sto_MarketIC2 
in trading case 5.A and 5.B are $15,342.30 and $23,214.90, and in trading case 6.A and 
6.B are $18,855.60 and $26,728.20 respectively. Table 7-10 shows the initial expected 
damage separated in each flood component using constraint type II and approximation B. 
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 Table 7-11 and Table 7-12 show outcomes with the additional constraints and 
thresholds, factors i and ii, and approximation type A for cases 5.A and 6.A, and 
approximation type B for cases 5.B and 6.B. 
 
Table 7-10 Initial expected flood damage estimates based on flood constraints and 
thresholds type II and approximation B in case 6 
 Depth 
($) 
Factor i 
($) 
Factor ii 
($) 
Total Expected 
($) 
CP-A $2,520.17 $1,029.55 $7.12 $3,556.84 
CP-AB $4,150.40 $2,830.21 $21.86 $7,002.48 
CP-ABC $5,130.81 $1,893.84 $107.80 $7,132.44 
CP-ABCD $5,713.80 $1,586.79 $352.50 $7,653.09 
CP-D $1,196.61 $26.47 $160.28 $1,383.35 
Total Catchment $18,711.79 $7,366.86 $649.56 $26,728.2 
 
 
Table 7-11 Trading results from the application of Sto_MarketIC2 for trading case 5 
Particip. 
Trading case 5.A (convexified) Trading case 5.B (non-convex) 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold 
(ha) 
Paid 
($) 
Received 
($) 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold 
(ha) 
Paid 
($) 
Received 
($) 
A1 0 150 $0 $559.71 0 150 $0 $732.99 
A2 0 150 $0 $559.71 0 150 $0 $732.99 
A3 0 150 $0 $559.71 0 150 $0 $732.99 
A4 0 167.385 $0 $979.12 0 167.385 $0 $1,321.79 
A5 150 0 $785.83 $0 100 0 $702.10 $0 
A6 150 0 $785.83 $0 100 0 $702.10 $0 
B1 0 50 $0 $104.01 0 50 $0 $129.21 
B2 0 0 $0 $0 0 0 $0 $0 
B3 0 0 $0 $0 0 0 $0 $0 
B4 0 70 $0 $286.82 0 70 $0 $356.10 
B5 83.333 0 $83.52 $0 83.333 0 $110.54 $0 
B6 83.333 0 $83.52 $0 83.333 0 $110.54 $0 
C1 514.99 0 $99.21 $0 514.99 0 $140.20 $0 
C2 0 250 $0 $694.87 0 250 $0 $971.91 
C3 514.99 0 $99.21 $0 514.99 0 $140.20 $0 
C4 514.99 0 $99.21 $0 514.99 0 $140.20 $0 
C5 0 250 $0 $414.29 0 250 $0 $582.81 
C6 0 250 $0 $486.67 0 250 $0 $684.94 
D1 612.83 0 $218.82 $0 612.83 0 $337.09 $0 
D2 612.83 0 $32.25 $0 612.83 0 $54.93 $0 
D3 612.83 0 $164.90 $0 612.83 0 $285.39 $0 
D4 612.83 0 $28.19 $0 612.83 0 $47.19 $0 
D5 612.83 0 $50.57 $0 612.83 0 $85.13 $0 
D6 0 250 $0 $344.59 0 250 $0 $565.21 
Total 5,075.79 1,737.39 $2,536.06 $4,994.50 4,975.79 1,737.39 $2,860.61 $6,815.94 
 
  
 
220 
After clearing the market most participants have IC allowances similar to the outcomes 
from Sto_MarketIC1 with case 4. Nevertheless, the final payments change, because flows 
violate thresholds for factors i and ii, and clearing prices account for these violations. With 
trading case 4.B, final prices for A1, B4 and C5 with Sto_MarketIC1 are $3.99/ha, 
$3.97/ha and $1.97/ha. For trading case 5.B (for both flooding components i and ii), 
participants A1, B4, and C5 change IC in 150, 70 and 250 ha, and receive $4.89/ha, 
$5.09/ha and $2.33/ha. For trading case 6.B, they change IC in 167.39, 83.33 and 250 ha, 
and receive $7.16/ha, $7.11/ha and $2.47/ha. The greater prices correspond to hastening 
inundations and shortening durations. The last effect will be analysed next when only a 
flood cost for rapid inundation is considered. In trading case 4.B, with Sto_MarkeIC1, 
participant D3 paid only $0.42/ha, while in trading case 5.B and 6.B, participant D3 
increases allowances and pays $0.46/ha and $0.57/ha respectively. This rise in price is due 
to the flood components for rapid inundations and lengthening durations at CP-ABCD. 
  
Table 7-12 Trading results from the application of Sto_MarketIC2 for trading case 6 
Particip. 
Trading case 6.A (convexified) Trading case 6.B (non-convex) 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold 
(ha) 
Paid 
($) 
Received 
($) 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold 
(ha) 
Paid 
($) 
Received 
($) 
A1 0 167.385 $0 $1,075.00 0 167.385 $0 $1,199.12 
A2 0 167.385 $0 $1,075.00 0 167.385 $0 $1,199.12 
A3 0 167.385 $0 $1,075.00 0 167.385 $0 $1,199.12 
A4 0 167.385 $0 $1,240.80 0 167.385 $0 $1,490.66 
A5 140.702 0 $844.21 $0 100 0 $734.17 $0 
A6 100 0 $600.00 $0 100 0 $734.17 $0 
B1 0 50 $0 $165.19 0 50 $0 $191.29 
B2 0 0 $0 $0 0 50 $0 $104.60 
B3 0 0 $0 40 0 0 $0 $0 
B4 0 83.333 $0 $507.68 0 83.333 $0 $592.56 
B5 70 0 $310.75 $0 70 0 $331.94 $0 
B6 70 0 $310.75 $0 70 0 $331.94 $0 
C1 514.99 0 $123.23 $0 514.99 0 $161.22 $0 
C2 0 250 $0 $752.30 0 250 $0 $1,018.75 
C3 514.99 0 $123.23 $0 514.99 0 $161.22 $0 
C4 514.99 0 $123.23 $0 514.99 0 $161.22 $0 
C5 0 250 $0 $455.91 0 250 $0 $616.90 
C6 0 250 $0 $543.37 0 250 $0 $732.47 
D1 612.83 0 $222.95 $0 612.83 0 $342.88 $0 
D2 612.83 0 $39.86 $0 612.83 0 $62.65 $0 
D3 612.83 0 $227.78 $0 612.83 0 $348.79 $0 
D4 612.83 0 $41.12 $0 612.83 0 460.20 $0 
D5 612.83 0 $77.79 $0 612.83 0 $112.53 $0 
D6 0 250 $0 $361.97 0 250 $0 $584.50 
Total 4,989.82 1,802.87 $3,050.90 $2,661.23 4,949.12 1,852.87 $ 572.73 $8,935.09 
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The SO is a net payer in cases 5 and 6, resulting in flood distributions being shifted and the 
expected flood damage being reduced in both cases. The final exposure depends on the 
flood cost type and constraints, bids from participants, and the flood damage 
approximation used in the clearing formulation. The final expected damage under 
Sto_MarketIC2, with cases 5.A and 5.B, are $12,553.80 and $18,785.20, and for cases 6.A 
and 6.B are $13,668.80 and $19,998.90 respectively. 
 Table 7-13 shows the final expected flood damage components after clearing the 
market under case 6-B. The expected flood damage is shifted and reduced in the 
catchment; however, the expected flood damage at control points varies, and hence the 
expected damage for each flood component. For instance, the expected flood damage at 
CP-A and CP-AB are reduced for depth and factor i, and increases for factor ii. Thus 
lengthened flood duration would be present at these control points. Figure 7-6 shows the 
hydrograph curve at CP-AB, which illustrates the reducing effect in peak flow (depth), the 
delayed peak flood time, and the increment in flood duration. 
 
Table 7-13 Final expected flood damage components for case 6-B 
 Depth 
($) 
Factor i 
($) 
Factor ii 
($) 
Total Expected 
($) 
CP-A $1,679.90 $437.56 $10.61 $2,128.07 
CP-AB $3,215.28 $1,684.13 $27.69 $4,927.10 
CP-ABC $3,671.79 $1,147.40 $97.29 $4,916.48 
CP-ABCD $5,074.76 $1,043.16 $374.09 $6,492.00 
CP-D $1,297.79 $34.73 $202.69 $1,535.20 
Total Catchment $14,939.52 $4,346.98 $712.37 $19,998.85 
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Figure 7-6 Initial and final exceeding flows above banks at control point AB under 
scenario 100 year and storm distribution types II. 
 
Case 7: the SO is concerned only about rapid inundation, so the market formulation 
includes the first flood cost factor i. The market formulation accounts for both proposed 
constraints and threshold types I and II using linearised and non-convex flood damage cost 
function. To analyse the flood cost effect on prices the Sto_MarketIC2 with constraints and 
thresholds type II and approximation to the flood damage function type B are used. Table 
7-14 shows the initial expected flood damage at control points according to the flood 
components. The initial expected flood damage is $26,078,64 at the catchment, 
decomposed by $18,711.79 for depth and $7,366.86 for hastening peak flood. 
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Table 7-14 Initial expected flood damage components with constraints and thresholds type 
II, Case 7 
 Depth ($) Factor i ($) Factor ii 
($) 
Total Expected 
($) 
CP-A $2,520.17 $1,029.55 $0 $3,549.72 
CP-AB $4,150.40 $2,830.21 $0 $6,980.62 
CP-ABC $5,130.81 $1,893.84 $0 $7,024.64 
CP-ABCD $5,713.80 $1,586.79 $0 $7,300.59 
CP-D $1,196.61 $26.47 $0 $1,223.07 
Total Catchment $18,711.79 $7,366.86 $  0.00 $26,078.64 
 
Table 7-15 summarises the trading outcomes. After clearing the market, participants A1, 
B4 and C5 receive $1,211.57 ($7.24/ha), $593.73 ($7.13/ha) and $587.56 ($2.35/ha) for 
reducing allowances on their properties. Final prices are higher than previous cases 5.B 
and 6.B (see Table 7-11 and Table 7-12) because in this case prices consider only the 
reducing effect of stage-flood and for hastening inundation. Previously, those final 
allowances also accounted for lengthening duration which penalised the final prices. 
Participant D3 increases IC allowances on 612.83 ha, paying $285.19 ($0.46/ha) due to 
increased peak flows and hastening inundation across scenarios. In this case, lengthening 
duration does not increase the cost to the system because it is not penalised. The SO is a 
net payer with $5,457,36. Table 7-16 shows the final expected flood damage, according to 
the flood component components using constraint and thresholds type II. 
 Imperviousness levels in the catchment are reduced after trading, and they could be 
seen as changes in the hydrographs curves at each control point, which reflect changes in 
the expected flood damage and flood damage components. Thus, comparing Table 7-14 
and Table 7-16, the expected flood damage (depth and hastening peak flood) is reduced at 
CP-A, CP-AB, CP-ABC and CP-ABCD, and so the hydrographs curves. Only at CP-D, the 
imperviousness levels increase and the expected flood damage rises by $1,089.55. 
 In summary, the trading cases produced different imperviousness levels and 
hydrograph curves, when flood components are included or the control point is capped 
(case 3) in the market formulations. Figure 7-7 illustrates the initial and final hydrograph 
curves above channel capacity from cases 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 at control point CP-ABC in 
storm scenario of 100 year. The greatest reduction in peak flow at CP-ABC is reached in 
case 3, but the flooding problem starts earlier (4 hours) and duration is lengthened 
comparing to the initial condition. In case 4, the peak flow is reduced, flooding starts one 
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hour later, and duration is lengthened, compared to the initial hydrograph curve. Similarly, 
in case 5, 6 and 7, the peak flow is reduced, but the peak time is delayed and the duration is 
lengthened comparing with case 4. However, the final allocations and prices change in 
cases 5, 6 and 7. 
 
Table 7-15 Trading result from the application of Sto_MarketIC2 for trading case 7 
Particip. 
Thresholds type I (non-convex) Thresholds type II (non-convex) 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold 
(ha) 
Paid 
($) 
Received 
($) 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold 
(ha) 
Paid 
($) 
Received 
($) 
A1 0 150 $0 $735.37 0 167.385 $0 $1,211.57 
A2 0 150 $0 $735.37 0 167.385 $0 $1,211.57 
A3 0 150 $0 $735.37 0 167.385 $0 $1,211.57 
A4 0 167.385 $0 $1,325.21 0 167.385 $0 $1,500.79 
A5 100 0 $703.34 $0 100 0 $734.03 $0 
A6 100 0 $703.34 $0 100 0 $734.03 $0 
B1 0 50 $0 $129.51 0 50 $0 $191.81 
B2 0 0 $0 $0 0 50 $0 $105.09 
B3 0 0 $0 $0 0 0 $0 $0 
B4 0 70 $0 $356.89 0 83.333 $0 $593.73 
B5 83.333 0 $110.97 $0 70 0 $334.04 $0 
B6 83.333 0 $110.97 $0 70 0 $334.04 $0 
C1 514.99 0 $139.93 $0 514.99 0 $144.37 $0 
C2 0 250 $0 $971.50 0 250 $0 $979.72 
C3 514.99 0 $139.93 $0 514.99 0 $144.37 $0 
C4 514.99 0 $139.93 $0 514.99 0 $144.37 $0 
C5 0 250 $0 $582.32 0 250 $0 $587.56 
C6 0 250 $0 $684.27 0 250 $0 $691.56 
D1 612.83 0 $338.47 $0 612.83 0 $343.67 $0 
D2 612.83 0 $54.80 $0 612.83 0 $55.41 $0 
D3 612.83 0 $284.33 $0 612.83 0 $285.19 $0 
D4 612.83 0 $47.05 $0 612.83 0 $47.56 $0 
D5 612.83 0 $84.83 $0 612.83 0 $86.44 $0 
D6 0 250 $0 $565.85 0 250 $0 $559.88 
Total 4,975.79 1,737.39 $2,857.89 $6,821.66 4,949.12 1,852.87 $3,387.52 $8,844.85 
 
Table 7-16 Final expected flood damage components with constraints and thresholds type 
II, Case 7 
 Depth ($) Factor i ($) Factor ii ($) Total Expected ($) 
CP-A $1,679.90 $437.56 $0 $2,117.46 
CP-AB $3,215.28 $1,684.13 $0 $4,899.41 
CP-ABC $3,671.79 $1,147.40 $0 $4,819.19 
CP-ABCD $5,074.76 $1,043.16 $0 $6,117.92 
CP-D $1,297.79 $34.73 $0 $1,332.52 
Total Catchment $14,939.52 $4,346.98 $0 $19,286.5 
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Participants located upstream face higher prices than those located downstream in case 7, 
because of the reducing effect in duration at CP-ABCD is not accounted. Participants 
located at CP-D and CP-ABCD notice the reduction in their settlements due to the 
lengthening duration component is not included in the market formulation. A further 
discussion about expected flood damage and revenue from the SO is presented in Section 
7.4.4. 
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Figure 7-7 Summary of initial and final hydrographs curves for cases 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 at 
control point CP-ABC with storm scenario 100 year and storm distribution type II. 
 
7.4.3 Sto_MarketIC_Risk 
Previous models considered risk neutral conditions for the SO. However, the SO could be 
concerned about the portfolio of IC allowances when there is a risk for a disaster if an 
extreme event affects the catchment. As stated in Chapter 6, the SO could hedge against 
changes in losses above this risk positions, via a coherent down-side risk measure such as 
CVaR. 
A key function of the SO is to include risk positions against extreme losses under an 
=0.95 (for the 5% extreme storm distribution), and so avoid expected losses above a 
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particular loss position at each control point and at the catchment level. This position may 
over-constrain the market if this is below the current limit, as discussed in Chapter 6. The 
SO can be a net payer for reducing expected flood damage and for reaching the desired 
system risk position. These cases are illustrated next with the different models and flood 
costs. The illustrations assume that the SO uses the same CVaR values to limit risk; thus, 
the idea is to state and discuss the effect of price and allocation with the CVaR positions. 
The SO may account for different flood components and options to estimate damage. 
The SO establishes different CVaR values according to the preferred flood component 
components and risk positions. 
The SO desires to reach CVaR=0.95 values at CP-A, CP-AB, CP-ABC, CP-D, and CP-
ABCD of $90,000, $167,000, $137,000, $70,000 and $160,000 respectively, and 
CVaR=0.95 $860,000 is the desired level within the catchment. These losses are assumed to 
correspond to the risk as desired by the community. 
Let us analyse a situation where only the maximum stage-flood accounts for damage, 
and secondly, a situation where the SO also includes the factors for hastening peak time 
(factor i) and lengthening duration (factor ii). Similar CVaR damage positions will be 
considered at each control point for the different model formulations to emphasise the 
effects on prices and allowances. To illustrate and analyse these effects, the 
Sto_MarketIC_Risk with thresholds type II and non-convex depth damage components 
(approximation type B) are used. 
Case 8: The SO considers only peak flow damage in the market formulation. Currently, 
equivalent CVaR=0.95 values with all flood components are greater than the SO desires. 
The CVaR constraints are not binding, so outcomes from participants are similar to those 
presented in Table 7-9. For example, participant A1 reduces allowances on 150 ha and 
receives $599.60, and D3 increases allowances on 612.83 ha and pays $258.90. However, 
the final prices and allocations change with hastening peak time of flooding and 
lengthening flood costs as will be shown in case 9. 
Case 9: The SO considers additional flood components i and ii with constraints and 
flood thresholds type II and approximation type B. Table 7-18 summarises the final 
payments and allocations from participants. Participants A1, B4 and C5 reduce allowances 
by 167.39, 83.33 and 450 ha, and receive $1,831.17 ($10.94/ha), $881.77 ($10.58/ha), and 
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$1,355.81 ($3.01/ha) respectively. In comparison to previous illustrations with similar 
flood components and flood damage approximations, (see trading case 6.B in Table 7-12), 
participants receive higher prices for the risk-reducing effects at control points. For 
example, participant B4 is granted a higher price compared to the incremental proportion 
observed in Sto_MarketIC2 with flood components (see Table 7-12). Participant D3 
increases allowances to crop by 612.83 ha and pays $414.27 ($0.67/ha). The SO is a net 
payer with $10,451.4, which is greater than previous net payments ($4,986.16) due to the 
desired risk positions being lower than the previous equivalent CVaR values at control 
points and at the catchment level. In the short term this could be expensive for the SO. 
However, in the long term, the SO is expected to be neutral, a net receiver, and the 
catchment remains safe from a range of storms and extreme damage. 
Table 7-17 presents the final expected flood damage for each flood component. In 
comparison to previous trading conditions (see expected flood damage in Table 7-13), the 
expected flood damage is reduced in most components. For example, at CP-AB the 
previous final expected flood damage for depth was $3,215.28, while in case 9 was 
$3,084.88. 
 
Table 7-17 Final expected flood damage components case 9 
 Depth 
($) 
Factor i 
($) 
Factor ii 
($) 
Total Expected 
($) 
CP-A $1,621.39 $406.95 $10.54 $2,038.87 
CP-AB $3,084.88 $1528.03 $27.86 $4,640.77 
CP-ABC $2,975.32 $949.68 $73.08 $3,998.07 
CP-ABCD $4,453.85 $887.64 $329.49 $5,670.98 
CP-D $1,297.79 $34.73 $202.67 $1,535.20 
Total Catchment $13,433.23 $3807.03 $643.64 $17,883.89 
 
Case 10: The SO considers flood cost for flood depth and for having rapid inundations 
(factor i) with constraints and thresholds type II and approximate type B. Table 7-18 
summarises the final payments and allocations. Participant A1 and B4 increase allowances 
on their entire properties, but participant C5 increases allowances of only 250 ha. The three 
participants receive $1,786.87 (10.67/ha), $908.43 ($10.91/ha) and $742.37 ($2.97/ha) 
respectively. Again, participant B4 is granted proportionally a lower payment, but 
participant A1 faces a higher price due to delaying stage-flood across control points. 
Participant D3 raises allowances for their property (612.83 ha) and pays $277.50 
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($0.45/ha), which is less than in case 9, because their lengthening duration effects are not 
as important at control point CP-ABCD, and also lower than in case 7 ($285.19). Cases 7 
and 10 differ because the final flood distribution for participant D3 is lower in case 10 than 
in case 7, and because the risk positions are loose at CP-D, CP-ABCD and at the catchment 
level. Thus, participant D3 is facing the new reduced flood distribution; their price 
represents the marginal flood contribution to the new flood conditions. Finally, the SO is a 
net payer with $9,529.10, and proportionally pays less than in case 9. 
 
Table 7-18 Trading outcomes from Sto_MarketIC_Risk with constraints and thresholds 
type II 
Parti
cip. 
Trading case 9 (non-convex) Trading case 10 (non-convex) 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area sold 
(ha) 
Paid ($) 
Received 
($) 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold (ha) 
Paid ($) 
Received 
($) 
A1 0 167.385 $0 $1,831.17 0 167.385 $0 $1,786.87 
A2 0 167.385 $0 $1,831.17 0 167.385 $0 $1,786.87 
A3 0 167.385 $0 $1,831.17 0 167.385 $0 $1,786.87 
A4 0 167.385 $0 $2,070.58 0 167.385 $0 $2,014.99 
A5 45.144 0 $451.44 $0 100 0 $956.31 $0 
A6 100 0 $1,000.00 $0 100 0 $956.31 $0 
B1 0 70 $0 $406.01 0 73.5326 $0 $441.20 
B2 0 50 $0 $168.07 0 50 $0 $178.60 
B3 0 0 $0 $0 0 0 $0 $0 
B4 0 83.333 $0 $881.77 0 83.333 $0 $908.43 
B5 50 0 $395.73 $0 50 0 $427.21 $0 
B6 50 0 $395.73 $0 50 0 $427.21 $0 
C1 514.99 0 $209.48 $0 514.99 0 $185.05 $0 
C2 0 355.776 $0 $1,778.88 0 376.33 $0 $1,881.65 
C3 514.99 0 $209.48 $0 514.99 0 $185.05 $0 
C4 514.99 0 $209.48 $0 514.99 0 $185.05 $0 
C5 0 450 $0 $1,355.81 0 250 $0 $742.37 
C6 0 450 $0 $1,621.88 0 450 $0 $1,573.26 
D1 612.83 0 $427.07 $0 612.83 0 $335.86 $0 
D2 612.83 0 $74.15 $0 612.83 0 $53.71 $0 
D3 612.83 0 $414.27 $0 612.83 0 $277.50 $0 
D4 612.83 0 $76.65 $0 612.83 0 $46.09 $0 
D5 612.83 0 $143.10 $0 612.83 0 $83.75 $0 
D6 0 250 $0 $681.38 0 250 $0 $547.10 
Total 4,854.26 2,378.65 $4,015.58 $14,466.89 4,909.12 2,202.74 $  0.00 $13,658.21 
 
For the same maximum depth factor, the final expected damage in case 10 is $13,995.82, 
being $1,702.42 higher than the damage of $12,293.40 in case 9. The result reflects the 
higher level of imperviousness of the catchment in case 10. Compared to case 7, the 
expected damage was $19,286.50, whereas in case 10 was $17,982.11. Furthermore for 
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case 7 the damage associated with flood depth was anticipated to be $14,939.52 compared 
to $13,995.82 for case 10. 
The results are characterised by binding risk positions at different control points. With 
case 9, risk positions are priced at CP-AB with $0.012503/CVaR=0.95 and at catchment 
with $0.007415/CVaR=0.95. With case 10, risk positions are binding at CP-AB with 
$0.007433/CVaR=0.95 and at CP-ABC with $0.03526/CVaR=0.95. These differences are 
due to the binding risk positions changed using different flood costs in the catchment. For 
instance, lengthening flooding duration would be more important at CP-ABCD, while 
hastening peak time of flooding would be more important at CP-ABC. 
 
Table 7-19 Final expected flood damage components for case 10 
 Depth 
($) 
Factor i 
($) 
Factor ii 
($) 
Total Expected 
($) 
CP-A $1,679.90 $437.56 $0 $2,117.46 
CP-AB $3,168.74 $1,576.61 $0 $4,745.35 
CP-ABC $3,201.47 $1,005.22 $0 $4,206.69 
CP-ABCD $4,647.92 $932.167 $0 $5,580.09 
CP-D $1,297.79 $34.73 $0 $1,332.52 
Total Catchment $13,995.82 $3,986.287 $0 $17,982.11 
 
In case 6.B, the expected damage was $19,998.90. With the Sto_MarketIC_Risk in case 9, 
the expected damage was reduced to $17,883.89. However, the cost to the SO in the first 
trading case was $5,457.33 whereas the cost in the second trading case was $10,451.40. 
The real flood reductions were $6,729.30 and $8,844.30 respectively. This result means 
that the SO granted an extra $10.451.40$8,844.30=$1,607.10 to participants who were 
reducing flood damage, and who allowed the catchment to obtain the desired risk position. 
7.4.4 Summary deterministic and stochastic models 
This section summarises the main outcomes from the previous deterministic and stochastic 
cases. Table 7-20 presents these outcomes in the expected flood damage, applied prices for 
two participants located upstream and downstream in the catchment, changes in flow peaks 
in storm scenario 100 year at CP-ABC, and the final revenue condition for the SO. 
Differences in the initial expected flood damage are due to the inclusion of flood damage 
components and CVaR positions. 
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Table 7-20 Summary of cases: changes in expected flood damage, applied price, changes 
in flow peak and the SO' revenue 
Cases 
Initial 
Expected 
Flood Damage 
Final 
Expected 
Flood Damage 
Applied price (1) Reduction in 
flow peak 
m
3
/sec (2) 
Revenue 
position of the 
SO 
Particip. 
A1 
Particip. 
D6 
Case 1 - - $2.000/ha  $6.140/ha 1.47 m
3
/sec $655.71 
Case 2 - - - - - - 
Case 3 - - $4.014/ha  $31.940/ha 2.77 m
3
/sec - $18,882.80 
Case 4 $18,711.80 $15,471.20 $3.997/ha  $1.899/ha 1.86 m
3
/sec -$2,932.83 
Case 5 $23,214.90 $18,785.20 $4.887/ha  $2.601/ha 1.97 m
3
/sec -$3,955.33 
Case 6 $26,728.20 $19,998.90 $7.164/ha  $2.228/ha 2.03 m
3
/sec -$5,386.15 
Case 7 $26,078.64 $19,286.50 $7.238/ha  $2.399/ha 2.03 m
3
/sec -$5,457.36 
Case 8 $18,711.80 $15,471.20 $3.997/ha  $1.899/ha 1.86 m
3
/sec -$2,932.83 
Case 9 $26,728.20 $17,883.89 $10.939/ha  $2.726/ha 3.29 m
3
/sec -$10,451.40 
Case 10 $26,078,64 $17,982.11 $10.675/ha  $2.296/ha 2.88 m
3
/sec -$9,529.10 
(1) Applied price is calculated based on the final settlement and the changed area of IC allowances ($/ha) 
(2) The reduction is estimated based on storm scenario 100 year at CP-ABC 
 
Comparing the cases, different outcomes are noticed in the expected flood damage, the 
peak flows, and the SO' revenues. The flood distribution is shifted in cases 3 to 10. The 
lower reductions in the expected damage are in cases 4, 5 and 8 with $3,240.6, $4,429.7 
and $3,240.9 respectively, whereas the greatest reduction is noticed in case 9 with 
$8,844.3.  Regarding the peak flows at CP-ABC, in the deterministic case 3, the peak flow 
is reduced by 2.77 m
3
/sec (initial peak flow is 14.24 m
3
/sec) and the SO is a net payer with 
$18,882.8. However, in case 9 the SO could reduce further the expected damage with the 
stochastic formulation. In this case, the peak flow is reduced by 3.29 m
3
/sec and the SO is 
a net payer with $10,452.4. 
 Between the stochastic cases (cases 4 to 8), the reducing effects in peak flows are close 
and vary between 1.86 and 2.03 m
3
/sec; however, the applied prices change when 
including flood components. For instance, for participants A1 and D6 the applied prices 
are $3.99/ha and $1.89/ha, when the market accounts for depth (flows peak reduction is 
1,86 m
3
/sec at ABC). Those prices, increase to $7.164/ha and $2.228/ha respectively if the 
market, additionally, accounts for hastening peak flows and duration (flow peak reduction 
is 2.03 m
3
/sec at CP-ABC). 
 On the other hand, the SO reaches different revenues with the deterministic and 
stochastic cases. In deterministic case 1, the catchment is fully allocated and the SO is a net 
receiver because sells impacting flows at times that previously were not binding at control 
points. In case 3 deterministic as well, the SO is exposed to be a net payer with $18,882.80, 
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and the SO reduces 2.77 m
3
/sec at CP-ABC. However, a greater reduction of 3.29 m
3
/sec is 
reached with the stochastic case 9, at equivalent storm scenario 100 year. The SO is a net 
payer only with $10,451.40 and could reach a better reducing position than case 3. With 
case 9, participants face the expected flood damage and risk position, and the SO pays 
mainly for the changes in the expected flood damage. With case 3, the SO pays more than 
the equivalent reducing effect of flooding. 
 Finally, the simplicity and clear application is an advantage of the deterministic 
method, whereas a stochastic method requires extra analysis to estimate impacting flows 
and flood damage across scenarios. 
7.5 Final remarks and conclusion 
This Chapter presented a variety of trading cases using the proposed market clearing 
models developed in this thesis. Participants were shown to have traded and obtained 
different IC allowances and prices in each model. The SO faced different revenue 
conditions with the different case formulations. In the trading cases, the SO was a net 
payer with the Sto_MarketICs and Sto_MarketIC_Risk. The SO could also be a net 
receiver with Det_MarketIC when the SO sold flood capacity for shifting peak times. 
However, the SO revenue was shown to be dependent on catchment conditions. 
The SO revenue depends, in part, on the opportunity cost for changing IC allowances 
and shifting the flood distribution. Thus, if opportunity costs from participants to reduce 
allowances are lower than the opportunity cost for reducing flood damage in the 
catchment, the market formulation reduces allowances, and the catchment becomes 
pervious. 
With flood costs for violating capacities for flood components in Sto_MarketIC 
models, the SO faces different revenue. Prices account for the marginal changes in flood 
distribution. Thus, for each condition, participants internalise the opportunity cost related 
to changes in flood distribution in the catchment. 
Incorporating the flood risk that the community desires, the SO faces different revenue 
results using the Sto_MarketIC_Risk model. But participants who change flood 
distribution at the extreme tail losses would face the price for binding the CVaR risk 
positions. If their IC allowances bind the risk, allowances would account for the cost to the 
system for trying to shift the risk from the community. Consequently clearing prices would 
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rise for participants who change the flood tail distribution and for those who reach the risk 
positions. 
The decision of which market model to use will depend on the catchment conditions 
and flood conditions that the SO, the government and community desire to safely manage 
floods within the catchment. The formulations affect prices and allocations due to the 
capped points, the flood distribution, flood components and the risk positions for the flood 
areas. Different models will result in different revenue conditions for the SO and trade 
from participants. 
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Chapter 8 
 
8 GROSS POOL MODEL WITH REVENUE 
ADJUSTMENT 
 
Previous chapters developed net pool market models for IC allowances. The market 
models accounted for trading net changes in IC allowances for each property (ha), relative 
to the status quo allowance. With Det_MarketIC1, participants buy and sell area 
allowances for their properties, with a land area balance constraint for each participant. 
With Det_MarketIC2, Sto_MarketIC and Sto_MarketIC_Risk, participants trade for 
changes in IC allowances in their areas. The market models account explicitly for the 
difference in IC allowances from their initial to the desired allowance in the area. 
However, the SO may not be revenue neutral if there are changes to the calculated capacity 
of the catchment (to deal with runoff, or over-allocation, changes in expected flood 
damage, etc). This chapter will consider the following aspects: 
- A gross pool formulation to clear the market. Most electricity markets use gross 
formulations (Alvey et al. 1998; Read and Chattopadhyay 1999) and they have been 
also proposed for water, nitrates and sediment (Raffensperger et al. 2009; Prabodanie 
2010; Pinto et al. 2012). The allocation results should be the same as from the previous 
net pool formulations. Duality will help to analyse and discuss the clearing price 
implications. 
- Introducing a “reference usage type” (land use) in order to provide a common basis for 
offers from participants, and a constraint transformation to deal with this reference. 
- Adjusting the rights to reach revenue neutrality for the SO, as proposed by 
Raffensperger (2011) and Pinto et al. (2012). 
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8.1 Gross vs. net pool market 
A market could operate using a net or a gross pool formulation. In a net pool, participants 
provide an offer curve to sell, and a separate bid curve to buy more. However, the demands 
and offers from participants in a net pool could be transformed into gross pool bids and 
vice-versa (Prabodanie et al. 2010). These are just two different ways of specifying the 
same net demand curve (Figure 8-1). 
A gross pool market does not accept sell offers and ignores initial rights in the market 
clearing model, but deals with them in the settlement systems. The totals sold and bought 
are determined after clearing the market by comparing initial and final allowances. 
To keep their initial IC allowance, a participant must bid high for that allowance, and 
low for alternative uses of that area, or else the market model could allocate another 
allowance to their property. This is the same as participants having high offers to sell 
existing IC allowances and low offers to buy alternatives in a net pool market. If a 
participant prefers a different IC allowance, their bids should be high enough to buy it, and 
with lower values for alternative IC allowances. Figure 8-1 illustrates a gross demand 
curve. For example, a participant currently may have 10 ha with IC allowance type 
‘meadow’, but want to buy (just) 5 ha of IC allowance type ‘concrete’. Therefore, the 
participant should bid a high price for 5 ha of concrete, and also a high price for 5 ha of 
meadow, and no more, with low prices for all alternatives. 
 
Figure 8-1 Demand curve in a gross pool market. μj is the applied price for IC allowance 
type j and gj is the final IC allowance. The participant would be a buyer or a seller 
depending on whether the initial position, B, is greater or less than the final. 
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Setting bids in a gross pool could be easier than in a net pool market, if a participant has a 
complex set of IC allowances and desires. For instance, the property could be the layout in 
Figure 8-2. The participant currently has IC allowances type A, B and C represented by the 
solid lines, and desires to develop a project with IC allowances type D shown with a 
dashed line. The participant would need to define bids for the IC allowance for the new 
area A1, for the small area represented by IC cover types A2 and D2, for the new B1, for 
area B2 and D1, for the new C1 and also for C2 and D3. The participant may find the process 
of setting these bids to be complex. However, if the SO defines a reference usage, setting 
bids could be simpler as will be discussed in the next sections. 
 
Figure 8-2 Example of a property layout of IC allowances. Original IC allowance is type 
A, B, and C defined by solid lines and the desired type is D defined by a dashed line. A1, 
A2, B1, B2, C1, C2, D1, D2, and D3 represent the areas of change. 
 
For the gross pool formulation to function, the total area in the property must equal the 
total area from the IC allowances after clearing the market. This area condition requires 
participants to have an internal price, which will set the participant’s allocations. This will 
be further discussed in section 1.5 and 1.6. 
8.2 A gross pool formulation, Gross_MarketIC1 
The TSSP model has a flood damage cost, which is assumed to be convex for incremental 
imperviousness. The damage depends on the stage flood level under uncertain storm 
events. 
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The gross pool model has the following new indices, parameters and variables. 
Indices 
i =  Participant, 1,…,N. 
j =  Land use type (CN or imperviousness), j= 1,…,J. 
b =  Bid step, b=1,...,B. 
t =  Storm time period, t=1,…,T. 
Parameters 
, ,i j bP  = Demand price ($/ha) for IC allowance type j from participant i and bid step b. This 
is the maximum that participant i is willing to pay for an IC allowance type j and 
bid step b. 
max
, ,i j bD =  Maximum amount of IC allowance type j (ha) for participant i in bid step b at price 
, ,i j bP . 
iA  =  Total land area of participant i (ha). 
,
0,
s t
kh =  Intercept flow for the linearisation at control point k, time t and scenario s (see 
Figure 8-3 below). This is the flow if all the IC allowance types currently used 
disappear unless there is a reference usage. 
Ei,j = Initial rights of participant i and IC allowance type j. This is not used in the 
Gross_MarketIC1, but only in the settlement. 
,i jG = Reference usage for participant i and IC allowance type j. This reference usage 
could correspond to arbitrary IC allowances for each participant, which might be 
established for the SO, or be the initial IC allowances for each participant. 
1,
, ,
t u s
i j kH
  = Marginal flow impact at control point k over scenario s, at the end of time t –u+1 
from participant i of the land IC allowance j. u is the lag time between the storm 
time and the flow which reaches the control point (volume/time ha). This 
coefficient determines the impact of the participant’s IC allowance on control 
points across rainfall scenarios, e.g., volume/time/ha. If participant i does not 
impact control point k, then ,
, ,
t s
i j kH = 0. This linear coefficient is likely to depend on 
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the initial IC allowance conditions in the catchment, so it should be updated as IC 
allowances changes. 
Mk =  Flow capacity at channel control point k (volume/time). This corresponds to the 
difference between channel flow capacity and the chosen base flow. Base flow 
refers to the normal flows in the channel between storm events. 
Variables 
, ,i j bqdem = Area in hectares of IC allowance type j and bid steps b purchased by participant 
i. 
,i jg =  Total hectares of IC allowance type j for participant i (ha). 
Model: Gross_MarketIC1 
Maximize , , , ,
1 1 1
N J B
i j b i j b
i j b
P qdem
      1 1
S K
s s
k k
s k
C f
 
    [8.1] 
Subject to: 
0 ≤ 
, ,i j bqdem  ≤  
max
, ,i j bD ,  i,j,b      : , ,i j b
 ,
, ,i j b
       [8.2] 
, , ,
1
B
i j b i j
b
qdem g

 ,  i,j    : ,i j  (free)       [8.3] 
, ,
1 1
J B
i j b i
j b
qdem A
 
  ,  i   : ˆi (free)       [8.4] 
,
0,
s t
kh  +  
1,
, , , ,
1 1
N J
t u s
i j k i j i j
i j
H g G 
 
    ≤  Mk + skf ,  t,k,s : ,s st k    [8.5] 
      
s
kf  ≥ 0     : 
s
k          [8.6] 
,i jg  free                   [8.7] 
Explanation 
[8.1] The objective function maximizes the expected total economic surplus from making 
IC allowances, less the expected recourse costs, due to flood damage under a finite 
set of rainfall events. Changes in the objective are the appropriate measure of 
changes in welfare (assuming the market is sufficiently competitive that bids reflect 
marginal costs). 
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[8.2]  Total IC allowance allocated in each tranche is bounded by maximum demand 
quantities. 
[8.3]  The final amount allocated of IC allowance type j of participant i. 
[8.4]  The area for which IC allowances are allocated must equal the area owned. 
[8.5]  For each scenario s, the total flows at control point k in time t should be lower than 
the capacity Mk. However, flows may violate the capacity Mk and 
s
kf  
estimates the 
peak flows
 
in the channel area across scenarios. This allows for possible upstream 
participants that are prepared to pay the flood damage cost. This is one of the many 
arbitrary representations that could be employed for this constraint, which implicitly 
assumes that the SO has established a referential usage for IC allowances and so a 
point for flood flows. Figure 8-3 illustrates linearisations from this referential point 
in a storm scenario. This is just one dimension of a multi-dimensional surface, and 
G and G correspond to patterns of land cover type. The flow intercepts ,
0,
s t
kh  and 
,
0,
s t
kh  
mean that all the area currently used for j disappear unless there is a reference usage. 
[8.6]  Condition of non-negative exceeding flows. 
[8.7]  IC allowance must be non-negative. This will naturally limit the final IC allowance, 
,i jg . 
Mk
Limit flows
Baseflow
,
0,
t s
kh
,
0,
t s
kh
IC levelsG G
 , 1,0, , , , ,
1 1
N K
t s t u s
k i j k i j i j
i j
h H g G 
 
  
 , 1,0, , , , ,
1 1
N K
t s t u s
k i j k i j i j
i j
h H g G 
 
  
Flows
 
Figure 8-3 Linear approximation with a gross formulation 
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8.3 Price analysis 
The market clearing prices associated with constraint [8.5] correspond to a set of flows 
received at control points, by time and by storm scenario, and will be non-zero for those 
flows at or above threshold capacities. Where ‘exceeding flows’ occur, the prices are the 
marginal change in the expected flood damage that may occur in the area. Otherwise, 
prices for binding limits will reflect the marginal cost of restricting participant allowances 
to void exceeding flow limits, as indicated by their offers. Each binding control point has 
its own dual price 
,
s s
k t  . The dual condition from equation [4.19] in Chapter 4 represents 
the relationship between the clearing price and the marginal change in flood cost. 
These clearing prices for binding control point capacity indirectly determine prices for 
participants’ IC allowances of each type, which are valued according to their flow impacts 
at peak times. The dual price in Equation [8.3] represents this price for participant i and IC 
allowance type j; and may be determined as follows: 
,i j =
1,
, , ,
1 1
S K T
s s t u s
t k i j k
s k t u
H   
     ,   i,j         [8.8] 
The dual price 
,i j  represents the economic impact of the increase in the expected flood 
damage, and/or reduction in other allowances, if the SO gives participant i another unit of 
IC allowance type j. The critical point to note is that there is no longer a price for changing 
from one land use to another, but a price for an extra area of land associated with that land 
use. In the model, only constraint [8.4] prevents this from happening, and so the shadow 
price on that constraint plays a critical role, as discussed in section 8.5 below. 
However, participants are actually not facing only 
,i j . They face are ,i j – ,i j ref  . This 
corresponds to the price difference between the IC allowance type j and the reference 
usage j=ref. This reference could correspond to the initial IC allowances or a specific land 
use that the SO defines for each participant within the catchment. This payment will be 
discussed in the following Sections 8.4 and 8.5. 
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8.4 Settlement 
The settlement for a participant depends on the reference usage. To simplify notation and 
the analysis, the initial IC allowance Ei,j=ref is distinguished from the final allocated IC 
allowance gi,j. (Notice that Ei,ref = gi,j=ref if participant i is not changing IC allowances.). 
Thus, if this reference corresponds to the initial IC allowances on their property, the final 
payment ri from participant i for the changes in IC allowance is  , , ,
1
J
i i j i j i j
j
r g E

  . 
If the reference usage is the initial IC allowance in the area type j=ini, which is related 
to initial impacting flow coefficients 1,
, ,
t u s
i j kH
   at control points and scenarios, the settlement 
from each participant could be decomposed based on changes in impacting flows at peak 
flow time t*. Thus, the final payment condition is as follows: 
ir =
*,
*, , , ,
1 1 1
S J K
s s t s
t k i j k i j
s j k
H g 
     
*,
*, , , ,
1 1 1
S J K
s s t s
t k i j k i j
s j k
H E 
     ,  i [8.9] 
Equation [8.9] represents the final payment from participant i. The first term represents the 
value of the final IC allowances after clearing the market; the second term represents the 
value of the initial IC allowances. If a participant is selling or buying for a particular area 
of land, the difference of *, *,, , , ,
t s t s
i j k i j ini kH H   helps to analyse the trading conditions. This 
could take a positive or negative value. If  *, *,*, , , , ,
1 1
0
S K
s s t s t s
t k i j k i j ini k
s k
H H  
 
   , 
participant i is selling IC allowances and receives a payment from the SO, 0ir  . If 
 *, *,*, , , , ,
1 1
0
S K
s s t s t s
t k i j k i j ini k
s k
H H  
 
   , participant i is buying IC allowance type j and 
pays to the SO, 0ir  . 
8.5 Trading condition 
A participant’s clearing price may not match the demand price offered on any step of their 
demand curve; this may make a participant i marginal, infra or supra marginal resulting in 
the following: 
,i j = , ,i j bP  , ,i j b
 +
, ,i j b
  ˆ
i     i,j,b  : , ,i j bqdem        [8.10] 
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If 0 < 
, ,i j bqdem  < Di,j,b, then the optimal IC allowance j for participant i is in the middle of 
step b, and this makes i “marginal”, and by complementary slackness, 
, ,i j b
 =
, ,i j b
 = 0 and 
so 
,i j = , ,i j bP  ˆi . 
This tranche b for participant i will not generally be marginal when 
,i j = , ,i j bP . Because 
the opportunity cost ˆ
i  is not zero, a participant i may not trade even if ,i j  , ,i j bP  
because the condition is 
,i j  , ,i j bP  ˆi . Thus, even though the bid price is higher than the 
clearing price, an extra unit of IC allowance type j would not be allocated. ˆ
i  
is the 
opportunity cost for a unit unbalancing of the total land. This could also be equivalent to 
having a clearing condition for each land area, with ˆ
i equal to the marginal value of that 
land. Thus, if j=m is the marginal use of the IC allowance [land use], the marginal 
condition is 
, , ,
ˆ
i i j m b i j mP    . ˆi  may be high, especially in city centres. 
Denoted 
,i m  as is the internal price for participant i for their marginal allowance m, the 
price could be represented as 
,i m = ˆi + ,i m = , ,i m bP . The price accounts for the opportunity 
cost of the marginal land use and the clearing price for this usage. The participant also has 
internal prices for other IC allowances on their property such as 
,i j = ˆi + ,i j . Thus, the 
participant has a relative internal price, which corresponds to 
,i j = , ,i m bP + ,i j  ,i m , i.e., a 
price difference between the IC allowance type j and the marginal usage for the property 
m. If the participant desires to change IC allowance, their bid price should be higher than 
the price difference between both land uses; otherwise, a participant would remain on the 
initial IC allowances or in the reference usage. Consequently, a participant is incentivised 
to disclose their opportunity cost between their land uses in their property. 
If a participant knows their marginal usage m, then 
, ,i m bP = 0 can be set and so 
participants can express their preference for other IC allowances according to their 
marginal usage. However the SO may decree that participants set their preferences related 
to a reference usage ref, which may be different than the marginal usage m for participant i. 
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Thus, the reference will establish referential bids11 between participants within the 
catchment. 
8.6 Issues with the Gross_MarketIC1 
Constraint [8.4] makes the µi,j prices applied to participant allocations relative rather than 
absolute. Consequently, the clearing prices for flow limits, and for other participants, 
would not change if the µi,j prices applied to a particular participant were all shifted 
uniformly, so these price differences will not change. Because ˆ
i  
is the same for the 
property, condition [8.10] could be used to show the relative price implication. Thus, at the 
equilibrium, the condition between two IC allowance types j and m are 
,i j = , ,i j bP ˆi  and 
µi,m= Pi,j=m,b ˆi ; therefore, the condition becomes ,i j  ,i m = , ,i j bP  , ,i j m bP   for participant i. 
The participant may obtain IC allowance type j if ,i j  ,i m  

 , ,i j b
P 
, ,i j m bP  . This analysis 
can be extended for two participants, for which the relative condition for participant n is 
,n j  
 
,n m = Pn,j,b  Pn,m,b. Thus, the relative prices are also between participants, 
,i j  ,n j  and ,i m  ,n m . For example, participants could set their bids for IC allowance 
type ‘concrete’ at $100/ha and for type ‘meadow’ at $50/ha, and another participant could 
set their bids for type ‘concrete’ at $1000/ha and for type ‘meadow’ at $950, resulting in 
both conditions being similar 
,i j  ,i m   $50/ha. If both participants are similarly located 
within the catchment and have the same H coefficients, they will face the same clearing 
prices for type ‘concrete’ and ‘meadow’, and both will obtain IC allowance type 
‘concrete’. This may initially appear peculiar, and may make it difficult to monitor abuse 
of market power, but it could still be conceptually correct. A similar implication was 
observed in the Det_MarketIC1 for the land area balance constraint. Therefore, participants 
could provide high bids, but the differences between the set of preferences could be small. 
With this formulation, if a participant bids only once for their IC allowance, the market 
model may allocate independently to the bid value, because the condition [8.4] must be 
satisfied. Thus participants can provide low bids for their IC allowances. A user interface 
during bidding could be used to control possible problems with market infeasibility. Such 
an issue could also be avoided if a reference land use were established in the catchment. 
                                                 
11
 This is analogous to trade being based on a specific currency, for instance trading only in US$. 
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If a catchment has no flooding problems (i.e., all constraints are loose), the clearing 
price 
,
s s
k t   is zero, and consequently the ,i j  price is also zero for each participant and IC 
allowance j. However, participants face their internal price for the marginal use ˆi , which 
corresponds to their own opportunity cost for having an additional area for the marginal 
usage. On the other hand, if control points are binding, participants will be exposed to the 
flood cost, and also to the relative prices from the marginal IC allowance usage. The 
opportunity cost for marginal usage could be higher than conditions under no flood. For 
example, if the catchment becomes impermeable, the flood problem will be more frequent. 
IC allowances which were previously valued at zero, such as undeveloped areas, would 
now become marginal. 
8.7 Setting a reference usage 
To define a reference usage, the constraints [8.4] and [8.5] need to be transformed. This 
simplifies bids for participants and possible issues relating to absolute prices. Charles 
River Associates (2003) observed that a constraint transformation should deal with a 
physical network situation and with the commercial structure. If prices are based on a 
reference node, they represent marginal cost and should be correctly oriented. In the 
market model, the constraint can be related to a reference usage for each property and the 
price will be correctly oriented to the reference. 
The reference usage conditions do not need to correspond to the current IC allowances. 
This reference usage could be defined as a particular IC allowance, and to the flows that 
impact at control points by time and scenario. If the SO defines an IC allowance as type ref 
for each participant, the constraints [8.4] and [8.5] are as follows: 
1
0
,
J
i j i
j ref
g A


 ,  i        : ˆi       [8.11]  
 
1
1, 1,
, , , , ,
1 1
N J
t u s t u s
i j k i j ref k i j
i j
H H g

   

 
  1, 0 ,, , 0,1
N
t u s t s s
k i j ref k i k k
i
M H A h f 

    ,     
            t,k,s  : 
,
s s
t k      
 [8.12]
 
1,
, ,
t u s
i j ref kH
 
  corresponds to the impact coefficient at control point k, time t and scenario s from 
participant i with a reference usage type ref. The changes  1, 1,, , , ,t u s t u si j k i j ref kH H     can be 
positive or negative. 
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However, the market still has a degree of freedom and associated problem at a higher 
level, because the sum of area properties must equal the catchment area, 0 0
1
N
i
i
A A

 and 
so one of the 0
iA  constraints becomes redundant. This means that the IC allowances cannot 
change the catchment area and that 
,i j  does not represent absolute prices for participants. 
Thus, the market model can be formulated on a referential land usage for all participants as 
was previously developed, and for a referential participant i=par. Therefore, participants 
will be buying IC allowances based on the referential land usage, and their bids will reflect 
marginal uses for new land, and 
,i j  
will represent this price for participants. However, the 
price will continue to represent marginal value from the reference usage, but will be 
correctly oriented to represent changes in flood damage. 
The constraint transformation should not compromise the final allocation, but bidding 
rules will require an alternative representation. 
Bidding with the reference usage 
The reference usage for IC allowances means that bids from participants are related to the 
established reference, and hence these bids should be correctly oriented to represent 
changes in IC allowances and be comparable between participants. Participants that agree 
with the reference usage should bid zero, otherwise they should bid for any available IC 
allowance or BMPs. If the participant desires to remain with their existing IC allowances, 
which could be more impervious than the reference condition, the participant should bid a 
high value. On the other hand, if their IC allowances are more pervious than the reference 
usage, the participant may bid a high negative value. For any other bids, the clearing model 
would consider that participants want to trade IC allowances. For instance, based on Figure 
8-2, if the reference usage were A, the participant should bid only for D1, D2 and D3, B1 
and B2, and C1 and C2. To get IC allowance type D, the participant should bid high enough 
to obtain the total area needed to develop the project. 
Price analysis and settlement 
With the reference usage, the applied price to participants should be distinguished from the 
dual 
,i j , which is now referenced to usage type ref defined for the SO. The dual condition 
which represents the trading condition is the same Equation [8.10], and in this case ˆ
i is 
the opportunity cost for participant i having extra area in the property. 
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However, the final trade as well as the applied price to participants could also be 
related to the initial IC allowances, if participants have the rights for their initial IC 
allowances. To calculate settlement for participants, the clearing price 
*,
s s
t k   should be 
used for the changes in IC allowances. The applied price corresponds, in this case, to the 
settlement from Equation [8.9]. 
If the SO decides that all participants initially have only reference usage rights in their 
properties, any changes from the reference as well as any established land use conditions, 
different than the reference, should be charged or credited. In this case, for participants 
whose IC allowances differ from the reference usage type “ref”, the applied charge is ri = 
1
, ,
1
J
i j i j
j
g

  with , 0i j   or , 0i j  . For those that remain in the reference usage, ,i j = 
0. The settlement can also be decomposed in terms of impact coefficients and clearing 
prices at control points; in this case, the applied cost for participants is as follows: 
 1, 1,, , , , *, ,
1 1 1
J K S
t u s t u s s s
i i j k i j ref k t k i j
j k s
r H H g    
  
    ,  i     [8.13] 
If the final demand curve is shifted outward, both reference usage conditions could 
expose the SO to be a net payer or receiver. The new demand curve may produce changes 
along the expected flood damage curve, which would produce revenue for the SO. Because 
participants may have the rights for the IC allowances, the SO is exposed to the changes in 
the demand curve from the initial IC allowances, and does not collect payments for any 
change from the reference usage across the catchment. Thus, the revenue analysis will be 
focused on possible surplus for shifting the demand curve from the initial IC allowances, 
but will also indicate changes in the expected flood damage function. 
8.8 Operator revenue adequacy 
As previously stated, the SO could be exposed to a possible outward shift of the demand 
curve, which shifts flows, the physical flood distribution, and likely the expected flood 
damage at control points. In this condition, the SO can be a net receiver or payer. For 
instance, upstream participants could desire to increase IC allowances, while other 
participants could desire to reduce IC allowances, but such reductions may not be 
sufficient to retain the same demand curve and expected flow levels. Hence the demand 
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curve is shifted, and possible movement along the expected flood damage curve may 
produce revenue, R=
1
N
i
i
r
 , for the SO. 
The revenue corresponds to the surplus for the changes in the expected flood damage. 
(Note that the surplus also accounts for possible extra revenue for the linearisation of the 
flood damage cost as previously discussed in Chapter 4.) 
The final surplus and payments from the SO depend on the changes in demand and the 
expected marginal flood damage curves. Because the non-linear flood damage cost has a 
piecewise linear approximation, extra revenue may be realised in the market. The SO can 
adjust up and down such additional revenue, and consequently the SO continues to be 
exposed to changes in the expected flood damage. 
New allowance
Equivalent revenue 
for the SO
Flow limitM
q0 q1
Linearisation-1
Linearisation-2
IC allowance levels
Flows
 
Figure 8-4 Illustration of the potential effect of linearisation and updating hydraulic 
coefficients on IC allowance levels. M is the flow limit, q
0
 and q
1
 is the IC allowance level 
within the catchment. 
 
Additionally, the SO could be exposed to revenue inadequacy for the physical flow 
linearisation at control points (Figure 8-4). The market is initially established with 
parameters related to linearisation-1, which allowed an equivalent q
0
 level of IC 
allowances. However, the SO realises that there is a need to update the hydraulic model 
coefficients for the market model and hence a new equivalent linearisation-2 is established. 
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This new condition would move allowance levels from q
0
 to q
1
 with equivalent revenue to 
the SO. 
8.9 Scaling initial rights to reach revenue neutrality 
The revenue could also be adjusted by scaling initial rights as proposed by Raffensperger 
(2011) and Pinto et al. (2012). The authors observed that when the SO capped the control 
points, different revenues were generated based on whether the catchment was over or 
under allocated. Hence they proposed to scale initial rights to reach revenue neutrality for 
the SO. In the case of IC allowances, the SO is exposed to changes in expected flood 
damage and possible physical flow conditions as previously discussed (see Figure 8-4). 
Pinto et al. (2012) noted that scaling impacting rights for each constraint by the same 
fraction is unlikely to be revenue neutral. Thus, to preserve revenue neutrality, within the 
auction itself, the initial position should be re-set for each participant by scaling their 
constraint rights. The author also pointed out that scaling need not be linear, but assumed 
that the initial rights linked with constraints were all scaled proportionately. The same 
approach is used in the market, but in this case, scaling will be applied for each constraint 
k, time flow peak t* and scenario s (up or down) to match the new flood conditions after 
clearing the market. 
If the SO decides to scale impacting flow rights from the IC allowances up or down, the 
SO could use a scaling factor such as ,k s  and hence adjust initial capacity rights 
proportionally from Equation [8.9]. Participants’ IC allowances are adjusted based on their 
initial set of impact flows at the new market equilibrium and hence the scaling factor will 
balance the revenue for the changes in the expected flood damage. The scaling factor is as 
follows: 
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The scaling factor adjusts the settlement for participants ex-post, i.e., after clearing the 
market, so the payments depend on the final IC allowances. Participants’ rights are 
adjusted by receiving credits or debits in proportion to the final flood level changes. 
Therefore, participants may face a debit just to retain their existing rights, which will be 
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offset from ongoing profitable trading. Thus, the participant is encouraged to express their 
preferences in the market. The final settlement for participants *
iz  becomes: 
* *,
*, , , ,
1 1 1
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i t k i j k i j
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  
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k s t k i j k i j
j m k s
H E  
     ,i [8.15] 
The SO could give credits if it is a net receiver, and debits if it is a net payer and so 
,k s would be greater or lower than 1. 
If , 1k s  , the SO gives credits to participants due to the increment in expected 
flooding. Thus, after clearing the market, the SO can scale up , 1k s   proportionally for 
the changes in the expected flood damage. The final payments from/to participants depend 
on the condition  *, *,, , , ,t s t si j k i j kH H . 
If 
,0 1k s  , the SO needs to cover the revenue shortfall, hence the SO charges all 
participants for the reduction in expected flood damage. Conditions when the SO has a 
revenue shortfall due to flood damage reduction are examined in the following cases. 
Case 1: A participant is not changing IC allowance, so 0ir  ; however, ,0 1k s   and 
so the final payment is *
iz  > 0. This means that participant i pays a proportional charge for 
the new expected flooding in the catchment. The participant needs to pay for keeping the 
IC allowances. 
Case 2: For participants who do change IC allowance, again ,0 1k s  ; however the 
payment from each participant depends on the condition  *, *,, , , ,t s t si j k i j kH H  before scaling. 
Let us see some conditions. 
Case 2.1: A participant reducing imperviousness,  *, *,, , , ,t s t si j k i j kH H < 0, would receive a net 
payment ir  < 0. However, because a new expected flooding condition was reached in the 
catchment and the SO decided to scale, the participant may receive a lower compensation 
for the changes in imperviousness. The participant may receive *
iz  < ir , or may not receive 
any payment for reducing imperviousness * 0iz  . In an extreme situation when the 
catchment is badly allocated, the participant may need to pay for the new condition *
iz  > 0. 
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Case 2.2: A participant increasing IC allowance,  *, *,, , , ,t s t si j k i j kH H > 0, may pay an extra 
charge which increases the payment for the new imperviousness, so the participant pays *
iz  
> 
ir . 
Distributional effects are observed if initial IC allowances are scaled; however this effect is 
outside the scope of this research. Additionally, distributional effects between upstream 
participants and flooding places are not considered in this analysis and research. The 
decision to scale is simply to remain revenue neutral for the SO. However, the SO may 
decide on alternative strategies to scale; for example, if the SO is a net receiver, there may 
be no decision to scale, and hence use the revenue for mitigation, investment in 
infrastructure, insurance, etc. 
8.10 Example applications 
This section presents two examples. The first example shows that the clearing model 
accounts for the relative bids rather than the absolutes for the constraint [8.4], and bids are 
scaled from participants to show this effect. The second example has similar trading 
conditions, but uses a reference usage of IC allowance in each property. 
These examples assume that 5 storm scenarios approximate the expected flood damage. 
Channel capacities at control points (CP) CP1 and CP2 are 60 and 70 volume/time 
respectively. The flood damage cost at CP1 is 0.05*f
 2
 and at CP2 is 0.01*f
 2
, where f is the 
peak flow at the control points. The model has a piecewise linear approximation of the 
flood damage cost. 
The marginal impact of each participant depends on the IC allowance and the flood 
area where they are impacting. Participants A and B are impacting at control points CP1 
and CP2, and participant C impacts only at CP2. Table 8-1 shows the marginal flow 
impacts for participants under different IC allowances (land uses), scenarios and control 
points (CP1 and CP2). Thus, 1 ha from a participant with different IC allowance has the 
following flow impacts at peak flow time at control point 1 and scenario 1: Hi,forest,1= 1, 
Hi,meadow,1= 2, Hi,crop,1= 3 and Hi,concrete,1= 4 from A and B, and for control point 2: Hi,forest,2= 
0.9, Hi,meadow,2= 1.9, Hi,crop,2= 2.9 for A or B, and HC,concrete,2= 4.1 and HC,Green_Area,2= 1.6 for 
participant C. 
  
 
250 
Suppose three participants, A, B and C, desire to trade. Participants A, B and C each 
have 10 ha with IC allowance type meadow, concrete and green area respectively. Table 
8-2 shows the participants’ preferences. For instance, participant A desires to keep 
meadow in 5 ha and to increase crops in 5 ha. Participant B desires to change all 10 ha to 
meadow. Participant C wants to change 6 ha of green area to concrete. Participants A and 
C are bidding high for the 5 ha and 4 ha that they do not want to change. Participant B 
wants to change IC allowance, but he/she must bid more than once for their area. In this 
case, participant B bids for their initial IC allowance and for the desired condition. 
Participants also need to bid for other IC allowances. 
 
Table 8-1 Impacting flows *,
, ,
t s
i j kH  from participant i at control point k and storm scenario 
Participant A,B Scen 1 Scen 2 Scen 3 Scen 4 Scen 5 
IC allowance Cp1 Cp2 Cp1 Cp2 Cp1 Cp2 Cp1 Cp2 Cp1 Cp2 
Forest 1 0.9 1.3 1.17 1.8 1.62 2.5 2.25 3.4 3.1 
Green Area 1.5 1.4 1.95 1.82 2.7 2.52 3.8 3.5 5.1 4.8 
Meadow 2 1.9 2.6 2.47 3.6 3.42 5 4.75 6.8 6.5 
Crop 3 2.9 3.9 3.77 5.4 5.22 7.5 7.25 10 9.9 
Concrete 4 3.8 5.2 4.94 7.2 6.84 10 9.5 14 13 
Participant C Scen 1 Scen 2 Scen 3 Scen 4 Scen 5 
IC allowance Cp1 Cp2 Cp1 Cp2 Cp1 Cp2 Cp1 Cp2 Cp1 Cp2 
Forest - 1.1 - 1.43 - 1.98 - 2.75 - 3.7 
Green Area - 1.6 - 2.08 - 2.88 - 4 - 5.4 
Meadow - 2.1 - 2.73 - 3.78 - 5.25 - 7.1 
Crop - 3.1 - 4.03 - 5.58 - 7.75 - 11 
Concrete - 4.1 - 5.33 - 7.38 - 10.3 - 14 
 
Example 1 
If the market is cleared with Bid-1 preferences, participant A finishes with 5 ha to crops 
and remains with 5 ha of meadow, participant B changes to 6.24 ha meadow and remains 
with 3.76 ha of concrete, and participant C changes to 4 ha of concrete and remains with 6 
ha of green areas. 
Participant’ preferences could be scaled for the condition [8.4] and the final trading 
solution does not change. For instance, suppose the market is cleared with Bid-2, which 
added a constant to participant's bids for a reference usage, forest from participant A, and 
for each participant subtract Bid(forest-A) = 5 from all their bids, so the new Bid(forest) = 
0 for all of them (see Bid-2 in Table 8-2). The primal solution and the clearing prices are 
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the same. Thus, if the initial IC allowance corresponds to the reference usage after trading, 
in both situations: participant A pays a total of $5.20, participant B receives a total of 
$12.50, and participant C pays a total of $8.40. The SO is a net receiver with $1.12, 
because expected flood damage at CP2 increases by $2.64, but reduces by $1.52 at CP1. 
 
Table 8-2 Participants’ initial IC allowance, required IC allowance, and bids 
Participant IC allowance Tranche Area Bid-1 Bid-2 
A Forest 1 10 $5 $0 
Green areas 2 10 $7 $2 
Meadow 3 5 $8 $3 
Crop 4 10 $11 $6 
Concrete 5 10 $11.1 $6.1 
Meadow 6 5 $10,000 $9,995 
B Forest 1 10 $4 $0 
Green areas 2 10 $7 $2 
Meadow 3 10 $10 $5 
Crop 4 10 $11 $6 
Concrete 5 10 $12 $7 
Meadow 6 0 $0 $-5 
C Forest 1 10 $4 $0 
Green areas 2 4 $8 $3 
Meadow 3 10 $9 $4 
Crop 4 10 $10 $5 
Concrete 5 10 $11 $6 
Meadow 6 6 $10,000 $9,995 
 
Suppose now the SO decides to scale proportionally to reach revenue neutrality. In this 
case, the SO will charge participants at CP1 with 
, 1k s   (scaling back) and gives credits 
to participants at CP2 with 
, 1k s   (scaling up). Table 8-3 shows the scaling factors at 
each control point k and scenario s. For instance, the scaling factor at CP1 and scenario 5 is 
1,5 =0.8755, and at CP2 and scenario 4 is 2,4 =1.0432. Thus, the final adjusted payments 
are: participant A pays a total of $5.03, participant B receives a total of $12.83, and 
participant C pays a total of $7.80. 
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Table 8-3 Scaling factor 
,k s  at control point k and scenario s 
Control Point Scenario 
Scaling factor 
(
,k s ) 
Control Point Scenario 
Scaling factor 
(
,k s ) 
CP1 S1 1 CP2 S1 1.043225758 
S2 0.875536055 S2 1.043226940 
S3 0.875537724 S3 1.043226347 
S4 0.875537292 S4 1.043225061 
S5 0.875535539 S5 1.043227547 
 
Example 2 
If the SO decides to establish a reference usage of IC allowance type ‘meadow’ for each 
participant, the conditions [8.11] and [8.12] are used. The reference is different than the 
current IC allowances. Participants that desire to remain with meadows do not need to bid. 
However, they need to bid if they want to keep their current conditions which are different 
to ‘meadow’ or to change these IC allowances. 
Assume the same participants from the previous example, but with different 
preferences. Participant A desires to keep meadow in 5 ha and to increase crops in 5 ha. 
Participant B desires to change 10 ha to meadow. Participant C wants to change 6 ha of 
green area to concrete and keep 4 ha of green area. Participants should carefully establish 
their preferences; if not, they could finish with the reference usage established for the SO. 
Participant A bids $5/ha for the 5 ha to crop, participant B bids $5/ha for the 10 ha of 
concrete and does not bid for meadow because their reference usage is meadow, and 
participant C bids $0/ha for any green area (10 ha) and $4/ha for 6 ha of concrete. 
After clearing the market, using the applied price to participants from Equation [8.9], 
the final total payment and trade are as follows: participant A obtains 5 ha of crop and pays 
a total of $13.11; participants B obtains 10 ha of meadow and receives a total of $50.24 for 
their concrete; and, participant C gets 4.4 ha of concrete and 5.6 ha of green areas, and 
pays a total of $24.20. The SO is a net payer with $12.93 based on the initial IC 
allowances, because expected flood damage is reduced by $6.33 and $6.60 at CP1 and CP2 
respectively. 
The SO may decide to scale to reach revenue neutrality based on the initial IC 
allowances. In this case, the factor 
,k s  should be estimated from Equation [8.14], and in 
  
 
253 
both cases 
,k s < 0 when floods occurs (if not ,k s =1). For instance, the SO scales back 
with a factor 
1,5 = 0.75 at CP1 and 2,4 = 0.9589 at CP2 (see Table 8-4). Therefore, 
participants are scaled and receive debits; the final settlements after scaling are: participant 
A pays a total of $16.93 (previously $13.11), participant B receives a total of $42.58 
(previously $50.24), and participant C pays a total of $25.64 (previously $24.20) at the 
end. 
 
Table 8-4 Scaling factor 
,k s  at control point k and scenario s 
Control 
Point 
Scenario 
Scaling factor 
(
,k s ) 
Control 
Point 
Scenario 
Scaling 
factor (
,k s ) 
CP1 S1 1 CP2 S1 0.9589 
S2 1 S2 0.9589 
S3 0.75 S3 0.9589 
S4 0.75 S4 0.9589 
S5 0.75 S5 0.9589 
 
8.11 Final remarks and conclusion 
This chapter proposed a gross pool market formulation for trading impervious cover areas. 
The market allocates IC allowances efficiently among participants. Participants face a price 
equilibrium which will encourage the use of BMPs and IC allowances in the property to 
manage floods in the catchment. Additionally, this gross pool formulation allows scaling to 
keep the regulator revenue neutral. 
The market formulation requires that participants bid for their initial IC allowance 
condition if they desire to remain with the same IC allowance, so the market works as if 
participants have no initial rights, but deals with them in the settlement systems. 
Bids can be scaled due to constraint [8.4], because the market accounts for relative bid 
differences rather than absolute bids. Thus, bids can add a constant, and neither clearing 
prices nor allocations change. This could confuse participants, but still corresponds to a 
feasible solution, and clearing prices still account for the flood damage. 
Alternatively, the SO can establish a reference usage [land use] for participants, which 
corresponds to particular IC allowances. This chapter presented a way to include a 
reference usage in the market formulation, to reduce the degree of freedom to the market 
  
 
254 
formulation and to avoid problems with relative bid prices. In this case, the participants 
would need to bid with respect to the reference usage, but settlements are based on their 
initial IC allowances. 
Finally, a scaling factor was proposed to reach revenue neutrality for the SO. The factor 
depends on the changes in expected flood damage at control points and scenarios. Scaling 
of final payments from participants based on their initial IC allowance was demonstrated. 
Similar to the proposed Sto_MarketIC and Sto_MarketIC_Risk, the gross pool 
formulation can be extended for flood components and for possible risk positions that the 
SO desires to reach or to cap at control points and catchment levels. 
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Chapter 9 
 
9 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This chapter presents a summary, the main conclusions of this thesis, and directions for 
future research. 
9.1 Summary 
The main contribution of this thesis is to propose market-based mechanisms for impervious 
cover (IC) allowances [land use], with the goal to manage extreme runoff discharges from 
point and non-point sources, and hence control flood problems within catchments. An IC 
allowance is a tradable permit to use a specific level of perviousness in a specific area 
(hectare). 
Two deterministic market-clearing models, Det_MarketIC1 and Det_MarketIC2, were 
proposed as described in Chapter 3. With Det_MarketIC1, participants buy and sell IC 
allowances. With Det_MarketIC2, participants bid for changes in IC allowances in their 
area. Each market model allowed for similar outcomes and prices to be reached. The 
market models account for capped capacities which corresponded to peak flows and flood 
conditions under a given extreme storm scenario. However, the market design may have 
possible issues related to internalising the flood cost related to storms greater than the one 
used to establish the market. These deterministic models did not penalise hastening 
inundation and lengthening duration, but could be extended to deal with these issues. 
The market signals a marginal cost for reducing flood peaks using imperviousness 
levels, which is connected to the dual price for capacity [3.6] and [3.22] in Det_MarketICs. 
These dual prices are also related to marginal increment in capacities and, in this sense, 
these could be related to levees, dikes, banks and temporary storage capacities. Thus, each 
improvement could be evaluated using the market and the solution should ensure a least 
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cost approach. However, other control approaches such policies and physical measures are 
also used to control and may not be a least cost approximation. Those control evaluations 
are outside the scope of this thesis, but an interesting future research. 
In Chapter 4, the market model Sto_MarketIC was formulated to deal with storm 
events where flow capacities are violated. The market model related capacity violations to 
flood depth damage and a TSSP market clearing model estimated flood damage via 
recourse flood cost across storm scenarios. The Sto_MarketIC1 model accounted for peak 
flow as the primary flood component across storm scenarios. With this formulation, issues 
related to non-convexity in the flood damage cost, the SO’s revenue, and possible free 
riders were discussed. 
In Chapter 5, the Sto_MarketIC2 model was developed to account for hastening peak 
time of flooding and lengthening floods in addition to the damages caused by peak flows. 
Additional constraints and thresholds were proposed related to these flood components and 
resulting flood damage. Trade conditions, allocations and prices were also analysed. 
In Chapter 6, the Sto_MarketIC_Risk model was proposed to include risk of flood 
disaster at the extreme tail of the flood damage distribution. A downside risk measure 
CVaR was proposed to be used in the market model. Thus, the SO could establish risk 
capped positions, which represent acceptable flood risk levels that the community desires. 
Duality allowed interpreting prices which also accounted for the risk positions at control 
points and within the catchment. Applied prices for participants account for the binding 
risk position in their IC allowances. The Sto_MarketIC_Risk model, was shown to be 
constrained via CVaRs, and should be carefully evaluated, because the market can be over-
constrained, and so the clearing prices can be high or resulting in an infeasible solution. 
In Chapter 7, a case study simulation of the L2 catchment was analysed using 
hypothetical participants and property delineations. The different market models were used 
to simulate prices and IC allocations in the catchment. The HEC-HMS and HEC-RAS 
models were used to estimate runoff from properties and impact flow coefficients in the 
catchment for a range of storm scenarios. The market models resulted in different prices, 
IC allocations as well as hedging flood conditions when the market conditions were 
changed such as capped flows, CVaRs constraints, flood components, etc. Participants 
faced the cost for changing the flood distribution and the risk implied by those changes in 
the price of IC allowances in their properties. 
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In Chapter 8, a gross pool model, Gross_MarketIC, was proposed to trade IC 
allowances. The model accounted for uncertain storms and violated channel capacities in a 
similar way as Sto_MarketIC. The gross formulation is cleared as if participants do not 
have rights and only with demand curves. Trade and settlement for participants account for 
either initial IC allowances or a base line of land use defined for the SO. Additionally, the 
market could reach an equilibrium which does not depend on the initial allowance. A 
scaling factor was proposed to allow the SO to reach revenue neutrality. Additionally, the 
implications of establishing a reference-usage allowance, the required constraint 
transformation to deal with the reference usage, and the bids from participants, were 
discussed. 
9.2 Conclusions 
 The target improvements (reductions) in imperviousness levels in the catchment can be 
allocated according to market mechanism with a low cost for the community. 
 The market design can conform to policies for managing floodplain areas, and allows 
targets to be reached at a low cost for the community. With the market mechanism, 
participants do not need to search for trading partners, nor look for contracts at each 
flooding place where they desire to change flood distributions. 
 The market mechanisms encourage participants to use BMPs and to face the cost to the 
system when they change impervious cover. Consequently, flooding could be well 
managed. 
 From duality, prices account for the cost to the system for the capped thresholds, flood 
components and flood costs as well as for the risk positions. 
 The market establishes a marginal cost for reducing flood peak using imperviousness 
levels. From duality, the shadow price of Equations [3.6] and [3.22] in Det_MarketIC 
signals the marginal change in capacity, or the cost to the system for allowing an 
additional unit of capacity. The dual price from Equation [4.7] in Sto_MarketIC signals 
the marginal changes in the expected flood damage. 
 Participants internalise the decision for shifting the flood distribution in the catchment, 
which can make it safe for a range of flow conditions. However, these market 
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mechanisms do not totally eliminate flooding in the catchment, but they rather attempt 
to manage flooding according to a desired flood distribution and probability of disaster. 
 For the market design to work, a reference needs to be established which can 
correspond to a grandfathering use of previous land use, current land use, or any other 
reference usage that the SO desires to establish for the catchment. 
 The market design reduces transaction costs, but requires setting up and monitoring; 
thus, the transaction cost savings would be reduced by these expenses. The SO 
establishes limits, but must carefully monitor during periods when flows reach critical 
levels. The SO will need to validate impervious levels in each property, and prosecute 
participants that do not follow the rules. 
 The market models could be implemented in any catchment. If the main concern from 
the SO is stage-flood, the market could account for this flood component as in models 
Det_MarketIC, Sto_MarketIC, and Gross_MarketIC; other flood components could also 
be included. If the SO desired to keep a capped risk position (CVaR) and to transfer 
possible changes on it, the market model could be Sto_MarketIC_Risk. 
 Non-convexity may produce market failure, because non-supporting price condition 
(O'Neill et al. 2005). As a result, externalities may not be internalised, the catchment 
may become impervious and the flood distribution will shift. Accordingly, 
convexification may be required if the expected flood changes are non-convex. 
 Non-linearity and convexification may produce extra rents, which could mean extra 
payments to or from the SO. Therefore, the SO should evaluate the flood damage 
convexification to reduce any possible extra rent. The SO may wish to pay for reducing 
imperviousness and risk. The SO should evaluate a position in terms of its budget 
position. 
 The SO could reach revenue neutrality after clearing the market with the proposed 
proportional scaling factor. The scaling factor could also be used by the SO to give 
credits and debits for participants for their trade, which adjust the final payment for their 
IC allowances. 
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9.3 Future research 
9.3.1 Flood damage (cost functions) and risk measures 
As stated in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, the flood damage cost functions may be non-linear and 
non-convex, and hence piecewise approximations are needed. These approximations affect 
prices and allocations. The SO should estimate accurate flood cost functions for the 
changes in flood distribution, and thus other cost formulations could be proposed to 
accurately estimate changes in flood distribution. 
The risk profile could be estimated ex-post, as presented with Sto_MarketIC_Risk2. 
This profile affects prices and allocations. The SO could accept this risk condition, but 
needs to evaluate whether flood risk in the catchment could increase above accepted levels. 
The market also needs to be evaluated for possible relationships between risk profile 
positions at control points and at the catchment level as well as the possible effects of these 
on clearing prices. 
9.3.2 Insurance for disasters 
In Chapters 4 and 6, we mentioned the possible effect that implementing an IC market 
could have on the risk premiums from insurer companies or a governmental insurer, and 
for the risk of people in the flood area. Because the market could establish risk positions 
for the community, the risk premium and adverse selections could change for the 
community. With market based models, places that previously suffered adverse selection 
could be insured due to risk reduction. This could be noticed if the SO constrains CVaR or 
tries to reduce CVaR value at control points. Reducing CVaR may enable managing or 
even reducing the risk of flooding. This risk condition would produce that insurance prime 
may be reduced as well. Ermolieva and Ermoliev (2005) observed that if a flood plain 
considers insurance with catastrophic risk management, an insurance pooling mechanism 
could not be achieved without location-specific risk exposures. Partial compensation and 
contingent credits could be enhanced with a proposed market mechanism for IC 
allowances. Duncan and Myers (2000) noted that insurers may require higher risk premium 
with low coverage levels, and suggested a subsidy for reinsurance companies to reduce 
premiums. However, with the IC market, a risk position and flood distribution could be 
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maintained for extreme events, which would also affect the risk positions of insurers. This 
is an interesting area for future research. 
9.3.3 Transported pollutants from runoff 
The market design could account for levels of pollutants such as sediments or nitrates 
which are transported by the runoff. The formulation would include new hydrology and 
hydraulic processes related to pollutants. Thus, the market model could account for 
accumulated deposits and pollutant levels at specific locations in the river over time. 
Consequently, the market would estimate prices and allocations, and participants would 
face the pollutant cost in their IC allowance decisions. 
The market formulation for IC allowances could be extended to include externalities 
related to transported pollutants with runoff, e.g., sediment discharge, nitrates, and 
phosphorus. An additional effort would be required in modelling and computer time. The 
formulation would need to model the spatial and temporal effects in the catchment for the 
levels of pollutants that pass or are accumulated under scenarios over several years. These 
physical relationships are probably non-linear and non-convex, which should be evaluated 
for the market formulation. 
Similar market mechanisms were proposed for nitrate pollution (Prabodanie et al. 
2010), runoff (Raffensperger and Cochrane 2010), groundwater (Raffensperger et al. 
2009), and sediment discharge (Pinto et al. 2012). These formulations assumed certain 
parameters for flows, leaching nitrates and sediments, but do not handle possible 
uncertainty as was proposed in this research. A stochastic smart market formulation could 
be extended for the previous resources and so uncertainty could be addressed for uncertain 
resource availability, process, and impacts. 
9.3.4 User interface and SO simulation framework 
A web based user interface could be developed which would allow users to place bids to 
sell and buy IC allowances at designated prices for their required changes in land use. The 
interface could also be designed to assist the users’ decision process for changing IC 
allowance. Participants could evaluate possible changes in runoff from their properties and 
the subsequent impact on flows at control points with their changes in IC allowance. The 
interface would be visually appealing and would run as a web site application. 
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The SO would require a simulation framework allowing for capture of all bids and 
selling as well as for running the hydrological and hydraulic models. This framework 
would enable the SO to run various market scenarios and determine final prices. This 
interface should also be flexible enough to allow for updates in models, parameters, etc. 
This flexibility would also allow testing of different clearing models as presented in 
Chapters 3-8. 
The interface would facilitate participants bid experience, and assist the SO to make 
decisions and transmit results to the market participants. 
9.3.5 Infrastructure investment and effects in the market 
The market considers an established infrastructure which retains flood and risk in 
hazardous places. Any flood plan considers investments for flood protections. These 
investments may change limits and thresholds and consequently prices and allocations. 
Shadow prices may signal improvement in infrastructure and reducing risk. These prices 
could be analysed and decomposed to evaluate improvement of infrastructure in the 
catchment. Real options could be used to analyse investment plans in infrastructure such as 
transmission in the electricity network. Real options are normally used to evaluate if an 
investment should be made in this period or later (Brunekreeft 2004; Boyle et al. 2006). In 
this case, price information from the market could be used to evaluate improvements in 
infrastructure. The SO could make decisions about the current period´s investment and 
could receive the revenue for the new infrastructure. Additionally the market could 
consider financial instruments as a way to reduce possible risk for changes in flood damage 
and to incentivise new investment in protecting potential flood areas. Future research could 
consider these points and use the market mechanism as a means to evaluate the effects of 
reducing the risk of floods and associated damage. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
This appendix presents the dual formulations of the different market model. Models are 
deterministic, based on an extreme storm event. Det_MarketIC1 model accounts for 
participants that sell and buy, while a land area balance is kept. Additionally a primal 
formulation for a variation of the Det_MarketIC1 model is presented. The Det_MarketIC2 
model considers participants bidding for the desired land conditions (changing IC 
allowance), while the model accounts explicitly for the changes in impacting flows for 
these changes across control points. The dual formulations for Sto_MarketIC1, 
Sto_MarketIC2 and Sto_MarketIC_Risk models are presented. 
 
Dual formulation Det_MarketIC1 model 
Minimize:
max
, , , ,
1 1 1
N J B
i j b i j b
i j b
D 
     +
max
, , , ,
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i j b i j b
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i j i j
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T K
k t kt k
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Subject to 
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Primal formulation Det_MarketIC1.1 model 
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0 ≤ 
, ,i j bqbuy ≤ 
max
, ,i j bD ,  i,j,b          : , ,i j b
 ,
, ,i j b
    
0 ≤ 
, ,i j bqsell ≤ 
max
, ,i j bS ,  i,j,b          : , ,i j b
 ,
, ,i j b
    
,i jg  = , , , , ,
1 1
B B
i j b i j b i j
b b
qbuy qsell C
 
   ,  i,j    : ,i j  (free)   
1
, , ,
1 1
N J
t u
i j k i j
i j
H g 
    ≤ 
t
kL ,  t,k        : ,t k     
, , , ,
1 1
0
B B
i j b i j b
b b
qbuy qsell
 
   ,  i      : i  12    
, , , ,
1 1
0
B B
i j b i j b
b b
qbuy qsell
 
   ,  i      : i      
,i jg  free             
Dual formulation Det_MarketIC1.1 model 
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, , , ,
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Dual formulation Det_MarketIC1.2 model (Subcatchment with connected control 
points) 
                                                 
12
 By definition 
i
  has a negative dual value, but this dual will be represented in a canonical way with a 
positive sign and so 0i
  . Positive i
  will be conveyed.  
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H  
   = 0,  i,j      : ,
D
i jg     
– 
,
S
i j  +
1
, , ,
1
K T
t u
i j k t k
k t u
H  
   = 0 i,j       : ,
S
i jg      
, ,i j b
 , 
, ,i j b
 , 
, ,i j b
 , 
, ,i j b
 , 
,
D
i j , ,
S
i j  and ,t k  ≥ 0 ; ,
D
i j , ,
S
i j  (free)   
Dual formulation Sto_MarketIC1 model 
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Minimize:
max
, , , ,
1 1 1
N J B
i j b i j b
i j b
D 
     +
max
, , , ,
1 1 1
N J B
i j b i j b
i j b
S 
     + 
0
, ,
1 1
N J
D
i j i j
i j
A
   +
0
, ,
1 1
N J
S
i j i j
i j
A
   + ,1 1 1
S T K
s s
t k k
s t k
M 
      
Subject to 
, ,i j b

,
D
i j  – , ,i j b
  + 
,
D
i j  = , ,
D
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, ,i j b
 +
,
S
i j  – , ,i j b
  + 
,
S
i j  = , ,
S
i j bP ,  i,j,b       : , ,i j bqsell    
,
D
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1,
, , ,
1 1
S K T
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i j k t k
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,
S
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1,
, , ,
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S K T
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1
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s s
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,
s s
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,
S
i j  (free) 
Dual formulation Sto_MarketICD2 model 
Minimize:
max
, , , ,
1 1 1
N J B
i j b i j b
i j b
D 
     +
max
, , , ,
1 1 1
N J B
i j b i j b
i j b
S 
     +
0
, ,
1 1
N J
D
i j i j
i j
A
  
+
0
, ,
1 1
N J
S
i j i j
i j
A
   + ,1 1 1
S T K
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t k k
s t k
M 
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S T Ks s
k t ks t k
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S T K
s s s
k t k t
s t k
      + , ,
S T K
s s s
k t k t
s t k
       
Subject to: 
, ,i j b

,
D
i j  – , ,i j b
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,
D
i j  = , ,
D
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, ,i j b
 +
,
S
i j  – , ,i j b
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,
S
i j  = , ,
S
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,
D
i j  +
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, , ,
S K T
s t u s s
i j k k t
s k t u
H  
   +
1,
, , ,
S K T
s t u s s
i j k k t
s k t u
H  
   = 0,     
    i,j    : 
,
D
i jg   
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– 
,
S
i j  +
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, , ,
S K T
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T
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Dual formulation Sto_MarketIC_Risk 
Minimize:
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1
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Appendix B 
 
These sections extend the convexification introduced in Section 4.9.2 of Chapter 4, with 
discussions about the flood damage approximations and SOS2 method for the market 
model. These approximations affect the SO revenue and the final IC in the catchment. The 
first section presents the possible externality in design with a non-convex damage function, 
when the design uses one extreme storm scenario. Then, this section illustrates similar 
conditions with several scenarios. Similar assumptions to examples in Chapter 4 are taken 
about timeframe, competitiveness, and damage estimation. The second section introduces 
flood damage with lower, middle and upper bounds approximations. Prices, allocations, 
imperviousness and final revenue from the SO are discussed. The extra rents correspond to 
the net surplus that the SO could face for the approximation and also for the differences 
between changes in damage and the total payment for the changes in flood damage. 
B.1 Linearised non-convex flood damage cost function, example 
This section illustrates a piece-wise approximation to a hypothetical flood damage cost 
function (see Figure B- 1) for the section 4.10 in Chapter 4. The idea is to analyse the cost 
function of a non-uniform or topographical sectional shape and see its implication for 
trading. 
The flooding area has two levees. The first protects up to 70 m
3
/time, and then the 
second levee protects up to flows of 335 m
3
/time (equivalent to exceeding peak flow 265 
m
3
/time). Figure B- 1 shows the flood damage cost related to the exceeding flows with 
both levees. The final ICs and storm scenarios shift the flood distribution and prices. 
Ten participants are in the catchment with one control point. Each participant has 10 ha 
with different IC allowances, and they desire to change IC allowances in 9 ha each. For 
instance, participant 2 has 10 ha with meadows, and desires to increase to crops, which 
would raise peak flow by 2 m
3
/time. Some participants desire to reduce IC and bid 
extremely high. Some participants desire to increase IC, but do not bid high enough, so 
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their bids are not accepted. Table B- 1Table B- 1 shows the initial IC allowances from 
participants who desire to change, and the participant preferred prices and areas. 
 
Table B- 1 Participants’ preferences for example 
Particip. Initial IC 
Initial 
trading 
area 
(ha) 
Impact 
at 
control 
point 
Option 1  Option 2 Option 3 
ha IC $/ha ha IC $/ha Ha IC $/ha 
1 Forest (F) 9 1 5 M $8 3 M $7 1 M $6 
2 Meadow (M) 9 1 5 Cr - 3 Cr - 1 Cr - 
3 Meadow (M) 9 1 5 Cn $9 3 Cn $7 1 Cn $5 
4 Meadow (M) 9 1 5 Cn $10 3 Cn $8 1 Cn $6 
5 Crop (Cr) 9 1 5 Cn $11 3 Cn $8 1 Cn $7 
6 Meadow (M) 9 1 5 F $2 3 F $8 1 F $9 
7 Concrete (Cn) 9 1 5 M $4 3 M $7 1 M $10 
8 Concrete (Cn) 9 1 5 Cr $5 3 Cr $8 1 Cr $9 
9 Crop (Cr) 9 1 5 M $7 3 M $10 1 M $12 
10 Meadow (M) 9 1 5 F $1 3 F $10 1 F $15 
 
Figure B- 1 depicts the flood damage from peak flows at the control point. The segmented 
red line represents a rough convexification of the damage function. The convexification 
ensures participants who desire to increase peak flows will face increasing prices, but 
prices and allocations could be far from the optimum. 
 
Figure B- 1 Hypothetical flood damage cost related to peak flow. Levee 1 limits up to 70 
m
3
/time, and levee 2 limits the exceeding peak flow up to 265 m
3
/time. 
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Consider an extreme situation with a single storm scenario. The current flood condition 
under this scenario has an exceeding peak flow of 218 m
3
/time at the flooding area with 
damage of $44,545.9. The market model includes SOS2 conditions. 
Participant 2 might have strategic power if he/she has knowledge of the flood damage 
and flow levels. The participant could bid high enough to raise the exceeding peak flow 
above 219 m
3
/time; but pay only $0.09, while flooding increased to 220.16 m
3
/time and the 
damage increased by $454.4 to $45,000.3. The difference would be assumed by the SO or 
by society. This externality could be observed across several scenarios when flooding has 
similar conditions. 
Extending modelling flood damage with SOS2 conditions, suppose the SO uses five 
storm scenarios, which all produce flood problems. The fifth scenario increases flood 
intensity, but does not change the stage-flood time. Probabilities of storm scenarios are 0.5, 
0.3, 0.1, 0.07 and 0.03. The initial expected flood damage is $30,049.9. Assume 
participants have the preferences of the previous example, and participant 2 bids high 
enough to increase their IC and to change the flood distribution. At the end, participant 2 
pays $903.8 and changes 9 ha to “crop”. The expected flood damage increases by $949.2 
and the difference between the payment and the increment in the expected damage, $45.4, 
would be assumed by the SO or society. 
Modelling flood damage by convexification 
The SO could convexify the flood damage as a way to force a revenue target. (Alternative 
convexification will be discussed in the next sections.) Convexifying the flood damage 
cost as illustrated in Figure B- 1, the estimated initial expected damage is $26,034.3 rather 
than $30,049.9. The SO could be aware of it, and may accept the differences in the 
estimated expected damage, but he/she may be more concerned about the change in 
damage rather than the estimated damage. Under this new damage approximation, if 
participant 2 offers a high price to increase imperviousness, after clearing the market, the 
final damage is $26,253.7 and the total payment to the SO is $632.6. Notice that without 
convexification and using the SOS2, the damage increases by $949.2. 
B.2 Approximations to the flood costs function 
Section 4.10 showed that convex approximations to the flood damage and linearisation 
with non-convex approximation produce different allocations, prices and SO revenue. In 
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some cases, low, middle and upper bound convex approximations could produce final trade 
and prices that may encourage increasing or reducing the impervious levels in the 
catchment. A low bound approximation could signal participants to increase IC 
allowances, and upper bound to reduce them. The approximations also affect the SO extra 
rent in expectancy. 
Figure B- 2 illustrates cost approximations with over and under damage estimation in 
two scenarios. Over and under estimation could correspond to upper and lower bound 
approximations in a storm scenario respectively. In scenario M1, assuming A is the real 
flood damage, and A’ the estimated damage, any increase in IC would produce a marginal 
increase in runoff and damage. The clearing price will become '
A  being 
'
A A  , and this 
price accounts for the marginal changes in flood damage. However, in underestimating 
damage such as A” (lower bound approximation), prices will be lower "
A A   and 
coincide with a rent neutrality for the SO in the scenario. 
 
Figure B- 2 Estimated flood damage; M1 and M2 are flood damage approximations with 
two flooding levels. 
 
In scenario M2, though the total damage B’ is greater than the real damage B, the price '
B  
is lower than the marginal damage 
B . In M2, the SO will be a net extra payer, and 
probably the final cost would not be paid by those participants who are producing the 
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damage in this scenario. Approximation B’’ implies that marginal flood changes prices 
"
B B  . Paradoxically, the marginal damage (price) would be higher than the real 
marginal damage B, and so the SO could be a net payer in B’’ scenario. However, as was 
stated in previous chapters, the changes in expected damage could be convex. 
Section B.2.1 illustrates a flood damage cost, where different convexifications produce 
different price effects and allocations; thus, the final IC in the catchment may be higher or 
lower at the end. Section B.2.2 extends linearised convexification. 
B.2.1 Example flood damage approximations 
This example considers a hypothetical small catchment with ten participants. Table B- 2 
presents their preferences for increasing or reducing IC allowances. Each participant has 
10 ha, but their demand and supply prices are different from the previous example (see 
Table B- 1), because we desire to stress effects of convexification, revenue and extra rents 
for the SO. 
The market model uses nine storm scenarios, and the damage function is related to 
maximum peak. The flood area has three levees, with exceeding peak flows 110, 160 and 
210 m
3
/time. Figure B- 3 illustrates the damage function and the approximations (low, 
middle and upper bounds). Storm probabilities are 0.35, 0.2, 0.15, 0.2, 0.07, 0.05, 0.04, 
0.03 and 0.01 and all these storm scenarios produce flood problems. 
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Figure B- 3 Flood damage cost and four approximations 
 
We use the linearised and non-convex damage function and participant’s preferences in 
Table B- 2. After clearing the market, the catchment becomes impervious and the flood 
distribution is shifted (Table B- 4 and Table B- 5). The expected flood damage rises by 
$59.11 (A-B). Figure B- 4 illustrates the different final flooding with the approximation. 
 
Table B- 2 Participants’ preferences 
Particip. Initial IC 
Initial 
trading 
area 
(ha) 
Impact 
at 
control 
point 
Option 1  Option 2 Option 3 
ha IC $/ha ha IC $/ha ha IC $/ha 
1 Forest (F) 9 1 5 M $6 3 M $5 1 M $4 
2 Meadow (M) 9 1 5 Cr $15 3 Cr $12 1 Cr $10 
3 Meadow (M) 9 1 5 Cn $15 3 Cn $12 1 Cn $8 
4 Meadow (M) 9 1 5 Cn $14 3 Cn $12 1 Cn $10 
5 Crop (Cr) 9 1 5 Cn $11 3 Cn $8 1 Cn $7 
6 Meadow (M) 9 1 5 F $10 3 F $11 1 F $12 
7 Concrete (Cn) 9 1 5 M $15 3 M $16 1 M $18 
8 Concrete (Cn) 9 1 5 Cr $12 3 Cr $13 1 Cr $15 
9 Crop (Cr) 9 1 5 M $7 3 M $10 1 M $12 
10 Meadow (M) 9 1 5 F $5 3 F $10 1 F $15 
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Figure B- 4 Flood damage and final damage after trading. Dotted colour points correspond 
to the final flood damage reached in a particular storm scenario after trading with the 
different approximations. 
 
Using the lower bound approximation, the catchment becomes more impervious 
comparing to previous outcome’s approximation (linearised). The expected damage 
increased by $187.45 with the approximation. The real damage rose by $186.34 (see Table 
B- 3). (The real damage corresponds to the damage estimates with the non-convex damage 
function under the final IC allowances.) With the upper approximation, the expected 
damage would be reduced by $423.62 and the equivalent expected damage (E) by only 
$154.97. However, the SO faces different revenue (C) and extra rent (D). 
With the linearised non-convex damage function, the SO allows increasing IC 
allowances and receives $73.43, of which $14.31 is extra rent due to the linearisation. 
With the lower bound approximation, the SO again allows increasing IC allowances 
and receives $192.715, of which $5.26 is extra rent due to the approximation. 
With the middle approximations, the SO is a net payer, reduces IC allowances, and 
pays $126.26. Comparing to the equivalent real reducing damage, the equivalent real 
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expected damage is reduced by only $58.11. The SO receives an extra rent almost zero 
($0.65) due to the middle approximation. 
With the upper bound 2 approximation, the SO reduces IC allowances and pays 
$426.52, of which $2.9 is extra rent payment given approximation. However, the estimated 
expected damage is reduced by $423.62. In addition, the SO pays more than the equivalent 
real reducing damage by $2,106.99  $1,952.01 = $154.97. 
 
Table B- 3 Expected damage, payment and extra rent of the SO 
 
Linearised 
flooding 
function ($) 
Lower 
bound 
approx ($) 
Middle 
approx ($) 
Upper 
bound 1 
approx ($) 
Upper 
bound 2 
approx ($) 
Initial expected damage  $2,106.99 (A) $1,661.04 $2,020.26 $2,341.98 $2,927.72 
Final expected damage (B) 
$2,166.10 $1,848.49 $1,893.35 $2,133.00 $2,504.10 
Difference (A-B) $59.11 $187.45 -$126.91 -$208.98 -$423.62 
Payment SO (C) -$73.425 -$192.715 $126.264 $201.797 $426.523 
Extra rent (D) $14.31 $5.26 $0.65 $7.19 -$2.90 
Final equivalent real expected 
damage (E) 
  
$2,293.33 $2,048.88 $2,023.46 $1,952.01 
Difference (A-E)   $186.34 -$58.11 -$83.53 -$154.97 
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Table B- 4 Trading and final payment under different flood damage approximation and participant 2 demands with a low price 
Part. 
Initial 
area 
(ha) 
Area to 
trade 
(ha) 
Linearised damage Lower bound approx Middle approx Upper bound approx 1 Upper bound approx 2 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold 
(ha) 
Payment 
($) 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold 
(ha) 
Payment 
($) 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold 
(ha) 
Payment 
($) 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold 
(ha) 
Payment 
($) 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold 
(ha) 
Payment 
($) 
1 10 9 9 0 $33.58 9 0 $32.66 8 0 $33.47 8 0 $39.82 5 0 $28.78 
2 10 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 10 9 2.67 0 $40.11 5 0 $72.79 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 10 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 10 9 0 0 0 5 0 $54.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 10 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 -$1.97 
7 10 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 -$34.24 0 9 -$179.68 0 9 -$207.80 
8 10 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 -$3.041 0 8.19 -$122.82 0 9 -$156.15 
9 10 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 10 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 -$28.78 
Total 100 90 11.67 0 $0 19 0 $0 8 13 0 8 17.1
9 
0 5 31 -28.78 
 
Table B- 5 Trading and final payment under different flood damage approximation and participant 2 demands with a high price 
Part. 
Initial 
area 
(ha) 
Area to 
trade 
(ha) 
Linearised damage Lower bound approx Middle approx Upper bound approx 1 Upper bound approx 2 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold 
(ha) 
Payment 
($) 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold 
(ha) 
Payment 
($) 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold 
(ha) 
Payment 
($) 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold 
(ha) 
Payment 
($) 
Area 
bought 
(ha) 
Area 
sold 
(ha) 
Payment 
($) 
1 10 9 9 0 $33.58 9 0 $32.66 8 0 $33.47 8 0 $37.34 4.10 0 $24.62 
2 10 9 9 0 $33.48 9 0 $32.57 9 0 $37.55 9 0 $41.88 9 0 $53.79 
3 10 9 0.42 0 $6.36 5 0 $72.79 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 10 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 10 9 0 0 0 5 0 $54.67 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 10 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 -$95.81 
7 10 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 -$134.24 0 9 -$168.49 0 9 -$216.45 
8 10 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 -$63.04 0 8 -$112.54 0 9 -$162.67 
9 10 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
10 10 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 -$30.00 
Total 100 90 18.42 0 $0 28 0 $0 17 13 0 17 17 0 13.1 31 -30 
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Consider the extreme storm events and their relation with the scenario selections in Figure 
B- 3. When a linearised but non-convex function is used to model flood damage, the 
damage almost does not change above flow level 300 m
3
/time. For instance, in scenario 9, 
the peak flow reaches 303.75 m
3
/time with an estimated flood damage $6,031.2, and 
probable damage is 0.01*$6,031.2 =$60.31. The clearing value is $0.0833/area m
3
/time, 
almost zero in the scenario. Thus, any scenario more extreme than scenario 9 would not 
significantly change damage, so the marginal damage would be almost zero. Consequently, 
any probable marginal damage would be lower, and the dual would be lower and close to 
zero. So the SO should evaluate this condition to decide which storm scenarios should be 
included to reduce computational time and avoid possible issues with dimensionality. 
B.2.2 Extending convexification 
We can extend the convexification previously analysed to allow rent neutrality. To do this, 
we fit the linear damage function with lower and upper bounds, and a middle linear 
(average) approximation. The final revenue for the SO will still depend on the market 
strength. Figure B- 5 shows these damage function approximations for the previous 
example. 
 
Figure B- 5 Lower, middle and upper linear flood damage cost approximation 
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The initial condition of expected damage is $2,106.99. With the approximations, the 
expected damages are $1,616.26, $2,530.35 and $2,991.38 for the lower, middle and upper 
linear approximations. Keeping assumptions about participants’ preferences, catchment 
conditions and storm probabilities, a final trade is as follows: 
- Lower bound approximation: Participants 1-5 change IC allowance level, each participant 
changes 9 ha and pays $17, $17, $68, $68 and $51 respectively. The final expected damage 
increases to $1,838.7 by $222.44 and the SO receives $222.44. The SO is a net receiver 
due to selling flood capacity at the control point and does not receive any extra rent for 
convexification. The final expected real damage is $2,547.5. 
- Middle bound approximation: Participants 1-5 change IC allowance level in 9, 9, 8, 8 and 
5 ha, paying $26.67, $26.62, $95.27, $95.27 and $44.75 respectively. The final expected 
damage increases to $2,818.95 by $288.6 and the SO receives $288.6. The SO is a net 
receiver, having sold flood capacity at the control point. The final expected real damage is 
$2,483.75. 
- Upper bound approximation: Participants 1, 2, 3 and 5 change IC allowance in 9, 9, 5, 
and 5 ha and the payment is $31.53, $31.47, $70.4 and $52.91 respectively. The final 
expected damage increases to $3,177.7 by $186.31, and the SO receives $186.31. The SO 
is a net receiver, having sold flood capacity at the control point. The final expected real 
damage is $2,298.4. 
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Appendix C 
 
This appendix presents the data used for the illustration in chapter 7. Any additional data could be asked to the author. 
Appendix C.1 Impervious condition from participants 
Table C- 1 Initial and desired conditions of participants A1 to A6 in the subcatchment A 
Initial condition 
subcatchment 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6  
Desired condition 
subcatchment 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 
Area (ha) 167.39 167.39 167.39 167.39 167.39 167.39 Area (ha) 167.39 167.39 167.39 167.39 167.39 167.39 
IC (CN) 85 85 85 80 74 74 IC (CN) 80 80 80 74 80 80 
Hydraulic length (m) 1293.77 1293.77 1293.77 1293.77 1293.77 1293.77 Hydraulic length (m) 1293.77 1293.77 1293.77 1293.77 1293.77 1293.77 
Av. Slope (m/m) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 Av. Slope (m/m) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Imperviousness (%) 65 65 65 65 9 9 Imperviousness (%) 60 60 60 60 9 9 
SCS Lag Time (hrs) 14.28 14.28 14.28 16.85 20.13 20.13 SCS Lag Time (hrs) 16.85 16.85 16.85 20.13 16.85 16.85 
 
Table C- 2 Initial and desired conditions of participants B1 to B6 in the subcatchment B 
Initial condition 
subcatchment 
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6  
Desired condition 
subcatchment 
B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 
Area (ha) 83.33 83.33 83.33 83.33 83.33 83.33 Area (ha) 83.33 83.33 83.33 83.33 83.33 83.33 
IC (CN) 78 82 75 78 80 80 IC (CN) 74 80 74 70 85 85 
Hydraulic length (m) 912.87 912.87 912.87 912.87 912.87 912.87 Hydraulic length (m) 912.87 912.87 912.87 912.87 912.87 912.87 
Av. Slope (m/m) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 Av. Slope (m/m) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Imperviousness (%) 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 Imperviousness (%) 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 
SCS Lag Time (hrs) 13.55 11.96 14.80 13.55 12.74 12.74 SCS Lag Time (hrs) 15.23 12.74 15.23 17.01 10.81 10.81 
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Table C- 3 Initial and desired conditions of participants C1 to C6 in the subcatchment C 
Initial condition 
subcatchment 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6  
Desired condition 
subcatchment 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 
Area (ha) 514.99 514.99 514.99 514.99 514.99 514.99 Area (ha) 514.99 514.99 514.99 514.99 514.99 514.99 
IC (CN) 53 78 53 53 74 74 IC (CN) 60 60 60 60 60 50 
Hydraulic length (m) 2269.34 2269.34 2269.34 2269.34 2269.34 2269.34 Hydraulic length (m) 2269.34 2269.34 2269.34 2269.34 2269.34 2269.34 
Av. Slope (m/m) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 Av. Slope (m/m) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Imperviousness (%) 5 9 5 5 9 9 Imperviousness (%) 5 9 5 5 9 9 
SCS Lag Time (hrs) 54.55 28.08 54.55 54.55 31.55 31.55 SCS Lag Time (hrs) 45.72 45.72 45.72 45.72 45.72 58.86 
 
Table C- 4 Initial and desired conditions of participants D1 to D6 in the subcatchment D 
Initial condition 
subcatchment 
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6  
Final condition 
subcatchment 
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 
Area (ha) 612.83 612.83 612.83 612.83 612.83 612.83  Area (ha) 612.83 612.83 612.83 612.83 612.83 612.83 
IC (CN) 78 53 53 47 47 78 IC (CN) 80 53 70 53 60 60 
Hydraulic length (m) 2475.55 2475.55 2475.55 2475.55 2475.55 2475.55 Hydraulic length (m) 2475.55 1984.30 3426.40 2475.55 3087.23 1787.16 
Av. Slope (m/m) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 Av. Slope (m/m) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Imperviousness (%) 65 5 5 5 5 65 Imperviousness (%) 65 5 5 5 5 65 
SCS Lag Time (hrs) 30.10 58.49 58.49 68.15 68.15 30.10 SCS Lag Time (hrs) 28.31 49 49 58.49 58.48 37.77 
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Appendix C.2 
This section presents the node points for the flood damage cost approximations at control 
points. The cost is related to the exceeding peak flows at control points. The linear 
convexified cost function corresponds to an approximation to the total damage function 
rather than approximations for each scenario. 
 
Control point A 
Linear non-convex Linear convexified 
Node 
(flow) 
Damage 
($/m
3
/sec) 
Node 
(flow) 
Damage 
($/m
3
/sec) 
0 0 0 0 
5 9,643.8 5 5,977.4 
10 30,369.1 10 17,932.1 
15 60,645.4 15 35,864.2 
20 120,434.0 20 59,773.6 
25 156,664.0 25 89,660.4 
30 171,822.0 30 125,525.0 
35 195,660.0 35 167,366.0 
40 194,654.0 40 215,185.0 
45 196,807.0 45 268,981.0 
46.5 197,136.0 46.5 286,913.0 
Control point AB 
Linear non-convex Linear convexified 
Node 
(flow) 
Damage 
($/m
3
/sec) 
Node 
(flow) 
Damage 
($/m
3
/sec) 
0 0 0 0 
5 5,415.4 5 4,659.0 
10 19,564.0 10 18,196.4 
15 47,366.2 15 55,833.7 
20 95,628.5 20 112,912.0 
25 178,890.0 25 189,431.0 
30 290,865.0 30 285,391.0 
35 455,820.0 35 400,792.0 
40 511,314.0 40 535,634.0 
42 528,914.0 42 601,235.0 
 
 
Control point ABC 
Linear non-convex Linear convexified 
Node 
(flow) 
Damage 
($/m
3
/sec) 
Node 
(flow) 
Damage 
($/m
3
/sec) 
0 0 0 0 
5 6,261.8 5 4,294.5 
10 17,257.1 10 12,883.5 
15 33,503.8 15 25,767.0 
20 55,089.7 20 42,945.1 
25 91,664.2 25 64,417.6 
30 110,024.0 30 90,184.6 
35 117,303.0 35 120,246.0 
40 129,951.0 40 154,602.0 
42 135,292.0 42 170,921.0 
 
 
 
 
Control point D 
Linear non-convex Linear convexified 
Node 
(flow) 
Damage 
($/m
3
/sec) 
Node 
(flow) 
Damage 
($/m
3
/sec) 
0 0 0 0 
5 1,300.9 5 3,397.1 
10 3,902.6 10 7,866.9 
15 7,805.1 15 13,868.8 
20 13,008.5 20 20,445.9 
25 19,512.7 25 29,224.1 
30 27,317.8 30 34,575.3 
35 36,423.8 35 38,161.2 
40 46,830.6 40 42,523.1 
45 58,538.2 45 47,111.2 
45.5 59,839.0 45.5 47,631.0 
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Control point ABCD 
Linear non-convex Linear convexified 
Node 
(flow) 
Damage 
($/m
3
/sec) 
Node 
(flow) 
Damage 
($/m
3
/sec) 
0 0 0 0 
5 2,007.9 5 4,328.7 
10 6,023.8 10 11,290.8 
15 12,047.5 15 20,219.8 
20 20,079.2 20 30,941.0 
25 30,118.8 25 46,405.0 
30 42,166.3 30 50,971.1 
35 56,221.8 35 54,659.8 
40 72,285.2 40 59,289.1 
42.5 81,521.6 42.5 61,817.0 
 
 
Appendix C.3 Flood damage related to peak flow at control points 
Control point A Control point AB 
Control point 
ABC 
Control point D 
Control point 
ABCD 
Flow 
(m
3
) 
Damage 
($/m
3
/sec) 
Flow 
(m
3
) 
Damage 
($/m
3
/sec) 
Flow 
(m
3
) 
Damage 
($/m
3
/sec) 
Flow 
(m
3
) 
Damage 
($/m
3
/sec) 
Flow 
(m
3
) 
Damage 
($/m
3
/sec) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
1.5 0 1.5 0 1.5 0 1.5 0 1.5 0 
2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 
2.5 0 2.5 0 2.5 0 2.5 0 2.5 0 
3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 
3.5 0 3.5 0 3.5 0 3.5 0 3.5 0 
4 359 4 0 4 0 4 0 4 0 
4.5 1,126 4.5 0 4.5 0 4.5 0 4.5 0 
5 1,938 5 0 5 0 5 314 5 0 
5.5 2,842 5.5 0 5.5 0 5.5 631 5.5 0 
6 3,859 6 0 6 0 6 936 6 0 
6.5 5,008 6.5 0 6.5 0 6.5 1,246 6.5 0 
7 6,310 7 0 7 0 7 1,482 7 0 
7.5 7,828 7.5 0 7.5 0 7.5 1,994 7.5 0 
8 9,326 8 0 8 0 8 2,377 8 161 
8.5 10,861 8.5 488 8.5 518 8.5 2,756 8.5 724 
9 12,454 9 947 9 1,136 9 3,137 9 1,192 
9.5 14,119 9.5 1,422 9.5 1,504 9.5 3,523 9.5 1,644 
10 15,863 10 1,931 10 2,315 10 3,916 10 2,097 
10.5 17,696 10.5 2,485 10.5 2,928 10.5 4,317 10.5 2,559 
11 19,622 11 3,089 11 3,569 11 4,728 11 3,035 
11.5 21,649 11.5 3,749 11.5 4,242 11.5 5,148 11.5 3,526 
12 23,782 12 4,471 12 4,952 12 5,580 12 4,036 
12.5 26,027 12.5 5,261 12.5 5,749 12.5 6,023 12.5 4,567 
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13 28,390 13 6,124 13 6,963 13 6,479 13 5,118 
13.5 30,876 13.5 7,066 13.5 7,403 13.5 6,947 13.5 5,693 
14 33,491 14 8,092 14 8,420 14 7,429 14 6,293 
14.5 36,242 14.5 9,210 14.5 9,457 14.5 7,963 14.5 6,918 
15 39,134 15 10,426 15 10,523 15 8,507 15 7,669 
15.5 42,173 15.5 11,746 15.5 11,622 15.5 9,090 15.5 8,420 
16 45,367 16 13,180 16 12,758 16 9,672 16 9,172 
16.5 48,721 16.5 15,496 16.5 13,934 16.5 10,256 16.5 9,933 
17 52,243 17 19,086 17 15,152 17 10,845 17 10,704 
17.5 55,939 17.5 18,239 17.5 16,414 17.5 11,439 17.5 11,489 
18 59,817 18 20,289 18 17,724 18 12,040 18 12,289 
18.5 63,884 18.5 22,509 18.5 19,082 18.5 12,648 18.5 13,104 
19 68,147 19 24,845 19 20,491 19 13,265 19 13,937 
19.5 72,616 19.5 27,312 19.5 21,952 19.5 13,890 19.5 14,788 
20 77,299 20 29,919 20 23,468 20 14,524 20 15,659 
20.5 82,202 20.5 32,676 20.5 25,040 20.5 15,168 20.5 16,549 
21 87,336 21 35,593 21 26,671 21 15,822 21 17,460 
21.5 92,709 21.5 38,677 21.5 28,362 21.5 16,486 21.5 18,392 
22 98,332 22 41,939 22 30,115 22 17,161 22 19,346 
22.5 104,212 22.5 45,388 22.5 31,934 22.5 17,847 22.5 20,323 
23 110,361 23 49,033 23 33,818 23 18,544 23 21,324 
23.5 116,791 23.5 52,884 23.5 35,771 23.5 19,253 23.5 22,348 
24 123,508 24 56,952 24 37,795 24 19,974 24 23,397 
24.5 130,526 24.5 61,246 24.5 39,891 24.5 20,707 24.5 24,471 
25 137,855 25 65,779 25 42,063 25 21,452 25 25,571 
25.5 144,602 25.5 70,560 25.5 44,312 25.5 22,210 25.5 26,697 
26 145,890 26 75,602 26 46,641 26 22,979 26 27,850 
26.5 147,233 26.5 80,918 26.5 49,052 26.5 23,765 26.5 29,032 
27 148,634 27 86,519 27 51,547 27 24,563 27 30,241 
27.5 150,096 27.5 92,420 27.5 54,129 27.5 25,374 27.5 31,480 
28 151,621 28 98,634 28 56,801 28 26,199 28 32,748 
28.5 153,209 28.5 105,176 28.5 59,565 28.5 27,041 28.5 34,046 
29 154,865 29 112,058 29 62,424 29 27,904 29 35,374 
29.5 156,591 29.5 119,300 29.5 65,380 29.5 28,766 29.5 36,735 
30 158,389 30 126,915 30 68,437 30 29,629 30 38,128 
30.5 160,262 30.5 134,919 30.5 71,597 30.5 31,207 30.5 39,553 
31 162,232 31 143,333 31 74,862 31 31,593 31 41,011 
31.5 164,260 31.5 152,171 31.5 78,238 31.5 31,978 31.5 42,504 
32 166,323 32 164,187 32 81,724 32 32,361 32 44,031 
32.5 168,430 32.5 171,136 32.5 85,326 32.5 32,744 32.5 47,236 
33 170,586 33 180,980 33 89,046 33 33,127 33 47,581 
33.5 172,793 33.5 191,051 33.5 92,889 33.5 33,512 33.5 47,927 
34 175,055 34 201,390 34 100,018 34 33,897 34 48,273 
34.5 177,374 34.5 212,027 34.5 102,204 34.5 34,284 34.5 48,623 
35 179,752 35 222,975 35 103,029 35 34,672 35 48,975 
35.5 182,191 35.5 234,256 35.5 103,858 35.5 35,062 35.5 49,330 
36 184,694 36 245,890 36 104,697 36 35,454 36 49,689 
36.5 187,262 36.5 257,881 36.5 105,547 36.5 35,848 36.5 50,052 
37 189,897 37 270,253 37 106,409 37 36,245 37 50,419 
37.5 193,778 37.5 283,012 37.5 107,285 37.5 36,644 37.5 50,790 
38 193,876 38 296,171 38 108,176 38 37,045 38 51,166 
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38.5 193,978 38.5 309,750 38.5 109,083 38.5 37,449 38.5 51,546 
39 194,082 39 323,758 39 110,005 39 37,856 39 51,931 
39.5 194,188 39.5 338,213 39.5 110,944 39.5 38,266 39.5 52,321 
40 194,298 40 353,118 40 111,900 40 38,678 40 52,716 
40.5 194,410 40.5 368,493 40.5 112,873 40.5 39,094 40.5 53,116 
41 194,525 41 384,359 41 113,865 41 39,512 41 53,521 
41.5 194,644 41.5 400,713 41.5 114,876 41.5 39,933 41.5 53,931 
42 194,765 42 417,587 42 115,905 42 40,358 42 54,347 
42.5 194,889 42.5 434,980 42.5 116,953 42.5 40,786 42.5 54,769 
43 195,017 43 452,926 43 118,022 43 41,217 43 55,196 
43.5 195,148 43.5 471,203 43.5 119,110 43.5 41,652 43.5 55,628 
44 195,282 44 474,693 44 120,220 44 42,090 44 56,067 
44.5 195,420 44.5 478,321 44.5 121,351 44.5 42,532 44.5 56,511 
45 195,561 45 482,090 45 122,502 45 42,976 45 56,962 
45.5 195,706 45.5 486,010 45.5 123,676 45.5 43,425 45.5 57,419 
46 195,854 46 490,081 46 124,872 46 43,877 46 57,881 
46.5 196,006 46.5 494,311 46.5 126,091 46.5 44,333 46.5 58,350 
47 196,162 47 498,706 47 127,333 47 44,793 47 58,826 
47.5 196,322 47.5 503,269 47.5 128,597 47.5 45,256 47.5 59,308 
48 196,486 48 508,008 48 129,888 48 45,723 48 59,796 
48.5 196,654 48.5 512,929 48.5 131,202 48.5 46,194 48.5 60,291 
49 196,826 49 518,031 49 132,541 49 46,670 49 60,793 
49.5 197,002 49.5 523,331 49.5 133,904 49.5 47,148 49.5 61,301 
50 197,183 50 528,828 50 135,294 50 47,631 50 61,817 
 
 
Appendix C.4 Peak flow and depth levels at different sections at control points 
Nomenclature uses in the tables. 
ht = Depth at the centre of the channel (m). 
hc1 = Bank depth at the right side of the channel (m). 
hc2 = Bank depth at the left side of the channel (m). 
hl1 = Depth at the left side in the first flood section (m). 
hl2 = Depth at the left side in the second flood section (m). 
hl3 = Depth at the left side in the third flood section (m). 
hr1 = Depth at the right side in the first flood section (m). 
hr2 = Depth at the right side in the second flood section (m). 
hr3 = Depth at the right side in the third flood section (m). 
 
Control point A: peak flow and flood depth at sections 
Flow 
(m
3
) 
ht 
(m) 
hc1 
(m) 
hc2 
(m) 
hl1 
(m) 
hr1 
(m) 
hl2 
(m) 
hr2 
(m) 
hl3 
(m) 
hr3 
(m) 
0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.5 0.255 0.255 0.255 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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1 0.390 0.390 0.390 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 0.501 0.501 0.501 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 0.600 0.600 0.600 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2.5 0.691 0.691 0.691 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3 0.775 0.775 0.775 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3.5 0.855 0.855 0.855 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4 0.920 0.920 0.900 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4.5 0.951 0.951 0.900 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5 0.975 0.975 0.900 0.000 0.075 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5.5 0.997 0.997 0.900 0.000 0.097 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
6 1.016 1.016 0.900 0.000 0.116 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
6.5 1.033 1.033 0.900 0.000 0.133 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
7 1.050 1.050 0.900 0.000 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
7.5 1.064 1.064 0.900 0.000 0.164 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 
8 1.076 1.076 0.900 0.000 0.176 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.000 
8.5 1.086 1.086 0.900 0.000 0.186 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.000 
9 1.096 1.096 0.900 0.000 0.196 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.000 
9.5 1.105 1.105 0.900 0.000 0.205 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.000 
10 1.114 1.114 0.900 0.000 0.214 0.000 0.064 0.000 0.000 
10.5 1.123 1.123 0.900 0.000 0.223 0.000 0.073 0.000 0.000 
11 1.131 1.131 0.900 0.000 0.231 0.000 0.081 0.000 0.000 
11.5 1.139 1.139 0.900 0.000 0.239 0.000 0.089 0.000 0.000 
12 1.146 1.146 0.900 0.000 0.246 0.000 0.096 0.000 0.000 
12.5 1.153 1.153 0.900 0.000 0.253 0.000 0.103 0.000 0.000 
13 1.160 1.160 0.900 0.000 0.260 0.000 0.110 0.000 0.000 
13.5 1.167 1.167 0.900 0.000 0.267 0.000 0.117 0.000 0.000 
14 1.174 1.174 0.900 0.000 0.274 0.000 0.124 0.000 0.000 
14.5 1.181 1.181 0.900 0.000 0.281 0.000 0.131 0.000 0.000 
15 1.187 1.187 0.900 0.000 0.287 0.000 0.137 0.000 0.000 
15.5 1.194 1.194 0.900 0.000 0.294 0.000 0.144 0.000 0.000 
16 1.200 1.200 0.900 0.000 0.300 0.000 0.150 0.000 0.000 
16.5 1.206 1.206 0.900 0.000 0.306 0.000 0.156 0.000 0.000 
17 1.212 1.212 0.900 0.000 0.312 0.000 0.162 0.000 0.000 
17.5 1.218 1.218 0.900 0.000 0.318 0.000 0.168 0.000 0.000 
18 1.224 1.224 0.900 0.000 0.324 0.000 0.174 0.000 0.000 
18.5 1.229 1.229 0.900 0.000 0.329 0.000 0.179 0.000 0.000 
19 1.235 1.235 0.900 0.000 0.335 0.000 0.185 0.000 0.000 
19.5 1.240 1.240 0.900 0.000 0.340 0.000 0.190 0.000 0.000 
20 1.246 1.246 0.900 0.000 0.346 0.000 0.196 0.000 0.000 
20.5 1.251 1.251 0.900 0.000 0.351 0.000 0.201 0.000 0.000 
21 1.257 1.257 0.900 0.000 0.357 0.000 0.207 0.000 0.000 
21.5 1.262 1.262 0.900 0.000 0.362 0.000 0.212 0.000 0.000 
22 1.267 1.267 0.900 0.000 0.367 0.000 0.217 0.000 0.000 
22.5 1.272 1.272 0.900 0.000 0.372 0.000 0.222 0.000 0.000 
23 1.277 1.277 0.900 0.000 0.377 0.000 0.227 0.000 0.000 
23.5 1.282 1.282 0.900 0.000 0.382 0.000 0.232 0.000 0.000 
24 1.287 1.287 0.900 0.000 0.387 0.000 0.237 0.000 0.000 
24.5 1.292 1.292 0.900 0.000 0.392 0.000 0.242 0.000 0.000 
25 1.297 1.297 0.900 0.000 0.397 0.000 0.247 0.000 0.000 
25.5 1.302 1.302 0.900 0.000 0.402 0.000 0.252 0.000 0.000 
26 1.307 1.307 0.900 0.000 0.407 0.000 0.257 0.000 0.000 
26.5 1.311 1.311 0.900 0.000 0.411 0.000 0.261 0.000 0.000 
27 1.316 1.316 0.900 0.000 0.416 0.000 0.266 0.000 0.000 
27.5 1.321 1.321 0.900 0.000 0.421 0.000 0.271 0.000 0.000 
28 1.325 1.325 0.900 0.000 0.425 0.000 0.275 0.000 0.000 
28.5 1.330 1.330 0.900 0.000 0.430 0.000 0.280 0.000 0.000 
  
 
302 
29 1.334 1.334 0.900 0.000 0.434 0.000 0.284 0.000 0.000 
29.5 1.339 1.339 0.900 0.000 0.439 0.000 0.289 0.000 0.000 
30 1.343 1.343 0.900 0.000 0.443 0.000 0.293 0.000 0.000 
30.5 1.348 1.348 0.900 0.000 0.448 0.000 0.298 0.000 0.000 
31 1.352 1.352 0.900 0.000 0.452 0.000 0.302 0.000 0.002 
31.5 1.356 1.356 0.900 0.000 0.456 0.000 0.306 0.000 0.006 
32 1.360 1.360 0.900 0.000 0.460 0.000 0.310 0.000 0.010 
32.5 1.364 1.364 0.900 0.000 0.464 0.000 0.314 0.000 0.014 
33 1.368 1.368 0.900 0.000 0.468 0.000 0.318 0.000 0.018 
33.5 1.372 1.372 0.900 0.000 0.472 0.000 0.322 0.000 0.022 
34 1.376 1.376 0.900 0.000 0.476 0.000 0.326 0.000 0.026 
34.5 1.379 1.379 0.900 0.000 0.479 0.000 0.329 0.000 0.029 
35 1.383 1.383 0.900 0.000 0.483 0.000 0.333 0.000 0.033 
35.5 1.387 1.387 0.900 0.000 0.487 0.000 0.337 0.000 0.037 
36 1.390 1.390 0.900 0.000 0.490 0.000 0.340 0.000 0.040 
36.5 1.394 1.394 0.900 0.000 0.494 0.000 0.344 0.000 0.044 
37 1.397 1.397 0.900 0.000 0.497 0.000 0.347 0.000 0.047 
37.5 1.400 1.400 0.900 0.000 0.500 0.000 0.350 0.000 0.050 
38 1.404 1.404 0.900 0.000 0.504 0.000 0.354 0.000 0.054 
38.5 1.407 1.407 0.900 0.000 0.507 0.000 0.357 0.000 0.057 
39 1.410 1.410 0.900 0.000 0.510 0.000 0.360 0.000 0.060 
39.5 1.414 1.414 0.900 0.000 0.514 0.000 0.364 0.000 0.064 
40 1.417 1.417 0.900 0.000 0.517 0.000 0.367 0.000 0.067 
40.5 1.420 1.420 0.900 0.000 0.520 0.000 0.370 0.000 0.070 
41 1.423 1.423 0.900 0.000 0.523 0.000 0.373 0.000 0.073 
41.5 1.426 1.426 0.900 0.000 0.526 0.000 0.376 0.000 0.076 
42 1.430 1.430 0.900 0.000 0.530 0.000 0.380 0.000 0.080 
42.5 1.433 1.433 0.900 0.000 0.533 0.000 0.383 0.000 0.083 
43 1.436 1.436 0.900 0.000 0.536 0.000 0.386 0.000 0.086 
43.5 1.439 1.439 0.900 0.000 0.539 0.000 0.389 0.000 0.089 
44 1.442 1.442 0.900 0.000 0.542 0.000 0.392 0.000 0.092 
44.5 1.445 1.445 0.900 0.000 0.545 0.000 0.395 0.000 0.095 
45 1.448 1.448 0.900 0.000 0.548 0.000 0.398 0.000 0.098 
45.5 1.451 1.451 0.900 0.000 0.551 0.000 0.401 0.000 0.101 
46 1.454 1.454 0.900 0.000 0.554 0.000 0.404 0.000 0.104 
46.5 1.457 1.457 0.900 0.000 0.557 0.000 0.407 0.000 0.107 
47 1.459 1.459 0.900 0.000 0.559 0.000 0.409 0.000 0.109 
47.5 1.462 1.462 0.900 0.000 0.562 0.000 0.412 0.000 0.112 
48 1.465 1.465 0.900 0.000 0.565 0.000 0.415 0.000 0.115 
48.5 1.468 1.468 0.900 0.000 0.568 0.000 0.418 0.000 0.118 
49 1.471 1.471 0.900 0.000 0.571 0.000 0.421 0.000 0.121 
49.5 1.474 1.474 0.900 0.000 0.574 0.000 0.424 0.000 0.124 
50 1.476 1.476 0.900 0.000 0.576 0.000 0.426 0.000 0.126 
 
 
Control point AB: peak flow and flood depth at sections 
Flow 
(m
3
) 
ht 
(m) 
hc1 
(m) 
hc2 
(m) 
hl1 
(m) 
hr1 
(m) 
hl2 
(m) 
hr2 
(m) 
hl3 
(m) 
hr3 
(m) 
0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.5 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 0.452 0.452 0.452 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 0.583 0.583 0.583 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 0.699 0.699 0.699 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2.5 0.807 0.807 0.807 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3 0.908 0.908 0.908 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
 
303 
3.5 1.003 1.003 1.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4 1.095 1.095 1.095 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4.5 1.183 1.183 1.183 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5 1.269 1.269 1.269 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5.5 1.352 1.352 1.352 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
6 1.433 1.433 1.433 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
6.5 1.512 1.512 1.512 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
7 1.590 1.590 1.590 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
7.5 1.666 1.666 1.666 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
8 1.741 1.741 1.741 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
8.5 1.770 1.750 1.770 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
9 1.783 1.750 1.783 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
9.5 1.794 1.750 1.794 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
10 1.804 1.750 1.804 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
10.5 1.812 1.750 1.812 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
11 1.820 1.750 1.820 0.070 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
11.5 1.828 1.750 1.828 0.078 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
12 1.835 1.750 1.835 0.085 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
12.5 1.842 1.750 1.842 0.092 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
13 1.848 1.750 1.848 0.098 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
13.5 1.854 1.750 1.854 0.104 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
14 1.860 1.750 1.860 0.110 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
14.5 1.866 1.750 1.866 0.116 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
15 1.872 1.750 1.872 0.122 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
15.5 1.877 1.750 1.877 0.127 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
16 1.883 1.750 1.883 0.133 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
16.5 1.890 1.624 1.675 0.140 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
17 1.900 1.750 1.900 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
17.5 1.898 1.750 1.898 0.148 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
18 1.903 1.750 1.903 0.153 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
18.5 1.907 1.750 1.907 0.157 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 
19 1.912 1.750 1.912 0.162 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 
19.5 1.916 1.750 1.916 0.166 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 
20 1.920 1.750 1.920 0.170 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 
20.5 1.924 1.750 1.924 0.174 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.000 
21 1.928 1.750 1.928 0.178 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 
21.5 1.932 1.750 1.932 0.182 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 
22 1.935 1.750 1.935 0.185 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000 
22.5 1.939 1.750 1.939 0.189 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.000 
23 1.943 1.750 1.943 0.193 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.000 
23.5 1.946 1.750 1.946 0.196 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.000 
24 1.950 1.750 1.950 0.200 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000 
24.5 1.953 1.750 1.953 0.203 0.000 0.053 0.000 0.000 0.000 
25 1.956 1.750 1.956 0.206 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.000 
25.5 1.960 1.750 1.960 0.210 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.000 
26 1.963 1.750 1.963 0.213 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.000 0.000 
26.5 1.966 1.750 1.966 0.216 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.000 
27 1.969 1.750 1.969 0.219 0.000 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.000 
27.5 1.973 1.750 1.973 0.223 0.000 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.000 
28 1.976 1.750 1.976 0.226 0.000 0.076 0.000 0.000 0.000 
28.5 1.979 1.750 1.979 0.229 0.000 0.079 0.000 0.000 0.000 
29 1.982 1.750 1.982 0.232 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.000 0.000 
29.5 1.985 1.750 1.985 0.235 0.000 0.085 0.000 0.000 0.000 
30 1.988 1.750 1.988 0.238 0.000 0.088 0.000 0.000 0.000 
30.5 1.991 1.750 1.991 0.241 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.000 
31 1.993 1.750 1.993 0.243 0.000 0.093 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
 
304 
31.5 1.996 1.750 1.996 0.246 0.000 0.096 0.000 0.000 0.000 
32 2.000 1.750 2.000 0.250 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 
32.5 2.002 1.750 2.002 0.252 0.000 0.102 0.000 0.002 0.000 
33 2.005 1.750 2.005 0.255 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.005 0.000 
33.5 2.007 1.750 2.007 0.257 0.000 0.107 0.000 0.007 0.000 
34 2.010 1.750 2.010 0.260 0.000 0.110 0.000 0.010 0.000 
34.5 2.012 1.750 2.012 0.262 0.000 0.112 0.000 0.012 0.000 
35 2.015 1.750 2.015 0.265 0.000 0.115 0.000 0.015 0.000 
35.5 2.017 1.750 2.017 0.267 0.000 0.117 0.000 0.017 0.000 
36 2.019 1.750 2.019 0.269 0.000 0.119 0.000 0.019 0.000 
36.5 2.021 1.750 2.021 0.271 0.000 0.121 0.000 0.021 0.000 
37 2.024 1.750 2.024 0.274 0.000 0.124 0.000 0.024 0.000 
37.5 2.026 1.750 2.026 0.276 0.000 0.126 0.000 0.026 0.000 
38 2.028 1.750 2.028 0.278 0.000 0.128 0.000 0.028 0.000 
38.5 2.030 1.750 2.030 0.280 0.000 0.130 0.000 0.030 0.000 
39 2.032 1.750 2.032 0.282 0.000 0.132 0.000 0.032 0.000 
39.5 2.034 1.750 2.034 0.284 0.000 0.134 0.000 0.034 0.000 
40 2.036 1.750 2.036 0.286 0.000 0.136 0.000 0.036 0.000 
40.5 2.038 1.750 2.038 0.288 0.000 0.138 0.000 0.038 0.000 
41 2.040 1.750 2.040 0.290 0.000 0.140 0.000 0.040 0.000 
41.5 2.042 1.750 2.042 0.292 0.000 0.142 0.000 0.042 0.000 
42 2.044 1.750 2.044 0.294 0.000 0.144 0.000 0.044 0.000 
42.5 2.046 1.750 2.046 0.296 0.000 0.146 0.000 0.046 0.000 
43 2.048 1.750 2.048 0.298 0.000 0.148 0.000 0.048 0.000 
43.5 2.050 1.750 2.050 0.300 0.000 0.150 0.000 0.050 0.000 
44 2.052 1.750 2.052 0.302 0.000 0.152 0.000 0.052 0.000 
44.5 2.054 1.750 2.054 0.304 0.000 0.154 0.000 0.054 0.000 
45 2.056 1.750 2.056 0.306 0.000 0.156 0.000 0.056 0.000 
45.5 2.058 1.750 2.058 0.308 0.000 0.158 0.000 0.058 0.000 
46 2.059 1.750 2.059 0.309 0.000 0.159 0.000 0.059 0.000 
46.5 2.061 1.750 2.061 0.311 0.000 0.161 0.000 0.061 0.000 
47 2.063 1.750 2.063 0.313 0.000 0.163 0.000 0.063 0.000 
47.5 2.065 1.750 2.065 0.315 0.000 0.165 0.000 0.065 0.000 
48 2.067 1.750 2.067 0.317 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.067 0.000 
48.5 2.068 1.750 2.068 0.318 0.000 0.168 0.000 0.068 0.000 
49 2.070 1.750 2.070 0.320 0.000 0.170 0.000 0.070 0.000 
49.5 2.072 1.750 2.072 0.322 0.000 0.172 0.000 0.072 0.000 
50 2.074 1.750 2.074 0.324 0.000 0.174 0.000 0.074 0.000 
 
Control point ABC: peak flow and flood depth at sections 
Flow 
(m
3
) 
ht 
(m) 
hc1 
(m) 
hc2 
(m) 
hl1 
(m) 
hr1 
(m) 
hl2 
(m) 
hr2 
(m) 
hl3 
(m) 
hr3 
(m) 
0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.5 0.294 0.294 0.294 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 0.452 0.452 0.452 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 0.583 0.583 0.583 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 0.699 0.699 0.699 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2.5 0.807 0.807 0.807 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3 0.908 0.908 0.908 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3.5 1.003 1.003 1.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4 1.095 1.095 1.095 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4.5 1.183 1.183 1.183 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5 1.269 1.269 1.269 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5.5 1.352 1.352 1.352 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
 
305 
6 1.433 1.433 1.433 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
6.5 1.512 1.512 1.512 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
7 1.590 1.590 1.590 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
7.5 1.666 1.666 1.666 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
8 1.741 1.741 1.741 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
8.5 1.785 1.770 1.785 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
9 1.800 1.770 1.800 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
9.5 1.807 1.618 1.589 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
10 1.821 1.770 1.821 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
10.5 1.830 1.770 1.830 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
11 1.838 1.770 1.838 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
11.5 1.846 1.770 1.846 0.076 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
12 1.853 1.770 1.853 0.083 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
12.5 1.860 1.638 1.640 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
13 1.870 1.770 1.870 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
13.5 1.873 1.770 1.873 0.103 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
14 1.878 1.770 1.878 0.108 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 
14.5 1.884 1.770 1.884 0.114 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 
15 1.889 1.770 1.889 0.119 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 
15.5 1.894 1.770 1.894 0.124 0.000 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.000 
16 1.898 1.770 1.898 0.128 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 
16.5 1.903 1.770 1.903 0.133 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 
17 1.907 1.770 1.907 0.137 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 
17.5 1.911 1.770 1.911 0.141 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.000 
18 1.916 1.770 1.916 0.146 0.000 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.000 
18.5 1.920 1.770 1.920 0.150 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.000 0.000 
19 1.924 1.770 1.924 0.154 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.000 
19.5 1.927 1.770 1.927 0.157 0.000 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.000 
20 1.931 1.770 1.931 0.161 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.000 0.000 
20.5 1.935 1.770 1.935 0.165 0.000 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.000 
21 1.939 1.770 1.939 0.169 0.000 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.000 
21.5 1.942 1.770 1.942 0.172 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.000 
22 1.946 1.770 1.946 0.176 0.000 0.076 0.000 0.000 0.000 
22.5 1.949 1.770 1.949 0.179 0.000 0.079 0.000 0.000 0.000 
23 1.953 1.770 1.953 0.183 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.000 0.000 
23.5 1.956 1.770 1.956 0.186 0.000 0.086 0.000 0.000 0.000 
24 1.959 1.770 1.959 0.189 0.000 0.089 0.000 0.000 0.000 
24.5 1.962 1.770 1.962 0.192 0.000 0.092 0.000 0.000 0.000 
25 1.966 1.770 1.966 0.196 0.000 0.096 0.000 0.000 0.000 
25.5 1.969 1.770 1.969 0.199 0.000 0.099 0.000 0.000 0.000 
26 1.972 1.770 1.972 0.202 0.000 0.102 0.000 0.000 0.000 
26.5 1.975 1.770 1.975 0.205 0.000 0.105 0.000 0.000 0.000 
27 1.978 1.770 1.978 0.208 0.000 0.108 0.000 0.000 0.000 
27.5 1.981 1.770 1.981 0.211 0.000 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.000 
28 1.984 1.770 1.984 0.214 0.000 0.114 0.000 0.000 0.000 
28.5 1.987 1.770 1.987 0.217 0.000 0.117 0.000 0.000 0.000 
29 1.990 1.770 1.990 0.220 0.000 0.120 0.000 0.000 0.000 
29.5 1.993 1.770 1.993 0.223 0.000 0.123 0.000 0.000 0.000 
30 1.996 1.770 1.996 0.226 0.000 0.126 0.000 0.000 0.000 
30.5 1.999 1.770 1.999 0.229 0.000 0.129 0.000 0.000 0.000 
31 2.002 1.770 2.002 0.232 0.000 0.132 0.000 0.000 0.000 
31.5 2.004 1.770 2.004 0.234 0.000 0.134 0.000 0.000 0.000 
32 2.007 1.770 2.007 0.237 0.000 0.137 0.000 0.000 0.000 
32.5 2.010 1.770 2.010 0.240 0.000 0.140 0.000 0.000 0.000 
33 2.013 1.770 2.013 0.243 0.000 0.143 0.000 0.000 0.000 
33.5 2.015 1.770 2.015 0.245 0.000 0.145 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
 
306 
34 2.020 1.770 2.020 0.250 0.000 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.000 
34.5 2.021 1.770 2.021 0.251 0.000 0.151 0.000 0.001 0.000 
35 2.023 1.770 2.023 0.253 0.000 0.153 0.000 0.003 0.000 
35.5 2.026 1.770 2.026 0.256 0.000 0.156 0.000 0.006 0.000 
36 2.028 1.770 2.028 0.258 0.000 0.158 0.000 0.008 0.000 
36.5 2.030 1.770 2.030 0.260 0.000 0.160 0.000 0.010 0.000 
37 2.033 1.770 2.033 0.263 0.000 0.163 0.000 0.013 0.000 
37.5 2.035 1.770 2.035 0.265 0.000 0.165 0.000 0.015 0.000 
38 2.037 1.770 2.037 0.267 0.000 0.167 0.000 0.017 0.000 
38.5 2.039 1.770 2.039 0.269 0.000 0.169 0.000 0.019 0.000 
39 2.042 1.770 2.042 0.272 0.000 0.172 0.000 0.022 0.000 
39.5 2.044 1.770 2.044 0.274 0.000 0.174 0.000 0.024 0.000 
40 2.046 1.770 2.046 0.276 0.000 0.176 0.000 0.026 0.000 
40.5 2.048 1.770 2.048 0.278 0.000 0.178 0.000 0.028 0.000 
41 2.050 1.770 2.050 0.280 0.000 0.180 0.000 0.030 0.000 
41.5 2.052 1.770 2.052 0.282 0.000 0.182 0.000 0.032 0.000 
42 2.054 1.770 2.054 0.284 0.000 0.184 0.000 0.034 0.000 
42.5 2.056 1.770 2.056 0.286 0.000 0.186 0.000 0.036 0.000 
43 2.058 1.770 2.058 0.288 0.000 0.188 0.000 0.038 0.000 
43.5 2.060 1.770 2.060 0.290 0.000 0.190 0.000 0.040 0.000 
44 2.062 1.770 2.062 0.292 0.000 0.192 0.000 0.042 0.000 
44.5 2.064 1.770 2.064 0.294 0.000 0.194 0.000 0.044 0.000 
45 2.065 1.770 2.065 0.295 0.000 0.195 0.000 0.045 0.000 
45.5 2.067 1.770 2.067 0.297 0.000 0.197 0.000 0.047 0.000 
46 2.069 1.770 2.069 0.299 0.000 0.199 0.000 0.049 0.000 
46.5 2.071 1.770 2.071 0.301 0.000 0.201 0.000 0.051 0.000 
47 2.073 1.770 2.073 0.303 0.000 0.203 0.000 0.053 0.000 
47.5 2.075 1.770 2.075 0.305 0.000 0.205 0.000 0.055 0.000 
48 2.076 1.770 2.076 0.306 0.000 0.206 0.000 0.056 0.000 
48.5 2.078 1.770 2.078 0.308 0.000 0.208 0.000 0.058 0.000 
49 2.080 1.770 2.080 0.310 0.000 0.210 0.000 0.060 0.000 
49.5 2.082 1.770 2.082 0.312 0.000 0.212 0.000 0.062 0.000 
50 2.083 1.770 2.083 0.313 0.000 0.213 0.000 0.063 0.000 
 
Control point D: peak flow and flood depth at sections 
Flow 
(m
3
) 
ht 
(m) 
hc1 
(m) 
hc2 
(m) 
hl1 
(m) 
hr1 
(m) 
hl2 
(m) 
hr2 
(m) 
hl3 
(m) 
hr3 
(m) 
0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.5 0.412 0.412 0.412 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 0.639 0.639 0.639 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 0.830 0.830 0.830 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 1.002 1.002 1.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2.5 1.162 1.162 1.162 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3 1.313 1.313 1.313 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3.5 1.457 1.457 1.457 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4 1.596 1.596 1.596 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4.5 1.731 1.731 1.731 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5 1.795 1.795 1.768 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5.5 1.816 1.816 1.768 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
6 1.834 1.834 1.768 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
6.5 1.848 1.848 1.768 0.000 0.081 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
7 1.858 1.858 1.750 0.000 0.091 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
7.5 1.872 1.858 1.768 0.014 0.105 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
8 1.881 1.858 1.768 0.023 0.114 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
 
307 
8.5 1.890 1.858 1.768 0.031 0.122 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
9 1.897 1.858 1.768 0.039 0.130 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
9.5 1.905 1.858 1.768 0.046 0.137 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
10 1.911 1.858 1.768 0.053 0.144 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
10.5 1.918 1.858 1.768 0.060 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
11 1.924 1.858 1.768 0.066 0.157 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
11.5 1.930 1.858 1.768 0.072 0.163 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
12 1.936 1.858 1.768 0.078 0.169 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
12.5 1.942 1.858 1.768 0.083 0.174 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
13 1.947 1.858 1.768 0.089 0.180 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
13.5 1.953 1.858 1.768 0.094 0.185 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
14 1.958 1.858 1.768 0.100 0.191 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
14.5 1.963 1.858 1.768 0.105 0.196 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 
15 1.968 1.858 1.768 0.109 0.200 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 
15.5 1.972 1.858 1.768 0.114 0.205 0.014 0.005 0.000 0.000 
16 1.977 1.858 1.768 0.118 0.209 0.018 0.009 0.000 0.000 
16.5 1.981 1.858 1.768 0.123 0.213 0.023 0.013 0.000 0.000 
17 1.985 1.858 1.768 0.127 0.218 0.027 0.017 0.000 0.000 
17.5 1.989 1.858 1.768 0.131 0.221 0.031 0.021 0.000 0.000 
18 1.993 1.858 1.768 0.134 0.225 0.034 0.025 0.000 0.000 
18.5 1.996 1.858 1.768 0.138 0.229 0.038 0.029 0.000 0.000 
19 2.000 1.858 1.768 0.142 0.233 0.042 0.033 0.000 0.000 
19.5 2.004 1.858 1.768 0.145 0.236 0.045 0.036 0.000 0.000 
20 2.007 1.858 1.768 0.149 0.240 0.049 0.040 0.000 0.000 
20.5 2.011 1.858 1.768 0.152 0.243 0.052 0.043 0.000 0.000 
21 2.014 1.858 1.768 0.156 0.246 0.056 0.046 0.000 0.000 
21.5 2.017 1.858 1.768 0.159 0.250 0.059 0.050 0.000 0.000 
22 2.020 1.858 1.768 0.162 0.253 0.062 0.053 0.000 0.000 
22.5 2.024 1.858 1.768 0.165 0.256 0.065 0.056 0.000 0.000 
23 2.027 1.858 1.768 0.168 0.259 0.068 0.059 0.000 0.000 
23.5 2.030 1.858 1.768 0.171 0.262 0.071 0.062 0.000 0.000 
24 2.033 1.858 1.768 0.175 0.265 0.075 0.065 0.000 0.000 
24.5 2.036 1.858 1.768 0.178 0.268 0.078 0.068 0.000 0.000 
25 2.039 1.858 1.768 0.181 0.271 0.081 0.071 0.000 0.000 
25.5 2.042 1.858 1.768 0.183 0.274 0.083 0.074 0.000 0.000 
26 2.045 1.858 1.768 0.186 0.277 0.086 0.077 0.000 0.000 
26.5 2.048 1.858 1.768 0.189 0.280 0.089 0.080 0.000 0.000 
27 2.050 1.858 1.768 0.192 0.283 0.092 0.083 0.000 0.000 
27.5 2.053 1.858 1.768 0.195 0.286 0.095 0.086 0.000 0.000 
28 2.056 1.858 1.768 0.198 0.289 0.098 0.089 0.000 0.000 
28.5 2.059 1.858 1.768 0.200 0.291 0.100 0.091 0.000 0.000 
29 2.061 1.858 1.768 0.203 0.294 0.103 0.094 0.003 0.000 
29.5 2.064 1.858 1.768 0.206 0.296 0.106 0.096 0.006 0.000 
30 2.067 1.858 1.768 0.208 0.299 0.108 0.099 0.008 0.000 
30.5 2.069 1.858 1.768 0.211 0.301 0.111 0.101 0.011 0.001 
31 2.071 1.858 1.768 0.213 0.304 0.113 0.104 0.013 0.004 
31.5 2.074 1.858 1.768 0.215 0.306 0.115 0.106 0.015 0.006 
32 2.076 1.858 1.768 0.217 0.308 0.117 0.108 0.017 0.008 
32.5 2.078 1.858 1.768 0.220 0.311 0.120 0.111 0.020 0.011 
33 2.080 1.858 1.768 0.222 0.313 0.122 0.113 0.022 0.013 
33.5 2.082 1.858 1.768 0.224 0.315 0.124 0.115 0.024 0.015 
34 2.084 1.858 1.768 0.226 0.317 0.126 0.117 0.026 0.017 
34.5 2.086 1.858 1.768 0.228 0.319 0.128 0.119 0.028 0.019 
35 2.088 1.858 1.768 0.230 0.321 0.130 0.121 0.030 0.021 
35.5 2.090 1.858 1.768 0.232 0.323 0.132 0.123 0.032 0.023 
36 2.092 1.858 1.768 0.234 0.325 0.134 0.125 0.034 0.025 
  
 
308 
36.5 2.094 1.858 1.768 0.236 0.327 0.136 0.127 0.036 0.027 
37 2.096 1.858 1.768 0.238 0.329 0.138 0.129 0.038 0.029 
37.5 2.098 1.858 1.768 0.240 0.331 0.140 0.131 0.040 0.031 
38 2.100 1.858 1.768 0.241 0.332 0.141 0.132 0.041 0.032 
38.5 2.102 1.858 1.768 0.243 0.334 0.143 0.134 0.043 0.034 
39 2.104 1.858 1.768 0.245 0.336 0.145 0.136 0.045 0.036 
39.5 2.105 1.858 1.768 0.247 0.338 0.147 0.138 0.047 0.038 
40 2.107 1.858 1.768 0.249 0.340 0.149 0.140 0.049 0.040 
40.5 2.109 1.858 1.768 0.250 0.341 0.150 0.141 0.050 0.041 
41 2.111 1.858 1.768 0.252 0.343 0.152 0.143 0.052 0.043 
41.5 2.112 1.858 1.768 0.254 0.345 0.154 0.145 0.054 0.045 
42 2.114 1.858 1.768 0.256 0.346 0.156 0.146 0.056 0.046 
42.5 2.116 1.858 1.768 0.257 0.348 0.157 0.148 0.057 0.048 
43 2.117 1.858 1.768 0.259 0.350 0.159 0.150 0.059 0.050 
43.5 2.119 1.858 1.768 0.261 0.351 0.161 0.151 0.061 0.051 
44 2.121 1.858 1.768 0.262 0.353 0.162 0.153 0.062 0.053 
44.5 2.122 1.858 1.768 0.264 0.355 0.164 0.155 0.064 0.055 
45 2.124 1.858 1.768 0.265 0.356 0.165 0.156 0.065 0.056 
45.5 2.125 1.858 1.768 0.267 0.358 0.167 0.158 0.067 0.058 
46 2.127 1.858 1.768 0.269 0.359 0.169 0.159 0.069 0.059 
46.5 2.129 1.858 1.768 0.270 0.361 0.170 0.161 0.070 0.061 
47 2.130 1.858 1.768 0.272 0.363 0.172 0.163 0.072 0.063 
47.5 2.132 1.858 1.768 0.273 0.364 0.173 0.164 0.073 0.064 
48 2.133 1.858 1.768 0.275 0.366 0.175 0.166 0.075 0.066 
48.5 2.135 1.858 1.768 0.276 0.367 0.176 0.167 0.076 0.067 
49 2.136 1.858 1.768 0.278 0.369 0.178 0.169 0.078 0.069 
49.5 2.138 1.858 1.768 0.279 0.370 0.179 0.170 0.079 0.070 
50 2.139 1.858 1.768 0.281 0.372 0.181 0.172 0.081 0.072 
 
Control point ABCD: peak flow and flood depth at sections 
Flow 
(m
3
) 
ht 
(m) 
hc1 
(m) 
hc2 
(m) 
hl1 
(m) 
hr1 
(m) 
hl2 
(m) 
hr2 
(m) 
hl3 
(m) 
hr3 
(m) 
0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.5 0.291 0.291 0.291 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1 0.445 0.445 0.445 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1.5 0.572 0.572 0.572 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 0.685 0.685 0.685 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2.5 0.788 0.788 0.788 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3 0.884 0.884 0.884 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
3.5 0.974 0.974 0.974 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4 1.061 1.061 1.061 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4.5 1.144 1.144 1.144 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5 1.224 1.224 1.224 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5.5 1.302 1.302 1.302 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
6 1.377 1.377 1.377 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
6.5 1.450 1.450 1.450 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
7 1.522 1.522 1.522 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
7.5 1.592 1.592 1.592 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
8 1.655 1.650 1.650 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
8.5 1.671 1.650 1.650 0.021 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
9 1.681 1.650 1.650 0.031 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
9.5 1.690 1.650 1.650 0.040 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
10 1.698 1.650 1.650 0.048 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
10.5 1.705 1.650 1.650 0.055 0.055 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
 
309 
11 1.712 1.650 1.650 0.062 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
11.5 1.718 1.650 1.650 0.068 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
12 1.724 1.650 1.650 0.074 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
12.5 1.729 1.650 1.650 0.079 0.079 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
13 1.735 1.650 1.650 0.085 0.085 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
13.5 1.740 1.650 1.650 0.090 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
14 1.745 1.650 1.650 0.095 0.095 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
14.5 1.750 1.650 1.650 0.100 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
15 1.754 1.650 1.650 0.104 0.104 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.000 
15.5 1.758 1.650 1.650 0.108 0.108 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.000 
16 1.762 1.650 1.650 0.112 0.112 0.012 0.012 0.000 0.000 
16.5 1.766 1.650 1.650 0.116 0.116 0.016 0.016 0.000 0.000 
17 1.770 1.650 1.650 0.120 0.120 0.020 0.020 0.000 0.000 
17.5 1.773 1.650 1.650 0.123 0.123 0.023 0.023 0.000 0.000 
18 1.776 1.650 1.650 0.126 0.126 0.026 0.026 0.000 0.000 
18.5 1.780 1.650 1.650 0.130 0.130 0.030 0.030 0.000 0.000 
19 1.783 1.650 1.650 0.133 0.133 0.033 0.033 0.000 0.000 
19.5 1.786 1.650 1.650 0.136 0.136 0.036 0.036 0.000 0.000 
20 1.789 1.650 1.650 0.139 0.139 0.039 0.039 0.000 0.000 
20.5 1.792 1.650 1.650 0.142 0.142 0.042 0.042 0.000 0.000 
21 1.795 1.650 1.650 0.145 0.145 0.045 0.045 0.000 0.000 
21.5 1.798 1.650 1.650 0.148 0.148 0.048 0.048 0.000 0.000 
22 1.800 1.650 1.650 0.150 0.150 0.050 0.050 0.000 0.000 
22.5 1.803 1.650 1.650 0.153 0.153 0.053 0.053 0.000 0.000 
23 1.806 1.650 1.650 0.156 0.156 0.056 0.056 0.000 0.000 
23.5 1.808 1.650 1.650 0.158 0.158 0.058 0.058 0.000 0.000 
24 1.811 1.650 1.650 0.161 0.161 0.061 0.061 0.000 0.000 
24.5 1.814 1.650 1.650 0.164 0.164 0.064 0.064 0.000 0.000 
25 1.816 1.650 1.650 0.166 0.166 0.066 0.066 0.000 0.000 
25.5 1.819 1.650 1.650 0.169 0.169 0.069 0.069 0.000 0.000 
26 1.821 1.650 1.650 0.171 0.171 0.071 0.071 0.000 0.000 
26.5 1.824 1.650 1.650 0.174 0.174 0.074 0.074 0.000 0.000 
27 1.826 1.650 1.650 0.176 0.176 0.076 0.076 0.000 0.000 
27.5 1.828 1.650 1.650 0.178 0.178 0.078 0.078 0.000 0.000 
28 1.831 1.650 1.650 0.181 0.181 0.081 0.081 0.000 0.000 
28.5 1.833 1.650 1.650 0.183 0.183 0.083 0.083 0.000 0.000 
29 1.835 1.650 1.650 0.185 0.185 0.085 0.085 0.000 0.000 
29.5 1.838 1.650 1.650 0.188 0.188 0.088 0.088 0.000 0.000 
30 1.840 1.650 1.650 0.190 0.190 0.090 0.090 0.000 0.000 
30.5 1.842 1.650 1.650 0.192 0.192 0.092 0.092 0.000 0.000 
31 1.844 1.650 1.650 0.194 0.194 0.094 0.094 0.000 0.000 
31.5 1.846 1.650 1.650 0.196 0.196 0.096 0.096 0.000 0.000 
32 1.848 1.650 1.650 0.198 0.198 0.098 0.098 0.000 0.000 
32.5 1.851 1.650 1.650 0.201 0.201 0.101 0.101 0.001 0.001 
33 1.853 1.650 1.650 0.203 0.203 0.103 0.103 0.003 0.003 
33.5 1.855 1.650 1.650 0.205 0.205 0.105 0.105 0.005 0.005 
34 1.857 1.650 1.650 0.207 0.207 0.107 0.107 0.007 0.007 
34.5 1.858 1.650 1.650 0.208 0.208 0.108 0.108 0.008 0.008 
35 1.860 1.650 1.650 0.210 0.210 0.110 0.110 0.010 0.010 
35.5 1.862 1.650 1.650 0.212 0.212 0.112 0.112 0.012 0.012 
36 1.864 1.650 1.650 0.214 0.214 0.114 0.114 0.014 0.014 
36.5 1.866 1.650 1.650 0.216 0.216 0.116 0.116 0.016 0.016 
37 1.867 1.650 1.650 0.217 0.217 0.117 0.117 0.017 0.017 
37.5 1.869 1.650 1.650 0.219 0.219 0.119 0.119 0.019 0.019 
38 1.871 1.650 1.650 0.221 0.221 0.121 0.121 0.021 0.021 
38.5 1.873 1.650 1.650 0.223 0.223 0.123 0.123 0.023 0.023 
  
 
310 
39 1.874 1.650 1.650 0.224 0.224 0.124 0.124 0.024 0.024 
39.5 1.876 1.650 1.650 0.226 0.226 0.126 0.126 0.026 0.026 
40 1.877 1.650 1.650 0.227 0.227 0.127 0.127 0.027 0.027 
40.5 1.879 1.650 1.650 0.229 0.229 0.129 0.129 0.029 0.029 
41 1.881 1.650 1.650 0.231 0.231 0.131 0.131 0.031 0.031 
41.5 1.882 1.650 1.650 0.232 0.232 0.132 0.132 0.032 0.032 
42 1.884 1.650 1.650 0.234 0.234 0.134 0.134 0.034 0.034 
42.5 1.885 1.650 1.650 0.235 0.235 0.135 0.135 0.035 0.035 
43 1.887 1.650 1.650 0.237 0.237 0.137 0.137 0.037 0.037 
43.5 1.888 1.650 1.650 0.238 0.238 0.138 0.138 0.038 0.038 
44 1.890 1.650 1.650 0.240 0.240 0.140 0.140 0.040 0.040 
44.5 1.891 1.650 1.650 0.241 0.241 0.141 0.141 0.041 0.041 
45 1.893 1.650 1.650 0.243 0.243 0.143 0.143 0.043 0.043 
45.5 1.894 1.650 1.650 0.244 0.244 0.144 0.144 0.044 0.044 
46 1.896 1.650 1.650 0.246 0.246 0.146 0.146 0.046 0.046 
46.5 1.897 1.650 1.650 0.247 0.247 0.147 0.147 0.047 0.047 
47 1.898 1.650 1.650 0.248 0.248 0.148 0.148 0.048 0.048 
47.5 1.900 1.650 1.650 0.250 0.250 0.150 0.150 0.050 0.050 
48 1.901 1.650 1.650 0.251 0.251 0.151 0.151 0.051 0.051 
48.5 1.903 1.650 1.650 0.253 0.253 0.153 0.153 0.053 0.053 
49 1.904 1.650 1.650 0.254 0.254 0.154 0.154 0.054 0.054 
49.5 1.905 1.650 1.650 0.255 0.255 0.155 0.155 0.055 0.055 
50 1.907 1.650 1.650 0.257 0.257 0.157 0.157 0.057 0.057 
 
